Science &#38; Consciousness Review

Read the rest of the article.

Editor’s note: The goal of computational neuroscience is to understand the brain and its mechanisms well enough to artificially simulate their functions. In some areas, like hearing, vision, and prosthetics, there have been great advances in the field. Yet there is still much about the brain that is unknown and therefore cannot be artificially replicated: How does the brain use language, make complex associations, or organize learned experiences? Once the neural pathways responsible for these and many other functions are fully understood and reconstructed, researchers will have the ability to build systems that can match—and maybe even exceed—the brain’s capabilities.

“If I cannot build it, I do not understand it.” So said Nobel laureate Richard Feynman, and by his metric, we understand a bit about physics, less about chemistry, and almost nothing about biology.¹

When we fully understand a phenomenon, we can specify its entire sequence of events, causes, and effects so completely that it is possible to fully simulate it, with all its internal mechanisms intact. Achieving that level of understanding is rare. It is commensurate with constructing a full design for a machine that could serve as a stand-in for the thing being studied. To understand a phenomenon sufficiently to fully simulate it is to understand it computationally.

“Computation” does not refer to computers per se; rather it refers to the underlying principles and methods that make them work. As Turing Award recipient Edsger Dijkstra said, computational science “is no more about computers than astronomy is about telescopes.”² Computational science is the study of the hidden rules underlying complex phenomena from physics to psychology.

Computational neuroscience, then, has the aim of understanding brains sufficiently well to be able to simulate their functions, thereby subsuming the twin goals of science and engineering: deeply understanding the inner workings of our brains, and being able to construct simulacra of them. As simple robots today substitute for human physical abilities, in settings from factories to hospitals, so brain engineering will construct stand-ins for our mental abilities—and possibly even enable us to fix our brains when they break.

Emotional processing in anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex

alice — Fri, 18 Feb 2011 02:28:30 +0000

A. Etkinsend, T. Egner, R. Kalisch
Article in Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Abstract
Negative emotional stimuli activate a broad network of brain regions, including the medial prefrontal (mPFC) and anterior cingulate (ACC) cortices. An early influential view dichotomized these regions into dorsal–caudal cognitive and ventral–rostral affective subdivisions. In this review, we examine a wealth of recent research on negative emotions in animals and humans, using the example of fear or anxiety, and conclude that, contrary to the traditional dichotomy, both subdivisions make key contributions to emotional processing. Specifically, dorsal–caudal regions of the ACC and mPFC are involved in appraisal and expression of negative emotion, whereas ventral–rostral portions of the ACC and mPFC have a regulatory role with respect to limbic regions involved in generating emotional responses. Moreover, this new framework is broadly consistent with emerging data on other negative and positive emotions.

Click here for the full article.

The Brain Signature of Love

alice — Wed, 16 Feb 2011 02:04:15 +0000

Study the literature of the world and you will find one theme that transcends both time and culture: that of love. Whether you are reading Shakespeare or Rumi, the manner in which love is described shows remarkable similarity. Those similarities go far beyond the page: Neuroscientists are now demonstrating that romantic love is also represented by a unique pattern of activation in the brain.

The neuroimaging of love

In the past six years, several groups of researchers have sought to localize romantic love in the brain using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques. Though some have criticized the attempt as nothing more than modern day phrenology, those who seek the neural correlates of love believe it an essential avenue of study.

“The study of love is important so we might bring some rationality to a complex and emotional phenomenon,” says Stephanie Ortigue, a neuroscientist at Syracuse University. “These studies allow scientists to show that love is not a drug or a pathology but something that has a unique signature in the healthy brain.”

Read the entire article.

Brain Awareness Week is Coming

alice — Mon, 14 Feb 2011 20:33:02 +0000

http://consciousness.arizona.edu/TSC2011ConcurrentSessions.htm

March 14-20, 2011 is Brain Awareness Week. Join the global campaign to increase public awareness of the progress and benefits of brain research. Become a partner and plan an event or find an event in your area at Dana.org

Brain Awareness Week (BAW) is the global campaign to increase public awareness about the progress and benefits of brain research. Every March, BAW unites the efforts of universities, hospitals, patient groups, government agencies, schools, service organizations, and professional associations worldwide in a week-long celebration of the brain. Founded and coordinated by the Dana Alliance for Brain Initiatives and European Dana Alliance for the Brain, BAW’s sixteenth annual celebration will take place from March 14-20, 2011.

During BAW, campaign partners organize creative and innovative activities in their communities to educate and excite people of all ages about the brain and brain research. Events are limited only by the organizers’ imaginations. Examples include open days at neuroscience laboratories; museum exhibitions about the brain; lectures on an array of brain-related topics; displays at malls, libraries, and community centers; classroom workshops; and many other activities and programs.

For more information about Brain Awareness Week

Toward a Science of Consciousness Conference 2011: Announcement

alice — Mon, 14 Feb 2011 18:56:04 +0000

Toward a Science of Consciousness
Brain, Mind and Reality

Stockholm, Sweden, May 3-7, 2011

Sponsored by the Center for Consciousness Studies

The University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona

and Mind Event, AB

www.consciousness.arizona.edu

Toward a Science of Consciousness (TSC) is an annual interdisciplinary conference on all aspects of the fundamental question of how the brain produces conscious experience, a question addressing who we are, the nature of reality and our place in the universe. TSC rigorously overs neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, neurobiology, medicine, quantum physics, cosmology, experiential and spiritual approaches to the understanding of conscious awareness.

Since 1994, TSC has alternated between
Tucson, Arizona and various locations around
the world. This year, the 18th Toward a Science
of Consciousness: Brain, Mind and Reality, will
take place May 3-7, 2011 at Aula Magna Hall,
Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden with
pre- and post-conference workshops May 1,2 and 7.

An estimated 500 scientists, philosophers,
psychologists, experientialists, artists, students
and others from more than 60 countries will
participate in hundreds of presentations included
in 14 Plenary or Keynote Sessions, 40 Concurrent
Talk Sessions, 2 Poster Sessions, Art-Tech Demos,
social events and special evening performances.

Details regarding Social Events will be posted soon.

Abstracts for all presentations will be posted at
www.consciousness.arizona.edu and published in a conference book prepared by the Journal of
Consciousness Studies.

Plenary Program Overview:
Plenary and Keynote Sessions will run Tuesday,
May 3 through Saturday, May 7 in the Aula Magna Hall,
8:30 am to 4:10 pm, with breaks. Concurrent talks,
Poster Sessions, Art Exhibits and Social Events
will take place late afternoon and evenings.

Featured Plenary and Keynote Speakers include
esteemed mathematical physicist and author
Sir Roger Penrose, Nobel Laureate Luc Montagnier, and
author, physician and V! edic scholar Deepak Chopra.

On May 2, Deepak Chopra will lead a full day
workshop, Consciousness: The Ultimate Reality
with a special session on Neuroscience of Enlightenment
followed by an early evening public forum at
Aula Magna Hall entitled, Are Science and Spirituality
Incompatible? (Speakers TBA).

In addition to major contributions to cosmology, physics
reality and geometry, Sir Roger Penrose brought
consciousness in a meaningful way into physics,
co-developed a controversial quantum theory of
consciousness, and recently proposed a cyclical,
serial universe. Dr. Luc Montagnier won the 2008
Nobel Prize in Medicine for showing that AIDs is
caused by HIV virus, and has of late reported
controversial evidence for non-local effects in
DNA. Dr. Deepak Ch! opra has applied ancient Vedic
teachings to modern m! edicine, cosmology, consciousness
and spirituality, and written 60 books including
War of the Worldviews with Leonard Mlodinow (also a
plenary speaker, and co-author of Grand Design with
Stephen Hawking).

A full listing of plenary sessions themes, speakers
and brief descriptions are below. The Plenary, Concurrent
and Poster session presenters and abstracts
will be posted on www.consciousness.arizona.edu
Pre-Conference workshops begin on Sunday, May 1 with
a full-day Synesthesia symposium. Also on May 1
will be 2 half-day workshops on Neural Correlates and
Depersonalization; 3 workshops are scheduled for May 7
after the close of the Plenary program: Altered States,
Quantum Biology and an Experiential Workshop on binaural
beat audio-guidance technology.

A full listing of Plenary, Concurrent Sessions, Poster Session Participants
Art-Tech Exhibitors and Workshops can be found at
http://consciousness.arizona.edu/TSC2011PlenaryKeynotesProgram.htm

http://consciousness.arizona.edu/TSC2011Posters.htm

http://consciousness.arizona.edu/TSC2011ArtTechDemos.htm

http://consciousness.arizona.edu/TSC2011WorkshopsALL.htm

http://consciousness.arizona.edu/TSC2011deepakworkshop.htm

For Registration, Lodging and other information, please go to
www.consciousness.arizona.edu

http://consciousness.arizona.edu/TSC2011Hotels.htm

We look forward to seeing you in Stockholm!

Best wishes on behalf of the entire Program Committee.

Vi ser fram emot att träffa dig i Stockholm!
Hälsningar från oss i konferenskommittén

Stuart Hameroff
Christer Perfjell
Abi Be har Montefiore

PLENARY PROGRAM
Aula Magna Hall
Tuesday, May 3, 2011
Plenary 1, 8:30 am to 10:40 am
Brain Electromagnetic Fields and Consciousness
McCormick D, Yale, Endogenous electric fields guide cortical network activity
Pockett S, Auckland, Electromagnetic field theory of consciousness: The shape of conscious fields
McFadden J, Surrey, The continuous electromagnetic information (CEMI) field theory of consciousness
Is the brain’s complex electromagnetic field itself the essence of consciousness?

Plenary 2, 11:10 am to 12:30 pm
Time and Consciousness I
Atmanspacher H, Freiberg, Temporal nonlocality in bistable perception
Gonzalez-Andino S, Geneva, Backward time referral in the amygdala of primates
Since the famous Libet experi! ments, backward time effects have been repeatedly detected in the brain.

Plenary 3, 2:00 pm to 4:10 pm
Consciousness and Reality
Keynote, Chopra D, Chopra Foundation, Vedic approaches to consciousness and reality
Mlodinow L, Pasadena, Grand Design
Zizzi P, Padua, Consciousness in the early universe
Is consciousness intrinsic to the universe, or an after-the-fact illusion?
Wednesday, May 4

Plenary 4, 8:30 am to 10:40 am
Transcranial Therapies
Wassermann E, NIH, Transcranial stimulation and consciousness
Snyder A, Sydney, Accessing information normally beyond conscious awareness by non-invasive brain stimulation
Tyler WJ, Arizona State, Transcranial ultrasound therapy for brain injury
New non-invasive transcranial therapies hold great promise for mind/brain disorders

Plenary 5, 11:10 am to 12:30 pm
Ne! ural cor relates of consciousness I
Malach R, Weizmann, Local neuronal ignitions and the emergence of perceptual awareness
Plenz D, NIH, Neuronal avalanches, coherence potentials, and cooperativity: Dynamical aspects that define mammalian cortex
Highly coherent neuronal brain activities correlate with consciousness.

Plenary 6, 2:00 pm to 4:10 pm
Consciousness and Reality II
Kafatos M, Chapman, Consciousness and the non-local universe
Kallio-Tamminem K,Helsinki, Quantum physics and Eastern philosophy
Pylkkanen P, Helsinki, Bohmian view of consciousness and reality
Consciousness, physics and metaphysics

Thursday, May 5

Plenary 7, 8:30 am to 10:40 am
Varieties of Religious Experience
Beauregard M, Montreal, Neuroscience of transcendent experiences
Moreira-Almeida A, Juiz De F! ora, Differential diagnosis between spiritual experiences and mental disorders
Roberto, Padrinho Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Sacred plants of Amazonia
What exactly is a religious experience?

Plenary 8, 11:10 am to 12:30 pm
Time and consciousness II
Bierman D, Amsterdam, Presentiment
Cerf M, NYU, Time effects in human cortical neuronal firings
Does information go backward-in-time in the brain?

Plenary 9, 2:00 pm to 4:10 pm
Quantum Biology I
Keynote, Luc Montagnier, Nobel Laureate, Pasteur Institute, The transfer of biological information through electromagnetic waves and matter
Vitiello G, Salerno, DNA: On the wave of coherence
Bernroider G and Summerhammer J, Salzburg, Quantum properties in ion channel proteins
Do nonlocal quantum effects mediate function in DNA and ion channel! s?

Thursday Evening
Confererence Dinner Cruise

Friday, May 6

Plenary 10, 8:30 am to 10:40 am
Microtubules
Tuszynski JA, Edmonton, Information processing within dendritic cytoskeleton
Bandyopadhyay A, NIMS, Tsukuba, Direct experimental evidence for quantum states in microtubules and topological invariance
Tanzi R, Harvard, Zinc link between aBeta and microtubule instability in Alzheimer’s disease
Possibilities for microtubule computing and quantum computing, and their role in Alzheimer’s Disease

Plenary 11, 11:10 am to 12:30 pm
Keynote, Sir Roger Penrose, Oxford
Consciousness in the universe

Plenary 12, 2:00 pm to 4:10 pm
Neural correlates of consciousness II
Hesslow G, Lund, The inner world as simulated interaction with the environment
Ehrsson H, Karolinska, How we come to experi! ence that we own our body: The cognitive neuroscience of body self-perception
Ullen F, Karolinska, The psychological flow experience: From phenomenology to biological correlates
At home in the brain with an all-Swedish session

Saturday, May 7

Plenary 13, 8:30 am to 10:40 am
Anesthesia and consciousness
Hudetz A, Milwaukee, Anesthetics and gamma synchrony
Franks N, London, Molecular actions of anesthetics
Hameroff S, Tucson, Meyer-Overton meets quantum physics
How do anesthetic gases selectively and reversibly erase consciousness?

Plenary 14, 11:10 am to 1:20 pm
End of life brain activity
Chawla L, GWU, Surges of electroencephalogram activity at the time of death
Van Lommel P, Amsterdam, Near death experiences: Clinical studies
Fenwick P, London, Death and the loo! sening of consciousness
Does highly c! oherent brain activity measured at the time of death correspond with near-death experiences?

Saturday Evening

End ofConsciousness Party

Contact:
center@u.arizona.edu
info@mindevent.se

conference website:
www.consciousness.arizona.edu

520-621-9317

Trends in Neuroscience: Table of Contents February 2011

alice — Mon, 07 Feb 2011 20:04:58 +0000

The February issue of Trends in Neuroscience is available online

Volume 34, Issue 2, pp. 51-112

Opinion

Review

Feature Review

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion

Tuning of synaptic responses: an organizing principle for optimization of neural circuits p51: Cian O’Donnell, Matthew F. Nolan

Abstract | Full Text | PDF (587 kb)

Review

Feature Review

Learning to move machines with the mind p61: Andrea M. Green, John F. Kalaska

Abstract | Full Text | PDF (1252 kb)

Featured ArticleFree

Astrocyte–neuron metabolic relationships: for better and for worse p76: Igor Allaman, Mireille Bélanger, Pierre J Magistretti

Abstract | Full Text | PDF (2044 kb)

Repairing the parkinsonian brain with neurotrophic factors p88: Liviu Aron, Rüdiger Klein

Abstract | Full Text | PDF (666 kb)

GABA_A,slow: causes and consequences p101: Marco Capogna, Robert A. Pearce

Abstract | Full Text | PDF (699 kb)

Brain Waves and Meditation

alice — Wed, 02 Feb 2011 15:53:57 +0000

From: ScienceDaily.com

Forget about crystals and candles, and about sitting and breathing in awkward ways. Meditation research explores how the brain works when we refrain from concentration, rumination and intentional thinking. Electrical brain waves suggest that mental activity during meditation is wakeful and relaxed.

“Given the popularity and effectiveness of meditation as a means of alleviating stress and maintaining good health, there is a pressing need for a rigorous investigation of how it affects brain function,” says Professor Jim Lagopoulos of Sydney University, Australia. Lagopoulos is the principal investigator of a joint study between his university and researchers from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) on changes in electrical brain activity during nondirective meditation.

Constant brain waves

Whether we are mentally active, resting or asleep, the brain always has some level of electrical activity. The study monitored the frequency and location of electrical brain waves through the use of EEG (electroencephalography). EEG electrodes were placed in standard locations of the scalp using a custom-made hat

Participants were experienced practitioners of Acem Meditation, a nondirective method developed in Norway. They were asked to rest, eyes closed, for 20 minutes, and to meditate for another 20 minutes, in random order. The abundance and location of slow to fast electrical brain waves (delta, theta, alpha, beta) provide a good indication of brain activity.

Relaxed attention with theta

During meditation, theta waves were most abundant in the frontal and middle parts of the brain.

“These types of waves likely originate from a relaxed attention that monitors our inner experiences. Here lies a significant difference between meditation and relaxing without any specific technique,” emphasizes Lagopoulos.

“Previous studies have shown that theta waves indicate deep relaxation and occur more frequently in highly experienced meditation practitioners. The source is probably frontal parts of the brain, which are associated with monitoring of other mental processes.”

“When we measure mental calm, these regions signal to lower parts of the brain, inducing the physical relaxation response that occurs during meditation.”

Silent experiences with alpha

Alpha waves were more abundant in the posterior parts of the brain during meditation than during simple relaxation. They are characteristic of wakeful rest.

“This wave type has been used as a universal sign of relaxation during meditation and other types of rest,” comments Professor Øyvind Ellingsen from NTNU. “The amount of alpha waves increases when the brain relaxes from intentional, goal-oriented tasks.This is a sign of deep relaxation, — but it does not mean that the mind is void.”

Neuroimaging studies byMalia F. Mason and co-workers atDartmouth College, NH, suggest that the normal resting state of the brain is a silent current of thoughts, images and memories that is not induced by sensory input or intentional reasoning, but emerges spontaneously “from within.”

“Spontaneous wandering of the mind is something you become more aware of and familiar with when you meditate,” continues Ellingsen, who is an experienced practitioner. “This default activity of the brain is often underestimated. It probably represents a kind of mental processing that connects various experiences and emotional residues, puts them into perspective and lays them to rest.”

Read the entire article: Brain Waves and Meditation

How Brain Activity is Linked to Sleep

alice — Wed, 26 Jan 2011 15:32:24 +0000

From: PsychCentral.com

Brain activity during times of wakefulness affects sleep and sleep quality. While researchers have been aware of this for some time, a clear understanding of how the mechanisms triggering sleep occur has remained largely unknown.

Now, a recent study has uncovered valuable insight into how the changeover from wakefulness to sleep occurs. This discovery potentially paves the way for a host of breakthroughs that could affect everything from sleeping aids to treatments for stroke and brain injury.

Led by James Krueger, Ph.D, Washington State University, the findings were recently published in the Journal of Applied Physiology and represent the most significant discovery of Krueger’s 36-year career focused on sleep research.

The study centered on a hypothesis that the major energy currency of the cell — ATP (adenosinetriphosphate) — is a key trigger for brain activity leading up to sleep. Specifically, researchers followed the method behind how ATP assists in the release of cytokines, the regulatory proteins for sleep.

“We know that brain activity is linked to sleep, but we’ve never known how,” Krueger said. “This gives us a mechanism to link brain activity to sleep. This has not been done before.”

A link between ATP and cytokines was charted, leading researchers to the method by which the brain keeps track of activity during wakefulness and then makes the switch to a state of sleep.

Krueger added that the conclusions line up with previous research conducted at WSU suggesting that sleep is a “local phenomenon, that bits and pieces of the brain sleep” depending on how they’ve been used.

By gaining knowledge of this mechanism, researchers believe the potential for a more detailed understanding of sleep processes is greatly widened with notable possibilities for new and improved therapies to treat the debilitating and dangerous effects associated with sleep disorders.

Sleep disorders affect between 50 and 70 million Americans and currently account for approximately $150 billion to businesses due to lost productivity and accidents linked back to fatigue. It is also estimated that vehicle accidents caused by fatigued drivers equate to $48 billion a year.

Krueger offered the below practical implications for the discovery of how brain activity and ATP affect sleep:

The study provides a new set of targets for potential medications. Drugs designed to interact with the receptors ATP binds to may prove useful as sleeping pills.
Sleep disorders like insomnia can be viewed as being caused by some parts of the brain being awake while other parts are asleep, giving rise to new therapies.
ATP-related blood flow observed in brain-imaging studies can be linked to activity and sleep.
Researchers can develop strategies by which specific brain cell circuits are oriented to specific tasks, slowing fatigue by allowing the used parts of the brain to sleep while one goes about other business. It may also clear the way for stroke victims to put undamaged regions of their brains to better use.
Brain cells cultured outside the body can be used to study brain cell network oscillations between sleep-like and wake-like states, speeding the progress of brain studies.

Read entire article: How Brain Activity is Linked to Sleep

Sizing Up Consciousness by Its Bits

alice — Tue, 18 Jan 2011 15:28:14 +0000

From: NYTimes.com

One day in 2007, Dr. Giulio Tononi lay on a hospital stretcher as an anesthesiologist prepared him for surgery. For Dr. Tononi, it was a moment of intellectual exhilaration. He is a distinguished chair in consciousness science at the University of Wisconsin, and for much of his life he has been developing a theory of consciousness. Lying in the hospital, Dr. Tononi finally had a chance to become his own experiment.

The anesthesiologist was preparing to give Dr. Tononi one drug to render him unconscious, and another one to block muscle movements. Dr. Tononi suggested the anesthesiologist first tie a band around his arm to keep out the muscle-blocking drug. The anesthesiologist could then ask Dr. Tononi to lift his finger from time to time, so they could mark the moment he lost awareness.
The anesthesiologist did not share Dr. Tononi’s excitement. “He could not have been less interested,” Dr. Tononi recalled. “He just said, ‘Yes, yes, yes,’ and put me to sleep. He was thinking, ‘This guy must be out of his mind.’ ”

Dr. Tononi was not offended. Consciousness has long been the province of philosophers, and most doctors steer clear of their abstract speculations. After all, debating the finer points of what it is like to be a brain floating in a vat does not tell you how much anesthetic to give a patient.

But Dr. Tononi’s theory is, potentially, very different. He and his colleagues are translating the poetry of our conscious experiences into the precise language of mathematics.

To do so, they are adapting information theory, a branch of science originally applied to computers and telecommunications. If Dr. Tononi is right, he and his colleagues may be able to build a “consciousness meter” that doctors can use to measure consciousness as easily as they measure blood pressure and body temperature. Perhaps then his anesthesiologist will become interested.

“I love his ideas,” said Christof Koch, an expert on consciousness at Caltech. “It’s the only really promising fundamental theory of consciousness.”

Sizing Up Consciousness by its Bits: Read the entire article

“Erasing” Traumatic Memories Moving from Science Fiction to Scientific Reality

alice — Thu, 13 Jan 2011 16:56:22 +0000

From: TheGlobeandMail.com

The brain has a remarkable capacity for keeping track of our past experiences. But detailed memories can sometimes seem more a curse than a blessing. This is especially true for those who’ve suffered significant losses or other traumas. Thus, while the holiday season is meant to be a joyous time, for many it merely provides salient reminders of these debilitating experiences.

Fortunately, researchers are discovering that memories may be far less durable than previously thought. Indeed research on “erasing” traumatic memories is quickly moving from the realm of science fiction to scientifically backed reality.

That each of us may be able to exert some control over what gets in and what then stays in long-term memory arises from our growing understanding of how the brain represents and stores information related to our conscious life experiences.

Read the entire article: “Erasing” Traumatic Memories Moving from Science Fiction to Scientific Reality

Trends in Neuroscience: Table of Contents January 2011

alice — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 20:04:19 +0000

The January issue of Trends in Neuroscience is available online.

Volume 34, Issue 1, pp. 1-50

Opinion

Review

________________________________________________________

___________________________

____________________________________

______________

Opinion

Stuck in a rut: rethinking depression and its treatment p1: Paul E. Holtzheimer, Helen S. Mayberg

Abstract | Full Text | PDF (298 kb)

Activation of cortical interneurons during sleep: an anatomical link to homeostatic sleep regulation? p10: Thomas S. Kilduff, Bruno Cauli, Dmitry Gerashchenko

Abstract | Full Text | PDF (612 kb)

Review

Is adult neurogenesis essential for olfaction? p20: Françoise Lazarini, Pierre-Marie Lledo

Abstract | Full Text | PDF (514 kb)

The extra-hypothalamic actions of ghrelin on neuronal function p31: Zane B. Andrews

Abstract | Full Text | PDF (520 kb)

Development, specification, and diversity of callosal projection neurons p41: Ryann M. Fame, Jessica L. MacDonald, Jeffrey D. Macklis

Abstract | Full Text | PDF (544 kb) | Supplemental Data

Neuroscientist, VS Ramachandran: The neurons that Shaped Civilization

alice — Tue, 11 Jan 2011 18:55:45 +0000

Enjoy this short video:

From: Ted.com

Neuroscientist Vilayanur Ramachandran outlines the fascinating functions of mirror neurons. Only recently discovered, these neurons allow us to learn complex social behaviors, some of which formed the foundations of human civilization as we know it.

Comments:

Hans Bauer

Jun 24 2010: Any species of comparable level in evolution may attain mirror neurons or something equivalent one day. May even be that this is already happening without our notice. It will hardly happen within a few days. As we heard it took hundreds of thousands of years for us.

May be that some species will develop culture and civilization one day – that is if mankind will not interfere.

By the way – my tom cat sometimes pees standing on two legs. Who knows how he learned it? :)

Watch the video, and read more

Bobby McFerrin Hacks Your Brain with Music

alice — Fri, 07 Jan 2011 18:55:01 +0000

Enjoy this short, amusing video on the power of our human brain with regard to music.

From: Ted.com

Interesting comments:

Jeff Weir

Dec 4 2010: I think beyond the “predictive” nature of the human brain, there lies the simple physics of the harmonic series. Once Bobby McFerrin sings the starting pitch, all of the other pitches of the pentatonic are contained in its harmonic series. I believe that is the main reason why all humans “get” the pentatonic scale… it is “spelled out” inside the harmonic series of any starting pitch.
Mitchell Plamondon

Nov 26 2010: That’s cool. I guess it’s an evolutionary result though. People have learned the ability of prediction. We can familiarize ourselves with sounds, whether this be scales, timbres, chords etc. They are all recognizable. He laid out one of the most simple scales, a 5 note pentatonic scale which by chance just so happens to be the most commonly used scale in popular music of the past nearly 100 years. And just like a driver is able to predict the actions of another driver, or just as we are able to walk down a busy sidewalk without colliding into others (not always true :P) we are able to create sonar expectations. Good video – much better than a lot of the pop-music videos that seem to be polluting the TED music related spectacles. (I’d expect to hear more intellectual music here. Perhaps Penderecki, Lutoslawski, Hétu… anything beyond lyric driven 3-4 chord garage-band tunes please :) )

Watch the video, and read more: Bobby McFerrin Hacks Your Brain with Music

Consciousness and Cognition Journal: Table of Contents December 2010

alice — Thu, 06 Jan 2011 15:24:33 +0000

The December issue of Consciousness and Cognition is available online:

Volume 19, Issue 4, December 2010

Table of Contents:

REGULAR ARTICLES

____________________________________________________________________________________________

___________________

__________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________________

Current concerns in involuntary and voluntary autobiographical memories Original Research Article
Pages 847-860
Kim Berg Johannessen, Dorthe Berntsen

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Awareness of the saccade goal in oculomotor selection: Your eyes go before you know Original Research Article
Pages 861-871
Wieske van Zoest, Mieke Donk

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Attentional processes and meditation Original Research Article
Pages 872-878
Holley S. Hodgins, Kathryn C. Adair

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The level of frontal-temporal beta-2 band EEG synchronization distinguishes anterior cingulate cortex from other frontal regions Original Research Article
Pages 879-886
M. Kukleta, P. Bob, M. Brázdil, R. Roman, I. Rektor

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How the intentions of the draftsman shape perception of a drawing Original Research Article
Pages 887-898
Alessandro Pignocchi

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Cerebral blood flow differences between long-term meditators and non-meditators Original Research Article
Pages 899-905
Andrew B. Newberg, Nancy Wintering, Mark R. Waldman, Daniel Amen, Dharma S. Khalsa, Abass Alavi

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Implicit and explicit components of dual adaptation to visuomotor rotations Original Research Article
Pages 906-917
Mathias Hegele, Herbert Heuer

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The experience of altered states of consciousness in shamanic ritual: The role of pre-existing beliefs and affective factors Original Research Article
Pages 918-925
Vince Polito, Robyn Langdon, Jac Brown

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Memory and consciousness: Trace distinctiveness in memory retrievals Original Research Article
Pages 926-937
Lionel Brunel, Ali Oker, Benoit Riou, Rémy Versace

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Beyond the internalism/externalism debate: The constitution of the space of perception Original Research Article
Pages 938-952
Charles Lenay, Pierre Steiner

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A high-loaded hemisphere successfully ignores distractors Original Research Article
Pages 953-961
Ritsuko Nishimura, Kazuhito Yoshizaki

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Self-specific priming effect Original Research Article
Pages 962-968
Alessia Pannese, Joy Hirsch

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Alzheimer’s disease and impairment of the Self Original Research Article
Pages 969-976
M.N. Fargeau, N. Jaafari, S. Ragot, J.L. Houeto, C. Pluchon, R. Gil

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NonREM sleep mentation in chronically-treated persons with schizophrenia Original Research Article
Pages 977-985
Félix-Antoine Lusignan, Roger Godbout, Marie-Josée Dubuc, Anne-Marie Daoust, Jean-Pierre Mottard, Antonio Zadra

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Self-denial and the role of intentions in the attribution of agency Original Research Article
Pages 986-998
Catherine Preston, Roger Newport

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Unconscious task application Original Research Article
Pages 999-1006
Filip Van Opstal, Wim Gevers, Magda Osman, Tom Verguts

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Mind control? Creating illusory intentions through a phony brain–computer interface Original Research Article
Pages 1007-1012
Margaret T. Lynn, Christopher C. Berger, Travis A. Riddle, Ezequiel Morsella

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Subjective reports of stimulus, response, and decision times in speeded tasks: How accurate are decision time reports? Original Research Article
Pages 1013-1036
Jeff Miller, Paula Vieweg, Nicolas Kruize, Belinda McLea

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A LORETA study of mental time travel: Similar and distinct electrophysiological correlates of re-experiencing past events and pre-experiencing future events Original Research Article
Pages 1037-1044
Christina F. Lavallee, Michael A. Persinger

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Subjective discriminability of invisibility: A framework for distinguishing perceptual and attentional failures of awareness Original Research Article
Pages 1045-1057
Ryota Kanai, Vincent Walsh, Chia-huei Tseng

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And much more: Consciousness and Cognition, Dec 2010

The Exploration of Meditation in the Neuroscience of Attention and Consciousness

alice — Tue, 04 Jan 2011 18:54:39 +0000

A. Raffoneand N. Srinivasan

Article in Cognitive Processing: International Quarterly of Cognitive Science

Abstract: Many recent behavioral and neuroscientific studies have revealed the importance of investigating meditation states and traits to achieve an increased understanding of cognitive and affective neuroplasticity, attention and self-awareness, as well as for their increasingly recognized clinical relevance. The investigation of states and traits related to meditation has especially pronounced implications for the neuroscience of attention, consciousness, self-awareness, empathy and theory of mind. In this article we present the main features of meditation-based mental training and characterize the current scientific approach to meditation states and traits with special reference to attention and consciousness, in light of the articles contributed to this issue.

Click here for the full article

No Implants Needed: Movement-Generating Brain Waves Detected and Decoded Outside the Head

alice — Tue, 28 Dec 2010 18:52:53 +0000

From: ScientificAmerican.com

New research holds promise for a noninvasive brain-computer interface that allows mental control over computers and prosthetics.

Our bodies are wired to move, and damaged wiring is often impossible to repair. Strokes and spinal cord injuries can quickly disconnect parts of the brain that initiate movement with the nerves and muscles that execute it, and neurodegenerative disorders such as Parkinson’s disease and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) draw the process out to the same effect. Scientists have been looking for a way to bypass damaged nerves by directly connecting the brain to an assistive device—like a robotic limb—through brain-computer interface (BCI) technology. Now, researchers have demonstrated the ability to nonintrusively record neural signals outside the skull and decode them into information that could be used to move a prosthetic.

Past efforts at a BCI to animate an artificial limb involved electrodes inserted directly into the brain. The surgery required to implant the probes and the possibility that implants might not stay in place made this approach risky.

A Prescription for Abdominal Pain: Due Diligence

alice — Thu, 23 Dec 2010 16:07:29 +0000

From: NYTimes.com: “For some reason people respect headaches,” said Dr. Carlo Di Lorenzo, a leading pediatric gastroenterologist and a professor of clinical pediatrics at Ohio State. “I’ve never seen a parent or a pediatrician tell a child complaining of a headache, ‘You don’t have a headache — it’s not real.’ Bellyache is just as real as headache.”

Indeed it is. And recurrent abdominal pain in children is common, frustrating and often hard to explain.

Consider a girl who came to the clinic for her 10-year physical exam. She gets these bellyaches, she told me. Had a bad one that week, but her stomach wasn’t hurting right at the moment.

She’d been treated for constipation; she’d been tested for celiac disease and other problems. Every blood and stool test over the two years since the pain began was completely normal. One night the bellyache was so bad she went to the emergency room — and her abdominal X-rays were normal as well.

The diagnostic term for this common and perplexing condition is “functional abdominal pain”: recurrent stomachaches, as the American Academy of Pediatrics put it in 2005, with no “anatomic, metabolic, infectious, inflammatory or neoplastic disorder” to explain them.

When I was a resident, we often smirked when we spoke of functional abdominal pain, treating it as a code for a troublesome patient, dubious symptoms or an anxious family. But recent research suggests we were too biomedically narrow in our thinking.

Scientists are coming to understand that abdominal pain is transmitted by a specialized nervous system that may be hypersensitive or hyperactive in some children. Studies in which researchers inflated balloons in children’s intestines suggested that those with functional abdominal pain might be unusually sensitive to any distension on the inside.

Click here for the entire article

Tracing the Spark of Creative Problem-Solving

alice — Mon, 20 Dec 2010 15:59:36 +0000

From: NYTimes.com.

Check out the puzzles in this article. They look easy, and mostly they are. Click here to see the puzzles.
Given three words: trip, house, and goal, for example, find a fourth that will complete a compound word with each. A minute or so of mental trolling (housekeeper, goalkeeper, trip?) is all it usually takes.

The payoff of tackling a mental exercise: leaps of understanding that seem to come out of the blue, without the incremental drudgery of analysis.

But who wants to troll?

Let lightning strike. Let the clues suddenly coalesce in the brain as they do so often for young children solving a riddle. As they must have done, for that matter, in the minds of those early humans who outfoxed nature well before the advent of deduction, abstraction or SAT prep courses. Puzzle-solving is such an ancient, universal practice, scholars say, precisely because it depends on creative insight, on the primitive spark that ignited the first campfires.

And now, modern neuroscientists are beginning to tap its source.

In a just completed study, researchers at Northwestern University found that people were more likely to solve word puzzles with sudden insight when they were amused, having just seen a short comedy routine.

What we think is happening, said Mark Beeman, a neuroscientist who conducted the study with Karuna Subramaniam, a graduate student, is that the humor, this positive mood, is lowering the brain’s threshold for detecting weaker or more remote connections to solve puzzles.

This and other recent research suggest that the appeal of puzzles goes far deeper than the dopamine-reward rush of finding a solution. The very idea of doing a crossword or a Sudoku puzzle typically shifts the brain into an open, playful state that is itself a pleasing escape, captivating to people as different as Bill Clinton, a puzzle addict, and the famous amnesiac Henry Molaison, or H.M., whose damaged brain craved crosswords.

And that escape is all the more tantalizing for being incomplete. Unlike the cryptic social and professional mazes of real life, puzzles are reassuringly soluble; but like any serious problem, they require more than mere intellect to crack.

Click here for the entire article

Breathe In, Breathe Out, Fall in Love

alice — Wed, 15 Dec 2010 18:54:53 +0000

From: NYTimes.com. In the front hall of the Victorian house was a laminated sign that said “Shoes,” and underneath it a row of Birkenstocks and Danskos stretched along the wall. I could hear voices coming from the meditation hall upstairs, so I figured people were already finding their seats. I sat down and pulled off my motorcycle boots, wishing every object had its own little sign. If only my ex-boyfriend had worn a sign the night before that said “ex-boyfriend,” I would not have slept with him.

I crept upstairs and tried to open the door soundlessly. Inside, two dozen people were perched on pillows. They were the same kind of people you find at a bookstore — a lot of spectacles, lumpy sweaters, laptop bags. A few were still whispering, but I sensed the room was about to fall into a trance of majestic silence. So I hurried to join them.

Sitting cross-legged, my hands cupped upward, I began to struggle with the basics of Vipassana meditation, trying to pay attention to my breath as it tickled my nostrils. “Vipassana” comes from the Pali word for “insight,” but here in Cambridge, Mass., the term connotes something else — a certain East Coast, over-educated style of sitting on a pillow.

On the dais, the teacher lounged on his meditation bench in a weathered Patagonia hoodie, his gray hair tied in a knot. “For the next eight hours, you will not say a word,” he told us brightly. “Did everyone remember to bring a bag lunch?”

At that point in my life I had never attempted a full day of meditation.

Click here for entire article.

Vital Signs; Regimes: Meditation, for the Mind and the Heart

alice — Wed, 15 Dec 2010 16:52:55 +0000

From: NYTimes.com. Could the mental relaxation produced by transcendental meditation have physiological benefits? A study presented last week at the American Heart Association meeting in Orlando, Fla., suggests that it may, at least in the case of people with established coronary artery disease.

Researchers followed about 200 high-risk patients for an average of five years. Among the 100 who meditated, there were 20 heart attacks, strokes and deaths; in the comparison group, there were 32. The meditators tended to remain disease-free longer and also reduced their systolic blood pressure.

”We found reduced blood pressure that was significant — that was probably one important mediator,” said Dr. Robert Schneider, director of the Institute for Natural Medicine and Prevention, a research institute based at the Maharishi University of Management in Fairfield, Iowa, who presented the findings.

Click here for entire article

How Mindfulness Can Make for Better Doctors

alice — Mon, 13 Dec 2010 16:09:57 +0000

From: NYTimes.com One night during my training, long after all the other doctors had fled the hospital, I found a senior surgeon still on the wards working on a patient note. He was a surgeon with extraordinary skill, a doctor of few words whose folksy quips had become the stuff of department legend. “I’m sorry you’re still stuck here,” I said, walking up to him.

He looked up from the chart. “I’m not working tomorrow, so I’m just fine.”

I had just reviewed the next day’s operating room schedule and knew he had a full day of cases. I began to contradict him, but he held his hand up to stop me.

“Time in the O.R.,” he said with a broad grin, “is not work; it’s play.”

For several years my peers and I relished anecdotes like this one because we believed we knew exactly what our mentor had meant. All of us had had the experience of “disappearing” into the meditative world of a procedure and re-emerging not exhausted, but refreshed. The ritual ablutions by the scrub sink washed away the bacteria clinging to our skin and the endless paperwork threatening to choke our enthusiasm. A single rhythmic cardiac monitor replaced the relentless calls of our beepers; and nothing would matter during the long operations except the patient under our knife.

We had entered “the zone.” We were focused on nothing else but our patients and that moment.

Click here for entire article

The Same Old Consciousness

alice — Tue, 07 Dec 2010 16:05:57 +0000

From: ErvinLaszlo.com: It makes sense to paraphrase Einstein’s famous dictum in regard to consciousness. Our problem is the unsustainability of the world we have created, and we should be clear that we can’t solve this problem with the same kind of consciousness that gave rise to it.

But many people try to do just that, even the leaders of the world’s twenty richest and most powerful nations. The November 2010 meeting of the G20 in Seoul gave indisputable proof of it. Not only did the meeting fail to achieve its main objectives (among them rebalancing international trade and reaching an accommodation between the U.S. and South Korea), the objectives themselves proved to be out-of-date. They centered on re-stabilizing the same moribund economic and financial system that made the world unsustainable in the first place.

But why is the G20’s failure due to wrong consciousness? Because consciousness in the social, political, and cultural context is sum total of our view of the world, with its values, aspirations, and background assumptions. It’s the “paradigm” that underlies the way we think and the way we set our priorities. The consciousness of the G20 gives rise to an obsolete view of the world, with faulty values and outdated aspirations. The leaders view the world as the arena for a Darwinian struggle for survival, seen as a competition for growth in the economies of nations. Since assured growth cannot be achieved even by the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the world by itself, the leaders recognize the need for some level and form of cooperation—as a means to an end. The end is for the rich nations to make sure that they remain rich.

Click here for the complete article.

‘Consciousness signature’ discovered spanning the brain

alice — Fri, 03 Dec 2010 16:02:17 +0000

From: Newscientist.com: Electrodes implanted in the brains of people with epilepsy might have resolved an ancient question about consciousness.

Signals from the electrodes seem to show that consciousness arises from the coordinated activity of the entire brain. The signals also take us closer to finding an objective “consciousness signature” that could be used to probe the process in animals and people with brain damage without inserting electrodes.

Previously it wasn’t clear whether a dedicated brain area, or “seat of consciousness”, was responsible for guiding our subjective view of the world, or whether consciousness was the result of concerted activity across the whole brain.

Probing the process has been a challenge, as non-invasive techniques such as magnetic resonance imaging and EEG give either spatial or temporal information but not both. The best way to get both simultaneously is to implant electrodes deep inside the skull, but it is difficult to justify this in healthy people for ethical reasons.

Brainy opportunity

Now neuroscientist Raphaël Gaillard of INSERM in Gif sur Yvette, France, and colleagues have taken advantage of a unique opportunity. They have probed consciousness in 10 people who had intercranial electrodes implanted for treating drug-resistant epilepsy.

Click here for the entire article.

Canadian Psychological Association 72nd Annual Convention

alice — Fri, 26 Nov 2010 01:37:44 +0000

CPA’s 72nd Annual convention is being held in Toronto, Ontario, June 2-4, 2011. Come and connect with fellow CPA colleagues and find out what interesting work people have been conducting in the field of psychology!

The Convention brings together psychology scientists, practitioners, educators and students from all corners of Canada as well as from abroad; it is our trading center for discoveries, innovations and ideas. Use the Convention as a vehicle for ensuring that your science gets translated into, and is informed by, education and practice and that your practice and education remain on a solid foundation of science. Please join us in beautiful Toronto, so we can reconnect and together bask in the city’s warmth and hospitality.

For more information, click here for the conference website.

Annual Cognitive Neuroscience Society Meeting: 2011

alice — Thu, 25 Nov 2010 01:34:48 +0000

The 18th Annual Cognitive Neuroscience Meeting will be held April 2-5, 2011 in San Francisco, California at the Hyatt Regency Hotel. Situated right on the Embarcadero waterfront, you are just steps away from the historic Ferry Building, the ferry to Alcatraz and the San Francisco Bay.

Convention activities will begin on the afternoon of Saturday, April 2nd. In addition to the regular symposia, slide, and poster sessions, the annual George A. Miller Lecture will be Sunday evening, with a reception afterwards. We will also be awarding two new Young Investigator Awards followed by talks given by the winners. The 4-day program will continue with a host of symposia, poster sessions, invited addressees, publisher exhibits, and special events.

For more information, please click here for the conference website.

Mental Training Through Meditation Enhances Attentional Stability

alice — Mon, 15 Nov 2010 20:28:47 +0000

A. Lutz, H. Slagter, et al.
Article in Journal of Neuroscience

Abstract
The capacity to stabilize the content of attention over timevaries among individuals, and its impairment is a hallmark ofseveral mental illnesses. Impairments in sustained attentionin patients with attention disorders have been associated withincreased trial-to-trial variability in reaction time and event-relatedpotential deficits during attention tasks. At present, it isunclear whether the ability to sustain attention and its underlyingbrain circuitry are transformable through training. Here, weshow, with dichotic listening task performance and electroencephalography,that training attention, as cultivated by meditation, can improvethe ability to sustain attention. Three months of intensivemeditation training reduced variability in attentional processingof target tones, as indicated by both enhanced theta-band phaseconsistency of oscillatory neural responses over anterior brainareas and reduced reaction time variability. Furthermore, thoseindividuals who showed the greatest increase in neural responseconsistency showed the largest decrease in behavioral responsevariability. Notably, we also observed reduced variability inneural processing, in particular in low-frequency bands, regardlessof whether the deviant tone was attended or unattended. Focusedattention meditation may thus affect both distracter and targetprocessing, perhaps by enhancing entrainment of neuronal oscillationsto sensory input rhythms, a mechanism important for controllingthe content of attention. These novel findings highlight themechanisms underlying focused attention meditation and supportthe notion that mental training can significantly affect attentionand brain function.

Cosmic Symphony — A Deeper Look at Quantum Consciousness

alice — Fri, 12 Nov 2010 18:53:56 +0000

From: ErvinLaszlo.com

The rise of quantum consciousness could be the biggest step our species has taken since it came down from the trees. It would bring us to a new stage of species maturity � and could also enable us to surmount the problems that threaten our life and our future.

But just what is quantum consciousness � QC? I have spoken about QC in my previous posts, but the question merits a further, deeper look.

First of all, what is consciousness? The commonsense assumption is that consciousness is a stream of experience produced by the brain. As long as the brain functions, there is consciousness; when the brain shuts down, consciousness vanishes. This, however, is not necessarily the case. It could be that our brain no more produces consciousness than the radio produces the symphony that comes through its speakers. The symphony, too, disappears when the radio is shut down, yet we know that it�s not produced by the radio. Both the radio and the brain pick up signals, transform them, and display the result in our stream of conscious experience.

Read the entire article

What Makes You Uniquely You?

alice — Thu, 11 Nov 2010 17:20:59 +0000

From: Discovermagazine.com

Feb 2009

Nobel laureate Gerald Edelman says your brain is one-of-a-kind in the history of the universe.

Some of the most profound questions in science are also the least tangible. What does it mean to be sentient? What is the self? When issues become imponderable, many researchers demur, but neuroscientist Gerald Edelman dives right in.

A physician and cell biologist who won a 1972 Nobel Prize for his work describing the structure of antibodies, Edelman is now obsessed with the enigma of human consciousness—except that he does not see it as an enigma. In Edelman’s grand theory of the mind, consciousness is a biological phenomenon and the brain develops through a process similar to natural selection. Neurons proliferate and form connections in infancy; then experience weeds out the useless from the useful, molding the adult brain in sync with its environment.

Edelman first put this model on paper in the Zurich airport in 1977 as he was killing time waiting for a flight. Since then he has written eight books on the subject, the most recent being Second Nature: Brain Science and Human Knowledge. He is chairman of neurobiology at the Scripps Research Institute in San Diego and the founder and director of the Neurosciences Institute, a research center in La Jolla, California, dedicated to unconventional “high risk, high payoff” science.

“What Babies Want” – An exploration of the Consciousness of Infants

alice — Wed, 10 Nov 2010 12:30:53 +0000

From: WhatBabiesWant.com

DVD Documentary starring Charlie Rose, Noah Wyle, and Joseph Chilton Pearce.

What Babies Want is an award winning documentary film that explores the profoundly important and sacred opportunity we have in bringing children into the world. Filled with captivating stories and infused with Noah Wyle’s warmth as narrator, the film demonstrates how life patterns are established at birth and before. The documentary includes groundbreaking information on early development as well as appearances by the real experts: babies and families.

Research is now showing us that our society is a product of how we welcome and raise our children. When babies are welcomed with love and warmth and given the immediate opportunity to bond with parents, they develop minds that are coherent and flexible, ready in turn to make compassionate and meaningful connections with others as they grow.

As we learn how early relationships shape the structure and function of the brain, we are also gaining a new appreciation of the wisdom of ancient cultures that understood the importance of welcoming children before, during and after the moment of birth.

Long-term Memories The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

alice — Sat, 06 Nov 2010 17:06:36 +0000

From The Dana Foundation

Editor’s note: Traumatic memories haunt the lives of people suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD, and other illnesses. Fortunately, recent research into the changeability of long-term memories may someday develop into treatments for such individuals. But before this can happen, writes Cristina Alberini, Ph.D., of Mount Sinai School of Medicine, researchers must determine just how effectively the fear associated with older memories—especially those involved in PTSD—can be reduced and for how long. Researchers must also address the ethical issues that go hand in hand with modifying memory.

For more than a century, clinicians, psychologists, and biologists have worked to understand the mechanisms underlying the formation and storage of long-term memories. Recently, scientists found that when a stored memory is recalled, it becomes sensitive to disruption for a limited time.^1,2 This finding indicates that it might be possible to weaken or even erase memories of traumatic experiences that become uncontrollably intrusive in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This possibility has drawn great interest from scientific and clinical communities, as well as from nonscientists, who became interested in its potential clinical applications; furthermore, it raised ethical concerns.

Many ethical questions and debates about treatments designed to weaken memories may reflect the still poor understanding of how memory recall or reactivation results in memory fragility and the many unknowns surrounding its temporal boundaries. Whereas the study of animal models and healthy humans has provided some knowledge about post-recall memory disruption, data on the use of such disruption to treat PTSD symptoms are still conflicting. The strengthening of memory with the passage of time, the resilience of strong memories to disruption, and the specific aspects of memory that become sensitive to disruption raise questions about the limitations of this approach and warrant more research. Here, we will look at how we form memories of an emotional event and how these memories become fragile after recall. That will help us consider the potential, limitations, and ethics of disrupting memories of emotion.

Read the entire article

6 More Reasons to Meditate

alice — Fri, 05 Nov 2010 14:54:39 +0000

From: Psychology Today

Why meditate? Outside of religious contexts, the most common reason is stress management. But as these latest research findings demonstrate, meditation is much more than just a relaxation technique. Here are a half-dozen more good reasons to take up meditation.

To enhance concentration
Meditation has an undeserved reputation for being esoteric and difficult to learn. In truth, it’s really nothing more than the practice of focusing the mind intently on a particular thing or activity. It seems logical that regular meditation would hone a person’s powers of concentration, and a recent study in the Journal of Neuroscience found just that. In the study, three months of intensive meditation training led to improvements in attentional stability – the ability to sustain attention without frequent lapses.

Why Animals Are Biologically Conscious. The conscious brain has a long evolutionary history.

alice — Thu, 04 Nov 2010 14:44:33 +0000

From: The Blog of Dr. Bernard J. Baars inPsychology Today

To the best of our knowledge, consciousness depends upon brains, and brains are biological organs. In a boxing match, a blow to the jaw often leads to a loss of consciousness, but the same impact to the torso does not. More specifically, scientists have long thought that human consciousness depends upon two large brain structures, the cortex and the thalamus. The daily cycle of waking, dreaming and sleep depends on distinctive global rhythm generators in the thalamus and cortex. (www.baars-gage.com, Chapter 8)

While deep brain nuclei control the daily sleep-waking cycle, the specific contents of conscious vision, like the sight of a coffee cup, are directly supported by known regions of the cortex and corresponding nuclei in the thalamus. Cortex and its satellites underlie speech and hearing, vision, hearing and touch, the ability to make decisions and to control our voluntary muscles.

In contrast, medical students have long learned that the two large lobes of the cerebellum, hanging from the rear of the cortex, can be damaged in humans without impairing consciousness significantly. Since the cerebellum has nearly the same numbers of neurons as cortex, the question therefore becomes: How it is that cortex supports conscious contents? Why not the cerebellum? (Figure 1).

Article in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Charlie Rose: The Brain Series

alice — Wed, 03 Nov 2010 07:30:27 +0000

The Charlie Rose Brain Series consists of interviews with some of the most knowledgeable scientists and researchers studying the human brain, including Drs. Eric Kandel and Oliver Sacks. Each monthly episode examines different subjects of the brain, including perception, social interaction, aging and creativity.

For more information, please check the Charlie Rose Brain Series website.

Fear in Love: Attachment, Abuse, and the Developing Brain

alice — Tue, 02 Nov 2010 10:10:58 +0000

From: The Dana Foundation

Editor’s note: Why do abused children attach and remain attached to abusive parents? In this article, Dr. Regina Sullivan explains how her research with rat pups has led to greater understanding of the infant brain, and how negative early experiences can cause long-term genetic, brain, behavioral, and hormonal changes that can affect not only the abuse victim but also the victim’s descendants.

Many parents have absolute faith that, with the right kind of stimulation, they can give their child an educational advantage. Conscientious mothers play Mozart to the baby in the womb, take their toddlers to Mommy and Me dance classes, and work their way through preschool applications as daunting as those for medical school. Yet even with the wide range of advantages available for infants today, many people are still surprised when I tell them that the way they treat their children will actually change the structure and circuitry of the child’s brain.

Click here to read the entire article

Center for Consciousness Studies Conference: May2-8, 2011

alice — Mon, 01 Nov 2010 17:29:59 +0000

The Center for Consciousness Studies promotes open, rigorous discussion of all phenomena relating to conscious experience. Their annual conference is being held May 2-8, 2011, at the Aula Magna Hall, at Stockholm University in Sweden.

Toward a Science of Consciousness is an interdisciplinary conference emphasizing broad and rigorous approaches to the study of conscious awareness. Topical areas include neuroscience, philosophy, psychology, biology, quantum physics, meditation and altered states, machine consciousness, culture and experiential phenomenology. Held annually since 1994, the conference is organized by the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona, and alternates yearly between Tucson, Arizona and various locations around the world. Toward a Science of Consciousness 2011 will be held at Stockholm University, Aula Magna Hall, Stockholm, Sweden, May 2-8, 2011.

A Little Black Box to Jog Failing Memory

alice — Fri, 29 Oct 2010 17:14:56 +0000

From: The New York Times

PITTSBURGH — On a cold, wet afternoon not long ago, Aron Reznick sat in the lounge of a home for the elderly here, his silver hair neatly combed, his memory a fog. He could not remember Thanksgiving dinner with his family, though when he was given a hint — “turkey” — it came back to him, vaguely, like a shadow in the moonlight.

Two years ago, Mr. Reznick, who has early-stage Alzheimer’s disease and is now 82, signed up for an experiment intended to help people with Alzheimer’s and other memory disorders. The concept was simple: using digital pictures and audio to archive an experience like a weekend visit from the grandchildren, creating a summary of the resulting content by picking crucial images, and reviewing them periodically to awaken and strengthen the memory of the event.

Click here for the complete article.

Neuroscience 2010 in San Diego Nov 13-17

alice — Thu, 28 Oct 2010 17:03:21 +0000

Neuroscience 2010, the 40th annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, is scheduled for Nov. 13-17 in San Diego, CA at the San Diego Convention Center.

Through lectures, symposia, workshops, and events, attendees experience innovative neuroscience research. The meeting features thousands of abstracts and provides networking and professional development opportunities.

For more information, please check the conference website.

The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness

alice — Thu, 28 Oct 2010 15:47:43 +0000

N. Shea, T. Bayne

Abstract

Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of the standard approach have suggested that some vegetative state patients might indeed be conscious, although they fall short of being demonstrative. The fact that some vegetative state patients show evidence of consciousness according to the standard approach is remarkable, for the standard approach to consciousness is rather conservative, and leaves open the pressing question of how to ascertain whether patients who fail such tests are conscious or not. We argue for a cluster-based ‘natural kind’ methodology that is adequate to that task, both as a replacement for the approach that currently informs research into the presence or absence of consciousness in vegetative state patients and as a methodology for the science of consciousness more generally.

Hypnosis Leads to Heightened Brain Waves and Levels of Consciousness

alice — Wed, 27 Oct 2010 18:25:14 +0000

From: Natural News

Many people are wary of hypnosis because they are not educated on the topic. Hypnosis is a natural state and many people reach this state of consciousness every day without even realizing it. When you drive a car, you are in a light state of hypnosis. You are in control, you have an increased ability to concentrate, and you are operating on autopilot without really realizing it. A great deal of research has been conducted on the hypnotic state and various states of consciousness.

Your brain has four different brain wave states: beta, alpha, theta, and delta. While you are reading this article, you are in the state of beta. You are alert and able to concentrate on this article. The beta state is normal wakening state. Alpha state is a relaxed state. You are able to access creativity and visualization. Theta state is a deeper state of relaxation; this is a common state of hypnosis and meditation. Theta allows you to access memories. You experience theta as you fall asleep and wake up every day. Lastly is delta, which occurs while sleeping. Delta allows your body to heal. You are able to access your subconscious mind during alpha, theta, and delta states and can also reach various depths of hypnosis (Tools for Wellness).

The Default Network: Your Mind, on Its Own Time

alice — Tue, 26 Oct 2010 14:14:13 +0000

Studies about the brain usually focus on neural activity during the completion of a specific task—remembering a series of words, for example. But over the last 20 years, researchers have been interested in what the brain does during periods of supposed inactivity. They discovered that when someone appears to be doing nothing at all, a network of brain regions—named the default network—is hard at work, allowing for the rich inner lives inside our heads. Applying what is known about the default network to diseases like Alzheimer’s allows for new possibilities for diagnosis and evaluation of treatments.

You’re lying in a brain scanner in the dark, looking up at a small white crosshair, left alone with your thoughts for the next six minutes. What goes through your mind? Perhaps you think about why you volunteered for this, or what you’ll do with the money you earn from this experiment. Perhaps you plan out the rest of your day, or start replaying a conversation from yesterday. New techniques in neuroimaging are helping scientists understand how your brain represents such internally directed and spontaneous thoughts.

Seizing an Opportunity: Broader Definitions of Epilepsy May Lead to Better Treatments

alice — Mon, 25 Oct 2010 16:50:34 +0000

Center for Consciousness Studies
The University of Arizona

There is not just one type of epilepsy. While some forms of the disease are characterized by convulsive seizures, others involve seizures that are barely noticeable. Seizures can occur for many reasons: they can be caused by genetic mutations, injury, or infection early in life. In addition, events in daily life, such as stress, or normal variations in hormones, such as estrogen and testosterone, can influence brain activity and therefore influence seizures. By considering the powerful interactions between the brain and the endocrine system, this influence of hormones on seizures can be understood and new treatment options can be considered.

A common misconception is that a seizure involves sudden, uncontrolled movements or convulsions. However, convulsions do not always accompany seizures. One type of epilepsy—absence epilepsy—is characterized by seizures that involve little movement at all, only a blank, expressionless gaze. For a brief period, the person experiencing the seizure is unresponsive, or “absent.” These seizures are not easy to recognize and may therefore go undetected. Even the person having the seizure may not notice it, because consciousness is temporarily interrupted during an absence seizure.

The diversity in the types of seizures has led to difficulty in classifying them. It is often hard to bring seizures under control because there are many causes, some of which are not well understood. Fortunately, in the past few decades clinical and laboratory research has led to a better understanding of the diversity of seizures and the causes of epilepsy.

Click here to read the entire article

What research paradigms have cognitive psychologists used to study “False memory,” and what are the implications of these choices?

alice — Fri, 22 Oct 2010 15:46:06 +0000

K. Pezdek, S. Lam
Article in Consciousness and Cognition

Abstract
This research examines the methodologies employed by cognitive psychologists to study “false memory“, and assesses if these methodologies are likely to facilitate scientific progress or perhaps constrain the conclusions reached. A PsycINFO search of the empirical publications in cognitive psychology was conducted through January, 2004, using the subject heading, “false memory.” The search produced 198 articles. Although there is an apparent false memory research bandwagon in cognitive psychology, with increasing numbers of studies published on this topic over the past decade, few researchers (only 13.1% of the articles) have studied false memory as the term was originally intended—to specifically refer to planting memory for an entirely new event that was never experienced in an individual’s lifetime. Cognitive psychologists interested in conducting research relevant to assessing the authenticity of memories for child sexual abuse should consider the generalizability of their research to the planting of entirely new events in memory.

Could an Experimental Memory Drug Put an End to “Senior Moments”?

alice — Thu, 21 Oct 2010 18:45:16 +0000

From: Discover Magazine Online:

A new drug seems to be able to reverse normal age-related memory decline in old mice–like a face-lift for neurons, bringing them back to their younger days. The results of the experimental treatment, which works by blocking certain stress hormones, were published in the Journal of Neuroscience.

“What’s most surprising is that even short-term inhibition was able to reverse memory loss in old mice,” says Jonathan Seckl, a professor of molecular medicine who was involved in the research. “I don’t think people had realized this was so reversible. It takes [the animals] back to being relatively young.” [Technology Review].

Research has shown that stress hormones called glucocorticoids play a role in memory loss, by damaging the brain over time. But targeting the glucocorticoids themselves is dangerous, because reducing their levels would leave the body without a stress response. The researchers therefore targeted an enzyme instead, which activates the hormone in neurons.

Click here for the complete article.

Toward a Science of Consciousness 2010

alice — Sun, 27 Dec 2009 05:34:38 +0000

Second Announcement and Call for Abstracts

Toward a Science of Consciousness, April 12-17, 2010
Tucson Convention Center, Tucson, Arizona

Abstract Submission Deadline December 31, 2009

Conference website:www.consciousness.arizona.edu

Notification by January 10, 2010

Sponsored by The Center for Consciousness Studies, The University of Arizona

The ninth biennial Tucson conference Toward a Science of Consciousness
will take place April 12-17, 2010 at the Tucson Convention Center and Hotel
Arizona in Tucson, Arizona. Known for rigorous, inter-disciplinary
and broad-ranging approaches to conscious experience, the Tucson
conference will again include Pre-Conference Workshops, Plenary and Keynote
Sessions, Concurrent Talk Sessions, Poster Presentations, Technical Demos, Art
Exhibit, Experiential Workshops, Side Trips, Social Events, Book and Exhibitor
Booths, and for the first time, late night Club Consciousness.

Keynote Speakers

Antonio Damasio – The Conscious Self
Karl Deisseroth – Circuits of the Mind
Marcus Raichle – Brain Dark Matter – Default Networks
Robert J. Sawyer – Consciousness in Science Fiction
Robert G. Shulman – Brain Energy Supports the State of Consciousness

Plenary Sessions

William James Centennial
Default Networks
Machine Consciousness and the Singularity
Mind Wandering/Stimulus-Independent Thought
Body Consciousness
Multimodal Experience
Consciousness Transformation
Theories of Consciousness

Plenary speakers will include

Bernard J. Baars
David Chalmers
Frederique DeVignemont
Patricia Lynn Duffy
Henrik Ehrsson
Ben Goertzel
Sid Kouider
Malia Mason
Dharmendra Modha
Casey O’Callaghan
Jonathan Schooler
Barry Stein
Eugene Taylor
Cassi Vieten

Pre-Conference Workshops – April 12 and 13, 2010
Tucson Convention Center and Hotel Arizona

Monday April 12
9 am to 1 pm

Lucid Dreaming – Theory and Practice
Stephen Laberge

Selective attention
Christof Koch

Western Introspectionism
Eric Schwitzgebel, Russell Hurlburt

Transforming Consciousness: Personal Mythology, Neuroscience,
and Organizational Culture (Part 1 – Part 2 Monday afternoon)
Frank Echenhoffer, Stanley Krippner, Sunil Ahuja, Stacey Sterling

Research on Psychedelics Moves into the Mainstream. How to Use Psychedelics
Wisely and Well (Part 1 – Part 2 Monday afternoon)
James Fadiman, Thomas B. Roberts

Biofeedback, Mindfulness and Consciousness: An Interactive Approach
Keya Maitra, Connie Schrader

Monday April 12, 2 pm to 6 pm

Voices, Visions, Dreams, and the Limits of Consciousness: Explaining Anomalous
Neurological Phenomena Through the Work of Julian Jaynes
Brian McVeigh, Marcel Kuijsten

Imaging and fMRI analysis of Transcendental Meditation
David Hubbard, Alarik Arenander

Neural Basis of Suppression, Repression and Dissociation
Heather Berlin, Michael C. Anderson

A Victorian’s Guide To Consciousness: James, Myers, and The Fin De Siecle
Gang – Then and Now (Part 1) Stanley Krippner, Arthur Hastings, Allan
Combs, Pim Van Lommel, Adrian Parker, Jonathan Bricklin, Gary E. Schwartz

Update on Microtubules and Quantum Biology (Part 1)
Jack Tuszynski, Stuart Hameroff, Travis Craddock, Anirban Bandyopadyay, Gustav Bernroider, Nancy Woolf

Psychedelics in Mainstream Part 2

Transforming Consciousness Part 2

Yoga Asanas as Tools for Transforming Consciousness
Siegfried Bleher

Tuesday Morning April 13, 9 am to 1 pm

Experimenting with endogenous experience
Abraham Zangen, Talma Hendler

New Evidence for Conscious Global Broadcasting in the Brain
Bernard J Baars, Katie McGovern

Why Synesthesia Matters: Art, Science and Spirituality
Sean Day, Patricia Lynne Duffy, Carol Steen, Maureen Seaberg (Moderator)

Philosophical Theories of Consciousness
Josh Weisberg, Uriah Kriegel

Update on Microtubules and Quantum Biology (Part 2)

Victorian’s Guide Part 2

Imperience: Effecting Self-Transformation through Pranahuti Aided Meditation
K. Madhava, K. Mannur, S. Bhamidipati, B.S. Murty, N.V. Raghava Rao, W. Zeng

Social Events

Tuesday April 13, 2010, 7 pm – 10 pm
Welcome Party, Hotel Arizona

Tuesday April 13, 2010, 10:00 pm – 11:30 pm
Club Consciousness I, Leo Rich Theater
Jeff Warren – The Wheel of Consciousness

Wednesday April 14, 2010, 10 pm – 11:30 pm
Club Consciousness II, Club Congress (Hotel Congress)
Stand-up Consciousness Comedy/Music

Thursday April 15, 2010, 6 pm – 10 pm
Conference Banquet
Westin La Paloma Hotel and Resort

Friday April 16, 2010, 10 pm – 11:30 pm
Club Consciousness III, Leo Rich Theater
Poetry Slam, Zombie Blues, Talent Show

Saturday April 17, 2010
End-of-Consciousness Party – Saturday April 17, 2010, 8 pm till..??
Maynards at the Depot

Hospitality Suite
Hotel Arizona, Location and times TBA

Side Trips

Thursday afternoon, April 15, 2010
For details and exact times see www.consciousness.arizona.edu

Sabino Canyon Nature Walk and Tram Tour

Desert Jeep Adventure

San Xavier Mission and Historic Tucson Tour

Mt. Lemmon, The Santa Catalina Mountains and Nature Walk

Contact: Abi Behar-Montefiore, Manager, Center for Consciousness Studies,
University of Arizona
center@u.arizona.edu

Conference Program Committee
Stuart Hameroff – Co-chair
David Chalmers – Co-chair
Bernard Baars
Anthony Freeman
Al Kaszniak
Christof Koch
Uriah Kriegel
Hakwan Lau
Marilyn Schlitz

TSC 2010 Conference Abstract Submission System is OPEN
www.consciousness.arizona.edu

Schedule of Deadlines — Tentative

December 31 Abstracts Due
January 10 Decisions
February 15 Early Registration Due
March 1 Final Edits/Abstracts Due

Toward a Science of Consciousness 2010
April 12-17, 2010
Plenary program opens Tuesday April 13 at 1:45 pm

Wired for Hunger: The Brain and Obesity

alice — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 03:09:03 +0000

From the Dana Foundation:For most of human history, food was not readily available; storing energy helped ensure survival. Humans thus evolved to eat whenever food is at hand-a tendency that in the modern world may contribute to widespread obesity. Researchers are starting to determine the brain circuitry responsible for this default “eat” message. Marcelo Dietrich and Tamas Horvath tell the story of false starts and measured successes in obesity research. They propose that developing successful obesity therapy may require combining drug therapy with psychological or psychiatric approaches, as well as exercise. In the sidebar, they examine the opposite of obesity: anorexia nervosa.

Click here for the complete article.

Consciousness: Two College-Level Webcourses

alice — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 02:45:36 +0000

ANNOUNCEMENT / REMINDER

CONSCIOUSNESS: THE WEBCOURSE
&
ADVANCED SEMINAR:AN INTRODUCTION TO MIND AND BRAIN

With Dr. Bernard J. Baars

See website for course outline and registration forms:

www.consciousness.arizona.edu

Brief Summary:

Both courses will run November 14, 2009 through February 7, 2010 with a Winter Break from December 20 to January 4.

You will receive weekly podcasts, pdf lectures, and Experiential Labs. We will meet in live Discussion Groups each weekend.

Consciousness: The WebCourse will have Discussion Groups each Saturday and Sunday morning from 10am -12 noon, Pacific Time. Course Members are invited to participate live for one or two hours.

If you cannot join us at those times, we will have an Asynchronous Discussion Group for you as well.

The Advanced Seminar will meet via the web on Sunday afternoons from 2-4 pm.

Dr. Baars will send you audio lectures (podcasts) each week of the 10-week term, along with written lectures. We will have Experiential Labs each week, to allow you to explore your own experiences in various interesting ways.

We want to know what you think!

Filling out this very brief survey (link) would help us a great deal.

If you take the Survey you can get free downloads with WebCourse materials — and it is for a good cause…

Please follow this link:http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=0s3v0Be3COqoJnGVEJ656g_3d_3d

Thank you kindly!
Bernard J Baars, PhD

http://www.nsi.edu
http://bernardbaars.pbwiki.com
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernard_Baars

Theta Rhythm and Memory Performance

alice — Sun, 25 Oct 2009 04:42:34 +0000

In a recent study, Sebastian Guderian and colleagues examined the relation between theta oscillations and memory performance. During the study phase of this memory experiment, participants were presented with words and either performed a semantic or phonemic encoding task (there were two levels of processing used in this experiment). During the study phase, the researchers obtained whole-head MEG recordings. Later on during the test phase, the participants were given a free-recall test on the words that were presented to them during the study phase.

Interestingly, Guderian and colleagues found that amplitudes of theta oscillations that shortly preceded the presentation of the words were higher for those words that were later recalled during the free-recall test, compared to those words that were later forgotten.

Although past studies have shown that specific patterns of brain activity are associated with the encoding of items, this study by Guderian and colleagues is one of a handful of more recent studies that demonstrate pre-stimulus brain activity that is associated with later memory performance (another example is a study by Otten and colleagues).

Moreover, although semantic study tasks typically lead to better memory performance compared to phonemic tasks, the results of the study by Guederian and colleagues suggest that this study task benefit is not only statistically independent from the theta-related recall benefit, but that these benefits are additive.

Click here for the full paper.

What Can Dance Teach Us about Learning?

alice — Thu, 22 Oct 2009 01:19:49 +0000

From the Dana Foundation: We might begin to learn a dance step when someone describes it to us, but we learn it better when we physically perform the steps as we observe and imitate an instructor doing them. Scott Grafton’s research sheds light on the brain’s action observation network, which fires up both when we perform an action and when we watch someone else perform it. Dr. Grafton contends that his and others’ findings highlight the importance of including physical learning in the classroom, to stimulate creativity, increase motivation and bolster social intelligence.

Click here for the complete article.

Alpha Oscillations, Attention and Consciousness

alice — Sat, 17 Oct 2009 06:47:54 +0000

One way to describe brain activity measured by EEG or MEG is by its frequency content. Frequencies can be categorized into one of the following ranges: low, middle and high. The low frequencies include the delta and theta ranges, whereas the middle frequency range consists of the alpha and beta ranges. The gamma wave belongs to the high frequency group.

Different cognitive functions have been associated with these different frequency ranges. Specifically, alpha oscillations have been associated with the inhibition of brain regions that are not required to perform a given task. However, in a past paper, Palva and Palva summarized an accumulating body of evidence that suggested that alpha oscillations play a much larger role in cognition by contributing to mechanisms of attention and consciousness. Click here for full access to the paper.

1/f Scaling and Emergent Pattern Formation in Complex Systems

alice — Sat, 10 Oct 2009 00:47:30 +0000

1/f scaling (or 1/f noise) refers to a scaling relation followed by fluctuations that have been widely observed in nature. 1/f fluctuations have been observed ubiquitously across different disciplines of science (e.g. chemistry, psychology, biology). In specific relation to cognitive neuroscience, 1/f scaling has been observed widely in fMRI measurement series and treated, generally, as noise to work around as opposed to an object of study. The challenge is that since 1/f fluctuations seem to be present throughout the brain, they do not help localize specific cognitive functions to specific areas of the brain. However, studies have shown that the appearance of 1/f fluctuations in fMRI measurements change as a function of cognitive variables.

Whereas some researchers argue that 1/f scaling is a byproduct of processes that are irrelevant to theories of cognition, others argue that 1/f fluctuations reflect a general and essential principle of emergent pattern formation in complex systems, including cognitive systems.

In a past study Kello, Beltz, Holden and Van Orden examined the relevance of 1/f scaling to cognitive function in four experiments using simple and choice response tasks. (For full access to the paper, click here.) The results of this study supported the emergent coordination argument and the researchers concluded that “the generality of 1/f scaling in cognitive performance is evidence that cognitive functions are universally formed as emergent patterns of physiological and behavioral activity”.

Lucid Dreaming: A State of Consciousness with Features of Both Waking and Non-Lucid Dreaming

alice — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 05:11:10 +0000

U. Voss, R. Holzmann, I. Tuin, J.A. Hobson
Article in Sleep

Abstract
Study Objectives: The goal of the study was to seek physiological correlates of lucid dreaming. Lucid dreaming is a dissociated state with aspects of waking and dreaming combined in a way so as to suggest a specific alteration in brain physiology for which we now present preliminary but intriguing evidence. We show that the unusual combination of hallucinatory dream activity and wake-like reflective awareness and agentive control experienced in lucid dreams is paralleled by significant changes in electrophysiology.

Design: 19-channel EEG was recorded on up to 5 nights for each participant. Lucid episodes occurred as a result of pre-sleep autosuggestion.

Setting: Sleep laboratory of the Neurological Clinic, Frankfurt University.

Participants: Six student volunteers who had been trained to become lucid and to signal lucidity through a pattern of horizontal eye movements.

Measurements and Results: Results show lucid dreaming to have REM-like power in frequency bands delta and theta, and higher-than-REM activity in the gamma band, the between-states-difference peaking around 40 Hz. Power in the 40 Hz band is strongest in the frontal and frontolateral region. Overall coherence levels are similar in waking and lucid dreaming and significantly higher than in REM sleep, throughout the entire frequency spectrum analyzed. Regarding specific frequency bands, waking is characterized by high coherence in alpha, and lucid dreaming by increased delta and theta band coherence. In lucid dreaming, coherence is largest in frontolateral and frontal areas.

Conclusions: Our data show that lucid dreaming constitutes a hybrid state of consciousness with definable and measurable differences from waking and from REM sleep, particularly in frontal areas.

Causal role of prefrontal cortex in the threshold for access to consciousness

alice — Mon, 05 Oct 2009 04:36:59 +0000

A. Del Cul, S. Dehaene, P. Reyes, E. Bravo, A. Slachevsky
Article in Brain

Abstract
What neural mechanisms support our conscious perception of briefly presented stimuli? Some theories of conscious access postulate a key role of topdown amplification loops involving prefrontal cortex (PFC). To test this issue, we measured the visual backward masking threshold in patients with focal prefrontal lesions, using both objective and subjective measures while controlling for putative attention deficits. In all conditions of temporal or spatial attention cueing, the threshold for access to consciousness was systematically shifted in patients, particular after a lesion of the left anterior PFC. The deficit affected subjective reports more than objective performance, and objective performance conditioned on subjective visibility was essentially normal. We conclude that PFC makes a causal contribution to conscious visual perception of masked stimuli, and outline a dual-route signal detection theory of objective and subjective decision making.

Web-based Courses on Consciousness

alice — Sun, 04 Oct 2009 06:56:15 +0000

Center for Consciousness Studies

announces

FALL 2009

Registration OPEN

November 14, 2009 to FEBRUARY 7, 2010

CONSCIOUSNESS: THE WEBCOURSE

and

ADVANCED SEMINAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO MIND AND BRAIN

Both taught by Dr. Bernard J. Baars

Both courses will run

November 14, 2009 – FEBRUARY 7, 2010

With a Winter Break from December 20 to January 4

Click here for Syllabus and Registration Forms

Tel: 520-621-9317

Email: center@u.arizona.edu

TOWARD A SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 2010

alice — Sat, 12 Sep 2009 17:00:59 +0000

First Announcement and Call for Abstracts

TOWARD A SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 2010
April 12-17, 2010
Tucson Convention Center, Tucson, Arizona

Survey: Neuroscience in Economics and Marketing?

thomasr — Wed, 29 Jul 2009 05:08:41 +0000

NEUROMARKETING SURVEY

We would like to invite you to take part to this survey. Your answers will help to gather information about the perceptions and thoughts about the use of brain science methods in non-medical settings.

CONFIDENTIALITY

Any information that you provide will be confidential. All participants will be anonymous such that no personal information concerning you or your company will be made public either during, or after the completion and release of this study. The questionnaire should take about 10 minutes of your time. If you wish to receive a summary of the results (that you can pass on to your home company) please indicate at the end of this questionnaire and include your e-mail address. We will not use this e-mail for other purposes than for sending you the summary.

WHO IS BEHIND THIS STUDY

My name is Matteo Bellisario, and I am completing my final report for my Master Degree in Strategic Market Creation at the Copenhagen Business School, in Copenhagen, Denmark.

My academic supervisor for this research is Dr. Thomas Z. Rams�y, head of the Decision Neuroscience Research Group at the Copenhagen Business School and Danish Research Centre for Magnetic Resonance at Copenhagen University Hospital.

The results will be part of my Master Thesis, and may, if suitable, be submitted to a peer-reviewed journal.

PLEASE CLICK ON THE LINK BELOW TO START THE SURVEY

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=UrWT2vR9gSIXNSKooLsNuQ_3d_3d

Neuroscience Meets Psychoanalysis

alice — Tue, 19 May 2009 05:29:27 +0000

From the Dana Foundation: Dr. Pierre Magistretti and Dr. Francois Ansermet spoke with Dana Foundation Chairman William Safire about their book, Biology of Freedom: Neural Plasticity, Experience, and the Unconscious, and the bridge between neuroscience and psychoanalysis. The event took place on November 14, 2007 at the Dana Center in Washington, DC.

Click here for the audio archive.

Learning, Arts, and the Brain: the Dana Consortium Report on Arts and Cognition

alice — Tue, 19 May 2009 04:47:34 +0000

From the Dana Foundation: The Dana Foundation released at a news conference on March 4, Learning, Arts, and the Brain, a three-year study at seven universities, which finds strong links between arts education and cognitive development. Speakers included Michael Gazzaniga, Ph.D., UC, Santa Barbara; Michael Posner, Ph.D., University of Oregon; Elizabeth Spelke, Ph.D., Harvard University and Brian Wandell, Ph.D., Stanford University. Guy Mckhann, M.D., Johns Hopkins University gave a summary and Dana Gioia, chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts spoke of the study’s importance to the field of education.

Click here for the webcast archive.

Click here for the event transcript.

Everyday Practice of Science: Where Intuition and Passion Meet Objectivity and Logic

alice — Mon, 04 May 2009 03:46:31 +0000

Everyday Practice of Science: Where Intuition and Passion Meet Objectivity and Logic

BY FREDERICK GRINNELL
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
248 PAGES

Reviewed by Alice Kim

From grade school onwards, I was taught that science follows a linear process. The practice of science was equated to the scientific method. During my undergraduate career I had the opportunity to get involved in research through independent research course projects, as well as summer student research programs. Throughout these experiences I started to sense that there may be more to the practice of science than the scientific method that I was taught in school. Now as a graduate student, I’m more aware of the ambiguity and passion that complements the objectivity and logic ingrained in the practice of science. In his book Everyday Practice of Science: Where Intuition and Passion Meet Objectivity and Logic, Dr. Frederick Grinnell describes the practice of science, embracing the role of intuition and passion, as well as logic and objectivity, in the path to discovery. Importantly, throughout his book Grinnell highlights the fact that scientists begin their work with particular interests and commitments. He recognizes that the hegemonic views of society are not filtered out from the practice of science. Instead, he emphasizes that the everyday practice of science seeks truth (small “t”) as we currently understand things, not Truth (capital “T”) that further experience cannot change.

Although the majority of the examples that Grinnell discusses come from the biomedical sciences and the biomedical research community, his examples provide thought-provoking insight into value judgments that are broadly applicable to different disciplines of research. For example, Grinnell discusses issues of trust that are involved in peer review processes of grant applications and research manuscripts submitted for publication, which is relevant to all disciplines of scientific research. Other topics covered in his book include conflict of interest and informed consent.

Grinnell’s discussion on peer review does an excellent job of guiding the reader to think about relevant ethical issues. For example, Grinnell aptly states that although the contents of grant applications and submitted manuscripts are privileged and confidential information, reviewers cannot avoid being affected by what they have learned. The following question that may then arise in the readers mind: How can a reviewer separate themselves and their research from the content of a paper or grant application that is under review? This is an important issue because scientists submit the reports of their studies for review before receiving credit for it, and according to the Society for Neuroscience guidelines for reviewers of manuscripts, the resources that are necessary for research are most often awarded to those with the best ideas and highest productivity. For this reason, it is very important that reviewers do not abuse their advanced access to new ideas, methods, or data. Moreover, since the stakes are so high it is important to consider the ethics of reviewing seriously and carefully. Although Grinnell does not specifically address the question posed above, I recommend Grinnell’s book because it stimulates the reader to think about these sorts of questions.

Moreover, the peer review process is put into perspective through Grinnell’s description and discussion on this topic. For example, writing specifically about grant applications to the National Institute of Health, Grinnell points out that organizing a review panel is a challenging task because the peer reviewers of these applications must be recognized authorities in their fields and must also be funded investigators on projects that are comparable to those under review. This is because peer reviewers should be knowledgeable on the topic of the proposal so that they can assess the applications fairly. A concern that arises then is this: the more closely a reviewer’s expertise overlaps with an applicant’s, the more likely it is that the two could be allies or direct competitors, which then leads to the topic of conflict of interest. This type of guided discussion makes this book a valuable resource for anyone in the early stages of a scientific career, particularly graduate students, and of interest to anyone concerned about science policy and science education.

I thoroughly appreciate the fact that Grinnell does not dodge the topics of scientific misconduct and conflicts of interest, which have raised concerns from the public about the integrity of scientists. In his writing on scientific misconduct, Grinnell highlights the fact that several instances of fabrication and plagiarism were committed by scientists during the late 1970′s, which led to the development of a definition of scientific misconduct in the United States that could accommodate the ambiguity of the practice of science. Although there was much controversy over how misconduct should be defined, Grinnell explains that this was eventually resolved with the government-wide definition that was set forth by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). According to the OSTP, scientific misconduct is defined as “fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in proposing, performing, or reviewing research, or in reporting research results”. This definition also established that “a finding of research misconduct requires that there be a significant departure from accepted practices of the relevant research community” (p118).

Grinnell’s discussion on the development of a Unites States government wide definition of scientific misconduct is interesting, because it highlights the ineffectiveness of guidelines for the conduct of science when vague language, such as the phrase “other practices that seriously deviate”, are utilized. As a graduate student, I’ve started to notice that guidelines for scientific conduct, such as the reviewing of manuscripts and deciding who should be an author on the paper, seem to only provide a general structure of how one should act, since much of the language used in these documents are left to the interpretation of the scientist or scientist in training. Although there may be a set definition of misconduct, often it seems that it is left to the discretion of the individual to assess which acts constitute misconduct in a given situation. Here, it seems that differences in interpretation and opinion lead to conflict, which is undeniably a part of science.

Grinnell’s organization of The Everyday Practice of Science is clear and logical, making the book easy to follow. The book is divided into two general sections. In the first section, Grinnell describes the practice of science with the insight of an insider (one who has been involved in biomedical research for more than 35 years). He takes the time to thoroughly discuss discovery and credibility, which Grinnell considers to be the two activities that are central to the practice of science. Interestingly, he notes that discovery and credibility circle the researcher and that the biography and personality of the researcher influences each step of these processes. In the second section of the book, Grinnell analyzes issues of science and society that have received significant national attention in recent years. He covers the topic of scientific integrity, from the individual level of responsible conduct to the societal level of science policy. He also focuses on issues relevant to informed consent, as well as risks that are present at the interface of human research and genetics. Grinnell then moves on to analyze the relation between science and religion, suggesting that the two represent different attitudes toward human experience that are based on different types of faith.

I highly recommend The Everyday Practice of Science to anyone who is pursuing or even considering a scientific career. Having gone through a North American education system from grade school through to an undergraduate degree in science, I was taught that successful results, organized presentation, and adherence to the structure and rules of the scientific method leads to discovery and reward in science. However, regardless of what one may expect or even wish the practice of science to be, if they stick with it long enough they will discover that it consists of more than the linear scientific method. Grinnell’s book guides the reader through different spheres of the practice of science that are not often, if ever, covered in the classroom or textbooks. Although all graduate students likely already have a basic sense of the everyday practice of science, Grinnell’s discussions illuminate and provoke deeper thought on aspects of practice that one may otherwise not ponder unless/until they are forced to deal with them in their own career. As a last note on the value of taking an interest in the practice of everyday science, I end this review with the Grinnell’s own words from Everyday Practice of Science (p. 20):

Why has everyday practice not become a more central focus for science education? Whatever the reasons, ignoring practice impedes the goals of science education. When he was executive director of the National Science Teachers Association, Bill Aldridge wrote that the framework for science education should be built around three fundamental questions: What do we mean? How do we know? Why do we believe? (31). Those who do not understand the practice of science cannot, in the end, answer these questions.

Understanding Consciousness, 2nd Edition

alice — Mon, 04 May 2009 02:51:15 +0000

Authored by Max Velmans

Understanding Consciousness, 2nd Edition provides a unique survey and evaluation of consciousness studies, along with an original analysis of consciousness that combines scientific findings, philosophy and common sense. Building on the widely praised first edition, this new edition adds fresh research, and deepens the original analysis in a way that reflects some of the fundamental changes in the understanding of consciousness that have taken place over the last 10 years.

The book is divided into three parts; Part one surveys current theories of consciousness, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. Part two reconstructs an understanding of consciousness from first principles, starting with its phenomenology, and leading to a closer examination of how conscious experience relates to the world described by physics and information processing in the brain. Finally, Part three deals with some of the fundamental issues such as what consciousness is and does, and how it fits into to the evolving universe. As the structure of the book moves from a basic overview of the field to a successively deeper analysis, it can be used both for those new to the subject and for more established researchers.

Understanding Consciousness tells a story with a beginning, middle and end in a way that integrates the philosophy of consciousness with the science. Overall, the book provides a unique perspective on how to address the problems of consciousness and as such, will be of great interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals concerned with mind/body relationships, and all who are interested in this subject.

2009, 408 pp, paperback and hardback
ISBN: 978-0-415-42516-2

Table of Contents

Part 1. Mind-body theories and their problems

1. What is consciousness?
2. Conscious souls, brains and quantum mechanics
3. Are mind and matter the same thing?
4. Are mind and consciousness just activities?
5. Could robots be conscious?

Part 2. A new analysis: How to marry science with experience

6.   Conscious phenomenology and common sense
7.   The nature and location of experiences
8.   Experienced worlds, the world described by physics, and the thing itself
9. Subjective, intersubjective and objective science
10. How consciousness relates to information processing in the brain
11. The neural causes and correlates of consciousness

Part 3. A new synthesis: Reflexive monism

12: What consciousness is
13. What consciousness does
14. Self-consciousness in a reflexive universe

Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies

alice — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 04:01:12 +0000

Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz
Article in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Abstract
When people are trying to determine whether an entity is capable of having certain kinds of mental states, they can think of it either from a functional standpoint or from a physical standpoint. We conducted a series of studies to determine how each of these standpoints impact people’s mental state ascriptions. The results point to a striking difference between two kinds of states-those that involve phenomenal consciousness and those that do not. Specifically, it appears that ascriptions of states that involve phenomenal consciousness show a special sort of sensitivity to purely physical factors.

Click here for the complete article.

The Emergence of Consciousness in Phylogeny

alice — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 04:00:47 +0000

Michel Cabanac, Arnaud J. Cabanac, Andre Parent
Article in Behavioural Brain Research

Abstract
The brains of animals show chemical, anatomical, and functional differences, such as dopamine production and structure of sleep, between Amniota and older groups. In addition, play behavior, capacity to acquire taste aversion, sensory pleasure in decision making, and expression of emotional tachycardia and fever started also to be displayed by Amniota, suggesting that the brain may have began to work differently in early Amniota than in Lissamphibia and earlier vertebrates. Thus we propose that emotion, and more broadly speaking consciousness, emerged in the evolutionary line among the early Amniota. We also propose that consciousness is characterized by a common mental pathway that uses pleasure, or its counterpart displeasure, as a means to optimize behavior.

Falls, Faints, Fits and Funny Turns

alice — Fri, 10 Apr 2009 04:05:38 +0000

Roland D. Thijs, Bastiaan R. Bloem, J. Gert van Dijk
Article in Journal of Neurology

Abstract
In this practically oriented review, we will outline the clinical approach of patients with falls due to an impairment or loss of consciousness. Following a set of definitions, we describe the salient clinical features of disorders leading to such falls. Among falls caused by true loss of consciousness, we separate the clinical characteristics of syncopal falls (due to reflex syncope, hypovolemia, orthostatic hypotension or cardiac syncope) from falls due to other causes of transient unconsciousness, such as seizures. With respect to falls caused by an apparent loss of consciousness, we discuss the presentation of cataplexy, drop attacks, and psychogenic falls. Particular emphasis will be laid upon crucial features obtained by history taking for distinguishing between the various conditions that cause or mimic a transient loss of consciousness.

Click here for a preview of the paper.

Investigating the Awareness of Remembering

alice — Fri, 10 Apr 2009 04:01:50 +0000

Ken A. Paller, Joel L.Voss, Carmen E. Westerberg
Article in Perspectives on Psychological Science

Abstract
There is a marked lack of consensus concerning the best way to learn how conscious experiences arise. In this article, we advocate for scientific approaches that attempt to bring together four types of phenomena and their corresponding theoretical accounts: behavioral acts, cognitive events, neural events, and subjective experience. We propose that the key challenge is to comprehensively specify the relationships among these four facets of the problem of understanding consciousness without excluding any facet. Although other perspectives on consciousness can also be informative, combining these four perspectives could lead to significant progress in explaining a conscious experience such as remembering. We summarize some relevant findings from cognitive neuroscience investigations of the conscious experience of memory retrieval and of memory behaviors that transpire in the absence of the awareness of remembering. These examples illustrate suitable scientific strategies for making progress in understanding consciousness by developing and testing theories that connect the behavioral expression of recall and recognition, the requisite cognitive transactions, the neural events that make remembering possible, and the awareness of remembering.

Click here for the full paper.

Toward a Science of Consciousness Conference 2009: Announcement and Call for Papers

alice — Fri, 10 Apr 2009 04:00:16 +0000

(Original posted on 15 Nov. 2008)
Investigating Inner Experience
Brain, Mind, Technology

Hong Kong, China, June 11-14, 2009

www.asiaconsciousness.org/TSC

Long a meeting place for Eastern and Western ideas and the media capital of Asia, Hong Kong, China hosts the 15th in a series of Toward a Science of Consciousness conferences held yearly since 1994. The conferences are known for broad, interdisciplinary and multi-faceted approaches to the age-old question of how the brain produces consciousness awareness

Subjective inner experience has long been approached through introspection, mysticism, and meditative contemplation, and revealed through art, mythology and ritual. In the past half century, science has found computation among neurons to explain brain functions, and promoted the possibility of conscious machines. Now, various media technologies attempt to communicate, simulate and re-create inner experience. In a spirit of synergy, the conference is organized along three entwined themes.

BRAIN: Does consciousness require axonal firing explosions, dendritic synchrony, global assemblies, recurrent loops, mobile agents or finer-scale activities inside neurons? What do mechanisms of mind-altering drugs tell us about consciousness? What can brain imaging and electrical recording tell us about conscious and unconscious processing?

MIND: How can subjective experience be studied objectively? Are Western analytical and Eastern contemplative methods complementary? Do ordinary states of consciousness differ in measurable brain activity from altered and meditative states? What essential features of inner experience can be best reported and artistically portrayed?

TECHNOLOGY: How can technology best interface with consciousness? Can consciousness exist in technology? Can the science of consciousness help media technology become more attuned to human subjective experience? Can functional brain organization be useful in technology design?

A Plenary Program, Pre-Conference Workshops, social events and side trips will be announced. The conference precedes the IEEE Conference on Cognitive Informatics in Hong Kong (June 15-17), and is affiliated with other events in June, 2009 which are part of an Asia Consciousness Festival – http://www.asia.consciousness.org

Submissions of original papers related to the three themes are invited from philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, phenomenology, media, technology, games, computer science, and other related fields.

Abstract submission will be open until February 1, 2009. For registration, abstract submission and further information see http://www.asiaconsciousness.org/TSC

Abstract Submissions: https://sbs.arizona.edu/project/consciousness

Submissions demonstrating media, technology and art attempting to simulate consciousness are invited for a special session. Prizes will be awarded for the best demos.

Abstract submitters will be notified regarding abstract assignment within two weeks of submission.

Sponsored by
Hong Kong Polytechnic University, MERECL

and the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona

Conference Organizers
Gino Yu, Hong Kong Polytechnic University
David Chalmers, Australian National University
Stuart Hameroff, The University of Arizona

Program Committee
Roy Ascott – University of Plymouth
David Chalmers – Australian National University
Richard Davidson – University of Wisconsin
Majid Fotuhi – Johns Hopkins University
Baroness Susan Greenfield – Oxford University
Stuart Hameroff – University of Arizona
Allen Houng – National Yang Ming University, Taiwan
Shier Ju – Sun Yat-sen University
Hakwan Lau – Columbia University
Olga Louchakova – Institute of Transpersonal Psychology
Jefferey Martin – California Institute of Integral Studies
Ryojei Nakatsu – National University of Singapore
Dean Radin – Institute of Noetic Sciences
Sraddhalu Ranade – Sri Aurobindo Ashram
Matthias Rauterberg – TU Eindhoven
Thomas Ray – University of Oklahoma
Pamela Rugledge – Media Psychology Research Center
Marilyn Schlitz – Institute of Noetic Sciences
Dan Siegel – Mindsight Institute
Jeff Warren – Author
Charles Whitehead – University of Westminster, London
Gino Yu – Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Nature Precedings: Pre-publication research and preliminary findings

alice — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 02:15:52 +0000

Contribute, comment and collaborate

Nature Precedings is a free online service from NPG that enables researchers in the life sciences to openly share preliminary findings, solicit community feedback, and claim priority over discoveries by posting preprint manuscripts, white papers, technical reports, posters, and presentations.

SCR is back after hiatus

admin — Tue, 10 Mar 2009 01:35:59 +0000

Apologies for the confusion everyone. It won’t be happening again for quite sometime.

The Default Mode Network and Self-Referential Processes in Depression

alice — Tue, 17 Feb 2009 04:49:25 +0000

In a recent study, Sheline and colleagues examined whether patients with major depression were impaired in their ability to regulate the activity of the default mode network, which is characterized by self-referential functions. To do so, they used fMRI to measure changes in brain activity occurring within this network in 20 individuals with major depression and 21 demographically similar control participants. The depressed and healthy control participants were asked to examine negative pictures passively and also to reappraise them actively.

In contrast to the depressed participants, the healthy control participants demonstrated reduced activity in widely distributed regions of the default mode network (ventromedial prefrontal cortex, prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, lateral parietal cortex, and lateral temporal cortex) while looking at the negative pictures and reappraising them. Moreover, compared to the healthy control participants, the depressed participants demonstrated a larger increase in activity in other default mode network regions (amygdala, parahippocampus, and hippocampus) while they looked at negative pictures.

Based on these data, Sheline and colleagues suggest that depression is characterized by both a stimulus-induced increase in brain activity and a failure to broadly decrease the activity of the default mode network. Further, the authors suggest that these findings provide a brain network framework within which to consider the pathophysiology of depression.

Click here for full access to the study.

When Your Gain is My Pain and Your Pain is My Gain: Neural Correlates of Envy and Schadenfreude

alice — Mon, 16 Feb 2009 08:07:58 +0000

We often make social comparisons to evaluate others and ourselves. In a recent study in Science, Takahashi and colleagues investigated the neurocognitive mechanisms of envy and schadenfreude (pleasure at another’s misfortune) using fMRI. The researchers found that envy and schadenfreude are associated with different parts of the brain. Whereas envy was associated with the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, schadenfreude was associated with the ventral striatum. The dorsal anterior cingulate is involved in the processing of cognitive conflicts; envy-related activation in this region was greater when the envied person had superior and more self-relevant characteristics. The ventral striatum is involved in processing reward and the schadenfreude-related activity in this region was stronger when misfortune befell an envied person more so than a neutral person. Additionally, envy-related activity in the anterior cingulate predicted schadenfreude-related activity in the ventral striatum. Takahashi and colleagues suggest that their findings document mechanisms of painful emotion, envy, and a rewarding reaction, schadenfreude.

Interoceptive Awareness in Experienced Meditators

alice — Mon, 09 Feb 2009 06:39:47 +0000

Meditation can be conceptualized as a complex form of attentional and emotional training that promotes well-being and emotional balance. In most meditation traditions, a common practice is to focus one’s attention to internal body sensations, and many traditions state that this practice results in an increased awareness of internal body sensations. In a study by Khalsa and colleagues, two groups of meditators (Tibetan Buddhist and Kundalini) were compared to a group of nonmeditators on their ability to detect their own heartbeat. (The meditators and nonmeditators were matched for age and body mass index.) Although the investigators predicted that the experienced meditators would outperform the nonmeditators, no such evidence was found. Compared to the nonmeditators, however, the experienced meditators consistently rated the difficulty of the heartbeat detection task as easier and their interoceptive performance as superior. These results suggest that the practice of focusing one’s attention to internal body sensations (a core feature of meditation) does not enhance the ability to sense the heartbeat at rest, but it alters the subjective experience of it.

Outliers: The Story of Success

alice — Mon, 09 Feb 2009 04:58:47 +0000

Why do some people succeed far more than others? Martin Gladwell, the author of The Tipping Point and Blink, tackles this question in his latest book Outliers. Gladwell argues that the true story of success is much more complex than the story that is typically told about extremely successful people – one that centers on ambition and intelligence. Click here for the table of contets.

Click here if you’re interested in knowing the most surprising pattern that Gladwell uncovered in his book, how he thinks Outliers compare to Blink and The Tipping Point and more.

Click here for a related article on genius by Gladwell in The New Yorker.

Personality and Motivations Associated with Facebook Use

alice — Sat, 31 Jan 2009 06:13:54 +0000

Craig Ross, Emily S. Orr, Mia Sisic, Jaime M. Arseneault, Mary G. Simmering and R. Robert Orr
Article in Computers in Human Behavior

Abstract
Facebook is quickly becoming one of the most popular tools for social communication. However, Facebook is somewhat different from other Social Networking Sites as it demonstrates an offline-to-online trend; that is, the majority of Facebook Friends are met offline and then added later. The present research investigated how the Five-Factor Model of personality relates to Facebook use. Despite some expected trends regarding Extraversion and Openness to Experience, results indicated that personality factors were not as influential as previous literature would suggest. The results also indicated that a motivation to communicate was influential in terms of Facebook use. It is suggested that different motivations may be influential in the decision to use tools such as Facebook, especially when individual functions of Facebook are being considered.

Identity Construction on Facebook: Digital Empowerment in Anchored Relationships

alice — Sat, 31 Jan 2009 06:13:42 +0000

Shanyang Zhao, Sherri Grasmuck and Jason Martin
Article in Computers in Human Behavior

Abstract
Early research on online self-presentation mostly focused on identity constructions in anonymous online environments. Such studies found that individuals tended to engage in role-play games and anti-normative behaviors in the online world. More recent studies have examined identity performance in less anonymous online settings such as Internet dating sites and reported different findings. The present study investigates identity construction on Facebook, a newly emerged nonymous online environment. Based on content analysis of 63 Facebook accounts, we find that the identities produced in this nonymous environment differ from those constructed in the anonymous online environments previously reported. Facebook users predominantly claim their identities implicitly rather than explicitly; they “show rather than tell” and stress group and consumer identities over personally narrated ones. The characteristics of such identities are described and the implications of this finding are discussed.

Caloric Restriction Improves Memory in Elderly Humans

alice — Sat, 31 Jan 2009 05:49:45 +0000

A. V. Witte, M. Fobker, R. Gellner, S. Knecht and A. Flöel
Article in PNAS

Abstract
Animal studies suggest that diets low in calories and rich in unsaturated fatty acids (UFA) are beneficial for cognitive function in age. Here, we tested in a prospective interventional design whether the same effects can be induced in humans. Fifty healthy, normal- to overweight elderly subjects (29 females, mean age 60.5 years, mean body mass index 28 kg/m) were stratified into 3 groups: (i) caloric restriction (30% reduction), (ii) relative increased intake of UFAs (20% increase, unchanged total fat), and (iii) control. Before and after 3 months of intervention, memory performance was assessed under standardized conditions. We found a significant increase in verbal memory scores after caloric restriction (mean increase 20%; P < 0.001), which was correlated with decreases in fasting plasma levels of insulin and high sensitive C-reactive protein, most pronounced in subjects with best adherence to the diet (all r values < -0.8; all P values <0.05). Levels of brain-derived neurotrophic factor remained unchanged. No significant memory changes were observed in the other 2 groups. This interventional trial demonstrates beneficial effects of caloric restriction on memory performance in healthy elderly subjects. Mechanisms underlying this improvement might include higher synaptic plasticity and stimulation of neurofacilitatory pathways in the brain because of improved insulin sensitivity and reduced inflammatory activity. Our study may help to generate novel prevention strategies to maintain cognitive functions into old age.

Hyperactivity and Hyperconnectivity of the Default Network in Schizophrenia and in First-degree Relatives of Persons with Schizophrenia

alice — Sat, 31 Jan 2009 05:29:40 +0000

Susan Whitfield-Gabrieli, Heidi W. Thermenos, Snezana Milanovic, Ming T. Tsuang, Stephen V. Faraone, Robert W. McCarley, Martha E. Shenton, Alan I. Green, Alfonso Nieto-Castanon, Peter LaViolette, Joanne Wojcik, John D. E. Gabrieli and Larry J. Seidman
Article in PNAS

Abstract
We examined the status of the neural network mediating the default mode of brain function, which typically exhibits greater activation during rest than during task, in patients in the early phase of schizophrenia and in young first-degree relatives of persons with schizophrenia. During functional MRI, patients, relatives, and controls alternated between rest and performance of working memory (WM) tasks. As expected, controls exhibited task-related suppression of activation in the default network, including medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus. Patients and relatives exhibited significantly reduced task-related suppression in MPFC, and these reductions remained after controlling for performance. Increased task-related MPFC suppression correlated with better WM performance in patients and relatives and with less psychopathology in all 3 groups. For WM task performance, patients and relatives had greater activation in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) than controls. During rest and task, patients and relatives exhibited abnormally high functional connectivity within the default network. The magnitudes of default network connectivity during rest and task correlated with psychopathology in the patients. Further, during both rest and task, patients exhibited reduced anticorrelations between MPFC and DLPFC, a region that was hyperactivated by patients and relatives during WM performance. Among patients, the magnitude of MPFC task suppression negatively correlated with default connectivity, suggesting an association between the hyperactivation and hyperconnectivity in schizophrenia. Hyperactivation (reduced task-related suppression) of default regions and hyperconnectivity of the default network may contribute to disturbances of thought in schizophrenia and risk for the illness.

Organizing for the Kingdom of Behavior: Academic Battles and Organizational Policies in the Twenties

alice — Sun, 25 Jan 2009 05:51:05 +0000

In his paper, Samelson (1985) highlights structural changes that occurred in academia and beyond during the 1920′s; like the changes and activities that were going on in research, these external changes were largely influenced by World War I. Samelson demonstrates that the historical developments of behaviorism were complicated and that a variety of forces and counter forces were operating. He describes, in detail, the role of Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM) and its members in directing the research program of the social sciences.

After the war, the LSRM planned to fund research that would help improve the social problems of post-war America by distributing enormous grants to research groups that conducted interdisciplinary, empirical social science research that served practical (not only academic) interests. The LSRM was looking to fund research that would result in substantial social control, in time, to help improve societal post-war conditions in America. Although it is unknown whether the LSRM funding drove universities to form interdisciplinary groups so that they could apply for LSRM funding or if academia and the Memorial were influencing each other the whole time, as the LSRM grants became available the formation of interdisciplinary social science research groups were on the rise, and the common topic of interest that brought them together were factors that affect the behavior of individuals and societies.

Although Watson and Skinner provided the faces and philosophies for behaviorism, the “Kingdom of Behaviorism” could not have risen at it did without the contributions of other factors. Evidently, the contribution of funding agencies, the directors of these organizations, and other larger social factors, such as the war, played a large role in the rise of behaviorism.

‘Introspectionism’ and the Mythical Origins of Scientific Psychology

alice — Sun, 25 Jan 2009 05:00:44 +0000

Alan Costall
Article in Consciousness and Cognition

Abstract
According to the majority of the textbooks, the history of modern, scientific psychology can be tidily encapsulated in the following three stages. Scientific psychology began with a commitment to the study of mind, but based on the method of introspection. Watson rejected introspectionism as both unreliable and effete, and redefined psychology, instead, as the science of behaviour. The cognitive revolution, in turn, replaced the mind as the subject of study, and rejected both behaviourism and a reliance on introspection. This paper argues that all three stages of this history are largely mythical. Introspectionism was never a dominant movement within modern psychology, and the method of introspection never went away. Furthermore, this version of psychology’s history obscures some deep conceptual problems, not least surrounding the modern conception of “behaviour,” that continues to make the scientific study of consciousness seem so weird.

Learning, Arts, and the Brain: The Dana Consortium Report

alice — Sat, 17 Jan 2009 08:41:39 +0000

From the Dana Foundation: Learning, Arts, and the Brain, a study three years in the making, is the result of research by cognitive neuroscientists from seven leading universities across the United States. In the Dana Consortium study, released in March 2008, researchers grappled with a fundamental question: Are smart people drawn to the arts or does arts training make people smarter?

For the first time, coordinated, multi-university scientific research brings us closer to answering that question. Learning, Arts, and the Brain advances our understanding of the effects of music, dance, and drama education on other types of learning. Children motivated in the arts develop attention skills and strategies for memory retrieval that also apply to other subject areas.

The research was led by Dr. Michael S. Gazzaniga of the University of California at Santa Barbara. “A life-affirming dimension is opening up in neuroscience,” said Dr. Gazzaniga, “to discover how the performance and appreciation of the arts enlarge cognitive capacities will be a long step forward in learning how better to learn and more enjoyably and productively to live. The consortium’s new findings and conceptual advances have clarified what now needs to be done.”

Click here for complete article

Click here to download a a PDF version of the full report (2MB)

The ‘Super-aged’ Proffer a Template

alice — Sat, 17 Jan 2009 08:20:44 +0000

From The Dana Foundation: My great-grandmother lived to the ripe old age of 98. While many of her friends and neighbors had lost critical cognitive function decades before, requiring assistance for day-to-day activities, she somehow maintained her faculties well enough to live on her own well into her 90s. What was it about my great-grandmother’s brain-and those of others like her-that allowed her to retain these essential cognitive capabilities? Researchers at Northwestern University and elsewhere are shedding some light on the so-called “super-aged,” offering new insight into the aging brain and memory.

Click here for complete article.

Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood

alice — Thu, 08 Jan 2009 19:20:53 +0000

Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood
BY NIKOLAS ROSE
Cambridge University Press (December 28, 1998)
236 pages

Book summary by Alice Kim

In Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood, Rose questions some of our contemporary certainties about the kinds of people we take ourselves to be, with the aim of helping to develop alternative ways in which we might begin to think of ourselves. He problematizes our contemporary regime of the self by examining some of the processes through which this regulative ideal of the self has been invented. A central argument of Rose’s book is that this regime of the self is often localized in distinct practices with particular presuppositions about the subjects that inhabit them and thus this regime of the self is more heterogeneous than is often allowed.

In response to the question how should one do the history of the self? Rose proposes an approach termed ‘the genealogy of subjectification’, which takes the individualized, interiorized, totalized, and psychologized understanding of what it is to be human as the site of a historical problem, not as a basis for a historical narrative. Further, he argues for a particular approach to the history of psychology that helps us think about the conditions under which what we take for truth and reality has been established. He refers to this approach as ‘critical history’. According to Rose, critical history reveals the fragility of things that seems solid and the contingency of things that seem necessary. Its aim is not to predetermine judgment, but to make judgment possible. Rose claims that psychology, and all the psy knowledges, have contributed significantly to the reorganization of the practices and techniques that have linked authority to subjectivity over the past century and that psychology is a profoundly social science, where even the most ‘individualistic’ experts of psychology must be connected into the social field.

Rose proposes the concept of techne to think about the characteristic ways that psychology has entered into a range of ‘human technologies’ – practices seeking certain outcomes in terms of human conduct such as reform, education, or cure. He argues that psychological modes of thought and action have come to underpin a range of diverse practices for dealing with persons and conduct that were previously thought of and legitimated in other ways. He also examines the links between social psychology and democracy, claiming that social psychology written in the 1930′s through to the 1950′s makes frequent references to democracy. According to Rose, to rule citizens democratically means ruling them through their freedoms, choices, and their solidarities and that social psychology is constitutively linked to democracy, as a way of organizing, exercising, and legitimizing political power.

Rose concludes his book by proposing that psy has played a key role in the ‘folds’ through which we have come to relate to ourselves and that analyses of these psychological ‘foldings’ help us understand how we have been brought to recognize ourselves as subjects of ‘freedom’. According to Rose, we seek to govern the psychological being under the regulative ideal of freedom, which is “an ideal that imposes as many burdens, anxieties, and divisions as it inspires projects of emancipation, and in the name of which we have come to authorize so many authorities to assist us in the project of being free from any authority but our own” (p. 197).

H.M.’s Brain and the History of Memory

alice — Mon, 08 Dec 2008 06:45:56 +0000

For an audio recording provided by the National Public Radio on patient H.M. and his contribution to memory research, click here.

H. M., an Unforgettable Amnesiac, Dies at 82

alice — Mon, 08 Dec 2008 05:18:45 +0000

From The New York Time (4 Dec. 2008): He knew his name. That much he could remember.

He knew that his father’s family came from Thibodaux, La., and his mother was from Ireland, and he knew about the 1929 stock market crash and World War II and life in the 1940s.

But he could remember almost nothing after that.

In 1953, he underwent an experimental brain operation in Hartford to correct a seizure disorder, only to emerge from it fundamentally and irreparably changed. He developed a syndrome neurologists call profound amnesia. He had lost the ability to form new memories.

For the next 55 years, each time he met a friend, each time he ate a meal, each time he walked in the woods, it was as if for the first time.

And for those five decades, he was recognized as the most important patient in the history of brain science. As a participant in hundreds of studies, he helped scientists understand the biology of learning, memory and physical dexterity, as well as the fragile nature of human identity.

On Tuesday evening at 5:05, Henry Gustav Molaison – known worldwide only as H. M., to protect his privacy – died of respiratory failure at a nursing home in Windsor Locks, Conn. His death was confirmed by Suzanne Corkin, a neuroscientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who had worked closely with him for decades. Henry Molaison was 82.

From the age of 27, when he embarked on a life as an object of intensive study, he lived with his parents, then with a relative and finally in an institution. His amnesia did not damage his intellect or radically change his personality. But he could not hold a job and lived, more so than any mystic, in the moment.

“Say it however you want,” said Dr. Thomas Carew, a neuroscientist at the University of California, Irvine, and president of the Society for Neuroscience. “What H. M. lost, we now know, was a critical part of his identity.”

At a time when neuroscience is growing exponentially, when students and money are pouring into laboratories around the world and researchers are mounting large-scale studies with powerful brain-imaging technology, it is easy to forget how rudimentary neuroscience was in the middle of the 20th century.

When Mr. Molaison, at 9 years old, banged his head hard after being hit by a bicycle rider in his neighborhood near Hartford, scientists had no way to see inside his brain. They had no rigorous understanding of how complex functions like memory or learning functioned biologically. They could not explain why the boy had developed severe seizures after the accident, or even whether the blow to the head had anything do to with it.

Eighteen years after that bicycle accident, Mr. Molaison arrived at the office of Dr. William Beecher Scoville, a neurosurgeon at Hartford Hospital. Mr. Molaison was blacking out frequently, had devastating convulsions and could no longer repair motors to earn a living.

After exhausting other treatments, Dr. Scoville decided to surgically remove two finger-shaped slivers of tissue from Mr. Molaison’s brain. The seizures abated, but the procedure – especially cutting into the hippocampus, an area deep in the brain, about level with the ears – left the patient radically changed.

Alarmed, Dr. Scoville consulted with a leading surgeon in Montreal, Dr. Wilder Penfield of McGill University, who with Dr. Brenda Milner, a psychologist, had reported on two other patients’ memory deficits.

Soon Dr. Milner began taking the night train down from Canada to visit Mr. Molaison in Hartford, giving him a variety of memory tests. It was a collaboration that would forever alter scientists’ understanding of learning and memory.

“He was a very gracious man, very patient, always willing to try these tasks I would give him,” Dr. Milner, a professor of cognitive neuroscience at the Montreal Neurological Institute and McGill University, said in a recent interview. “And yet every time I walked in the room, it was like we’d never met.”

At the time, many scientists believed that memory was widely distributed throughout the brain and not dependent on any one neural organ or region. Brain lesions, either from surgery or accidents, altered people’s memory in ways that were not easily predictable. Even as Dr. Milner published her results, many researchers attributed H. M.’s deficits to other factors, like general trauma from his seizures or some unrecognized damage.

“It was hard for people to believe that it was all due” to the excisions from the surgery, Dr. Milner said.

That began to change in 1962, when Dr. Milner presented a landmark study in which she and H. M. demonstrated that a part of his memory was fully intact. In a series of trials, she had Mr. Molaison try to trace a line between two outlines of a five-point star, one inside the other, while watching his hand and the star in a mirror. The task is difficult for anyone to master at first.

Every time H. M. performed the task, it struck him as an entirely new experience. He had no memory of doing it before. Yet with practice he became proficient. “At one point he said to me, after many of these trials, ‘Huh, this was easier than I thought it would be,’ ” Dr. Milner said.

The implications were enormous. Scientists saw that there were at least two systems in the brain for creating new memories. One, known as declarative memory, records names, faces and new experiences and stores them until they are consciously retrieved. This system depends on the function of medial temporal areas, particularly an organ called the hippocampus, now the object of intense study.

Another system, commonly known as motor learning, is subconscious and depends on other brain systems. This explains why people can jump on a bike after years away from one and take the thing for a ride, or why they can pick up a guitar that they have not played in years and still remember how to strum it.

Soon “everyone wanted an amnesic to study,” Dr. Milner said, and researchers began to map out still other dimensions of memory. They saw that H. M.’s short-term memory was fine; he could hold thoughts in his head for about 20 seconds. It was holding onto them without the hippocampus that was impossible.

“The study of H. M. by Brenda Milner stands as one of the great milestones in the history of modern neuroscience,” said Dr. Eric Kandel, a neuroscientist at Columbia University. “It opened the way for the study of the two memory systems in the brain, explicit and implicit, and provided the basis for everything that came later – the study of human memory and its disorders.”

Living at his parents’ house, and later with a relative through the 1970s, Mr. Molaison helped with the shopping, mowed the lawn, raked leaves and relaxed in front of the television. He could navigate through a day attending to mundane details – fixing a lunch, making his bed – by drawing on what he could remember from his first 27 years.

He also somehow sensed from all the scientists, students and researchers parading through his life that he was contributing to a larger endeavor, though he was uncertain about the details, said Dr. Corkin, who met Mr. Molaison while studying in Dr. Milner’s laboratory and who continued to work with him until his death.

By the time he moved into a nursing home in 1980, at age 54, he had become known to Dr. Corkin’s M.I.T. team in the way that Polaroid snapshots in a photo album might sketch out a life but not reveal it whole.

H. M. could recount childhood scenes: Hiking the Mohawk Trail. A road trip with his parents. Target shooting in the woods near his house.

“Gist memories, we call them,” Dr. Corkin said. “He had the memories, but he couldn’t place them in time exactly; he couldn’t give you a narrative.”

He was nonetheless a self-conscious presence, as open to a good joke and as sensitive as anyone in the room. Once, a researcher visiting with Dr. Milner and H. M. turned to her and remarked how interesting a case this patient was.

“H. M. was standing right there,” Dr. Milner said, “and he kind of colored – blushed, you know – and mumbled how he didn’t think he was that interesting, and moved away.”

In the last years of his life, Mr. Molaison was, as always, open to visits from researchers, and Dr. Corkin said she checked on his health weekly. She also arranged for one last research program. On Tuesday, hours after Mr. Molaison’s death, scientists worked through the night taking exhaustive M.R.I. scans of his brain, data that will help tease apart precisely which areas of his temporal lobes were still intact and which were damaged, and how this pattern related to his memory.

Dr. Corkin arranged, too, to have his brain preserved for future study, in the same spirit that Einstein’s was, as an irreplaceable artifact of scientific history.

“He was like a family member,” said Dr. Corkin, who is at work on a book on H. M., titled “A Lifetime Without Memory.” “You’d think it would be impossible to have a relationship with someone who didn’t recognize you, but I did.”

In his way, Mr. Molaison did know his frequent visitor, she added: “He thought he knew me from high school.”

Henry Gustav Molaison, born on Feb. 26, 1926, left no survivors. He left a legacy in science that cannot be erased.

A version of this article appeared in print on December 5, 2008, on page A1 of the New York edition.

Seeking Insights Into the Human Mind in Art and Science

alice — Mon, 08 Dec 2008 04:44:09 +0000

Proust Was a Neuroscientist
BY JONAH LEHRER
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN, 2007
230 PAGES

Reviewed by Steven Rose, Ph.D.
About Steven Rose, Ph.D.

From The Dana Foundation: Proust was a neuroscientist? No, despite Jonah Lehrer’s provocative title, the novelist Marcel Proust was not.

Proust’s seven-volume novel, À la recherche du temps perdu (English translations are titled either Remembrance of Things Past or In Search of Lost Time), published between 1913 and 1927, is a profound meditation on the nature of emotional and sensual memory and the complex interpersonal relationships of a decadent aristocracy and a rising bourgeoisie. Researchers studying memory will almost certainly be aware of the famous passage, early on in the first volume, where the taste of a madeleine cake evokes in Proust’s semi-autobiographical narrator an entire ensemble of childhood memories, as it is one of the few references to the work of a novelist to find its way regularly into neuroscience textbooks. But while Proust was profoundly introspective and focused on his own thoughts and feelings, his concern with the bodily mechanisms that underlay them was almost certainly confined to medical consultations about his perennially poor health.

Lehrer’s title thus reflects both the ambitious goals of his book and their limitations. His thesis, presented in a series of eight case studies, is that through the 19th and early 20th centuries, writers, painters, musicians, and even cooks achieved insights into the mind that both contradicted the assumptions of the sciences of their time and anticipated some of the understanding of the brain that modern neuroscience offers. It’s a fun and thought-provoking argument, even though I feel that at times his case remains at best non-proven.

Click here for complete article.

Real-time chemical responses in the nucleus accumbens differentiate rewarding and aversive stimuli

alice — Mon, 24 Nov 2008 05:28:12 +0000

Mitchell F Roitman, Robert A Wheeler, R Mark Wightman and Regina M Carelli
Article in Nature Neuroscience

Abstract
Rewarding and aversive stimuli evoke very different patterns of behavior and are rapidly discriminated. Here taste stimuli of opposite hedonic valence evoked opposite patterns of dopamine and metabolic activity within milliseconds in the nucleus accumbens. This rapid encoding may serve to guide ongoing behavioral responses and promote plastic changes in underlying circuitry.

Gamma oscillations mediate stimulus competition and attentional selection in a cortical network model

alice — Mon, 24 Nov 2008 04:48:16 +0000

Christoph Börgers, Steven Epstein, and Nancy J. Kopell
Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, USA

Abstract
Simultaneous presentation of multiple stimuli can reduce the firing rates of neurons in extrastriate visual cortex below the rate elicited by a single preferred stimulus. We describe computational results suggesting how this remarkable effect may arise from strong excitatory drive to a substantial local population of fast-spiking inhibitory interneurons, which can lead to a loss of coherence in that population and thereby raise the effectiveness of inhibition. We propose that in attentional states fast-spiking interneurons may be subject to a bath of inhibition resulting from cholinergic activation of a second class of inhibitory interneurons, restoring conditions needed for gamma rhythmicity. Oscillations and coherence are emergent features, not assumptions, in our model. The gamma oscillations in turn support stimulus competition. The mechanism is a form of “oscillatory selection,” in which neural interactions change phase relationships that regulate firing rates, and attention shapes those neural interactions.

The Decider

alice — Mon, 24 Nov 2008 04:17:13 +0000

Informing the debate over the reality of ‘free will’ requires learning something about the lateral habenula.

From ScienceNews: At the end of The Matrix trilogy, Neo and Agent Smith are engaged in one final, interminable scene of surreal combat, a surrogate competition for an eternal battle between humans and machines. “It’s pointless to keep fighting,” Agent Smith declares to Neo. “Why do you persist?”

“Because I choose to,” Neo replies, just before the computer-generated Smith meets his demise in a cinematic celebration of human free will’s superiority to the programming that enslaves machines. Machines are mindless. The brain is a decider.

All very inspiring, except that the brain itself is a machine, a network of cells that computes its choices based on the sum of sensory inputs and their interactions with neural anatomy. “Free will” is not the defining feature of humanness, modern neuroscience implies, but is rather an illusion that endures only because biochemical complexity conceals the mechanisms of decision making.

Yet belief in free will persists as stubbornly as Neo’s resistance to electronic tyranny. Whether supposedly free choice is actually a Matrix-like mirage remains one of the great questions of human philosophical history. For centuries that question was assessed mostly with thought -uninformed by actual neurobiological knowledge. Nowadays, though, the inner workings of the brain are revealing themselves to modern methods of neuroinquiry, and free will seems merely to emerge from electrochemical networks of neuronal interactions. But like tourists exploring a strange city without a GPS map, scientists don’t know how all the neural neighborhoods are connected and occasionally encounter surprising enclaves-such as a place in the brain called the lateral habenula.

“There’s lots of new research showing that an overactive habenula has behavioral effects,” says neuropharmacologist Martine Mirrione of Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, N.Y.

Questioning consciousness

To most people, who have never heard of the habenula, free will’s existence seems obvious, because they can make up their own mind whether to believe in it or not. Consciousness of choosing seems to imply the ability to choose. But the 19th century English historian Henry Thomas Buckle ridiculed such logic, pointing out that consciousness is often fallible. Some people profess to have consciousness of the presence of ghosts, for example. “If this boasted faculty deceives us in some things, what security have we that it will not deceive us in others?” Buckle asked.

Knowing everything about a man’s character, history and all external circumstances would in fact allow someone to accurately predict what he would do, Buckle averred. That example was hypothetical, he acknowledged. “We never can know the whole of any man’s antecedents,” he wrote. “But it is certain that the nearer we approach to a complete knowledge of the antecedents, the more likely we shall be to predict the consequent.”

Today, science’s knowledge is not nearly complete, but it’s a lot closer than in Buckle’s day. As evidence flows in from probes of animal brains and scans of living humans, the neural antecedents of the brain’s decisions are becoming more clearly visible. “Perhaps,” write neuroscientists Alireza Soltani and Xiao-Jing Wang, “we are entering a new period of consilience between the science of the brain and the science of the mind.”

Death to dualism

Such consilience would certify the death of Cartesian dualism, the mind-body distinction articulated by the French philosopher René Descartes in the 17th century. In modern neuroscience, that division dissolves-the mind is simply a reflection of different states of the brain. And brain states dictate the behaviors that masquerade as free choices.

Brains are, after all, the product of evolution. To survive and perpetuate their species, animals need food, water and sex. So brains are programmed to produce behavior that serves those ends-or seek substitutes that stimulate the same neural systems. Free will is not free to ignore these imperatives, although it isn’t always obvious how they all add up and tip the scales in favor of go or stop, do or don’t. Somehow, the brain sorts out the interplay between desire and caution, pleasure and pain, curiosity and fear. And the neural systems established by evolution for survival direct all the other decisions that animals (including people) routinely make-fight or flee, explore or hide, red or white, left or right.

Neurobiologists like to describe the sum of the brain’s many motivations with the concept of reward. In real life, the common currency for measuring reward is money (and consequently the study of the brain’s choice-making is sometimes called neuroeconomics). In the brain, that currency seems to be the molecular messenger known as dopamine.

Neurons producing dopamine are powerful forces in directing the brain’s decisions. Certain dopamine neurons in the midbrain are particularly active in driving the brain to seek rewards. But they’re not tuned simply to pleasure. Those dopamine neurons become electrically excited and release molecular messages simply in anticipation of pleasure. If the expected reward does not then materialize, those dopamine neurons take a rest. On the other hand, when an unexpected reward arrives, they fire signals vigorously. Apparently these dopamine neurons encode errors in predictions about potential rewards, so as to improve future decisions on what courses of action to pursue. In other words, dopamine neurons underlie learning how to behave based on pleasurable experiences.

Hail the habenula

Sound decisions depend on more than seeking pleasure, though. It’s also important to learn what choices will turn out to be bad. And the latest research suggests that that’s a job for the habenula.

It’s an obscure structure found deep in the brain, beneath the corpus callosum near the thalamus and in front of the pineal gland (the small body identified by Descartes as the seat of the soul, the source of free will). “Virtually all kinds of vertebrates have this habenula, which suggests that it is very important for survival,” says Okihide Hikosaka of the National Eye Institute, an NIH agency inBethesda, Md.

When a monkey is faced with a nonrewarding choice, neurons in the lateral part of the habenula fire their signals rapidly, Hikosaka and Masayuki Matsumoto reported in Nature last year. When the habenula neurons fire, dopamine neurons slow down. Apparently the habenula warns against bad choices by suppressing dopamine activity, either directly or perhaps via intermediary neurons.

“Dopamine neurons contribute to learning of actions based on good experiences,” Hikosaka says, “whereas lateral habenula neurons are probably involved in learning of actions based on bad experiences.”

Recent work in several other labs suggests that the habenula plays an especially key role in neuronal crosstalk, serving as a sort of relay station between the primitive parts of the brain, which control basic needs, and the most advanced frontal regions where thought and logic presumably moderate basic impulses. But nobody suggests that the habenula is the source of all decisions or the seat of human consciousness. It’s just one hub in a network of brain addresses where parts of the decision-making process are assembled. Neuroscientists discussing such issues chatter about the amygdala, the nucleus accumbens and the anterior cingulate cortex, the PFC, the OFC and the IPC. Such areas encode information on rewards, costs or how much to discount the value of rewards that will be delayed. Different neural neighborhoods control risky choices, safe bets and when to change a decision already made. And while the habenula communicates to many brain regions involved in decision making, various regions transmit messages to the habenula, too.

All of this is important for much more than just enlightening free-will philosophy or learning the nomenclature of brain anatomy. Habenula activity has been implicated in everything from stress and anxiety to psychiatric disorders and sleep. Besides influencing dopamine cells, for example, signals from the habenula suppress neurons that make serotonin, the brain chemical famous for its effects on mood. Mirrione and her collaborators at Brookhaven have shown a link between elevated habenula activity and symptoms of depression in rats.

Depressed people typically forgo pleasurable activities that would ordinarily elicit “go” signals from dopamine neurons. An overactive habenula, by damping dopamine, could drive depression by denying the brain the power to choose pleasure. Many popular antidepressants work by elevating the brain’s serotonin levels, perhaps countering the habenula signals that suppress serotonin production. But such antidepressants don’t always work. Direct intervention in the habenula might offer an alternative, Mirrione says. Their rat study “suggests that the habenula appears to be a novel target for therapeutic intervention in treatment-resistant depression,” she and her collaborators reported in November in Washington, D.C., at the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience.

Other studies hint that the habenula plays a role in nicotine withdrawal behaviors, with implications for helping people to quit smoking. Behavior underlying other drug addictions might also be disrupted by intercession in the habenula, Israeli scientists reported at the neuroscience meeting. Their study found that deep brain stimulation of the habenula influenced the desire of addicted rats to self-administer cocaine.

Practical and clinical implications aside, the habenula’s multiple powers, and the diversity of other brain regions it interacts with, all suggest that the original question about free will is ill-posed. Asking whether humans have free will is like asking which came first, chicken or egg. It’s not a meaningful question. For chickens and eggs, the issue is understanding DNA and genes and the chemistry controlling reproduction and heredity. For free will, the issue is understanding the complex circulation of molecular information that is massaged and manipulated at various stations by neural systems tuned to multiple decision-making considerations. That process is free will, even if it isn’t really free. So deciding whether the will is free turns out to be circular, although perhaps not viciously, like some of those fights in The Matrix.

“Giving Up Maleness”: Abraham Maslow, Masculinity, and the Boundaries of Psychology

alice — Thu, 20 Nov 2008 05:37:48 +0000

In a paper in History of Psychology, Nicholson (2001) examines Abraham Maslow’s attempt to reconstruct the boundaries of psychology. This paper focuses on Maslow’s struggle to find a way to “soften” scientific psychology without completely undermining what he believed was its essentially male nature. Nicholson argues that Maslow’s attempt to broaden what it meant to be a psychologist was intimately linked to the question of what it meant to be a man, and that Maslow’s struggle to come to terms with his masculinity should stand as a testament to the power of gender assumptions in psychology and in American professional life as a whole. According to Nicholson, Maslow stands as a dramatic demonstration of how significant the search for a powerful masculinity can be for the seemingly unrelated task of developing a powerful discipline.

BOOK: Frontiers of consciousness — The Chichele lectures

thomasr — Mon, 17 Nov 2008 14:31:11 +0000

In recent years consciousness has become a significant area of study in the cognitive sciences. The ‘Frontiers of Consciousness‘ is a major interdisciplinary exploration of consciousness. The book stems from the Chichele lectures held at All Souls College in Oxford, and features contributions from a ‘who’s who’ of authorities from both philosophy and psychology. The result is a truly interdisciplinary volume, which tackles some of the biggest and most impenetrable problems in consciousness.

The book includes chapters considering the apparent explanatory gap between science and consciousness, our conscious experience of emotions such as fear, and of willed actions by ourselves and others. It looks at subjective differences between two ways in which visual information guides behaviour, and scientific investigation of consciousness in non-human animals. It looks at the challenges that the mind-brain relation presents for clinical practice as well as for theories of consciousness. The book draws on leading research from philosophy, experimental psychology, functional imaging of the brain, neuropsychology, neuroscience, and clinical neurology.

Distinctive in its accessibility, authority, and its depth of coverage, ‘Frontiers of Consciousness’ will be a groundbreaking and influential addition to the consciousness literature.

Edited by two leading figures in psychology and philosophy of mind, and including contributions from an all star cast of scientists and philosophers
Unparalleled in its authority and depth of coverage

Contents

1. Consciousness and explanation , Martin Davies

2. Explanatory gaps and dualist intuitions , David Papineau

3. Emotional coloration of consciousness: how feelings came about , Joseph Le Doux

4. Emotion, higher order syntactic thoughts and consciousness , Edmund T Rolls

5. Conscious and unconscious visual processing in the human brain , A D Milner

6. Vision, action and awareness , Manos Tsakiris & Patrick Haggard

7. The social functions of consciousness , Chris D Frith

8. Are we studying consciousness yet? , Hakwan Lau

9. Beast machines? Questions of animal consciousness , Cecilia Heyes

10. Why a rat is not a beast machine , Anthony Dickinson

11. Does consciousness spring from the brain? Dilemmas of awareness in practice and theory , Adam Zeman

12. On the ubiquity of conscious-unconscious dissociations in neuropsychology , Lawrence Weiskrantz

Self-awareness deficits following loss of inner speech: Dr. Jill Bolte Taylor’s case study

alice — Sun, 09 Nov 2008 09:08:50 +0000

Alain Morin
Article in Consciousness and Cognition

Abstract
In her 2006 book ‘‘My Stroke of Insight” Dr. Jill Bolte Taylor relates her experience of suffering from a left hemispheric stroke caused by a congenital arteriovenous malformation which led to a loss of inner speech. Her phenomenological account strongly suggests that this impairment produced a global self-awareness deficit as well as more specific dysfunctions related to corporeal awareness, sense of individuality, retrieval of autobiographical memories, and self-conscious emotions. These are examined in details and corroborated by numerous excerpts from Taylor’s book.

Click here for complete article.

How good are you at Self-Control?

alice — Wed, 05 Nov 2008 05:47:31 +0000

Two recent studies suggest that effective self-regulation involves strong working memory capacity

Why is it that you managed to lose 10 pounds in only one month while I did not lose a single pound in three months? Classic work conducted in the 80′s by Albert Bandura, Charles Carver, and Michael Scheier, as well as more recent efforts by Roy Baumeister and his team, indicate that factors such as sustained self-observation, setting clear and reasonable goals, transcending the immediate situation (i.e., delaying gratification), and avoiding “self-control depletion” all play a role in successful self-regulation.

To illustrate: You most probably succeeded at losing the extra pounds because you (1) kept monitoring food intake and weight loss on a regular basis (sustained self-observation), (2) wisely decided that it would be realistic to try losing between two and three pounds per week (setting clear and reasonable goals), (3) avoided eating between meals by making sure that no food (e.g., candies, chips) was available in your car or office (transcending the immediate situation; delaying gratification), and (4) did not use up your self-control “energy” all at once (e.g., at breakfast or lunch) and instead spent it evenly throughout the day to have some left in the evening (avoiding “self-control depletion”; current research indeed shows that repeated acts of self-control drain a psychological resource, leading to poorer self-regulation subsequently).

By contrast, it is most probable that I failed at losing weight because I (1) did not pay enough attention to my eating behavior and neglected to monitor my weight throughout the process, (2) unrealistically hoped that I could lose 25 pounds, if not more, in only one month, (3) did not manage to avoid short-term temptations, and (4) tried too hard not to overeat in the mornings and afternoons, so that at dinner time I had no strength left and often overindulged in sweets of all sorts.

This example clearly represents an oversimplification of reality but provides us with a snapshot of what is currently known about the complex and fundamental process of self-regulation, defined as altering our own inner states (e.g., emotions, thought patterns) and behaviors (e.g., eating habits). Self-regulation permeates many spheres of human activity: addiction, unwanted sexual behavior, crime, impulsive buying behavior, financial planning, anger management, attention deficit disorders, and many more.

Two recently published articles add yet another variable to the self-regulatory puzzle: working memory capacity (WMC). Despite its name, WMC is not about memory capacity per se (e.g., how much information we can store in short-term memory) but rather about our ability to maintain information in an active, quickly retrievable state. WMC allows us to form a mental representation of something in our mind (like a short-term goal) and to keep this representation active while suppressing other competing information-other mental representations or external stimuli. Put simply, WMC makes it possible to focus on tasks and not get constantly distracted by other thoughts or things occurring around us.What goes on in our head when we actively apply our WMC? The most probable answer is that we engage in self-talk.

In their research, Wilhelm Hofmann (at the University of Würzburg in Germany) and colleagues propose that self-regulation is governed by automatic and controlled processes, and that the relative influence of these components is affected by people’s individual differences in WMC.

Automatic processes mainly consist of unconscious attitudes and personality traits; these attitudes and traits tend to make us act impulsively, and thus partially explain self-regulatory failure. Controlled processes are made up of conscious attitudes and goals; they are responsible for reflective action, and consequently foster self-regulatory success. Since WMC promotes the focus of attention on current conscious mental representations, it should activate controlled processes and facilitate self-regulation.

Hofmann and his team conducted three studies in which participants with low or high WMC had to self-regulate in the sexual, food, and anger domains. For instance, in the anger study, male participants received particularly negative feedback following their filmed WMC performance from another alleged participant; they then saw a video sequence of that same participant performing the WMC task and could retaliate against him by providing feedback. The participants’ feedback served as indicators of anger levels after the provoking situation. WMC was measured by having participants perform simple equations (e.g., 3 + 5 = ?) and memorize the results (e.g., 8) while simultaneously judging other equations as being either true or false. This most certainly represents a valid measure of WMC because participants had to maintain mental representations (the results of the equations) while suppressing another competing mental activity (the concurrent task).

In a nutshell, and as suggested above, what Hofmann and his colleagues observed is that participants with low WMC tended to activate more automatic processes (e.g., unconscious attitudes: chocolate tastes great) to the detriment of controlled ones (e.g., conscious goals: remember, I’m on a diet), thus exhibiting poor self-regulatory behavior (e.g., overeating); participants with high WMC were more inclined to use controlled processes and suppress their automatic processes, thus performing better at self-regulation.

In their article, Noah Shamosh (at Yale University in Connecticut, USA) and associates used a different type of task to measure self-regulation and aimed to identify the brain areas sustaining WMC using fMRI. The team used what is called a “delay discounting” task, where participants were asked to resist smaller, quicker financial rewards and choose instead delayed, but larger and constantly increasing, amounts of money. So in essence they had to think in terms of long-term consequences and postpone immediate gratification. WMC was evaluated in various ways-for instance, by having participants keeping several words in mind while doing math problems. Participants with high WMC showed the best self-regulatory performance; recording of their brain activity during the delay discounting task indicates that the left anterior prefrontal cortex was particularly active, suggesting that this area represents the neurological seat of WMC (see Figure 1).

Figure 1-the anterior prefrontal cortex

Now the question is: Phenomenologically speaking, what is WMC? What goes on in our head when we actively apply our WMC? The most probable answer is that we engage in self-talk. It is pretty surprising indeed that none of the two articles discussed here mention inner speech (Baddeley’s phonological loop), which has been shown to be an important part of working memory since its inception into cognitive psychology in the 70′s. Basically, when we maintain information in an active state so that we can readily retrieve it (which is what working memory does), most of the time at least we talk to ourselves: “OK, how many teaspoons of salt am I supposed to add now? Yes! Two… Two… Two…”

Going back to Hofmann and colleagues’ work, one can suggest that participants with high WMC were better at self-regulation because of greater inner speech use. To illustrate, let us imagine a man who’s trying to control his temper. He may have a predisposition toward aggression (a personality trait: automatic process) as well as a genuine desire to avoid getting into trouble (a goal: controlled process). If he has high WMC, he most likely will say to himself when facing frustration “Calm down! I always tend to explode in rage in that type of situation, that’s who I am [becoming aware of his automatic process-personality trait], but I don’t want this to happen [thus suppressing it], I want to stay cool” [focusing attention on his controlled process-the goal]. Of course, the man with low WMC would engage in little or no inner speech, would not be able to draw attention on the goal, and thus would succumb to his automatic processes…

Interestingly enough, a large body of literature exists on the relation between private speech in children and effective self-regulation, going back to Lev Vygosky and Alexander Luria; this line of work is still very active with research conducted by Adam Winsler (at George Mason University in Virginia, USA) and Charles Fernyhough (at Durham University in UK), just to name a couple researchers… It actually adds weight to the claim that WMC is associated with better self-regulatory skills. Quite simply, on one hand we already know that inner speech promotes self-control. On the other hand, as suggested by the work of Hofmann and Shamosh, WMC also facilitates self-regulation. And then, there is the implicit assumption that a large part of WMC precisely consists of inner speech. We thus end up with a nice, tight conceptual triangle (see Figure 2), that both papers reviewed here have unfortunately overlooked.

Figure 2-Postulated interactions between inner speech, WMC, and self-regulation

About the Author

Alain Morin, Behavioral Sciences, Mount Royal College,
4825 Mount Royal Gate SW, Calgary (AB), Canada T3E 6K6
amorin@mtroyal.ca
http://www2.mtroyal.ab.ca/~amorin/

References

Hofmann, W., Gschwendner, T., Friese, M., Wiers, R.W., & Schmitt, M. (2008). Working memory capacity and self-regulatory behavior: Toward an individual differences perspective on behavior determination by automatic versus controlled processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psycholology, 95(4), 962-77.
Shamosh, N.A., DeYoung, C.G., Green, A.E., Reis, D.L., Johnson, M.R., Conway, A.R.A., Engle, R.W., Braver, T.S., & Gray, J.R. (2008). Individual differences in delay discounting: Relation to intelligence, working memory, and anterior prefrontal cortex. Psychological Science, 19(9), 904-911.

Additional readings

Bandura, A. (1991). Social cognitive theory of self-regulation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 248-287.
Baumeister, R.F. & Kathleen D. Vohs (eds.) (2004). Handbook of self-regulation: Research, theory, and applications. New York: Guilford.
Carver, C.S., & Scheier, M.F. (1998). On the self-regulation of behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Connectomics: Tracing the Wires of the Brain

alice — Wed, 05 Nov 2008 04:54:10 +0000

From The Dana Foundation: Scientists working with rapidly advancing computer technology and electron microscopes hope one day to map the billions of neuronal connections in the brain. The resulting map, or “connectome,” could help us understand memory, intelligence and mental disorders, Dr. Sebastian Seung writes.

Suppose that someone gave you a radio and asked you to figure out how it works. You could try measuring electrical signals inside it, but the measurements might not be sufficient. You might be more successful if you were also given a circuit diagram illustrating all the components of the radio and how they are connected to each other.

Now imagine that your goal is to discover how a brain works. A map of brain connections would be helpful for interpreting measurements of the signals transmitted between neurons. In the human brain, these signals travel in a complex network of 100 billion or so neurons, each of which is connected to 10,000 others.

Such a map of a brain, human or otherwise, does not yet exist. But as technology advances, researchers are setting their sights on the “connectome,” a word coined in a 2005 study by Olaf Sporns and colleagues to describe a complete map of connections in a brain or a piece of a brain.

Click here for complete article.

Human Brain is Capable of Subliminal Conditioning, Study Shows

alice — Mon, 03 Nov 2008 18:55:23 +0000

From The Dana Foundation: Imagine you are playing a game of poker. Watching your opponent, you have a gut feeling that if you raise the bet, he will fold. You decide to go with your intuition and it works.

Were you just lucky?

According to neuroscientist Mathias Pessiglione, the gut feeling you experienced could be the result of your brain picking up subliminal cues from your opponent and associating them with a positive outcome. Pessiglione uses a poker game as a possible real-life example of the kind of subliminal instrumental conditioning that he and his colleagues at the Institut National de la santé et de la recherche médicale (INSERM), a public research institute in Paris, have demonstrated for the first time in the human brain.

They report the results of a carefully designed study using a system of masked cues matched to win or loss outcomes in the Aug. 28 issue of the journal Neuron.

Click here for complete article.

Art Teams With Science to Explain It All to You

alice — Mon, 03 Nov 2008 03:53:09 +0000

From NY Times (Oct 31, 2008): The taste of a ripe tomato, the hook of a catchy song, the scent of a lover’s hair. What is it, exactly, that drives us to seek these things again and again?

Neuroscientists who study perception are starting to discover the inner workings of the sensory mind. Starting on Monday at the New York Academy of Sciences, researchers and artists will team up to explore this new research in a series of talks called Science of the Five Senses. Their conversations will raise a question for the amateur hedonist: If we had a better understanding of the signals our bodies send to our brains, might we take more pleasure from them?

Click here for complete article.

Online papers on consciousness

alice — Mon, 03 Nov 2008 03:52:40 +0000

David Chalmers had compiled a directory of 2573 online papers on consciousness and related topics. Most of these papers are by academic philosophers or scientists. Click here to check out this great online resource.

Theta phase synchrony and conscious target perception: Impact of intensive mental training

alice — Mon, 03 Nov 2008 03:44:36 +0000

Heleen A. Slagter, Antoine Lutz, Lawrence L. Greischar, Sander Nieuwenhuis, and Richard J. Davidson.
Article in Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

Abstract
The information processing capacity of the human mind is limited, as is evidenced by the attentional blink-a deficit in identifying the second of two targets (T1 and T2) presented in close succession. This deficit is thought to result from an overinvestment of limited resources in T1 processing. We previously reported that intensive mental training in a style of meditation aimed at reducing elaborate object processing, reduced brain resource allocation to T1, and improved T2 accuracy [Slagter, H. A., Lutz, A., Greisschar, L. L., Frances, A. D., Nieuwenhuis, S., Davis, J., et al. Mental training affects distribution of limited brain resources. PloS Biology, 5, e138, 2007]. Here we report EEG spectral analyses to examine the possibility that this reduction in elaborate T1 processing rendered the system more available to process new target information, as indexed by T2-locked phase variability. Intensive mental training was associated with decreased cross-trial variability in the phase of oscillatory theta activity after successfully detected T2s, in particular, for those individuals who showed the greatest reduction in brain resource allocation to T1. These data implicate theta phase locking in conscious target perception, and suggest that after mental training the cognitive system is more rapidly available to process new target information. Mental training was not associated with changes in the amplitude of T2-induced responses or oscillatory activity before task onset. In combination, these findings illustrate the usefulness of systematic mental training in the study of the human mind by revealing the neural mechanisms that enable the brain to successfully represent target information.

The Problem of Consciousness

alice — Sun, 02 Nov 2008 04:26:18 +0000

John R. Searle
Copyright John R. Searle. Click here for complete online text.

The most important scientific discovery of the present era will come when someone — or some group — discovers the answer to the following question: How exactly do neurobiological processes in the brain cause consciousness? This is the most important question facing us in the biological sciences, yet it is frequently evaded, and frequently misunderstood when not evaded. In order to clear the way for an understanding of this problem. I am going to begin to answer four questions: 1. What is consciousness? 2. What is the relation of consciousness to the brain? 3. What are some of the features that an empirical theory of consciousness should try to explain? 4. What are some common mistakes to avoid?

* An earlier version of this article has appeared in the publications of the CIBA Foundation. The theses advanced in this paper are presented in more detail and with more supporting argument in Searle, J.R. The Rediscovery of the Mind, MIT Press, 1992.

Is surfing the internet altering your brain?

alice — Fri, 31 Oct 2008 05:25:33 +0000

From Reuters: CANBERRA (Reuters) – The Internet is not just changing the way people live but altering the way our brains work with a neuroscientist arguing this is an evolutionary change which will put the tech-savvy at the top of the new social order.

Gary Small, a neuroscientist at UCLA in California who specializes in brain function, has found through studies that Internet searching and text messaging has made brains more adept at filtering information and making snap decisions.

But while technology can accelerate learning and boost creativity it can have drawbacks as it can create Internet addicts whose only friends are virtual and has sparked a dramatic rise in Attention Deficit Disorder diagnoses.

Small, however, argues that the people who will come out on top in the next generation will be those with a mixture of technological and social skills.

“We’re seeing an evolutionary change. The people in the next generation who are really going to have the edge are the ones who master the technological skills and also face-to-face skills,” Small told Reuters in a telephone interview.

“They will know when the best response to an email or Instant Message is to talk rather than sit and continue to email.”

In his newly released fourth book “iBrain: Surviving the Technological Alteration of the Modern Mind,” Small looks at how technology has altered the way young minds develop, function and interpret information.

Small, the director of the Memory & Aging Research Center at the Semel Institute for Neuroscience & Human Behavior and the Center on Aging at UCLA, said the brain was very sensitive to the changes in the environment such as those brought by technology.

He said a study of 24 adults as they used the Web found that experienced Internet users showed double the activity in areas of the brain that control decision-making and complex reasoning as Internet beginners.

“The brain is very specialized in its circuitry and if you repeat mental tasks over and over it will strengthen certain neural circuits and ignore others,” said Small.

“We are changing the environment. The average young person now spends nine hours a day exposing their brain to technology. Evolution is an advancement from moment to moment and what we are seeing is technology affecting our evolution.”

Small said this multi-tasking could cause problems.

He said the tech-savvy generation, whom he calls “digital natives,” are always scanning for the next bit of new information which can create stress and even damage neural networks.

“There is also the big problem of neglecting human contact skills and losing the ability to read emotional expressions and body language,” he said.

“But you can take steps to address this. It means taking time to cut back on technology, like having a family dinner, to find a balance. It is important to understand how technology is affecting our lives and our brains and take control of it.”

New vistas for alpha-frequency band oscillations

alice — Sun, 26 Oct 2008 07:50:43 +0000

Palva S, Palva JM.
Article in Trends in Neurosciences

Abstract
The amplitude of alpha-frequency band (8-14 Hz) activity in the human electroencephalogram is suppressed by eye opening, visual stimuli and visual scanning, whereas it is enhanced during internal tasks, such as mental calculation and working memory. Alpha-frequency band oscillations have hence been thought to reflect idling or inhibition of task-irrelevant cortical areas. However, recent data on alpha-amplitude and, in particular, alpha-phase dynamics posit a direct and active role for alpha-frequency band rhythmicity in the mechanisms of attention and consciousness. We propose that simultaneous alpha-, beta- (14-30 Hz) and gamma- (30-70 Hz) frequency band oscillations are required for unified cognitive operations, and hypothesize that cross-frequency phase synchrony between alpha, beta and gamma oscillations coordinates the selection and maintenance of neuronal object representations during working memory, perception and consciousness.

I move, therefore I am: A new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership

alice — Sun, 26 Oct 2008 05:12:59 +0000

Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau and Albert Newen
Article in Consciousness and Cognition

Abstract
The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and (self-)representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a gradually evolving, onto- and phylogenetically plausible framework which proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor processes to more complex conceptual and meta-representational processes of agency and ownership, respectively. In particular, three fundamental levels of agency and ownership processing have to be distinguished: The level of feeling, thinking and social interaction. This naturalistic account will not only allow to “ground the self in action”, but also provide an empirically testable taxonomy for cognitive neuroscience and a new tool for disentangling agency and ownership disturbances in psychopathology (e.g. alien hand, anarchic hand, anosognosia for one’s own hemiparesis).

Attention regulation and monitoring in meditation

alice — Sun, 26 Oct 2008 04:41:27 +0000

Antoine Lutz, Heleen A. Slagter, John D. Dunne and Richard J. Davidson
Review article in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, click here for full article

Abstract:
Meditation can be conceptualized as a family of complex emotional and attentional regulatory training regimes developed for various ends, including the cultivation of well-being and emotional balance. Among these various practices, there are two styles that are commonly studied. One style, focused attention meditation, entails the voluntary focusing of attention on a chosen object. The other style, open monitoring meditation, involves nonreactive monitoring of the content of experience from moment to moment. The potential regulatory functions of these practices on attention and emotion processes could have a long-term impact on the brain and behavior.

Pain, dissociation and subliminal self-representations

alice — Sun, 19 Oct 2008 07:09:16 +0000

Petr Bob
Review article in Consciousness and Cognition

Abstract:
According to recent evidence, neurophysiological processes coupled to pain are closely related to the mechanisms of consciousness. This evidence is in accordance with findings that changes in states of consciousness during hypnosis or traumatic dissociation strongly affect conscious perception and experience of pain, and markedly influence brain functions. Past research indicates that painful experience may induce dissociated state and information about the experience may be stored or processed unconsciously. Reported findings suggest common neurophysiological mechanisms of pain and dissociation and point to a hypothesis of dissociation as a defense mechanism against psychological and physical pain that substantially influences functions of consciousness. The hypothesis is also supported by findings that information can be represented in the mind/brain without the subject’s awareness. The findings of unconsciously present information suggest possible binding between conscious contents and self-functions that constitute self-representational dimensions of consciousness. The self-representation means that certain inner states of own body are interpreted as mental and somatic identity, while other bodily signals, currently not accessible to the dominant interpreter’s access are dissociated and may be defined as subliminal self-representations. In conclusion, the neurophysiological aspects of consciousness and its integrative role in the therapy of painful traumatic memories are discussed.

Mood state effects of chocolate

alice — Sun, 19 Oct 2008 06:31:42 +0000

Gordon Parker, Isabella Parker and Heather Brotchie
Article in Journal of Affective Disorders

Abstract:
Background: Chocolate consumption has long been associated with enjoyment and pleasure. Popular claims confer on chocolate the properties of being a stimulant, relaxant, euphoriant, aphrodisiac, tonic and antidepressant. The last claim stimulated this review.

Method: We review chocolate’s properties and the principal hypotheses addressing its claimed mood altering propensities. We distinguish between food craving and emotional eating, consider their psycho-physiological underpinnings, and examine the likely ‘positioning’ of any effect of chocolate to each concept.

Results: Chocolate can provide its own hedonistic reward by satisfying cravings but, when consumed as a comfort eating or emotional eating strategy, is more likely to be associated with prolongation rather than cessation of a dysphoric mood.

Limitations: This review focuses primarily on clarifying the possibility that, for some people, chocolate consumption may act as an antidepressant self-medication strategy and the processes by which this may occur.

Conclusions: Any mood benefits of chocolate consumption are ephemeral.

Toward a Cultural Phenomenology of Personal Identity

alice — Sat, 18 Oct 2008 05:20:37 +0000

Excerpt from Tafarodi, R. W. (2008). Toward a cultural phenomenology of personal identity. In F. Sani (Ed.), Self-continuity: Individual and collective perspectives (pp. 27-40). New York: Psychology Press.

How does our inherited world of meaning relate to our fundamental experience of ourselves as persons? Is there a core of self-consciousness that is sequestered from the constitutive reach of culture and language? Can we speak of an unmediated basis for personal identity? These are the questions I will explore in this chapter. My method will be analytic, not comparative or ethnographic. Psychological anthropology and cross-cultural psychology have produced rich literatures showcasing the diversity of conceptions of the person in terms of its physical, mental, and spiritual properties (Csordas, 1994; Fogelson, 1982; Heelas & Lock, 1981; Marsella, DeVos, & Hsu, 1985; Morris, 1994). I will not review these ample literatures here. Rather, my purpose is to provide a warrant and direction for considering self-consciousness as a thoroughly cultured form of experience. My argument will involve reviewing and questioning the commitment to a phenomenological universalism, exemplified by Kant’s transcendental account of the I. From there, I will proceed to a sociocultural discussion of the temporality of subjectivity, as it manifests in both the synchronic and diachronic unity of personal identity. By taking subjective time as my focus, I will demonstrate how cultural forms are implicated in even the most immanent and fundamental aspects of self-consciousness.

Click here for to access the full chapter.

Theta synchronization during episodic retrieval: Neural correlates of conscious awareness

alice — Mon, 13 Oct 2008 06:04:17 +0000

In a past study, Klimesch and colleagues examined whether the conscious experience of remembering and knowing are associated with neural synchronization in the theta bandwidth. These investigators first presented participants with a series of words (through both auditory and visual means) and then tested participants’ memory for these words using a recognition test and the “Remember-Know” task.

During the recognition test, participants were shown a series of words (the participants saw some of these words earlier during the experiment, whereas other words were not seen before) and were asked to judge whether these same words were presented to them earlier. For those words that were judged as “old” (previously presented), participants also performed the Remember-Know task.

The Remember-Know task is widely used in memory research to study one’s state of consciousness during a recognition decision. ”Remember” judgments are made when an “old” decision on the recognition test is accompanied by awareness of details of the previous occurrence of the stimulus in question. “Know” judgments are made when an “old” decision is not accompanied by such awareness.

Among other interesting results, Klimesch and colleagues found that theta power was larger for Know judgments early during the recognition period of a word (300 – 450 ms) and larger for Remember judgments during a later period (450 – 625 ms). The investigators concluded that these patterns of theta associated with Remember and Know judgments demonstrate that the temporal dynamics of the neural synchronization plays an important role in the experiential characteristics associated with memory retrieval.

Cephalopod consciousness: Behavioural evidence

alice — Mon, 13 Oct 2008 04:00:34 +0000

Building on past investigations of the possibility of a form of consciousness in birds and cephalopod molluscs, Jennifer Mather reports on cephalopod consciousness in an article in Consciousness and Cognition. Using global workspace as a criterion for consciousness, Mather concludes that cephalopods appear to have primary consciousness.

Abstract:

Behavioural evidence suggests that cephalopod molluscs may have a form of primary consciousness. First, the linkage of brain to behaviour seen in lateralization, sleep and through a developmental context is similar to that of mammals and birds. Second, cephalopods, especially octopuses, are heavily dependent on learning in response to both visual and tactile cues, and may have domain generality and form simple concepts. Third, these animals are aware of their position, both within themselves and in larger space, including having a working memory of foraging areas in the recent past. Thus if using a ‘global workspace’ which evaluates memory input and focuses attention is the criterion, cephalopods appear to have primary consciousness.

Comparison of event-related potentials in attentional blink and repetition blindess

alice — Sat, 11 Oct 2008 20:44:45 +0000

In a recent study, Mika Koivisto and Antti Revonsuo compared the timing and mechanisms of attentional blink (AB) and repetition blindness (RB) directly during the same rapid serial visual presentation stream to examine the relation between the two phenomena. To do so, they recorded electrophysiological responses over the scalp (EEG, ERP) to repeated and unrepeated targets.

The authors report the following findings:

Comparable to earlier ERP studies on visual awareness, the results showed for both types of targets a negative amplitude difference between ERPs to consciously recognized and unrecognized targets during 250-350 ms from stimulus onset, suggesting that both AB and RB are associated with deficits of conscious perception, occurring at earlier stages than access to working memory. However, the perceptual deficit in RB is more severe, which may be related to higher overall negativity in response to repeated targets observed 150-300 ms after stimulus onset, suggesting stronger cortical baseline activation and higher perceptual threshold for repeated targets as compared with unrepeated ones.

EEG activity in Carmelite nuns during a mystical experience

alice — Sun, 05 Oct 2008 09:20:19 +0000

In a recent article, Beauregard and Paquette examined EEG spectral power and coherence in 14 Carmelite nuns during a mystical experience, which is characterized by a sense of union with God and is reported across all cultures.

EEG data were recorded for three conditions: Mystical, Control and Baseline. During the Mystical conditions, the nuns were asked to remember and relive the most intense mystical experience felt in their lives as a member of the Carmelite Order. In the Control condition, the nuns were instructed to remember and relive the most intense state of union with another human ever felt in their lives while being affiliated with the Carmelite Order. The Baseline condition was a normal restful state.

The phenomenological data that were collected indicate that the nuns actually experienced genuine mystical experiences, instead of vivid memories of a mystical state, during the Mystical condition. The experiences reported during this condition were multidimensional, implicating changes in perception (e.g., visual mental imagery), cognition (e.g., representations about the self), and emotion (e.g., peace, joy, and unconditional love).

In the Mystical, compared to Control, condition, greater theta power was observed over the left and central fronto-parietal region, whereas greater gamma1 power was observed over the right temporal and parietal regions. Additionally, greater coherence for the theta and alpha bands were displayed over different pairs of electrodes

Beauregard and Paquette concluded that the results of this study demonstrate that mystical experiences are mediated by marked changes in EEG power and coherence and that these changes implicate several cortical areas of the brain in both hemispheres.

ASSC Conference, June 2008

alice — Tue, 01 Apr 2008 22:50:50 +0000

Location: Gis Convention Center, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan
Date: June 19-22, 2008
Contact: assc12@ym.edu.tw
Click here for conference website

We are glad to announce that the 12th annual meeting of Association for Scientific Study of Consciousness will be held for the first time in Asia during 19-22 June, 2008, in Taipei, Taiwan.
The conference will take place at the heart of Taipei city, National Taiwan University.

Taipei is the home of Taipei 101, currently the tallest building in the world, and the National Palace Museum, with the world’s most sophisticated collection of Chinese art/antiques.
Within a short drive, the famous marble Taroko Gorge, sub-tropical forests covering towering mountains, and rising cliffs overlooking the Pacific Ocean are all within your reach.

Please join us in a meeting that will both stimulate your mind and senses at ASSC 12, Taipei.
To enquire about the meeting, please mail to assc12@ym.edu.tw

Scientific Program Committee Co-chairs:
Ralph Adolphs, California Institute of Technology, USA
Allen Houng, National Yang Ming University, Taiwan

Local Organizing Committee Co-chairs:
Allen Houng, National Yang Ming University, Taiwan
Jong-Tsun Huang, China Medical University, Taiwan

Presidential Address:
David Rosenthal, City University of New York, USA, topic: Why Are Mental States Ever Consciousness?

Confirmed Keynote Speakers:
Thomas Metzinger, The Johannes Gutenberg-Universitat Mainz, Germany, topic: The Self
Mitsuo Kawato, Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International, Japan, topic: Computational Advantages of Internal Models as Self-Consciousness
Tetsuro Matsuzawa, Kyoto University, Japan, topic: The Mind of the Chimpanzees
Susana Martinez-Conde, Barrow Neurological Institute,USA, topic: Microsaccades: Windows on the Mind

Confirmed Symposium Speakers:
Ned Block, New York University, USA
Victor Lamme, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Sid Kouider, Ecole Normale Superieure, France
Barbara Jones, McGill University, Canada
Donald Pfaff, Rockefeller University, USA
Steven Laureys, University of Liege, Belgium
Haibo Di, Hangzhou Normal University, China
Charles Spence, University of Oxford, UK
Keiji Tanaka, RIKEN Brain Science Institute, Japan
Glyn Humphreys, University of Birmingham, UK
Shaul Hochstein, Life Sciences Institute and Neural Computation Center, Israel
Tim Bayne, University of Oxford, UK
Ryan McKay, University of Zurich, Switzerland
Ian Gold, McGill University, Canada
Robyn Langdon, Macquarie University, Australia

Confirmed Tutorial Workshops:
Antoine Bechara, topic: Emotions, Feelings, and Decision-Making
Juliane Wilcke, topic: The Evolutionary Function of Consciousness
Jennifer Windt & Thomas Metzinger, topic: Neurophilosophical Approaches to the Dreaming Mind-a Contrastive Analysis of Dreaming and Wakefulness
Tim Bayne & Jakob Hohwy, topic: Creature Consciousness and State Consciousness: Explanatory Strategies in the Study of Consciousness
Andrew Brook, topic: Terminology in Consciousness Studies
Shigeru Kitazawa & Shin’ya Nishida, topic: Adaptive Anomalies in Conscious Time Perception

Neuroeconomics conference Copenhagen, May 2008

thomasr — Thu, 27 Mar 2008 12:03:01 +0000

A unique opportunity to learn about contemporary neuroeconomics

We are writing to you in connection with the Conference on Neuroeconomics (ConNEcs 2008), which is going to take place at the Copenhagen Business School May 14-16, 2008. The conference is arranged by Center for Marketing Communication in cooperation with Hilke Plassmann (CalTech, US) and Peter Kenning (Zeppelin University, Germany).

The primary goal of the conference is to establish an international discussion forum for research on Neuroeconomics. Also the conference aims to look into how decision neuroscience can inform consumer and business research, and to illuminate how consumer behaviour is represented in the brain. We expect 150 participants comprising international researchers as well as various organisations and industries.

This unique conference gives you the opportunity to meet members of the most advanced, international research community working with neuromarketing, neuroeconomics and decision neuroscience research.

At CBS we are developing a Decision neuroscience project in corporation with Hvidovre Hospital. At the conference you will also learn about this research.

We recommend you to sign up for the conference.

Attached you will find a more detailed description of the conference including the conference program and registration form. You are also more than welcome to contact us for further information.

We look forward to hearing from you and please feel free to distribute the programme to interested parties.

Kind regards,

ConNEcs 2008 Organizing Committee:

Flemming Hansen,
Peter Kenning,
Hilke Plassmann and
Majken L. Møller

www.connecs.org

The first hominin of Europe

thomasr — Thu, 27 Mar 2008 11:44:50 +0000

In this week’s Nature, an article reports on the discovery of a human lower jaw associated with stone tools and animal bones from the Sima del Elefante in northern Spain. The finds have been dated to between 1.1 and 1.2 million years using a variety of dating techniques, making the site the oldest and most accurately dated record of human occupation in Europe.

From the article:

Here we report the discovery of a human mandible associated with an assemblage of Mode 1 lithic tools and faunal remains bearing traces of hominin processing, in stratigraphic level TE9 at the site of the Sima del Elefante, Atapuerca, Spain. Level TE9 has been dated to the Early Pleistocene (approximately 1.2–1.1 Myr), based on a combination of palaeomagnetism, cosmogenic nuclides and biostratigraphy. The Sima del Elefante site thus emerges as the oldest, most accurately dated record of human occupation in Europe, to our knowledge.

The study of the human mandible suggests that the first settlement of Western Europe could be related to an early demographic expansion out of Africa. The new evidence, with previous findings in other Atapuerca sites (level TD6 from Gran Dolina), also suggests that a speciation event occurred in this extreme area of the Eurasian continent during the Early Pleistocene, initiating the hominin lineage represented by the TE9 and TD6 hominins.

Who’s bad? Chimps figure it out by observation

thomasr — Thu, 27 Mar 2008 09:15:03 +0000

Chimpanzees make judgments about the actions and dispositions of strangers by observing others’ behavior and interactions in different situations. Specifically, chimpanzees show an ability to recognize certain behavioral traits and make assumptions about the presence or absence of these traits in strangers in similar situations thereafter. These findings, by Dr. Francys Subiaul – from the George Washington University in Washington DC – and his team, have just been published online in Animal Cognition, a Springer journal.

Character judgments are an essential feature of cooperative exchanges between humans, and we use them to predict future behavioral interactions. A system for attributing reputation is therefore expected in any species which needs to assess the behavior of others and to predict the outcomes of future interactions. Chimpanzees have sophisticated social skills and there is evidence that primates eavesdrop and benefit from third-party interactions. Could they have a system for forming reputation judgments across a wide variety of contexts like humans”

In a series of three experiments, Dr. Subiaul and colleagues looked at whether chimpanzees learn the reputation of strangers indirectly by observation, or by first-hand experience. Seven chimpanzees observed unfamiliar humans either consistently give (‘generous’ donor) or refuse to give (‘selfish’ donor) food to either a familiar human recipient or another chimp.

In the first experiment, after observing humans either give or refuse food to familiar humans, chimps were in turn given the opportunity to gesture to either the ‘selfish’ or the ‘generous’ human.

There was no marked preference for either donor. However, in a second experiment, the researchers evaluated whether prolonged observation and first-hand experience would allow chimps to generalize this social rule—pertaining to the reputation of strangers—to new humans. In this experiment, the chimpanzees showed a strong preference for the new generous donor. They were able to predict which new donor was generous, based entirely on observation.

In a third experiment, chimpanzees (rather than humans) were the recipients of either ‘selfish’ or ‘generous’ acts. The results of this last experiment replicated the results of the second experiment in a new context and using novel ‘generous’ and ‘selfish’ acts, demonstrated that chimpanzees are flexible and astute social problem-solvers, capable of attributing reputation to strangers by eavesdropping on interactions between others.

The authors conclude that their results demonstrate chimpanzees’ ability “to infer stability in an individual’s character or behavior over time through observation – an inference that underlies the ability to make reputation judgments…This ability may have served as a catalyst to the evolution of various uniquely human traits such as shared intentionality, language and reasoning.”

Reference: Subiaul F et al (2008). Do chimpanzees learn reputation by observation? Evidence from direct and indirect experience with generous and selfish strangers. Animal Cognition (DOI 10.1007/s10071-008-0151-6)

Neuropsychologia special issue: Consciousness & Perception

thomasr — Wed, 05 Mar 2008 09:32:04 +0000

Neuropsychologia hosts a special issue in relation to the work of Larry Weiskrantz. It contains a densely packed number of articles on the topic of blindsight and hindsights.

Neuropsychologia — Volume 46, Issue 3, Pages 771-926 (2008)

Consciousness and Perception: Insights and Hindsights – A Festschrift in Honour of Larry Weiskrantz
Edited by Arash Sahraie

1. Editorial Board
Page CO2

Commentary
2. Surprises
Pages 771-773
L. Weiskrantz

Research Reports
3. Two visual systems re-viewed
Pages 774-785
A.D. Milner and M.A. Goodale

4. A hand in blindsight: Hand placement near target improves size perception in the blind visual field
Pages 786-802
Liana E. Brown, Greg Kroliczak, Jean-François Demonet and Melvyn A. Goodale

5. Interhemispheric transfer and integration of imagined visual stimuli
Pages 803-809
S. Savazzi, F. Mancini and C.A. Marzi

6. Reaction time inhibition from subliminal cues: Is it related to inhibition of return?
Pages 810-819
Sonia Mele, Silvia Savazzi, Carlo A. Marzi and Giovanni Berlucchi

7. Affective blindsight in the intact brain: Neural interhemispheric summation for unseen fearful expressions
Pages 820-828
Marco Tamietto and Beatrice de Gelder

8. Consciousness and its function
Pages 829-840
David M. Rosenthal

9. Single neuron studies of inferior temporal cortex
Pages 841-852
Charles G. Gross

10. Colour constancy and conscious perception of changes of illuminant
Pages 853-863
John L. Barbur and Karoline Spang

11. Attended but unseen: Visual attention is not sufficient for visual awareness
Pages 864-869
R.W. Kentridge, T.C.W. Nijboer and C.A. Heywood

12. A blindsight conundrum: How to respond when there is no correct response
Pages 870-878
Alan Cowey, Iona Alexander and Petra Stoerig

13. Temporal properties of spatial channel of processing in hemianopia
Pages 879-885
Arash Sahraie, Ceri T. Trevethan and Mary-Joan MacLeod

14. Ipsilesional and contralesional sensorimotor function after hemispherectomy: Differences between distal and proximal function
Pages 886-901
H.C. Dijkerman, F. Vargha-Khadem, C.E. Polkey and L. Weiskrantz

15. Dissociation of egocentric and allocentric coding of space in visual search after right middle cerebral artery stroke
Pages 902-914
Cathleen Grimsen, Helmut Hildebrandt and Manfred Fahle

16. Modular structure of awareness for sensorimotor disorders: Evidence from anosognosia for hemiplegia and anosognosia for hemianaesthesia
Pages 915-926
Lucia Spinazzola, Lorenzo Pia, Alessia Folegatti, Clelia Marchetti and Anna Berti

Gene variants may increase risk of anxiety disorders

thomasr — Wed, 05 Mar 2008 09:21:03 +0000

From physorg: Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) researchers – in collaboration with scientists at the University of California at San Diego and Yale University – have discovered perhaps the strongest evidence yet linking variation in a particular gene with anxiety-related traits. In the March issue of Archives of General Psychiatry, the team describes finding that particular versions of a gene that affects the activity of important neurotransmitter receptors were more common in both children and adults assessed as being inhibited or introverted and also were associated with increased activity of brain regions involved in emotional processing.

“We found that variations in this gene were associated with shy, inhibited behavior in children, introverted personality in adults and the reactivity of brain regions involved in processing fear and anxiety,” says Jordan Smoller, MD, ScD, of the MGH Department of Psychiatry, the report’s lead author. “Each of these traits appears to be a risk factor for social anxiety disorder, the most common type of anxiety disorder in the U.S.”

It has long been recognized that the tendency to anxiety disorders can
run in families and is believed to be influenced by the interaction of
several genes. Because of the different forms of these disorders and
their complex patterns of inheritance, identifying specific
susceptibility genes has been difficult. Studies in mice have associated
an area of chromosome 1 with anxious temperament, particularly the gene
that codes for a protein called RGS2, which mediates the activity of
neurotransmitter receptors that are also the targets of many
antidepressant and antipsychotic drugs. Mice in whom RGS2 is knocked out
exhibit increased fearful behavior.

To more comprehensively investigate the role of RGS2 in humans, the
researchers conducted several experiments. They analyzed blood samples
from children from 119 families who had participated in an earlier study
assessing their reactions to unfamiliar situations at the ages of 21
months, 4 and 6 years. The participants had been evaluated on their
levels of behavioral inhibition, a form of temperament linked to
increased risk of anxiety disorders.. Testing several sites in the RGS2
gene identified nine variations that appeared to be associated with
inhibition.

The second experiment involved more than 700 college students who had
completed questionnaires designed to measure several personality traits.
Analyzing blood samples from this group, the research team genotyped the
four gene markers that had demonstrated the strongest effects in the
first group. They found that the versions associated with inhibited
behavior in the children were also more common in the college students
who scored high on measures of introversion, a personality trait that
also involves social inhibition.

Another group of 55 college students had functional MRI brain imaging
done after they had completed a standard interview screening for anxiety
and mood disorders. While in the MR scanner, the participants viewed a
series of faces expressing various emotions, a test that previously was
shown to influence activity in the amygdala, a brain structure involved
in emotion processing. Participants with the
inhibition/introver

sion-associated alleles also had increased activity
of the amygdala and the insula, another anxiety-related brain region.

“Now we need to investigate whether these RGS2 variants actually are
associated with particular disorders and how they act on a cellular
level,” says Smoller, an associate professor of Psychiatry at
Harvard Medical School. “We hope that ultimately this work will lead
to new drug targets and treatment options for anxiety disorders.”

Source: Massachusetts General Hospital

New issue: Self & Identity

thomasr — Wed, 05 Mar 2008 09:15:24 +0000

A new issue of Self & Identity is out, with articles including topics such as cultural differences in self-esteem, the self in change, and the self in life transitions.

TOC

Explaining self-esteem differences between Chinese and North Americans: Dialectical self (vs. self-consistency) or lack of positive self-regard p. 113
Authors: Young-Hoon Kim;  Siqing Peng; Chi-Yue Chiu
DOI: 10.1080/15298860601063437
Link: http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=1529-8868&volume=7&issue=2&spage=113&uno_jumptype=alert&uno_alerttype=new_issue_alert,email

Self-structure and well-being in life transitions p. 129
Authors: Warren A. Reich;  Kent D. Harber; Harold I. Siegel
DOI: 10.1080/15298860601119940
Link: http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=1529-8868&volume=7&issue=2&spage=129&uno_jumptype=alert&uno_alerttype=new_issue_alert,email

Individual differences in perceived esteem across cultures p. 151
Authors: Anthony D. Hermann;  Gale M. Lucas; James Friedrich
DOI: 10.1080/15298860701319044
Link: http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=1529-8868&volume=7&issue=2&spage=151&uno_jumptype=alert&uno_alerttype=new_issue_alert,email

Defending the self against identity misclassification p. 168
Authors: Jennifer L. Prewitt-Freilino; Jennifer K. Bosson
DOI: 10.1080/17405620701330706
Link: http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=1529-8868&volume=7&issue=2&spage=168&uno_jumptype=alert&uno_alerttype=new_issue_alert,email

Contingencies of self-worth and responses to negative interpersonal feedback p. 184
Authors: Lora E. Park; Jennifer Crocker
DOI: 10.1080/15298860701398808
Link: http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=1529-8868&volume=7&issue=2&spage=184&uno_jumptype=alert&uno_alerttype=new_issue_alert,email

The self in change: A longitudinal investigation of coping and self-determination processes p. 204
Authors: Catherine E. Amiot;  Céline M. Blanchard; Patrick Gaudreau
DOI: 10.1080/15298860701580793
Link: http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=1529-8868&volume=7&issue=2&spage=204&uno_jumptype=alert&uno_alerttype=new_issue_alert,email

Consciousness, Brain Rhythms, and the Perception-Action Cycle

alice — Thu, 28 Feb 2008 06:09:23 +0000

A Workshop at the University of Memphis
May 3-4, 2008

A wave of scientific findings is now emerging on brain rhythms in consciousness, perception, autobiographical memory, action planning and attention. This small, intensive workshop presents five leading researchers in the field, discussing their work with a small audience. Students, scientists and the public are welcome to attend.

Please visit: http://ccrg.cs.memphis.edu/announcement.html

Emotion — new issue

thomasr — Mon, 25 Feb 2008 11:15:27 +0000

A new issue of Emotions is out, with articles on the inter- and intrapersonal functions of smiling, emotion and time perception, and the automaticity of emotion recognition.

Emotion

Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 1-150 (February 2008)

Smiling in the Face of Adversity: The Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Functions of Smiling
Pages 1-12
Anthony Papa and George A. Bonanno

Fifty Years of Memory of College Grades: Accuracy and Distortions
Pages 13-22
Harry P. Bahrick, Lynda K. Hall and Laura A. Da Costa

Risk for Mania and Positive Emotional Responding: Too Much of a Good Thing?
Pages 23-33
June Gruber, Sheri L. Johnson, Christopher Oveis and Dacher Keltner

Counter-Regulation in Affective Attentional Biases: A Basic Mechanism That Warrants Flexibility in Emotion and Motivation
Pages 34-46
Klaus Rothermund, Andreas Voss and Dirk Wentura

Prepared for the Worst: Readiness to Acquire Threat Bias and Susceptibility to Elevate Trait Anxiety
Pages 47-57
Patrick Clarke, Colin MacLeod and Nicole Shirazee

Error Detection and Posterror Behavior in Depressed Undergraduates
Pages 58-67
Rebecca J. Compton, Min Lin, Gray Vargas, Joshua Carp, Stephanie L. Fineman and Lorna C. Quandt

Emotional Scenes in Peripheral Vision: Selective Orienting and Gist Processing, But Not Content Identification
Pages 68-80
Manuel G. Calvo, Lauri Nummenmaa and Jukka Hyönä

The Automaticity of Emotion Recognition
Pages 81-95
Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins

Affective Learning Increases Sensitivity to Graded Emotional Faces
Pages 96-103
Seung-Lark Lim and Luiz Pessoa

Emotional States Alter Force Control During a Feedback Occluded Motor Task
Pages 104-113
Stephen A. Coombes, Kelly M. Gamble, James H. Cauraugh and Christopher M. Janelle

The Psychophysiology of James Bond: Phasic Emotional Responses to Violent Video Game Events
Pages 114-120
Niklas Ravaja, Marko Turpeinen, Timo Saari, Sampsa Puttonen and Liisa Keltikangas-Järvinen

Looking Happy: The Experimental Manipulation of a Positive Visual Attention Bias
Pages 121-126
Heather A. Wadlinger and Derek M. Isaacowitz

Negative Emotionality Influences the Effects of Emotion on Time Perception
Pages 127-131
Jason Tipples

Modulations of the Electrophysiological Response to Pleasant Stimuli by Cognitive Reappraisal
Pages 132-137
Jason W. Krompinger, Jason S. Moser and Robert F. Simons

Big Tales and Cool Heads: Academic Exaggeration Is Related to Cardiac Vagal Reactivity
Pages 138-144
Richard H. Gramzow, Greg Willard and Wendy Berry Mendes

Appraisal-Emotion Relationships in Daily Life
Pages 145-150
John B. Nezlek, Kristof Vansteelandt, Iven Van Mechelen and Peter Kuppens

From Monkey Brain to Human Brain: A Fyssen Foundation Symposium

alice — Thu, 07 Feb 2008 04:07:00 +0000

Edited by Stanislas Dehaene, Jean-René Duhamel, Marc D. Hauser and Giacomo Rizzolatti

The extraordinary overlap between human and chimpanzee genomes does not result in an equal overlap between human and chimpanzee thoughts, sensations, perceptions, and emotions; there are considerable similarities but also considerable differences between human and nonhuman primate brains. From Monkey Brain to Human Brain uses the latest findings in cognitive psychology, comparative biology, and neuroscience to look at the complex patterns of convergence and divergence in primate cortical organization and function.

Several chapters examine the use of modern technologies to study primate brains, analyzing the potentials and the limitations of neuroimaging as well as genetic and computational approaches. These methods, which can be applied identically across different species of primates, help to highlight the paradox of nonlinear primate evolution — the fact that major changes in brain size and functional complexity resulted from small changes in the genome. Other chapters identify plausible analogs or homologs in nonhuman primates for such human cognitive functions as arithmetic, reading, theory of mind, and altruism; examine the role of parietofrontal circuits in the production and comprehension of actions; analyze the contributions of the prefrontal and cingulate cortices to cognitive control; and explore to what extent visual recognition and visual attention are related in humans and other primates.

The Fyssen Foundation is dedicated to encouraging scientific inquiry into the cognitive mechanisms that underlie animal and human behavior and has long sponsored symposia on topics of central importance to the cognitive sciences.

2005, 418 p, cloth

ISBN-10: 0-262-04223-1
ISBN-13: 978-0-262-04223-9

Table of Contents and Sample Chapters

About the Editors

Stanislas Dehaene is Director of Research at INSERM’s Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Paris.

Jean-René Duhamel is Director of Research, Institute of Cognitive Science at CNRS, Lyon.

Marc D. Hauser is Professor of Psychology and Codirector of the Mind, Brain, and Behavior Program at Harvard University.

Giacomo Rizzolatti is Professor of Human Physiology at the University of Parma.

The Hidden Sense: Synesthesia in Art and Science

alice — Thu, 07 Feb 2008 03:19:51 +0000

Authored by Cretien van Campen

What does it mean to hear music in colors, to taste voices, to see each letter of the alphabet as a different color? These uncommon sensory experiences are examples of synesthesia, when two or more senses cooperate in perception. Once dismissed as imagination or delusion, metaphor or drug-induced hallucination, the experience of synesthesia has now been documented by scans of synesthetes’ brains that show “crosstalk” between areas of the brain that do not normally communicate. In The Hidden Sense, Cretien van Campen explores synesthesia from both artistic and scientific perspectives, looking at accounts of individual experiences, examples of synesthesia in visual art, music, and literature, and recent neurological research.

Van Campen reports that some studies define synesthesia as a brain impairment, a short circuit between two different areas. But synesthetes cannot imagine perceiving in any other way; many claim that synesthesia helps them in daily life. Van Campen investigates just what the function of synesthesia might be and what it might tell us about our own sensory perceptions. He examines the experiences of individual synesthetes–from Patrick, who sees music as images and finds the most beautiful ones spring from the music of Prince, to the schoolgirl Sylvia, who is surprised to learn that not everyone sees the alphabet in colors as she does. And he finds suggestions of synesthesia in the work of Scriabin, Van Gogh, Kandinsky, Nabokov, Poe, and Baudelaire.

What is synesthesia? It is not, van Campen concludes, an audiovisual performance, a literary technique, an artistic trend, or a metaphor. It is, perhaps, our hidden sense–a way to think visually; a key to our own sensitivity.

2007, 208 p, cloth

ISBN-10: 0-262-22081-4
ISBN-13: 978-0-262-22081-1

Table of Contents and Sample Chapters

About the Author

Cretien van Campen is a social scientist at the Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands. He is the author of two books on perception and visual art.

God on the brain

thomasr — Wed, 30 Jan 2008 12:06:11 +0000

From BBC (and read exciting transcript): Rudi Affolter and Gwen Tighe have both experienced strong religious visions. He is an atheist; she a Christian. He thought he had died; she thought she had given birth to Jesus. Both have temporal lobe epilepsy.

Like other forms of epilepsy, the condition causes fitting but it is also associated with religious hallucinations. Research into why people like Rudi and Gwen saw what they did has opened up a whole field of brain science: neurotheology.

The connection between the temporal lobes of the brain and religious feeling has led one Canadian scientist to try stimulating them. (They are near your ears.) 80% of Dr Michael Persinger’s experimental subjects report that an artificial magnetic field focused on those brain areas gives them a feeling of ‘not being alone’. Some of them describe it as a religious sensation.

His work raises the prospect that we are programmed to believe in god, that faith is a mental ability humans have developed or been given. And temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) could help unlock the mystery.

Religious leaders

History is full of charismatic religious figures. Could any of them have been epileptics? The visions seen by Bible characters like Moses or Saint Paul are consistent with Rudi’s and Gwen’s, but there is no way to diagnose TLE in people who lived so long ago.

There are, though, more recent examples, like one of the founders of the Seventh Day Adventist Movement, Ellen White. Born in 1827, she suffered a brain injury aged 9 that totally changed her personality. She also began to have powerful religious visions.

Representatives of the Movement doubt that Ellen White suffered from TLE, saying her injury and visions are inconsistent with the condition, but neurologist Gregory Holmes believes this explains her condition.

Better than sex

The first clinical evidence to link the temporal lobes with religious sensations came from monitoring how TLE patients responded to sets of words. In an experiment where people were shown either neutral words (table), erotic words (sex) or religious words (god), the control group was most excited by the sexually loaded words. This was picked up as a sweat response on the skin. People with temporal lobe epilepsy did not share this apparent sense of priorities. For them, religious words generated the greatest reaction. Sexual words were less exciting than neutral ones.

Make believe

If the abnormal brain activity of TLE patients alters their response to religious concepts, could altering brain patterns artificially do the same for people with no such medical condition? This is the question that Michael Persinger set out to explore, using a wired-up helmet designed to concentrate magnetic fields on the temporal lobes of the wearer.

His subjects were not told the precise purpose of the test; just that the experiment looked into relaxation. 80% of participants reported feeling something when the magnetic fields were applied. Persinger calls one of the common sensations a ‘sensed presence’, as if someone else is in the room with you, when there is none.

Horizon introduced Dr Persinger to one of Britain’s most renowned atheists, Prof Richard Dawkins. He agreed to try his techniques on Dawkins to see if he could give him a moment of religious feeling. During a session that lasted 40 minutes, Dawkins found that the magnetic fields around his temporal lobes affected his breathing and his limbs. He did not find god.

Persinger was not disheartened by Dawkins’ immunity to the helmet’s magnetic powers. He believes that the sensitivity of our temporal lobes to magnetism varies from person to person. People with TLE may be especially sensitive to magnetic fields; Prof Dawkins is well below average, it seems. It’s a concept that clerics like Bishop Stephen Sykes give some credence as well: could there be such a thing as a talent for religion?

Brain imaging

Sykes does, though, see a great difference between a ‘sensed presence’ and a genuine religious experience. Scientists like Andrew Newberg want to see just what does happen during moments of faith. He worked with Buddhist, Michael Baime, to study the brain during meditation. By injecting radioactive tracers into Michael’s bloodstream as he reached the height of a meditative trance, Newberg could use a brain scanner to image the brain at a religious climax.

The bloodflow patterns showed that the temporal lobes were certainly involved but also that the brain’s parietal lobes appeared almost completely to shut down. The parietal lobes give us our sense of time and place. Without them, we may lose our sense of self. Adherants to many of the world’s faiths regard a sense of personal insignificance and oneness with a deity as something to strive for. Newberg’s work suggests a neurological basis for what religion tries to generate.

Religious evolution

If brain function offers insight into how we experience religion, does it say anything about why we do? There is evidence that people with religious faith have longer, healthier lives. This hints at a survival benefit for religious people. Could we have evolved religious belief?

Prof Dawkins (who subscribes to evolution to explain human development) thinks there could be an evolutionary advantage, not to believing in god, but to having a brain with the capacity to believe in god. That such faith exists is a by-product of enhanced intelligence. Prof Ramachandran denies that finding out how the brain reacts to religion negates the value of belief. He feels that brain circuitry like that Persinger and Newberg have identified, could amount to an antenna to make us receptive to god. Bishop Sykes meanwhile, thinks religion has nothing to fear from this neuroscience. Science is about seeking to explain the world around us. For him at least, it can co-exist with faith.

Source: BBC

New books for SCR review

thomasr — Tue, 22 Jan 2008 11:00:45 +0000

Dear all,

As recently announced, we now present a list of books that are approved for review at the Science & Consciousness Review. If you are interested in reviewing a particular book (or a book not listed here), please send us (thomasr AT drcmr DOT dk) a note with your full name, mailing address, affiliation, motivation for reviewing the book, and the expected deadline for your review submission.

The following books are now ready for review:

The head trip – Adventures on the Wheel of Consciousness

by Jeff Warren

Warren, a Canadian science journalist, combines the rigorous self-experimentation of Steven Johnson’s Mind Wide Open with the wacky self-experimentation of A.J. Jacobs’s The Know-It-All in this entertaining field guide to the varying levels of mental awareness. Beginning with the mild hallucinogenic state that comes just before true sleep, he tries to hone his skills at lucid dreaming, subjects himself to hypnosis and joins a Buddhist meditation retreat, among other adventures. Along the way, he begins to realize that dreaming and waking are equivalent states, and that we can learn how to induce the subtle gradations of consciousness within ourselves. This could come off as New Age psychobabble, but Warren is well versed in the scientific literature, and he provides detailed accounts of his own research. (During one three-week period, for example, he goes to bed at sundown to recreate a period of wakefulness before returning to sleep that used to be common before electric light reconfigured our sleep schedules.) His self-mocking attitude toward his inability to achieve instant nirvana, along with a steady stream of cartoon illustrations, ensures that his ideas remain accessible. More important than the theories, though, may be the basic tools—and the visionary spirit—that Warren hands off to those interested in hacking their own minds.

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Hypnosis and Conscious States. The cognitive neuroscience perspective

Edited by Graham Jamieson

The phenomenon of hypnosis provides a rich paradigm for those seeking to understand the processes that underlie consciousness. Understanding hypnosis tells us about a basic human capacity for altered experiences that is often overlooked in contemporary western societies. Throughout the 200 year history of psychology, hypnosis has been a major topic of investigation by some of the leading experimenters and theorists of each generation. Today hypnosis is emerging again as a lively area of research within cognitive (systems level) neuroscience informing basic questions about the structure and biological basis of conscious states.

This book describes the latest advances in understanding hypnosis and similar trance states by researchers within the neuroscience of consciousness. It contains many new and exciting contributions from up and coming researchers and provides a lively debate on methodological and theoretical issues central to the development of emerging research paradigms in the neuroscience of conscious states.

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Imaginative Minds. Concepts, Controversies and Themes

Edited by Ilona Roth

Imagination is one of the most distinctive characteristics of human thought. The supreme powers of flexibility, supposition and inventiveness that are its hallmarks, whether in science, technology, business or the visual, literary and performing arts, are highly prized in contemporary societies. Yet in the fields of psychology and cognitive science, where we might expect to find the topic ‘centre-stage’, there has been comparatively little work. This volumes addresses this omission by bringing together the theories and methods of these disciplines with other perspectives offering important insights into the imagination.

The 15 chapters address key questions about the imaginative workings of the mind, including how the capacity for imagination evolved, how it is expressed and what roles it plays in children’s thinking, what psychological processes and brain mechanisms are involved, and how imagination operates in universal cultural phenomena such as music, fiction and religion, which are both the fruits of and the ‘fuel’ for imaginative minds.

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Biology of Freedom: Neural Plasticity, Experience, and the Unconscious

by Francois Ansermet (Author), Pierre Magistretti (Author), Susan Fairfield (Translator)

Freud hoped that the neurosciences would offer support for his psychoanalysis theories at some point in the future: both disciplines, after all, agree that experience leaves traces in the mind. But even today, as we enter the twenty-first century, all too many scientists and analysts maintain that each side has wholly different models of the origin and nature of those traces. What constitutes human experience, how does this experience shape us, and how, if at all, do we change our lives? Psychoanalysis and the neurosciences have failed to communicate about these questions, when they have not been frankly antagonistic. But in Biology of Freedom François Ansermet and Pierre Magistretti are at last breaking new ground.

This fully illustrated account, rigorous yet lucid and entirely accessible, shows how the plasticity of the brain’s neural network allows for successive inscriptions, transcriptions, and retranscriptions of experience, leading to the constitution of an inner reality, an unconscious psychic life unique to each individual. In what amounts to a paradigm shift based on the concept of plasticity, this elegant, seamless collaboration of a psychoanalyst and a neuroscientist bridges the gap between disciplines formerly believed to be incompatible. Ansermet and Magistretti have opened up new areas of exploration of the mind/body connection and profoundly new ways in which to understand the bodily underpinnings of personal freedom, identity, and change.

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Sciousness

Edited by Jonathan Bricklin

James’s notion of sciousness or “pure experience” is akin to Zen tathata (suchness). Japan’s renowned philosopher Kitaro Nishida, in fact, used James’s concept to explain tathata to the Japanese themselves. As this collection of essays makes clear, Western practioners of Zen and other nondual practices need not be spiritual vagabonds. We need, rather, to claim our inheritance from the “father of American psychology.”

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San Marino Summer School on Social Cognition and Social Narrative

thomasr — Tue, 22 Jan 2008 10:00:40 +0000

APPLICATION DEADLINE 1 March 2008. Please let your grad students know about this.

The European Science Foundation and the ESF project Consciousness in a Natural and Cultural Context is sponsoring a one-week interdisciplinary collegium/summer school on contemporary research in the area of social cognition, theory of mind, and narrative theory at the University of San Marino in San Marino (geographically within Italy). See the collegium website.

Organizers: Shaun Gallagher, Dan Hutto, Dan Zahavi.

The collegium/summer school is open to a limited number of graduate students and post-doc researchers interested in theory of mind and the role of narrative and embodied intersubjectivity in our understanding of others. Research presentations, discussions, and tutorial sessions will allow researchers and students to share knowledge and interact. Students will have the opportunity to earn 15 points in the ECTS system.

The preliminary list of faculty includes

Cristiano Castelfranchi. Psychology. ISTC-CNR, Rome.
Jonathan Cole. Neurophysiology. Universities of Southampton and Bournsmouth
Stephen M. Fiore. Cognitive Science. University of Central Florida.
Shaun Gallagher. Philosophy/Cognitive Science. Universities of Central Florida & Hertfordshire.
Vittorio Gallese. Neuroscience. Università degli Studi di Parma.
David Herman. English/Project Narrative. Ohio State University.
Jessica Hobson. Psychology. Tavistock/University College London.
Peter Hobson. Developmental Psychopathology. University College London.
Dan Hutto. Philosophy. University of Hertfordshire.
Tjeerd Jellema. Psychology. University of Hull.
Daniela Kloo. Psychiatry. Universität Salzburg, Austria
Andrew Meltzoff. Developmental Psychology. University of Washington
Joëlle Proust. Philosophy, Jean Nicod Institute, Paris.
Andreas Roepstorff. Anthropology/Neuroscience. University of Aarhus.
Stephen Stich. Philosophy. Rutgers University.
Kai Vogeley. Neuropsychology. University of Cologne, Germany.
Patrizia Violi. Semiotics and Communication. Universities of Bologna & San Marino.
Dan Zahavi. Philosophy. University of Copenhagen.

Topics include: social interaction in infancy, folk psychology, theory of mind, simulation theories, interaction theory, social neuroscience, mirror neurons, extended mind, the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, neurological deficits, and the role of narrative in social cognition.

Tuition: free. Funding is available to cover individual travel expenses for some participants. For more information and application procedure please go here.

Application deadline: 1 March 2008

The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World

alice — Tue, 15 Jan 2008 07:01:10 +0000

Authored by Owen J. Flanagan

If consciousness is the “hard problem” in mind science–explaining how the amazing private world of consciousness emerges from neuronal activity–then the “really hard problem,” writes Owen Flanagan in this provocative book is explaining how meaning is possible in the material world. How can we make sense of the magic and mystery of life naturalistically, without an appeal to the supernatural? How do we say truthful and enchanting things about being human if we accept the fact that we are finite material beings living in a material world, or, in Flanagan’s description, short-lived pieces of organized cells and tissue? Flanagan’s answer is both naturalistic and enchanting. We all wish to live in a meaningful way, to live a life that really matters, to flourish, to achieve eudaimonia–to be a “happy spirit.” Flanagan calls his “empirical-normative” inquiry into the nature, causes, and conditions of human flourishing eudaimonics. Eudaimonics, systematic philosophical investigation that is continuous with science, is the naturalist’s response to those who say that science has robbed the world of the meaning that fantastical, wishful stories once provided.Flanagan draws on philosophy, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and psychology, as well as on transformative mindfulness and self-cultivation practices that come from such nontheistic spiritual traditions as Buddhism, Confucianism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism, in his quest. He gathers from these disciplines knowledge that will help us understand the nature, causes, and constituents of well-being and advance human flourishing. Eudaimonics can help us find out how to make a difference, how to contribute to the accumulation of good effects–how to live a meaningful life.

2007, 304 pp., 1 illus., cloth

ISBN-10: 0-262-06264-X
ISBN-13: 978-0-262-06264-0

Table of Contents and Sample Chapters Endorsements

About the Author

Owen Flanagan is James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy at Duke University. He is the author of Consciousness Reconsidered (MIT Press), The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them, and other books.

Neuronal correlates of “free will” are associated with regional specialization in the human intrinsic/default network

alice — Sat, 12 Jan 2008 08:30:39 +0000

Ilan Goldberg, Shimon Ullman and Rafael Malach
In press article in Consciousness & Cognition

Abstract:
Recently, we proposed a fundamental subdivision of the human cortex into two complementary networks-an ‘‘extrinsic” one which deals with the external environment, and an ‘‘intrinsic” one which largely overlaps with the ‘‘default mode” system, and deals with internally oriented and endogenous mental processes. Here we tested this hypothesis by contrasting decision making under external and internally-derived conditions. Subjects were presented with an external cue, and were required to either follow an external instruction (‘‘determined” condition) or to ignore it and follow a voluntary decision process (‘‘free-will” condition). Our results show that a well defined component of the intrinsic system-the right inferior parietal cortex-was preferentially activated during the ‘‘free-will” condition. Importantly, this activity was significantly higher than the base-line resting state. The results support a self-related role for the intrinsic system and provide clear evidence for both hemispheric and regional specialization in the human intrinsic system.

Cheap drugs against aggression don’t work

thomasr — Wed, 09 Jan 2008 11:40:31 +0000

Study shows placebos as good as antipsychotics for the intellectually disabled.

Scientists have discovered that taking a sugar pill is more effective than routine medications in treating aggression in people with intellectual disabilities. Until now, patients with intellectual disabilities have been prescribed antipsychotic drugs — normally given to people with a psychiatric disease like schizophrenia — to treat aggressive behaviour such as head banging. But evidence for the drugs’ effectiveness has been thin.

“Antipsychotic drugs are widely used because they are cheap and at high doses they sedate people,” says Eric Emerson at Lancaster University, an expert in the behaviour of intellectually disabled people.

Peter Tyrer, based at Imperial College London, led an international research project looking at 86 people with intellectual disability at clinics across England, Wales and at one centre in Australia. Patients being treated for aggressive behaviour randomly received one of two antipsychotic drugs — respiridone or haloperidol — or a placebo.

Nature News

Ageing makes the imagination wither

thomasr — Wed, 09 Jan 2008 11:36:10 +0000

Memory decline in old age may also mean a less vivid imagination. Stitching together personal details gets harder as we get older. Old age does more than stealthily steal away our most cherished memories: it also seems to diminish our ability to imagine things.

This finding, detailed in the January issue of the journal Psychological Science 1, supports the ‘prospective brain’ hypothesis, the idea that imagining the future and remembering the past rely on the same neural machinery.

“One implication of this study is that imagining is quite closely related to, and dependent on, remembering, perhaps more so than we previously realized,” says Dan Schacter of Harvard University.

In the study, Schacter and his team asked groups of young and old participants, with average ages of 25 and 72, respectively, to recount a personal episode from their past or imagine a personal experience in their future in response to cue words.

Nature News

Decision making, impulsivity and time perception

thomasr — Fri, 04 Jan 2008 15:28:23 +0000

Time is an important dimension when individuals make decisions. Specifically, the time until a beneficial outcome can be received is viewed as a cost and is weighed against the benefits of the outcome.

We propose that impulsive individuals experience time differently, that is with a higher cost. Impulsive subjects, therefore, overestimate the duration of time intervals and, as a consequence, discount the value of delayed rewards more strongly than do self-controlled individuals.

The literature on time perception and impulsivity, however, is not clear cut and needs a better theoretical foundation. Here, we develop the theoretical background on concepts of time perception, which could lead to an empirically based notion of the association between an altered sense of time and impulsivity.

Article by Marc Wittmann and Martin P. Paulus in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 12, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 13-16

Altered emotional response in bipolar mania

thomasr — Fri, 04 Jan 2008 15:20:41 +0000

Psychiatric illnesses are often good models for testing the functional relationship between specific regions of the brain. At the same time, one may gain insight into the neurocognitive mechanisms behind a specific disease.

This is the case in a recently published study in Psychiatry Research by Foland et al.:

Evidence for deficient modulation of amygdala response by prefrontal cortex in bipolar mania.
Foland LC, Altshuler LL, Bookheimer SY, Eisenberger N, Townsend J, Thompson PM.

Several studies have implicated the involvement of two major components of emotion regulatory networks, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and amygdala, in the pathophysiology of bipolar disorder. In healthy subjects, the VLPFC has been shown to negatively modulate amygdala response when subjects cognitively evaluate an emotional face by identifying and labeling the emotion it expresses.

The current study used such a paradigm to assess whether the strength of this modulation was altered in bipolar subjects when manic. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), nine manic subjects with bipolar I disorder and nine healthy subjects either named the emotion shown in a face by identifying one of two words that correctly expressed the emotion (emotion labeling task) or matched the emotion shown in a face to one of two other faces (emotion perception task). The degree to which the VLPFC regulated amygdala response during these tasks was assessed using a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis.

Compared with healthy subjects, manic patients had a significantly reduced VLPFC regulation of amygdala response during the emotion labeling task. These findings, taken in context with previous fMRI studies of bipolar mania, suggest that reductions in inhibitory frontal activity in these patients may lead to an increased reactivity of the amygdala.

Psychiatry Res. 2008 Jan 15;162(1):27-37.

Unconscious Perception: Adding a Dorsal Stream to IDA

alice — Wed, 19 Dec 2007 02:47:44 +0000

Minds, Agents, and the Only Question That Matters:

For the past decade or more, my research team has pursued an understanding of how minds work, human minds, animal minds, and artificial minds. Minds? To us, a mind is a control structure for an autonomous agent. Autonomous agent? An autonomous agent (Franklin & Graesser 1997) is a system situated in, and part of, an environment, which senses that environment, and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda, and in such a way that its actions may affect future sensing. Biological examples of autonomous agents include humans and other animals. Non-biological examples include some mobile robots, and various computational agents, including artificial life agents (Langston 1989), software agents (Franklin & Graesser 1997) and many computer viruses.

Every autonomous agent, including you, me, my cat, my software agent IDA and the thermostat in this room, must continually answer for itself the only question that really matters, What do I do next? That’s what minds, that is control structures, are for, to answer this question, to choose what to do next. How do minds so choose?

Cognition and the Cognitive Cycle:

They choose by means of frequent iteration of a sense-process-act cycle that begins with sampling (sensing) of the environment, continues by processing the incoming stimuli, and concludes by acting on the agent’s world. We refer to the processing portion of each such cycle as cognition, and to the cycle itself as the cognitive cycle. A very simple agent, such as a thermostat, may have a trivial cognitive cycle consisting only of sense-reflex-act. At the other end of the spectrum may be a human cognitive cycle, sense-cognition-act, where its quite complex cognition includes perception, working memory, episodic memory, consciousness, procedural memory, and action selection.

In humans other, higher-level, cognitive processes such as high-level perception, deliberation, volition, self, metacognition, etc., are accomplished using multiple cognitive cycles. Thus, a cognitive cycle is best thought of as a cognitive atom or a cognitive moment, the fundamental unit of cognition out of which everything else is built. Let’s look at an example.

The LIDA Model and her Cognitive Cycle

Designed from Baars’ global workspace theory (1988,1997) and adhering to a number of other psychological theories (Baddeley 2000, Barsalou 1999, Conway 2002, Ericsson and Kintsch 1995, Glenberg 1997), IDA is a software agent that does personnel work for the US Navy (Franklin 2001). IDA was completely hand crafted; what she knows was built into her by her designers. (Click here for articles describing her various modules and mechanisms.)

LIDA is a second order acronym standing for Learning IDA, that is, the IDA model with perceptual, episodic and procedural learning added (D’Mello et al. 2006). Working from the diagram in Figure 1 we’ll briefly describe LIDA’s cognitive cycle. (For more complete descriptions of this cognitive cycle in contexts, please see Baars and Franklin 2003, Franklin et al 2005.)

Figure 1. The LIDA Cognitive Cycle

For convenience, we’ll divide the LIDA cognitive cycle into nine steps.

Incoming sensory stimuli is filtered through preconscious perception where meaning is added and a percept produced.
The current percept moves to preconscious working memory where it participates, along with undecayed percepts from previous cycles, in the structure building of higher-level perception.
The current structure from working memory cues transient episodic memory and declarative memory producing local associations, which are stored in long-term working memory.
Coalitions of the contents of long-term working memory compete for consciousness thus training attention on the most relevant, urgent, important, etc.
The conscious broadcast a la global workspace theory occurs, enabling the various forms of learning and the recruitment of internal resources. The broadcast is hypothesized to be the time of phenomenal consciousness.
Receiving the contents of the conscious broadcast, appropriate schemes from procedural memory respond.
Responding schemes instantiate copies of themselves in the action selection mechanism, bind variables, and pass activation.
The action selection mechanism chooses an action for this cognitive cycle.
LIDA then acts on her environment.

Human cognitive cycles, as modeled by LIDA are hypothesized to sample the environment and act on it asynchronously every 100 to 300 ms. (The running IDA software agent did not sample at this rate.) This timing is compatible with neuroscience evidence (Halgren et al 2002, Freeman, Burke and Holmes 2003, Lehmann, Ozaki and Pal 1987, Lehmann et al 1998). Cycles may cascade with several cycles having parts running simultaneously in parallel. The seriality of consciousness must, however, be preserved. Since so many actions, for example saccades of the eyes, simply redirect the senses, one could argue that cycles should begin with step 9, an action.

The LIDA model is a unified theory of cognition (Newell 1990), and perhaps the most complete such to date. Including both its cognitive cycle and the higher-level cognitive processes mentioned above, the LIDA model aims to be a cognitive “theory of everything,” that is, to model all of human cognition. This is, of course, an unattainable ambition, since human cognition is too rich and multi-faceted to ever be modeled completely. There will always be gaps, that is cognitive processes not incorporated into the model. However, we hope to make the basic building block of the LIDA model, it’s cognitive cycle, sufficiently complete that any particular gap in the model can be filed only by addition, that is without any significant reworking of the existing model. As an example, let’s look at filling such a gap by adding a dorsal stream to LIDA’s perception.

Unconscious Perception via the Dorsal Stream

Perception acts on incoming sensory stimuli to produce information by adding meaning (Oyama 1985). Thus perception enables an agent to model its world. Note that not every agent needs to do this kind of modeling. A thermostat causally transforms its sensory input, a temperature, into an action, possibly into a no-operation. On the other hand, essentially every animal requires perception to identify food items, mates, predators, nest mates, etc. An animal’s knowledge of its world is, at best, approximate, and arises from sensory stimuli via perception.

As Bateson so succinctly points out, ” The processes of perception are inaccessible; only the products are conscious and, of course, it is the products that are necessary.” (1979 p.32) Looking at the LIDA cognitive cycle above, we see that all of perception is preconscious in that it occurs in the cycle prior to the conscious broadcast, the moment of phenomenal consciousness. But some of the contents (products) of perception eventually come to consciousness during the cycle. Can all of the contents of perceptual associative memory potentially come to consciousness? Before learning about the dorsal stream (Milner and Goodale 1995, Goodale and Humphrey 1998, Goodale and Milner 2004) we thought so. Dorsal stream? What’s that?

The work of Goodale and Milner, as described in their eminently readable short book Sight Unseen (2004), describes two divergent visual perception streams, the ventral stream and the dorsal stream, often referred to as the “what” stream and the “how” stream. The ventral stream is concerned with making sense of the current scene, while the dorsal stream is used to guide actions. (Recent additions to our knowledge has shown that what was called the ventral stream should actually be two distinct streams. But, that’s beyond the scope of this essay. For our purposes, let’s refer to both together as the ventral stream. Our main focus is on adding a dorsal stream to the LIDA model. For a visual rendition please click here .

Both steams can be thought of as starting in the early visual areas of the occipital lobe (V1, V2, V3), and later diverging. Starting at the back of the head in the occipital lobe, the ventral stream winds its way around the side and into the temporal lobe, before sending out connections to other temporal and frontal lobe structures housing episodic memory, decision making and the like. Starting nearby, the dorsal stream moves upwards through the occipital lobe into the parietal lobe and continuing until it makes contact with the primary somato-sensory cortex and the primary motor cortex. There are also direct pathways from the dorsal stream to lower parts of the brain such as the superior colliculus. But why so much brain geography, and why two separate visual perceptual streams?

Goodale and Milner describe quite convincing empirical studies that show decidedly different functions for the two perceptual streams. Each being part of perception, both steams produce information by adding meaning to incoming sensory stimuli. They differ as to the kind of meaning they add. Let’s look at the needs and functions of the two visual perception streams individually.

The ventral or “what” stream is concerned with making sense of a scene. This requires recognizing and categorizing objects, and the relations between them, that is, situations. This recognition and categorization must be accomplished independent of scale. The scene must be understood if it appears on a small TV screen, in an actual physical room, or on a huge screen in a movie theater. This understanding must also be independent of position. What’s needed is the relative position of objects, what’s to the left of what, what’s on what, etc. Approximate distance metrics suffice. The function of the ventral stream is to provide information of use in choosing the next action as outlined above in the description of the LIDA cognitive cycle.

The dorsal, or “how,” stream is concerned with providing information on how to carry out an action. For instance, grasping requires not a relative, but an exact, location relative to the hand, and an exact size. Again, this process is part of perception creating information by adding meaning, but it’s a quite different sort of meaning.

The Goodale and Milner work began with a patient whose ventral stream was severely impaired. She could consciously see some color and texture, but was completely unable to recognize shapes and, therefore, couldn’t identify objects. But with her intact dorsal stream, the patient could accurately grasp objects she reported not seeing, and could navigate through rooms with out bumping into chairs that she couldn’t report seeing. Careful experimentation, some using optical illusions, convinced Goodale and Milner that the dorsal stream was not only preconscious, but unconscious, that it, its contents never come to consciousness. Thus we arrive at the title of this section, unconscious perception via the dorsal stream.

is dorsal stream perception really unconscious, or is it only that people can’t report it because they have no episodic memory of it?But, is dorsal stream perception really unconscious, or is it only that people can’t report it because they have no episodic memory of it? This situation occurs with dream amnesia, and with the so-called unconscious driving. In both cases we have concluded that the problem in reporting was with episodic memory and not with consciousness (Franklin et al 2005). Might this also be true of the inability to report the contents of the dorsal stream?

Although the neural correlates of consciousness are not precisely known (Koch 2004), we’ve concluded that’s not the case on the basis of known neural connections. If one follows the LIDA cognitive cycle through brain areas known to be involved with the various LIDA processes, one doesn’t arrive at the endpoint of the dorsal stream until action selection has taken place in the cycle.

One can bolster this conclusion by considering the functions of the two streams. The contents of the ventral stream, the sense of the scene, would be expected to be of use in choosing what to do next and, according to global workspace theory, should come to consciousness. On the other hand, the contents of the dorsal stream are only needed to effect an action after it has been chosen. Consciousness would be irrelevant at this point. This is an argument from computational needs.

The end result of these considerations points out a gap in the LIDA model that needs to be filled to accommodate an unconscious dorsal stream. Filling this gap required the addition of a sensory memory and a sensory motor memory connected by a dorsal stream. Sensory Memory holds incoming sensory stimuli. Such sensory stimuli can be external, that is, generated by the environment, or internal, that is, generated by proprioception or other internal processes. Sensory memory also holds early feature detectors that begin to make sense of the stimuli. Sensory memory feeds into Perceptual Associative Memory in route to consciousness, but its nodes are not permitted to become part of the percept. At a much faster time scale sensory memory also feeds multiple times into each executing sensory-motor automatism (SMA), taken from sensory-motor memory, that operates without benefit of consciousness. All of this addition can be seen illustrated online in the LIDA brief tutorial.

This example illustrates the relative ease of filling gaps in the LIDA model without the necessity of changes to its overall structure. This ease adds to the believability of the model in the absence of direct empirical verification due to current experimental technology being lacking in either temporal or special resolution, or in scope (Franklin et al 2005). We hope to have such verification or falsification in the future as the experimental technology improves.

References:

Baars, B. J. 1988. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baars, B. J. 1997. In the Theater of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baars, B. J., and S. Franklin. 2003. How conscious experience and working memory interact. Trends in Cognitive Science 7:166-172.
Baddeley, A. D. 2000. The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory? Trends in Cognitive Science 4:417-423.
Barsalou, L. W. 1999. Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22:577-609.
Bateson, G. 1979. Mind and Nature: a Necessary Unity. New York: Dutton.
Conway, M. A. 2002. Sensory-perceptual episodic memory and its context: autobiographical memory. In Episodic Memory, ed. A. Baddeley, M. Conway, and J. Aggleton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
D’Mello, Sidney K, S Franklin, U Ramamurthy, and B J Baars. 2006. A cognitive science based machine learning architecture. In AAAI 2006 Spring Symposium Series Sponsor: American Association for Artificial Intelligence. Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, USA.
Ericsson, K. A., and W. Kintsch. 1995. Long-term working memory. Psychological Review 102:211-245.
Franklin, S. 2001. Automating Human Information Agents. In Practical Applications of Intelligent Agents, ed. Z. Chen, and L. C. Jain. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Franklin, S., B. J. Baars, U. Ramamurthy, and M. Ventura. 2005. The Role of Consciousness in Memory. Brains, Minds and Media 1:1-38, pdf.
Franklin, S., and A. C. Graesser. 1997. Is it an Agent, or just a Program?: A Taxonomy for Autonomous Agents. In Intelligent Agents III. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
Freeman, W. J., B. C. Burke, and M. D. Holmes. 2003. Aperiodic Phase Re-Setting in Scalp EEG of Beta-Gamma Oscillations by State Transitions at Alpha-Theta Rates. Human Brain Mapping 19:248-272.
Glenberg, A M. 1997. What memory is for. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20: 1-19.
Goodale, M. A., and G. K. Humphrey. 1998. The objects of action and perception. Cognition 67:181-208.
Goodale, M. A., and D. Milner. 2004. Sight Unseen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Halgren, E., C. Boujon, J. Clarke, C. Wang, and P. Chauvel. 2002. Rapid distributed fronto-parieto-occipital processing stages during working memory in humans. Cerebral Cortex 12:710-728.
Koch, C. 2004. The Quest for Consciousness: A neurobiological approach. Englewood, Colorado: Roberts & Co.
Langston, C. 1989. Artificial Life. Redwood City, Calif.: Addison-Wesley.
Lehmann, D., H. Ozaki, and I. Pal. 1987. EEG alpha map series: brain micro-states by space-oriented adaptive segmentation. Electroencephalogr. Clin. Neurophysiol. 67:271-288.
Lehmann, D., W. K. Strik, B. Henggeler, T. Koenig, and M. Koukkou. 1998. Brain electric microstates and momentary conscious mind states as building blocks of spontaneous thinking: I. Visual imagery and abstract thoughts. Int. J. Psychophysiol. 29:1-11.
Milner, A. David and Melvyn A. Goodale. 1995. The visual brain in action. Oxford psychology series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Newell, A. 1990. Unified Theories of Cognition. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Oyama, S. 1985. The Ontogeny of Information. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Personality & Individual Differences — new issue

thomasr — Fri, 14 Dec 2007 07:28:17 +0000

A new issue of the journal Personality and Individual Differences (Volume 44, Issue 3) hosts a number of interesting articles including:

Trait-anxiety and repressors: Suppression of recall for aversive images
Pages 550-562
Douglas C. Johnson, Michelle Craske and Deane Aikins
Effects of neuroticism on depression and anxiety: Rumination as a possible mediator
Pages 574-584
Jeffrey Roelofs, Marcus Huibers, Frenk Peeters and Arnoud Arntz
An investigation of maternal personality, parenting styles, and subjective well-being
Pages 585-595
Julie Desjardins, John M. Zelenski and Robert J. Coplan
Identity formation: The role of identity processing style and cognitive processes
Pages 643-653
Michael D. Berzonsky
Psychopathy and trait emotional intelligence
Pages 733-743
Melanie B. Malterer, Samantha J. Glass and Joseph P. Newman

Cognition & Emotion new issue

thomasr — Fri, 14 Dec 2007 07:22:34 +0000

A new issue of Cognition & Emotion is out, including articles on emotional memory and awareness, music and emotions, and anger-induction methods.

Cognition & Emotion: Volume 22 Issue 2 is now available online at informaworld (http://www.informaworld.com).

This new issue contains the following articles:

Emotional processing and emotional memory are modulated by interoceptive awareness
Authors: Olga Pollatos; Rainer Schandry

Clear heads are cool heads: Emotional clarity and the down-regulation of antisocial affect
Authors: Benjamin M. Wilkowski; Michael D. Robinson

Psychometric properties of the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire: Chinese version
Authors: Xiongzhao Zhu; Randy P. Auerbach; Shuqiao Yao; John R. Z. Abela; Jing Xiao; Xi Tong

Liking for happy- and sad-sounding music: Effects of exposure
Authors: E. Glenn Schellenberg; Isabelle Peretz; Sandrine Vieillard

Revisiting the affective Simon effect
Authors: Katia Duscherer; Daniel Holender; Esther Molenaar

Automatic attitudes and alcohol: Does implicit liking predict drinking?
Authors: B. Keith Payne; Olesya Govorun; Nathan L. Arbuckle

Mixed affective responses to music with conflicting cues
Authors: Patrick G. Hunter; E. Glenn Schellenberg; Ulrich Schimmack

How to push someone’s buttons: A comparison of four anger-induction methods
Authors: Jill Lobbestael; Arnoud Arntz; Reinout W. Wiers

Response-bound primes diminish affective priming in the naming task
Authors: Dirk Wentura; Christian Frings

Call for book reviewers

thomasr — Wed, 12 Dec 2007 09:49:24 +0000

SCR is expanding! We now call for people that are interested in reviewing books. Recently published and forthcoming books are often made available to SCR, and we have the opportunity to bring you the latest news on the consciousness book frontier.

There are two ways to suggest a book review. First, SCR will bring the latest book news as explicit “to be reviewed” headlines. Second, you may have a book you want to review (that has not already appeared at SCR). In both cases, please write to SCR and suggest yourself as a reviewer. If you are interested, please send an email to thomasr AT drcmr DOT dk. Please add some information about yourself; your education, affiliation and interests. Students are encouraged to participate!

We look forward to a continuous expansion of SCR as the forum for the review and discussion of the science of consciousness.

The trivial function of sleep

thomasr — Tue, 11 Dec 2007 08:40:01 +0000

Rest in poikilothermic animals is an adaptation of the organism to adjust to the geophysical cycles, a doubtless valuable function for all animals. In this review, we argue that the function of sleep could be trivial for mammals and birds because sleep does not provide additional advantages over simple rest. This conclusion can be reached by using the null hypothesis and parsimony arguments.

First, we develop some theoretical and empirical considerations supporting the absence of specific effects after sleep deprivation. Then, we question the adaptive value of sleep traits by using non-coding DNA as a metaphor that shows that the complexity in the design is not a definitive proof of adaptation.

We then propose that few, if any, phenotypic selectable traits do exist in sleep. Instead, the selection of efficient waking has been the major determinant of the most significant aspects in sleep structure. In addition, we suggest that the regulation of sleep is only a mechanism to enforce rest, a state that was challenged after the development of homeothermy.

As a general conclusion, there is no direct answer to the problem of why we sleep; only an explanation of why such a complex set of mechanisms is used to perform what seems to be a simple function. This explanation should be reached by following the evolution of wakefulness rather than that of sleep. Sleep could have additional functions secondarily added to the trivial one, although, in this case, the necessity and sufficiency of these sleep functions should be demonstrated.

The trivial function of sleep. R.V. Rial, Maria C. Nicolau, Antoni Gamundi, Mourad Akaarir, Sara Aparicio, Celia Garau, Silvia Tejada, Catalina Roca, Lluis Gene, David Moranta, Susana Esteban, 2007. Sleep Medicine Reviews 11(4):311-325.

Belief, disbelief and uncertainty activate distinct brain regions

thomasr — Tue, 11 Dec 2007 08:32:06 +0000

The capacity of the human mind to believe or disbelieve a statement is a powerful force for controlling both behavior and emotion, but the basis of these states in the brain is not yet understood. A new study found that belief, disbelief and uncertainty activate distinct regions of the brain, with belief/disbelief affecting areas associated with the pleasantness/unpleasantness of tastes and odors. The study will publish online in the Annals of Neurology, the official journal of the American Neurological Association.

Led by Sam Harris of the University of California, Los Angeles, the study involved 14 adults who underwent functional MRI scans during which they were presented with short statements that they had to evaluate as true, false or undecided. Each participant underwent three scans while they evaluated statements from a broad variety of categories such as mathematical, geographical, autobiographical, religious and factual. The statements were designed to be clearly true, false or undecidable.

Contrasting belief and disbelief trials yielded increased signal in the (VMPFC), which is involved in linking factual knowledge with emotion. “The involvement of the VMPFC in belief processing suggests an anatomical link between the purely cognitive aspects of belief and human emotion and reward,” the authors state. The fact that ethical belief showed a similar pattern of activation to mathematical belief suggests that the physiological difference between belief and disbelief is not related to content or emotional associations, they note.

The contrasts between disbelief and belief showed increased signal in the anterior insula, a region involved in the sensation of taste, the
perception of pain, and the feeling of disgust, indicating that “false propositions might actually disgust us,” the authors state. “Our results appear to make sense of the emotional tone of disbelief, placing it on a continuum with other modes of stimulus appraisal and rejection,” they add.

Uncertainty evoked a positive signal in the anterior cingulate cortext (ACC) and a decreased signal in the caudate, a region of the basal
ganglia, which plays a role in motor action. Noting that both belief and disbelief showed an increased signal in the caudate compared to
uncertainty, the authors suggest that the basal ganglia may play a role in mediating the cognitive and behavioral differences between decision and indecision.

The study raises the possibility that the differences between belief, disbelief and uncertainty may one day be reliably distinguished by
neuroimaging techniques. They conclude: “This would have obvious implications for the detection of deception, for the control of the
placebo effect during the process of drug design, and for the study of any higher-cognitive phenomenon in which the differences between belief, disbelief, and uncertainty might be a relevant variable.”

From physorg.com
Source: Wiley-Blackwell

Neurons in the frontal lobe may be responsible for rational decision-making

thomasr — Mon, 10 Dec 2007 11:17:03 +0000

From physorg.com — You study the menu at a restaurant and decide to order the steak rather than the salmon. But when the waiter tells you about the lobster special, you decide lobster trumps steak. Without reconsidering the salmon, you place your order—all because of a trait called “transitivity.”

“Transitivity is the hallmark of rational economic choice,” says Camillo Padoa-Schioppa, a postdoctoral researcher in HMS Professor of Neurobiology John Assad’s lab. According to transitivity, if you prefer A to B and B to C, then you ought to prefer A to C. Or, if you prefer lobster to steak, and steak to salmon, then you will prefer lobster to salmon.

Padoa-Schioppa is lead author on a paper that suggests this trait might be encoded at the level of individual neurons. The study, which appears online Dec. 9 in Nature Neuroscience, shows that some neurons in a part of the brain called the orbitofrontal cortex encode economic value in a “menu invariant” way. That is, the neurons respond the same to steak regardless if it’s offered against salmon or lobster.

“People make choices by assigning values to different options. If the values are menu invariant preferences will be transitive. The
activity of these neurons does not vary with the menu options, suggesting that these neurons could be responsible for
transitivity,” Padoa-Schioppa explains.

“This study provides a key insight into the biology of our frontal lobes and the neural circuits that underlie decision-making,” Assad
adds. “Despite the maxim, we in fact can compare apples to oranges, and we do it all the time. Camillo’s research sheds light on how we
make these types of choices.”

Frontal lobe damage has been linked to “choice deficits” such as
eating disorders, compulsive gambling and abnormal social behavior. For
example, in the first documented case of brain injury impacting
behavior, the infamous railroad construction foreman Phineas Gage became
unsociable after a tamping iron passed through his skull in 1848,
damaging his frontal lobes. This area of the brain has also been
implicated in drug abuse.

Labs are just beginning to probe normal decision-making at the level of
individual neurons, venturing into a new field called neuroeconomics.
Such research might eventually help to explain choice deficits
associated with frontal lobe functions.

The new study builds on an April 2006 Nature paper in which
Padoa-Schioppa and Assad identified neurons that encode the value
macaque monkeys assign to juice they choose independent of its type,
providing a common currency of comparison for the brain.

In that study, the scientists found that although monkeys generally
prefer grape juice to apple juice, sometimes they choose the latter, if
it is offered in large amounts. When presented with 3 units of apple
juice and 1 unit of grape juice, for example, a monkey might take the
grape juice only 50 percent of the time. This indicates that the value
of the grape juice is 3 times that of the apple juice. A particular
group of neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex fire at roughly the same
rate, regardless of the monkey’s decision because the animal values
both choices equally. These neurons also fire at the same rate if the
monkey chooses 6 units of apple juice or 2 units of grape juice. Thus,
these neurons encode the value the monkey receives in each trial.

Now, by adding a third juice to the mix, the team has tested whether
these neurons reflect transitivity. The three juices were offered to a
monkey in pairs dozens of times over the course of a session, the
quantity of each juice varying from trial to trial.

In general, monkeys preferred 1 unit of juice A to 1 unit of juice B, 1B
to 1C, and 1A to 1C. During each session, Padoa-Schioppa recorded the
activity of a handful of neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex, and he
discovered their firing rate did not depend on whether B was offered
against A or against C, indicating that these neurons respond in a menu
invariant way.

“The stability of these neurons could help to explain why we make
decisions that are consistent over the short term,” Padoa-Schioppa
says. “In our study, the neural circuit was not influenced by the
short-term behavioral context.”

Padoa-Schioppa is now examining the possibility that value-encoding
neurons may adapt to different value scales over longer periods of time.

Source: Harvard Medical School

Researchers can read thoughts to decipher what a person is actually seeing

thomasr — Mon, 10 Dec 2007 08:21:57 +0000

From physorg.com — Following ground-breaking research showing that neurons in the human brain respond in an abstract manner to particular individuals or objects, University of Leicester researchers have now discovered that, from the firing of this type of neuron, they can tell what a person is actually seeing.

The original research by Dr R Quian Quiroga, of the University’s Department of Engineering, showed that one neuron fired to, for instance, Jennifer Aniston, another one to Halle Berry, another one to the Sydney Opera House, etc. The responses were abstract. For example, the neuron firing to Halle Berry responded to several different pictures of her and even to the letters of her name, but not to other people or names.

This result, published in Nature in 2005 and selected as one of the top 100 scientific stories of the year by Discover Magazine, came from data from patients suffering from epilepsy. As candidates for epilepsy surgery, they are implanted with intracranial electrodes to determine as accurately as possible the area where the seizures originate. From that, clinicians can evaluate the potential outcome of curative surgery.

Dr Quian Quiroga’s latest research, which has appeared in the Journal of Neurophysiology, follows on from this. Dr Quian Quiroga explained:

“For example, if the ‘Jennifer Aniston neuron’ increases its firing then we can predict that the subject is seeing Jennifer Aniston. If the ‘Halle Berry neuron’ fires, then we can predict that the subject is seeing Halle Berry, and so on. “To do this, we used and optimised a ‘decoding algorithms’, which is a mathematical method to infer the stimulus from the neuronal firing. We also needed to optimise our recording and data processing tools to record simultaneously from as many neurons as possible. Currently we are able to record simultaneously from up to 100 neurons in the human brain.

“In these experiments we presented a large database of pictures, and discovered that we can predict what picture the subject is seeing far above chance. So, in simple words, we can read the human thought from the neuronal activity.

“Once we reached this point, we then asked what are the most fundamental features of the neuronal firing that allowed us to make this
predictions. This gave us the chance of studying basic principles of neural coding; i.e. how information is stored by neurons in the brain.

“For example, we found that there is a very limited time window in the neuronal firing that contains most of the information used for such predictions. Interestingly, neurons fired only 4 spikes in average during this time window. So, in another words, only 4 spikes of a few neurons are already telling us what the patient is seeing.”

Potential applications of this discovery include the development of Neural Prosthetic devices to be used by paralysed patients or amputees. A patient with a lesion in the spinal cord (as with the late Christopher Reeves), can still think about reaching a cup of tea with his arm, but this order is not transmitted to the muscles.

The idea of Neural Prostheses is to read these commands directly from the brain and transmit them to bionic devices such as a robotic arm that the patient could control directly from the brain.

Dr Quian Quiroga’s work showing that it is possible to read signals from the brain is a good step forward in this direction. But there are
still clinical and ethical issues that have to be resolved before Neural Prosthetic devices can be applied in humans.

In particular, these would involve invasive surgery, which would have to be justified by a clear improvement for the patient before it could be undertaken.

Source: University of Leicester

Are Humans Evolving Faster?

thomasr — Mon, 10 Dec 2007 08:13:41 +0000

From physorg.com – Researchers discovered genetic evidence that human evolution is speeding up – and has not halted or proceeded at a constant rate, as had been thought – indicating that humans on different continents are becoming increasingly different.

We used a new genomic technology to show that humans are evolving rapidly, and that the pace of change has accelerated a lot in the last 40,000 years, especially since the end of the Ice Age roughly 10,000 years ago,” says research team leader Henry Harpending, a distinguished professor of anthropology at the University of Utah.

Harpending says there are provocative implications from the study, published online Monday, Dec. 10 in the journal Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences:

“We aren’t the same as people even 1,000 or 2,000 years ago,” he says, which may explain, for example, part of the difference between Viking invaders and their peaceful Swedish descendants. “The dogma has been these are cultural fluctuations, but almost any temperament trait you look at is under strong genetic influence.”

“Human races are evolving away from each other,” Harpending says. “Genes are evolving fast in Europe, Asia and Africa, but almost all of these are unique to their continent of origin. We are getting less alike, not merging into a single, mixed humanity.” He says that is happening because humans dispersed from Africa to other regions 40,000 years ago, “and there has not been much flow of genes between the regions since then.”

“Our study denies the widely held assumption or belief that modern humans [those who widely adopted advanced tools and art] appeared 40,000 years ago, have not changed since and that we are all pretty much the same. We show that humans are changing relatively rapidly on a scale of centuries to millennia, and that these changes are different in different continental groups.”

The increase in human population from millions to billions in the last 10,000 years accelerated the rate of evolution because “we were in new environments to which we needed to adapt,” Harpending adds. “And with a larger population, more mutations occurred.”

Study co-author Gregory M. Cochran says: “History looks more and more like a science fiction novel in which mutants repeatedly arose and displaced normal humans – sometimes quietly, by surviving starvation and disease better, sometimes as a conquering horde. And we are those mutants.”

Harpending conducted the study with Cochran, a New Mexico physicist, self-taught evolutionary biologist and adjunct professor of anthropology at the University of Utah; anthropologist John Hawks, a former Utah postdoctoral researcher now at the University of Wisconsin, Madison; geneticist Eric Wang of Affymetrix, Inc. in Santa Clara, Calif.; and biochemist Robert Moyzis of the University of California, Irvine.

No Justification for Discrimination

The new study comes from two of the same University of Utah scientists -
Harpending and Cochran – who created a stir in 2005 when they published
a study arguing that above-average intelligence in Ashkenazi Jews -
those of northern European heritage – resulted from natural selection in
medieval Europe, where they were pressured into jobs as financiers,
traders, managers and tax collectors. Those who were smarter succeeded,
grew wealthy and had bigger families to pass on their genes. Yet that
intelligence also is linked to genetic diseases such as Tay-Sachs and
Gaucher in Jews.

That study and others dealing with genetic differences among humans -
whose DNA is more than 99 percent identical – generated fears such
research will undermine the principle of human equality and justify
racism and discrimination. Other critics question the quality of the
science and argue culture plays a bigger role than genetics.

Harpending says genetic differences among different human populations
“cannot be used to justify discrimination. Rights in the Constitution
aren’t predicated on utter equality. People have rights and should have
opportunities whatever their group.”

Analyzing SNPs of Evolutionary Acceleration

The study looked for genetic evidence of natural selection – the
evolution of favorable gene mutations – during the past 80,000 years by
analyzing DNA from 270 individuals in the International HapMap Project,
an effort to identify variations in human genes that cause disease and
can serve as targets for new medicines.

The new study looked specifically at genetic variations called “single
nucleotide polymorphisms,” or SNPs (pronounced “snips”) which are
single-point mutations in chromosomes that are spreading through a
significant proportion of the population.

Imagine walking along two chromosomes – the same chromosome from two
different people. Chromosomes are made of DNA, a twisting, ladder-like
structure in which each rung is made of a “base pair” of amino acids,
either G-C or A-T. Harpending says that about every 1,000 base pairs,
there will be a difference between the two chromosomes. That is known as
a SNP.

Data examined in the study included 3.9 million SNPs from the 270 people
in four populations: Han Chinese, Japanese, Africa’s Yoruba tribe and
northern Europeans, represented largely by data from Utah Mormons, says
Harpending.

Over time, chromosomes randomly break and recombine to create new
versions or variants of the chromosome. “If a favorable mutation
appears, then the number of copies of that chromosome will increase
rapidly” in the population because people with the mutation are more
likely to survive and reproduce, Harpending says.

“And if it increases rapidly, it becomes common in the population in a
short time,” he adds.

The researchers took advantage of that to determine if genes on
chromosomes had evolved recently. Humans have 23 pairs of chromosomes,
with each parent providing one copy of each of the 23. If the same
chromosome from numerous people has a segment with an identical pattern
of SNPs, that indicates that segment of the chromosome has not broken up
and recombined recently.

That means a gene on that segment of chromosome must have evolved
recently and fast; if it had evolved long ago, the chromosome would have
broken and recombined.

Harpending and colleagues used a computer to scan the data for
chromosome segments that had identical SNP patterns and thus had not
broken and recombined, meaning they evolved recently. They also
calculated how recently the genes evolved.

A key finding: 7 percent of human genes are undergoing rapid, recent
evolution.

The researchers built a case that human evolution has accelerated by
comparing genetic data with what the data should look like if human
evolution had been constant:

– The study found much more genetic diversity in the SNPs than would be
expected if human evolution had remained constant.

– If the rate at which new genes evolve in Africans was extrapolated
back to 6 million years ago when humans and chimpanzees diverged, the
genetic difference between modern chimps and humans would be 160 times
greater than it really is. So the evolution rate of Africans represents
a recent speedup in evolution.

– If evolution had been fast and constant for a long time, there should
be many recently evolved genes that have spread to everyone. Yet, the
study revealed many genes still becoming more frequent in the
population, indicating a recent evolutionary speedup.

Next, the researchers examined the history of human populationsize on
each continent. They found that mutation patterns seen in the genome
data were consistent with the hypothesis that evolution is faster in
larger populations.

Evolutionary Change and Human History: Got Milk?

“Rapid population growth has been coupled with vast changes in cultures
and ecology, creating new opportunities for adaptation,” the study says.
“The past 10,000 years have seen rapid skeletal and dental evolution in
human populations, as well as the appearance of many new genetic
responses to diet and disease.”

The researchers note that human migrations into new Eurasian
environments created selective pressures favoring less skin pigmentation
(so more sunlight could be absorbed by skin to make vitamin D),
adaptation to cold weather and dietary changes.

Because human population grew from several million at the end of the Ice
Age to 6 billion now, more favored new genes have emerged and evolution
has speeded up, both globally and among continental groups of people,
Harpending says.

“We have to understand genetic change in order to understand history,”
he adds.

For example, in China and most of Africa, few people can digest fresh
milk into adulthood. Yet in Sweden and Denmark, the gene that makes the
milk-digesting enzyme lactase remains active, so “almost everyone can
drink fresh milk,” explaining why dairying is more common in Europe than
in the Mediterranean and Africa, Harpending says.

He now is studying if the mutation that allowed lactose tolerance
spurred some of history’s great population expansions, including when
speakers of Indo-European languages settled all the way from northwest
India and central Asia through Persia and across Europe 4,000 to 5,000
years ago. He suspects milk drinking gave lactose-tolerant Indo-European
speakers more energy, allowing them to conquer a large area.

But Harpending believes the speedup in human evolution “is a temporary
state of affairs because of our new environments since the dispersal of
modern humans 40,000 years ago and especially since the invention of
agriculture 12,000 years ago. That changed our diet and changed our
social systems. If you suddenly take hunter-gatherers and give them a
diet of corn, they frequently get diabetes. We’re still adapting to
that. Several new genes we see spreading through the population are
involved with helping us prosper with high-carbohydrate diet.”

Source: University of Utah

Subliminal smells bias perception about a person’s likeability

thomasr — Mon, 10 Dec 2007 08:06:31 +0000

From physorg.com — Anyone who has bonded with a puppy madly sniffing with affection gets an idea of how scents, most not apparent to humans, are critical to a dog’s appreciation of her two-legged friends. Now new research from Northwestern University suggests that humans also pick up infinitesimal scents that affect whether or not we like somebody. “We evaluate people every day and make judgments about who we like or don’t like,” said Wen Li, a post-doctoral fellow in the Cognitive Neurology and Alzheimer’s Disease Center at Northwestern’s Feinberg School of Medicine and lead author of the study. “We may think our judgments are based only on various conscious bits of information, but our senses also may provide subliminal perceptual information that affects our behavior.”

“Subliminal Smells Can Guide Social Preferences” was published in the December issue of Psychological Science. Besides Li, the
study’s co-investigators include Isabel Moallem, Loyola University; Ken Paller, professor of psychology in the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences at Northwestern; and Jay Gottfried, assistant professor of neurology at Feinberg and senior author of the paper.

Minute amounts of odors elicited salient psychological and physiological changes that suggest that humans get much more information from barely perceptible scents than previously realized.

To test whether subliminal odors alter social preferences, participants were asked to sniff bottles with three different scents: lemon (good), sweat (bad) and ethereal (neutral). The scents ranged from levels that could be consciously smelled to those that were barely perceptible. Study participants were informed that an odor would be present in 75 percent of the trials.

Most participants were not aware of the barely perceptible odors. After sniffing from each of the bottles, they were shown a face with a neutral expression and asked to evaluate it using one of six different rankings, ranging from extremely likeable to extremely unlikeable.

People who were slightly better than average at figuring out whether the minimal smell was present didn’t seem to be biased by the subliminal scents.

“The study suggests that people conscious of the barely noticeable scents were able to discount that sensory information and just evaluate the faces,” Li said. “It only was when smell sneaked in without being noticed that judgments about likeability were biased.”

The conclusions fit with recent studies using visual stimuli that suggest that top-down control mechanisms in the brain can be exerted on unconscious processing even though individuals have no awareness of what is being controlled.

“When sensory input is insufficient to provoke a conscious olfactory experience, subliminal processing prevails and biases perception,”
Paller said. “But as the awareness of a scent increases, greater executive control in the brain is engaged to counteract unconscious
olfaction.”

The acute sensitivity of human olfaction tends to be underappreciated. “In general, people tend to be dismissive of human olfaction and
discount the role that smell plays in our everyday life,” said Gottfried. “Our study offers direct evidence that human social behavior is under the influence of miniscule amounts of odor, at concentrations too low to be consciously perceived, indicating that the human sense of smell is much keener than commonly thought.”

The study adds to a growing body of research suggesting that subliminal sensory information — whether from scents, vision or hearing — affects perception. “We are beginning to understand more about how perception and memory function,” Paller said, “by taking into
account various types of influences that operate without our explicit knowledge.”

Source: Northwestern University

How emotions colour our perception of time

thomasr — Fri, 07 Dec 2007 10:39:47 +0000

Our sense of time is altered by our emotions to such an extent that time seems to fly when we are having fun and drags when we are bored. Recent studies using standardized emotional material provide a unique opportunity for understanding the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie the effects of emotion on timing and time perception in the milliseconds-to-hours range.

We outline how these new findings can be explained within the framework of internal-clock models and describe how emotional arousal and valence interact to produce both increases and decreases in attentional time sharing and clock speed. The study of time and emotion is at a crossroads, and we outline possible examples for future directions

Article by Sylvie Droit-Volet & Warren H. Meck in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 12, December 2007, Pages 504-513

New issue: Emotion

thomasr — Sun, 02 Dec 2007 06:42:23 +0000

A new issue of Emotion is now out, including articles on audition and time perception, distraction and emotional bias, mood and cognition, and emotioms over time. Here, we bring the table of contents.

Emotion, Volume 7, Issue 4

The detection of fear-relevant stimuli: Are guns noticed as quickly as snakes?

Fox, Elaine; Griggs, Laura; Mouchlianitis, Elias

How emotional auditory stimuli modulate time perception.

Noulhiane, Marion; Mella, Nathalie; Samson, S.; Ragot, R.; Pouthas, V.

Aging and goal-directed emotional attention: Distraction reverses emotional biases.

Knight, Marisa; Seymour, Travis L.; Gaunt, Joshua T.; Baker, Christopher; Nesmith, Kathryn; Mather, Mara

Clearing the mind: A working memory model of distraction from negative mood.

Van Dillen, Lotte F.; Koole, Sander L.

Processing of observed pupil size modulates perception of sadness and predicts empathy.

Harrison, Neil A.; Wilson, C. Ellie; Critchley, Hugo D.

Facial dynamics as indicators of trustworthiness and cooperative behavior.

Krumhuber, Eva; Manstead, Antony S. R.; Cosker, Darren; Marshall, Dave; Rosin, Paul L.; Kappas, Arvid

“What is in a word? No versus Yes differentially engage the lateral orbitofrontal cortex”: Correction.

Alia-Klein, Nelly; Goldstein, Rita Z.; Tomasi, Dardo; Zhang, Lei; Fagin-Jones, Stephanie; Telang, Frank; Wang, Gene-Jack; Fowler, Joanna S.; Volkow, Nora D.

Judgments of emotion from spontaneous facial expressions of New Guineans.

Naab, Pamela J.; Russell, James A.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging responses relate to differences in real-world social experience.

Eisenberger, Naomi I.; Gable, Shelly L.; Lieberman, Matthew D.

Under what conditions can human affective conditioning occur without contingency awareness? Test of the evaluative conditioning paradigm.

Dawson, Michael E.; Rissling, Anthony J.; Schell, Anne M.; Wilcox, Rand

Brain activation while forming memories of fearful and neutral faces in women and men.

Fischer, Håkan; Sandblom, Johan; Nyberg, Lars; Herlitz, Agneta; Bäckman, Lars

Emotions over time: Synchronicity and development of subjective, physiological, and facial affective reactions to music.

Grewe, Oliver; Nagel, Frederik; Kopiez, Reinhard; Altenmüller, Eckart

The prototypical pride expression: Development of a nonverbal behavior coding system.

Tracy, Jessica L.; Robins, Richard W.

The influence of sad mood on cognition.

Chepenik, Lara G.; Cornew, Lauren A.; Farah, Martha J.

“Just stop thinking about it”: Effects of emotional disengagement on children’s memory for educational material.

Rice, John A.; Levine, Linda J.; Pizarro, David A.

Context matters: The benefits and costs of expressing positive emotion among survivors of childhood sexual abuse.

Bonanno, George A.; Colak, Deniz M.; Keltner, Dacher; Shiota, Michelle N.; Papa, Anthony; Noll, Jennie G.; Putnam, Frank W.; Trickett, Penelope K.

Physical abuse amplifies attention to threat and increases anxiety in children.

Shackman, Jessica E.; Shackman, Alexander J.; Pollak, Seth D.

Anger, disgust, and presumption of harm as reactions to taboo-breaking behaviors.

Gutierrez, Roberto; Giner-Sorolla, Roger

A bumpy train ride: A field experiment on insult, honor, and emotional reactions.

IJzerman, Hans; van Dijk, Wilco W.; Gallucci, Marcello

Incidental sadness biases social economic decisions in the Ultimatum Game.

Harlé, Katia M.; Sanfey, Alan G.

Fearful expressions gain preferential access to awareness during continuous flash suppression.

Yang, Eunice; Zald, David H.; Blake, Randolph

“Facial expressions of emotion influence memory for facial identity in an automatic way”: Correction to D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2007).

D’Argembreau, Arnaud; Van der Linden, Martial

“Awareness of subtle emotional feelings: A comparison of long-term meditators and nonmeditators”: Correction to Nielsen and Kaszniak (2006).

Nielsen, Lisbeth; Kaszniak, Alfred W.

“Motivation sharpens exogenous spatial attention”: Correction to Engelmann and Pessoa (2007).

Engelmann, Jan B.; Pessoa, Luiz

Subliminal Smells Can Guide Social Preferences

Subjective values

thomasr — Sun, 02 Dec 2007 06:32:11 +0000

Neuroimaging studies of decision-making have generally related neural activity to objective measures (such as reward magnitude, probability or delay), despite choice preferences being subjective. However, economic theories posit that decision-makers behave as though different options have different subjective values.

Here we use functional magnetic resonance imaging to show that neural activity in several brain regions—particularly the ventral striatum, medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex—tracks the revealed subjective value of delayed monetary rewards.

This similarity provides unambiguous evidence that the subjective value of potential rewards is explicitly represented in the human brain.

Joseph W Kable & Paul W Glimcher, The neural correlates of subjective value during intertemporal choice. Nature Neuroscience 10, 1625 – 1633 (2007)

Social neuroeconomics: the neural circuitry of social preferences

thomasr — Mon, 26 Nov 2007 12:32:12 +0000

Combining the methods of neuroscience and economics generates powerful tools for studying the brain processes behind human social interaction. We argue that hedonic interpretations of theories of social preferences provide a useful framework that generates interesting predictions and helps interpret brain activations involved in altruistic, fair and trusting behaviors. These behaviors are consistently associated with activation in reward-related brain areas, such as the striatum, and with prefrontal activity implicated in cognitive control, the processing of emotions, and integration of benefits and costs, consistent with resolution of a conflict between self-interest and other-regarding motives.

Fehr & Camerer in Trends in Cognitive Science 2007 Oct ; 11(10): 419-27

Hubmed

PDF of article

Is Theory of Mind dependent on episodic memory?

thomasr — Mon, 26 Nov 2007 12:24:27 +0000

The latest issue of Science brings an article about the relationship between Theory of Mind (ToM) and episodic memory. The article abstract by Shanya Rosenbaum and her colleagues says:

[ToM] to infer other people’s current mental states and episodic memory of personal happenings have been assumed to be closely related. We report two participants with severely impaired episodic memory who perform indistinguishably from healthy controls on objective ToM tests. These results suggest that ToM can function independently of episodic memory.

In other words, it seems that ToM and episodic memory are independent processes. I, for one, first stumbled on why this relationship should be obvious at all. So let’s ask: why should we assume that there is a relationship between the two functions? In order to answer this, we first need to know what the two functions are.

ToM is actually a term that covers many different meanings, but for the present purposes (and this the presently most used meaning) ToM is taken to mean “the ability to attribute mental states—beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc.—to oneself and others and to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions that are different from one’s own”. This original definition stems from the very beginning of ToM research, when Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked whether chimpanzees have a theory of mind. Later, Simon Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1985) asked whether ToM could be found in autistic children, and some even question whether ToM can be found in non-mammals such as birds.

So basically, ToM refers to our ability to think that others have thoughts and feelings that are different from our own. Importantly, neuroimaging studies by researchers such as Chris Frith and Rebecca Saxe, ToM have shown a relation to activation in medial frontal cortex, temporal poles and the temporoparietal junction.

Episodic memory refers to the memory of personally experienced events, which includes experienced places, associated emotions, and, to some extent, conceptual knowledge that is related to these experiences. Together with semantic memory, episodic memory has been thought to be a part of a declarative memory system, i.e., conscious memory. Episodic memory is normally associated with the medial temporal lobe (MTL). Most early theories stressed the importance of the hippocampus, but more recent research has pointed to additional regions within the MTL, such as the perirhinal cortex, parahippocampal cortex and entorhinal cortex (Moscovitch et al. 2006). In addition, have demonstrated hemispheric asymmetries during different stages of episodic memory. For example, encoding has been found to involve left hemisphere structures – both in the MTL and in prefrontal cortex – while retrieval has been shown to involve the right hemispheric counterparts more (Habib, Nyberg & Tulving, 2003).

So what is the relationship between ToM and episodic memory? The neural foundations suggests that they are separate processes. However, as Rosenbaum et al. writes:

The idea that ToM is closely related to, and that it may depend on, episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness seems perfectly natural: that in order to imagine and make sense of other people’s thoughts, feelings, intentions, and actions, we must rely on our autobiographical recollections. The ability to consciously recollect past personal happenings has been shown to be necessary for imagining coherent and detailed personal happenings in the future. Both episodic memory and ToM emerge close in time in ontogenetic development. The neural substrate on which the two abilities rely is in many ways strikingly similar.

In order to study this relationship, the authors studied two patients that have well-described deficits in episodic memory. In particular, the patients had lost the ability to consciously recollect personal happenings from their own lives. The question now was: would these patients also show deficits in ToM? Using a comprehensive battery of tests on ToM (Bird et al. 2004), the patients and 14 control subjects were assessed for their ability to reason about other people’s thoughts and feelings. Here the researchers found that the ToM scores were indistinguishable from that of the control subjects.

Thus, this study demonstrates that episodic memory is not needed for normal ToM functioning. However, one should bear in mind that the study was made on subjects that have already a mature ToM (and premorbid episodic memory). Thus, it is still possible that a healthy episodic memory is important in the establishment of normal ToM function during development. It would indeed be interesting to see studies relating early damage to the MTL region and the development of ToM.

Thomas Z. Ramsøy is a cognitive neuroscientist at the Danish Research Centre for Magnetic Resonance in Copenhagen, Denmark. He is also co-editor of SCR and BrainEthics.

Homepage

References

Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A.M., & Frith, U. (1985) Does the autistic child have a ‘theory of mind’? Cognition, 21, 37-46

Bird C. M., Castelli F., Malik O., Frith U., Husain M. (2004). The impact of extensive medial frontal lobe damage on ‘Theory of Mind’ and cognition. Brain, 127(Pt 4): 914-28

Habib R., Nyberg L., Tulving E. (2003). Hemispheric asymmetries of memory: the HERA model revisited. Trends Cogn Sci. 7(6): 241-245

Moscovitch M., Nadel L., Winocur G., Gilboa A., Rosenbaum R.S. (2006) The cognitive neuroscience of remote episodic, semantic and spatial memory. Curr Opin Neurobiol. 16(2):179-90.

Premack, D. G. & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 515-526

Morality starts young

thomasr — Thu, 22 Nov 2007 21:23:03 +0000

The key to successful social interactions is the ability to assess others’ intentions — be they friend or foe. A new study in 6- and 10-month-old infants shows that humans engage in social evaluations even earlier than was thought, before they can use language. The infants could evaluate actors on the basis of their social acts — they were drawn towards an individual who helps an unrelated third party to achieve his or her goal, and they avoided an individual who hinders a third party’s efforts to achieve a goal. The findings support the claim that precursors to adult-like social evaluation are present even in babies. This skill could be a biological adaptation that may also serve as the foundation for moral thought and action later in life.

Editor summary in Nature

Nature article by Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom

Consciousness & mind related articles in Psychological Science

thomasr — Thu, 22 Nov 2007 20:54:23 +0000

Psychological Science is out with a new issue that brings several articles relevant to the SCR audience. Here, we bring some selected abstracts.

It is widely accepted that unconscious processes can modulate judgments and behavior, but do such influences affect one’s daily interactions with other people? Given that olfactory information has relatively direct access to cortical and subcortical emotional circuits, we tested whether the affective content of subliminal odors alters social preferences. Participants rated the likeability of neutral faces after smelling pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant odors delivered below detection thresholds. Odor affect significantly shifted likeability ratings only for those participants lacking conscious awareness of the smells, as verified by chance-level trial-by-trial performance on an odor-detection task. Across participants, the magnitude of this priming effect decreased as sensitivity for odor detection increased. In contrast, heart rate responses tracked odor valence independently of odor awareness. These results indicate that social preferences are subject to influences from odors that escape awareness, whereas the availability of conscious odor information may disrupt such effects.

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Does the Human Motor System Simulate Pinocchio’s Actions? Coacting With a Human Hand Versus a Wooden Hand in a Dyadic Interaction

Corepresenting actions performed by conspecifics is essential to understanding their goals, inferring their mental states, and cooperating with them. It has recently been demonstrated that joint-action effects in a Simon task provide a good index for corepresentation. In the present study, we investigated whether corepresentation is restricted to biological agents or also occurs for nonbiological events. Participants performed a Simon task either with an image of a human hand or with a wooden analogue. The Simon-like effect emerged only when participants coacted with a biological agent. The lack of the joint-action effect when participants interacted with a wooden hand indicates that the human corepresentation system is biologically tuned.

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Monkey See, Monkey Plan, Monkey Do: The End-State Comfort Effect in Cotton-Top Tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)

The way human adults grasp objects is typically influenced by their knowledge of what they intend to do with the objects. This influence is reflected in the end-state comfort effect: Actors adopt initially uncomfortable postures to accommodate later task demands. Although many experiments have demonstrated this effect, to the best of our knowledge its phylogenetic roots have not been investigated. In two experiments, we tested whether 9 cotton-top tamarin monkeys would show the end-state comfort effect. We did so by presenting the monkeys with a small cup containing a marshmallow. The cup was suspended in different orientations. The monkeys inhibited their natural grasping tendencies and adopted unusual grasping postures to accommodate subsequent task requirements, thus demonstrating the end-state comfort effect. This outcome provides evidence for more sophisticated motor planning than has previously been ascribed to this and related species.

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Voluntary Action Influences Visual Competition

Converging lines of evidence point to a strong link between action and perception. In this study, we show that this linkage plays a role in controlling the dynamics of binocular rivalry, in which two stimuli compete for perceptual awareness. Observers dichoptically viewed two dynamic rival stimuli while moving a computer mouse with one hand. When the motion of one rival stimulus was consistent with observers’ own hand movements, dominance durations of that stimulus were extended and, remarkably, suppression durations of that stimulus were abbreviated. Additional measurements revealed that this change in rivalry dynamics was not attributable to observers’ knowledge about the condition under test. Thus, self-generated actions can influence the resolution of perceptual conflict, even when the object being controlled falls outside of visual awareness.

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Emotion as Motion: Asymmetries in Approach and Avoidant Actions

To emote literally means to move or prepare for action. A large body of research indicates that flexor and extensor movements are conditionally associated with approach- and avoidance-related motivations. It has also been widely argued that approach and avoidant motivations are asymmetrically instantiated in the left and right hemispheres, respectively. Nevertheless, to date, these literatures remain largely separate. In the present investigation, flexor and extensor movements that were visuospatially contextualized as being directed toward the self and away from the self were observed to be asymmetrically represented in the “approach” and “avoidance” hemispheres. Moreover, this pattern of hemispheric specialization was manifested to a greater degree the higher participants’ self-reported level of daily positive affect and the lower their self-reported level of dispositional anxiety. Collectively, these findings have direct implications for models of embodied emotional and perceptual processing, as well as for investigations of individual differences in emotional disposition.

Toward a Science of Consciousness: 2008 Conference

alice — Tue, 20 Nov 2007 04:00:18 +0000

The eighth biennial Tucson conference, hosted by the Center for Consciousness Studies and the University of Arizona, continues an interdisciplinary tradition of intense, far-ranging and rigorous discussions on all approaches to the fundamental issue of how the brain produces conscious experience.

The conference will take place from April 8-12, 2008 at the Tucson Convention Center, Tucson, Arizona.

For more information, please check the conference website.

APS 20th Annual Convention

alice — Tue, 20 Nov 2007 03:29:48 +0000

The Association for Psychological Science (APS) is a nonprofit organization dedicated to the advancement of scientific psychology and its representation.

From May 22-25, 2008, the Sheraton Chicago Hotel & Towers will host thousands of psychological researchers as they converge for presentations by award-winning scientists and leaders across all areas of psychology.

For more information, please check the conference website.

15th Annual CNS meeting

alice — Tue, 20 Nov 2007 03:06:07 +0000

This year marks the 15th anniversary of the Cognitive Neuroscience Society (CNS). Founded in 1994, CNS’s mission was to provide its members with a forum to present posters, symposia and to engage in scientific discourse on the understanding of the nature of the mind. 15 years later, CNS’s mission is the same and the Society is going strong thanks to the involvement of its 2,000 members world wide. As usual, the annual meeting promises not to disappoint and it is scheduled to take place from Saturday, April 12 to Tuesday, April 15 at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in San Francisco, California.

For more information, please check the conference website.

Call for papers: Psychophysiology — cognitive and affective processes

thomasr — Sun, 18 Nov 2007 19:46:28 +0000

Psychophysiology was the first journal dedicated to the publication of research on relationships between the physiological and psychological aspects of brain and behavior, and it remains the most well-established journal in this field. This prestigious international journal continues to play a key role in advancing psychophysiological science and human neuroscience. Psychophysiology reports on new theoretical, empirical, and methodological advances that inform psychology and psychiatry, cognitive science, cognitive and affective neuroscience, social science, health science and behavioral medicine, biomedical engineering, and signal processing and statistics.

Since its inception in 1964, Psychophysiology has published seminal papers relevant to the role of regional brain specialization in perceptual, cognitive, and emotional function. The journal’s commitment to brain imaging has been continuously evident as the field has both specialized and expanded, encompassing a wide variety of techniques and tools including high-density EEG, MEG, magnetic source imaging (MEG + MRI), and near-infrared spectroscopy. Psychophysiology continues this publication tradition by featuring papers that employ functional MRI (fMRI). Indeed, fMRI is the quintessential psychophysiological measure, revealing fundamental relationships between psychological processes and physiological measures of their neural substrate.

We are interested in papers that expand the application of fMRI to illuminate a wide variety of psychological phenomena, both normative and clinical. Given Psychophysiology’s long tradition of publishing innovative methodological and statistical papers, we also welcome manuscripts reporting innovative techniques for fMRI.

Manuscripts should be submitted electronically at http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/psyp. Submissions should include a brief cover letter indicating that informed consent was obtained from human subjects and that human or infrahuman subjects were treated in accordance with appropriate ethical guidelines. Manuscripts must conform to the specifications of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, 5th edition.

Measuring pain

thomasr — Sun, 18 Nov 2007 12:33:44 +0000

Nature News features an article about a recent study relating pain intensity and EEG signals.

Recordings from electrodes in the human brain may offer the first objective way to measure the intensity of pain. Researchers say that they have found a neural signal that correlates with the amount of pain that an individual feels. The signal could be used to refine pain-relief techniques that involve stimulating the brain with electricity, they say.

Single cells have previously been identified in the human brain that are active in pain, but their response is binary, signalling either pain or no pain. Now, Morten Kringelbach of the psychiatry department at the University of Oxford, UK, and his colleagues have identified low-frequency brain waves that emanate from two regions buried deep within the brain when a patient is in pain. The more pain that is experienced, the longer the waves last.

Kringelbach’s team recorded activity from two electrodes positioned in the thalamus and the periaqueductal grey area of 12 awake people who had been undergoing deep-brain stimulation (DBS) for chronic pain. During the recording, the team touched either a painful or pain-free area of the patients’ bodies and had patients rate their pain every minute. The duration of the waves — dubbed “pain spindles” — correlated with how intensely the patients felt their pain. “It is an objective measure that correlates with a subjective measure,” says Kringelbach, who presented the findings at the Society for Neuroscience meeting in San Diego, California, last week.

This signal could help refine DBS for such patients, he says. Currently, the electrodes fire signals continuously, even when the patient doesn’t need pain relief, which wears down the implanted battery. “We could have a stimulator that picks up this neural signature of pain and only starts sending signals at that point,” Kringelbach says.

“It would be great to have a ‘signature of pain’,” says Allan Basbaum, a neuroscientist at the University of California, San Francisco. It is not clear from this preliminary study whether these spindles disappear when painkillers, anaesthetics or electrical stimulation are used, he adds.

The next step is to try to record the signals with a non-invasive technique, such as magnetoencephalography, which measures electrical activity in the brain via changes in the magnetic field. This could allow pain monitoring in a much broader range of patients.

PDF of article

Rare great ape fossil challenges theory of primate evolution

thomasr — Tue, 13 Nov 2007 08:21:24 +0000

From physorg.com: Archaeologists have discovered the ancient jawbone of what appears to be a new species of ape that was very close to the last common ancestor of gorillas, chimpanzees and humans, a study released Monday said. The 10-million year-old fossil, complete with 11 teeth, was recovered from volcanic mud deposits in Kenya’s Nakali region on the eastern edge of the Rift Valley in 2005 by a team of Japanese and Kenyan researchers. The researchers say the fossil fills what was until recently something of a void in the fossil record, and challenges one of the working assumptions of primate evolution.

Genetic studies suggest that humans and great apes split from a common ancestor about eight million years ago, but paleontologists have struggled to find fossils for the ancestors of modern African great apes for the past 13 million years. However scientists found plenty of fossil evidence for great apes in Europe and Asia during that period and they also noted some similarities between some of those apes and contemporary African apes.

That led some paleontologists to speculate that the common ancestor of apes and humans had left Africa, and evolved into several different species, and that one of those species later returned to the continent to become the missing link between man and his closest primate relatives.

But the new evidence appears to undercut that theory, and it doesn’t stand alone.

In addition to the new Kenyan species of ancient ape, (dubbed Nakalipithecus nakayamai,), evidence recently emerged of another ancient African ape.

In August, a team of Japanese and Ethiopian paleontologists announced that they had uncovered 10-million year-old teeth fossils in Ethiopia’s Afar region in 2006 and 2007. The scientists said the teeth probably belonged to a “proto-gorilla” species which they named Chororapithecus abyssinicus.

Prior to this, the last time a hominoid fossil of this period was found in Africa was in Kenya in 1982.

The evidence that Africa was home to a number of ape ancestors in the middle to late Miocene period casts doubt on the theory that the ancestors of contemporary African apes were extinguished completely on the continent and were re-introduced from Europe or Asia, the authors wrote in the paper in the journal, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

And while it will require further fossil discovery to flesh out the family tree of modern African apes, “it is likely that these early Late Miocene African hominoids are more or less close to the last common ancestor of the African great apes and humans,” the authors said.

That friendly car is smiling at me: When products are perceived as people

thomasr — Tue, 13 Nov 2007 08:14:02 +0000

From physorg.com: A forthcoming study from the Journal of Consumer Research looks at how consumers anthropomorphize products, endowing a car or a pair of shoes with human characteristics and personalities. The researchers, from the University of Toronto and the University of Chicago, find that people are more likely to attribute human qualities or traits to inanimate objects if the product fits with their expectations of relevant human qualities – and are also more likely to positively evaluate an anthropomorphized item.

“We sometimes see cars as loyal companions going so far as to name them. We argue with, cajole, and scold malfunctioning computers and engines,” explain Pankaj Aggarwal (University of Toronto) and Ann L. McGill (University of Chicago). “We find that if the product has a feature that is typically associated with a human prototype, then people are more likely to humanize the product, and also evaluate it more
positively.”

For example, the researchers found that people are more likely to buy
into the idea of a “family” of products if all the products are
differently sized, with some products representing “parents” and
others representing a teenager and a small kid.

Similarly, non-identical products presented as “twins” fared
worse in evaluations than identical objects presented as twins. The
researchers also found that products with positive traits were better
liked than products with rebellious or negative traits. In the study,
identical looking objects presented as “good twins” were better
liked than the same products presented as “evil twins.”

As the researchers explain: “Efforts by marketers to
anthropomorphize products may be viewed as shifting the category of
evaluation from product to human, and more specifically, to particular
human categories such as friends, helpers, families, or
spokespeople.”

Citaton: Pankaj Aggarwal and Ann L. McGill, “Is That Car Smiling at
Me” Schema Congruity as a Basis for Evaluating Anthropomorphized
Products.” Journal of Consumer Research: December 2007.

Source: University of Chicago Press Journals

Contextualized Self-Representations in Adulthood

thomasr — Mon, 12 Nov 2007 10:10:02 +0000

Theorizing has focused on individuals’ self-representations as a psychological resource for coping with life stress and developmental challenges in adulthood. Many of the prominent theories have conceptualized self-representations with regard to specific social contexts (e.g., role-specific self-representations) and have examined specific structural organizations of the self-concept with regard to psychological adjustment.

This article describes research on the associations between self-concept structures and psychological well-being in adulthood. Specific emphasis is given to the feature of self-concept differentiation (SCD). Most research suggests that a high level of SCD tends to indicate self-fragmentation and tends to be associated with poorer adjustment and psychological well-being.

Findings from a daily diary study with adults of all ages are reported showing that different levels of SCD were in a consistent and meaningful way related to the daily endorsement of positive and negative self-attributes. Daily self-representations, in turn, were significantly related to individuals’ level of daily negative affect and to intra-individual variation in negative affect.

These findings suggest that SCD may exert its effect on adjustment and psychological well-being through specific ways of processing self-related information.

Manfred Diehl & Elizabeth L. Hay in Journal of Personality
Volume 75 Issue 6 Page 1255-1284, December 2007

Distance changes face perception?

thomasr — Sat, 10 Nov 2007 08:14:58 +0000

This is probably one of the best illusions ever! Please do the following: look at the above images from your seat in front of the computer; Mr. Angry is on the left, and Ms.Calm is on the right. Now, get up from your seat, and move back 10 or 12 feet. Who’s the angry and calm now?

It’s said that this illusion was made by Phillippe G.Schyns and Aude Oliva. Cudos to Robert Karl Stonjek for showing us this illusion.

Brain Chemicals Involved In Aggression Identified

thomasr — Fri, 09 Nov 2007 13:25:54 +0000

From ScienceDaily (Nov. 7, 2007) — School shootings. Muggings. Murder. Road rage. After decreasing for more than a decade, the rate of violent crime in the United States has begun to inch up again. According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program, violent crime rose 2.3 percent in 2005 and 1.9 percent in 2006, the first steady increase since 1993.

And new studies are helping scientists gain deeper insight into the neurobiology of aggression and violence. One analysis of brain imaging studies has revealed that brain structures involved in making moral judgments are often damaged in violent individuals. Another study involving teenage boys suggests that disruptions in a brain region linked to impulsive, aggressive behavior may underlie a certain type of violent, reactive behavior.

Still other research has shed new light on the role that certain brain chemicals play in aggressive behavior, including in maternal aggression. And new animal studies reveal that aggressive encounters cause changes in the brains of aggressors as well as their victims that increase vulnerability to depression and immune-related illnesses.

“Violence in our society is a major concern, indeed, a national health problem,” says Craig Ferris, PhD, of Northeastern University in Boston. “Understanding the confluence of events, both environmental and biological, that trigger a violent act has been the focus of educators, health professionals, and scientists for decades.

“New imaging technologies and animal models have helped neuroscientists
identify changes in brain neurobiology associated with inappropriate
aggressive behavior,” he says. “This information may help in the
development of new psychosocial and psychotherapeutic intervention
strategies.” Ferris is a stockholder in Azevan Pharmaceuticals, which is
developing drugs to stop self-injurious behavior.

After analyzing data from 47 independent brain imaging studies,
researchers at the University of Pennsylvania have found that the
rule-breaking behavior common to people with antisocial, violent, and
psychopathic tendencies may result partly from damage to the neural
circuitry in the brain that underlies moral decision-making.

“This finding supports other studies that may force society to question
its attitude toward the nature of crime and punishment,” says Adrian
Raine, PhD. “For example, should psychopaths be punished if, for reasons
beyond their control, they do not have the appropriate brain circuitry
to process moral dilemmas?”

Scientists have long known that damage to certain regions of the brain,
most notably the prefrontal cortex, can result in violent behavior. More
recently, imaging studies have identified the neural circuits that
become activated in the brains of normal, healthy individuals during
moral decision-making.

The analysis was undertaken to see if the brain regions compromised in
antisocial populations include the newly identified brain regions
involved in moral decision-making. Raine and his colleagues compared the
brain images of 792 antisocial individuals with 704 control subjects.
They found that antisocial individuals also tended to have overlapping
damage in brain structures involved in making moral judgments, most
notably the dorsal and ventral prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, and the
angular gyrus.

“If offenders are not fully responsible for the source of the brain
dysfunction that impairs their moral-decision making, this raises a
significant neuroethical issue regarding the appropriate level of
punishment for those who perpetrate morally inappropriate acts,” Raine
says.

New studies from the University of California, San Diego, are helping
scientists better understand what goes on in the brains of some teenage
boys who respond with inappropriate anger and aggression to perceived
threats. Preliminary findings from these studies suggest that such
behavior is associated with a hyperactive response in the amygdala, an
area of the brain that processes information regarding threats and fear,
and with a lessening of activity in the frontal lobe, a brain region
linked to decision-making and impulse control.

“This work will provide significant neurobiologic insight into why some
adolescents become aggressive and violent,” says Guido Frank, MD.
“Eventually, it may lead to more effective therapies for helping
adolescents overcome excessively aggressive behaviors that are harmful
to themselves as well as to others.”

Aggressive behavior can be divided into two types: proactive and
reactive. Proactive aggressors plan how they’re going to hurt and bully
others. Reactive aggression, however, is not premeditated; it occurs in
response to an upsetting trigger from the environment.

“Reactively aggressive adolescents — most commonly boys — frequently
misinterpret their surroundings, feel threatened, and act
inappropriately aggressive,” Frank says. “They tend to strike back when
being teased, blame others when getting into a fight, and overreact to
accidents. Their behavior is emotionally ‘hot,’ defensive, and
impulsive.”

The term “reactive-affective-defensive-impulsive” (RADI) has recently
been created to describe such behavior. Research suggests that
adolescents with RADI behavior are at an increased risk for a lifetime
of problems associated with impulsive aggression. “A major problem in
researching this topic is stigma and a notion that children will grow
out of aggressive behaviors,” Frank says. “It’s often difficult to
recruit such youngsters and their families to participate in research.”

Little is known about how the brain works in reactive aggression. In
their most recent studies, Frank and his colleagues recruited two groups
of male adolescents: one group diagnosed with RADI behavior and the
other group without any history of mental illness or aggression
problems. While being scanned by a brain imaging machine, both sets of
teenagers were asked to perform tasks that involved reacting to
age-appropriate, fear-inducing images. The tasks also tested the
teenagers’ impulsivity.

Preliminary data reveal that the brains of RADI teenagers exhibited
greater activity in the amygdala and lesser activity in the frontal lobe
in response to the images than the brains of the teenagers in the
control group. In a related study, Frank and his colleagues are
investigating whether these changes in brain activity are associated
with an abnormal increase in cortisol levels, a marker of the stress
response.

The brain chemical serotonin has long been known to play an important
role in regulating anger and aggression. Low cerebrospinal fluid
concentrations of serotonin have even been cited as both a marker and
predictor of aggressive behavior.

New studies from the Netherlands, however, indicate that this
serotonin-deficiency hypothesis of aggressiveness may be too simple.
“Serotonin deficiency appears to be related to pathological, violent
forms of aggressiveness, but not to the normal aggressive behavior that
animals and humans use to adapt to everyday survival,” says Sietse de
Boer, PhD, of the University of Groningen.

Furthermore, research now suggests that unchecked aggressive behavior
can eventually change the brain in ways that cause serotonin activity to
decrease-and, perhaps, violent behavior to increase.

To perform their most recent studies, de Boer and his colleagues
engendered violent characteristics of aggressive behavior in feral mice
and rats by permitting them to physically dominate other rodents
repeatedly. With such positive reinforcement, the animals’ initially
normal aggressiveness gradually became transformed into a more
pathological form-the kind also seen in pathologically violent people.

During this transformation, de Boer studied the chemical changes that
occurred in the rodents’ aggression-related brain circuits, particularly
those circuits involved with serotonin. They found that serotonin
activity decreased as a result of the animals experiencing repeated
victorious episodes of aggression but not as a result of normal,
functional acts of aggression.

“Our findings support meta-analyses of serotonin activity in aggressive
humans,” says de Boer. “That data showed that serotonin deficiency is
most readily detected in people who engage in impulsive and violent
forms of aggressive behavior rather than in individuals with more
functional forms of aggression.”

More recently, de Boer and his colleagues have found that the transition
from normal, adaptive aggressive behavior into abnormal forms that
inflict harm and injury is due to functional, but not structural,
changes in certain serotonin receptors in the brain. In animal studies,
treatment with selective serotonin receptor agonist compounds has been
found to restore the normal function of these receptors-and suppress
aggressive behavior, including its escalated forms. These findings may
one day lead to more effective treatments for violent behavior in
humans.

Researchers have identified, for the first time, that the release of a
neurotransmitter called arginine-vasopressin (AVP) in an area of the
brain called the amygdala helps regulate maternal aggression-a behavior
that ensures the survival of the offspring. Although the study was
conducted using rat dams, maternal aggression occurs in all mammals,
including humans.

“By understanding the brain pathways underlying maternal aggression in
rodents, we’re also gaining deeper understanding of regulation of
maternal behavior in general,” says Oliver Bosch, PhD, of the University
of Regensburg, in Germany.

Much of the past research into the neurobiology of maternal aggression
has focused on oxytocin, a neurotransmitter released in the brain during
birth and breastfeeding. Oxytocin reduces anxiety and fear, a factor
that is believed to enable new mothers to more aggressively face
intruders that might harm their offspring.

In his new study, Bosch investigated whether AVP also plays a role in
the regulation of maternal aggressiveness. Found in all mammals, AVP is
synthesized in the brain and then released to the kidneys, where it
helps regulate the body’s retention of water. More recently, AVP has
been implicated in male aggression and other social behavior,
particularly pair-bonding between sexual partners.

Using tiny probes that enabled the real-time collection of samples of
brain fluid, Bosch and his colleagues measured the release of AVP within
the amygdala, an area of the brain associated with both maternal anxiety
and aggression, while rat dams moved around their cages with their pups.
Some of the dams had been selectively bred for high anxiety-related
behavior; others had been bred for low anxiety-related behavior.
High-anxiety dams are not only more anxious, but also show more maternal
aggression towards intruders. In addition, they spend more time nursing
and in direct contact with their pups.

During the study, the rat dams were sometimes left undisturbed and were
at other times confronted for 10 minutes with an intruder. The more
aggressive, high-anxiety dams released more AVP within the amygdala
while defending their offspring from the intruder than did the less
aggressive, low-anxiety dams-a finding that strongly suggests a role for
AVP in maternal aggression.

The researchers also found they could use the brain’s AVP system to
manipulate the aggression shown by the dams. When the animals were given
an AVP receptor antagonist, which blocks the brain’s receptors for AVP,
the dams became less anxious and less aggressive. When synthetic AVP was
infused into the animals’ brains, however, the dams became more anxious
and increasingly aggressive.

“While AVP’s effects on maternal aggression are similar to what we found
earlier for oxytocin, these neuropeptides act differently on anxiety,”
Bosch says. “So it’s the brain’s AVP system itself, not AVP acting on
oxytocin receptors, that causes these changes in maternal behavior.”

Being the recipient of an aggressive social encounter can cause changes
in the brain that lead to depression, anxiety, and susceptibility to
immune-related illnesses, according to new animal studies from Carleton
University in Ottawa. Surprisingly, some of these negative effects
appear to be as strong in animals that successfully dominate social
situations as in those that react with submission.

“It seems that aggression, which is clearly deleterious to the
well-being of the victim, also has several negative repercussions for
the aggressor as well,” says Marie-Claude Audet, PhD.

Social stressors and negative relationships are believed to contribute
to stress-related disorders, including depression and anxiety. Stressful
events have a profound influence on the neuroendocrine and neurochemical
systems, causing chemical changes in many areas of the brain, including
several that are strongly involved in emotions: the prefrontal cortex,
the hippocampus, and the amygdala. Among the neurotransmitters and
hormones altered by stress are dopamine, serotonin, noradrenalin, and
corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) (which affects blood levels of
corticosterone). Recent research also has suggested a link between
stress and cytokines (signaling molecules within the immune system).
Cytokines may inform the brain of the presence of pathogens in the body,
thus triggering a stress-like response.

To more precisely determine how a social stressor disturbs
neuroendocrine, neurochemical, and cytokine function as well as
behavior, Audet and her colleagues designed a study in which naive mice
(ones not previously exposed to any social situation) were introduced to
the home cage of dominant mice for 15 minutes on either a single day or
on three consecutive days. As a control, some mice were not exposed to
any social stressor. The animals’ basal motor activity was monitored,
and blood and brain samples were taken and analyzed either 3 minutes or
75 minutes after the end of the stressor.

The study found that aggressive social interactions caused both dominant
and submissive mice to become hyperactive relative to the controls.
However, although motor activity remained high in dominant mice,
particularly in those that engaged in vigorous behavior, it declined
gradually in the submissive mice. Corticosterone levels-a marker of
stress-were significantly increased soon after the end of the stressor
session, and those levels remained elevated for protracted periods over
the course of the experiment. The increase was similar in both
submissive and dominant mice. Some cytokines also became elevated in the
prefrontal cortex of both groups of mice, and this effect was greater
after the stressful social encounters were repeated.

Measurements of stress-related neurotransmitters and hormones, however,
revealed some significant differences between the dominant and
submissive animals. For example, brain levels of the neurotransmitter
noradrenaline, which may help mediate the effects of stress on the body,
fell in the hippocampus of the dominant mice, but increased in the
central amygdala of the submissive mice. The expression of CRH also fell
in the prefrontal cortex of the dominant mice, but only after repeated
encounters with an intruding mouse.

In further studies, Audet observed that chronic exposure to social
stress increased the sensitivity to a bacterial challenge and that this
effect was more apparent in dominant mice.

“Our findings suggest that stressful social experiences, by affecting
central neurotransmitters and cytokines, may influence vulnerability to
depression and susceptibility to immune-related illness,” says Audet.
“Moreover, it appears that in addition to markedly affecting the
victim’s existence, aggression may have detrimental consequences also
for the one that dominates the interaction.”

Source: Society For Neuroscience

Decision-making special issue in Science:

thomasr — Thu, 01 Nov 2007 11:19:27 +0000

From Mind Hacks: This week’s Science has a special selection of papers on the psychology and neuroscience of decision making. While most of the articles are closed-access, one on how game theory and neuroscience are helping us understand social decision-making is freely available.

It is a great introduction to ‘neuroeconomics’, a field that attempts to work out how the brain supports cost-benefit type decisions.

This can be directly applied to financial decision-making, but also to other types of situations where weighing possible gains and losses is important, whether the gains and losses are in the form of money, time, social advantage or status – to name just a few.

One of the crucial discoveries of recent years is that people do not act as rational maximisers – making individual decisions on how to get the most benefit out of each choice. In fact, social influences can be huge and often lead people to reject no-risk economic gains when then feel it is socially unjustified.

This had led the field into interesting territory, both informing models of the economy, and illuminating how we make social decisions.

As part of the neuroeconomic approach, researchers have begun to investigate the psychological and neural correlates of social decisions using tasks derived from a branch of experimental economics known as Game Theory. These tasks, though beguilingly simple, require sophisticated reasoning about the motivations of other players. Recent research has combined these paradigms with a variety of neuroscientific methods in an effort to gain a more detailed picture of social decision-making. The benefits of this approach are twofold. First, neuroscience can describe important biological constraints on the processes involved, and indeed, research is revealing that many of the processes underlying complex decision-making may overlap with more fundamental brain mechanisms. Second, actual decision behavior in these tasks often does not conform to the predictions of Game Theory, and therefore, more precise characterizations of behavior will be important in adapting these models to better fit how decisions are actually made.

Link to Science special issue on decision making.
Link to article ‘Social Decision-Making: Insights from Game Theory and Neuroscience’.
Link to previous Mind Hacks post on game theory and (ir)rationality.

Brain conference 2008

thomasr — Wed, 31 Oct 2007 18:10:17 +0000

Combining the latest research foci and treatment modalities, the Second Annual International Brain Conference at UCF offers physicians, scientists, pharmaceuticals, medical device manufacturers, nurses, allied medical professionals and students the opportunity to learn about the absolute latest in brain research and practice. Participants will also be able to earn Continuing Medical & Psychological credits.

Held at UCF’s beautiful Rosen College of Hospitality Management in the heart of Orlando’s tourist district, the Second International
Brain Conference at UCF features keynote speaker Dr. Konrad Beyreuther, recipient of the Potamkin Prize and the Henry M. Wisniewski Award for Lifetime Achievement in Alzheimer’s Disease Research. Beyreuther’s work laid the foundation for understanding the molecular processes that lead to Alzheimer’s Disease.

On opening night Special Guest Mark McEwen, weatherman and entertainment reporter on the CBS Early Show for 16 years, will tell his inspiring personal story: “Stroke: My Recovery Story and the Regenerative Powers of Hope and Rehabilitation.”

Take advantage of early registration rates that end December 1. Special rates are also available for ADI members. Register now at
www.brainconference.org or call 407-882-1576 for more information.

Psychic studies may be influenced by suggestion:

thomasr — Wed, 31 Oct 2007 08:26:05 +0000

From Mind hacks: The BPS Research Digest has discussed a recent study that analysed recordings of parapsychology experiments and has found that some of the positive findings may be due to experimenters unconsciously prompting the participants as they gave their answers.The experiments used the Ganzfeld technique where one participant has diffuse white light and auditory noise played to them, effectively blocking the key senses, while another tries to ‘send’ images to them through mental projection.

Afterwards, the ‘receiver’ tells the experimenter what images came to mind and the research team see if it matches what the ‘sender’ was trying to transmit.

Taken as a whole, these sorts of experiments show a weak but positive evidence for extra-sensory perception (ESP), but it’s not clear whether this isn’t just due to a tendency for some negative trials not being reported.

In this new study, psychologist Robin Woofit analysed the tapes of Ganzfeld experiments from the mid-1990s and found that experimenters were more likely to respond decisively to correct responses but give subtle cues (such as saying ‘mm hm’) to give more information when the response wasn’t initially accurate.

This suggests that some of the positive findings may be due to this subtle prompting which is known as the Clever Hans effect, after a horse who was thought to be able to do amazing calculations, until it was later discovered that he was simply clopping his hoof until his trainer responded in a positive way.

However, this also highlights another aspects of parapsychology – they do some of the most thorough experiments in psychology.

This new study was only possible because the researchers keep archived audio recordings of every experimental session, something that almost never happens for other psychology studies.

It could be that other experimental findings in psychology are influenced by the Clever Hans effect, but we’ll never know, because few labs keep such thorough records.

Try asking for the audio recordings of decade-old experimental sessions from other areas of psychology if you’re not convinced.

It sometimes strikes me as ironic that some scientists consider academic parapsychologists to be unscientific when they do often some of the most carefully designed studies in the literature.

The fact that these studies typically find no evidence of ESP doesn’t mean they’re not doing science, and in fact, they’re provided some of the best evidence against airy fairy notions of ‘psychic powers’.

UPDATE: This is an important clarification on the study from Christian, which puts a different spin on it:

The observed interaction effect occurred during the review phase, where the researcher goes through the images the receiver spoke out loud earlier as the the ‘sender’ watched the video clip. This is prior to the receiver’s attempt to choose the correct video clip from a few distractors.

The review generally follows the pattern of the researcher saying ‘you said you saw x’, the receiver say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ or maybe elaborates. It was those times the receiver elaborated, that experimenters appeared to have an influence – if they said ‘okay’ and moved onto the next item, then that was that, but if they went ‘hmm mm’ with an enquiring tone, then the receiver tended to ramble on a bit more and lose confidence in their imagery.

I don’t think it is clear that this would make positive results more likely, and could even make a negative result more likely. Remember too that these were double blind experiments, so it is not a case of the experimenters directing the receivers towards the correct imagery. It is possible though that a sceptical researcher could be more prone to the ‘hmm mm’ noises, and therefore would make their receivers less confident.

Link to BPSRD on parapsychology and suggestion.
Link to abstract of scientific study.

Dynamic neural correlates of consciousness

thomasr — Wed, 31 Oct 2007 07:27:29 +0000

PLOS Biology has a most interesting article from Stanislas Dehaene‘s group on the neurodynamics of conscious experience. The researchers studied brain activation using EEG, while subjects rated visually presented stimuli on a scale from unseen to clearly seen. It was found that conscious experience of a stimulus was related to the engagement of a widespread network involving the frontal, parietal and temporal cortices.

SCR note: It is mentioning a recent study using fMRI (Christensen et al. 2006) provided comparable results, and adding two factors; (1) the conscious experience of a visual stimulus involved activation of both thalami, and (2) subjects consistently rated some experiences as vague, i.e., as “detected but not identified”. This experience was associated with both lower activation in those regions involved in conscious experience, and unique activation of additional regions, including some prefrontal regions.

Author description: Understanding the neural mechanisms that distinguish between conscious and nonconscious processes is a crucial issue in cognitive neuroscience. In this study, we focused on the transition that causes a visual stimulus to cross the threshold to consciousness, i.e., visibility. We used a backward masking paradigm in which the visibility of a briefly presented stimulus (the “target”) is reduced by a second stimulus (the “mask”) presented shortly after this first stimulus. (Human participants report the visibility of the target.) When the delay between target and mask stimuli exceeds a threshold value, the masked stimulus becomes visible. Below this threshold, it remains nonvisible. During the task, we recorded electric brain activity from the scalp and reconstructed the cortical sources corresponding to this activity. Conscious perception of masked stimuli corresponded to activity in a broadly distributed fronto-parieto-temporal network, occurring from about 300 ms after stimulus presentation. We conclude that this late stage, which could be clearly separated from earlier neural events associated with subliminal processing and mask-target interactions, can be regarded as a marker of consciousness.

The neuropathic pain triad: neurons, immune cells and glia

thomasr — Tue, 30 Oct 2007 14:05:09 +0000

Joachim Scholz and Clifford J Woolf have a nice article in Nature Neuroscience on the biological causes of neuropathic pain. This includes (as the title goes) neurons, as well as immune cells and glia cells.

Abstract:

Nociceptive pain results from the detection of intense or noxious stimuli by specialized high-threshold sensory neurons (nociceptors), a transfer of action potentials to the spinal cord, and onward transmission of the warning signal to the brain. In contrast, clinical pain such as pain after nerve injury (neuropathic pain) is characterized by pain in the absence of a stimulus and reduced nociceptive thresholds so that normally innocuous stimuli produce pain.

The development of neuropathic pain involves not only neuronal pathways, but also Schwann cells, satellite cells in the dorsal root ganglia, components of the peripheral immune system, spinal microglia and astrocytes.

As we increasingly appreciate that neuropathic pain has many features of a neuroimmune disorder, immunosuppression and blockade of the reciprocal signaling pathways between neuronal and non-neuronal cells offer new opportunities for disease modification and more successful management of pain.

Young minds — 3 papers

thomasr — Mon, 29 Oct 2007 07:57:52 +0000

The journal Cognitive Development has released its latest issue, with a few interesting titles.

Among these, we here present three titles with direct impact on the study of consciousness. These cover topics as self-regulation in pre-schoolers, decision making in adolescence, and impulsivity and control in childhood.

Cognitive and emotional aspects of self-regulation in preschoolers

The goal of the present study was to examine the contribution of executive function (EF) and social cognition to individual differences in emotion regulation (ER) in preschool children. Sixty 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children were administered a battery of EF tasks, two theory of mind tasks, a measure of verbal ability, and an ER task. In addition, parents completed the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Functioning—Preschool Version (BRIEF-P). Performance on the theory of mind tasks as well as parental ratings of executive function was not related to performance on the ER task. However, a component of EF (i.e., inhibition) approached significance with children’s displays of positive behaviors during the ER task. Verbal ability was related to the regulation of positive but not negative emotions. Parental ratings of shifting accounted for a significant amount of variance in parental ratings of ER, even after controlling for verbal ability. The findings are discussed in the context of different conceptualizations of the developmental relation between ER and EF.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

The contribution of “cool” and “hot” components of decision-making in adolescence: Implications for developmental psychopathology

Impairments in either “cool” or “hot” processes may represent two pathways to deficient decision-making. Whereas cool processes are associated with cognitive and rational decisions, hot processes are associated with emotional, affective, and visceral processes. In this study, 168 boys were administered a card-playing task at ages 13 and 14 years to assess response perseveration. This task was designed to initially reward playing and gradually associate playing with punishment. Measures of subjective ordering (cool processes) and neuroticism (hot processes) at age 13 years were used to examine how these individual characteristics relate to perseveration over time. A decrease in perseveration from age 13 to 14 was associated with cool processes whereas hot processes were associated with response perseveration only over time. A complementary but simultaneous assessment of cool and hot processes, such as neuropsychological and personality tests, could facilitate treatment planning of children with behavioral problems.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

The relations of effortful control and impulsivity to children’s sympathy: A longitudinal study

The relations of children’s (n = 214 at Time 1; M age = 6 years at Time 1) dispositional sympathy to adult-reported and behavioral measures of effortful control (EC) and impulsivity were examined in a longitudinal study including five assessments, each two years apart. Especially for boys, relatively high levels of EC and growth in EC were related to high sympathy. Teacher-reported impulsivity was generally modestly negatively related to measures of teacher-reported sympathy for boys, and a decline in impulsivity was linked to boys’ sympathy. Some findings suggested a positive association between impulsivity and children’s self-reported sympathy. EC, especially when reported by teachers, was more often a unique predictor of sympathy than was impulsivity. Results generally support the argument that sympathetic individuals, especially boys, are high in EC and that EC is a more consistent predictor of sympathy than impulsivity.

New issue: Personality and Individual Differences

thomasr — Thu, 25 Oct 2007 21:20:02 +0000

A new issue of PID is out, including articles on borderline and self-regulation, black anti-white attitudes and personality, and stress reactions and personality.

More…
Personality and Individual Differences Personality and Individual Differences

Volume 44, Issue 1, Pages 1-334 (January 2008)

1. Editorial Board/Publication Information
Page IFC

2. ISSID pages
Pages 1-2

Longer Communication – Special Review
Morningness and eveningness personality: A survey in literature from 1995 up till 2006
Pages 3-21
G.M. Cavallera and S. Giudici

General Articles
Borderline personality disorder in the context of self-regulation: Understanding symptoms and hallmark features as deficits in locomotion and assessment
Pages 22-31
Marina A. Bornovalova, Shira Fishman, David R. Strong, Arie W. Kruglanski and C.W. Lejuez

5. Testing mindfulness with perceptual and cognitive factors: External vs. internal encoding, and the cognitive failures questionnaire
Pages 32-41
Felix Herndon

6. Assessing individual differences in adolescents’ preference for rational and experiential cognition
Pages 42-52
Anthony D.G. Marks, Donald W. Hine, Rebecca L. Blore and Wendy J. Phillips

7. Personality correlates of aggressive and non-aggressive antisocial behavior
Pages 53-63
S. Alexandra Burt and M. Brent Donnellan

8. Attachment, personality, and volunteering: Placing volunteerism in an attachment-theoretical framework
Pages 64-74
Ayelet Erez, Mario Mikulincer, Marinus H. van Ijzendoorn and Pieter M. Kroonenberg

9. Love and control: Self-criticism in parents and daughters and perceptions of relationship partners
Pages 75-85
Oren A. Amitay, Myriam Mongrain and Norman Fazaa

10. The ‘dark side’ of leadership personality and transformational leadership: An exploratory study
Pages 86-97
Hwee S. Khoo and Giles St. J. Burch

11. The influence of men’s sexual strategies on perceptions of women’s bodily attractiveness, health and fertility
Pages 98-107
Viren Swami, Rebecca Miller, Adrian Furnham, Lars Penke and Martin J. Tovée

12. Temperamental sensitivity: Two constructs or one?
Pages 108-118
David E. Evans and Mary K. Rothbart

13. Personality and birth order in large families
Pages 119-128
Melissa M. Dixon, Carla J. Reyes, Mark F. Leppert and Lisa M. Pappas

14. Head size correlates with IQ in a sample of Hooton’s criminal data
Pages 129-139
Jeremy E.C. Genovese

15. Narcissism and displaced aggression: Effects of positive, negative, and delayed feedback
Pages 140-149
Marc A. Martinez, Amos Zeichner, Dennis E. Reidy and Joshua D. Miller

16. The relationship between maladaptive perfectionism and depressive symptoms: The mediating role of rumination
Pages 150-160
Patrick W. Harris, Carolyn M. Pepper and Danielle J. Maack

17. Sex drive is positively associated with women’s preferences for sexual dimorphism in men’s and women’s faces
Pages 161-170
Lisa L.M. Welling, Benedict C. Jones and Lisa M. DeBruine

18. Modeling the stress process: Personality eclipses dysfunctional cognitions and workload in predicting stress
Pages 171-181
Maureen A. Conard and Russell A. Matthews

19. Black anti-White attitudes: The influence of racial identity and the Big Five
Pages 182-192
Len Lecci and James D. Johnson

20. Academic delay of gratification and expectancy–value
Pages 193-202
Héfer Bembenutty

21. Conditional mate preferences: Factors influencing preferences for height
Pages 203-215
Irmina Salska, David A. Frederick, Boguslaw Pawlowski, Andrew H. Reilly, Kelsey T. Laird and Nancy A. Rudd

22. Patterns of second-by-second resting frontal brain (EEG) asymmetry and their relation to heart rate and temperament in 9-month-old human infants
Pages 216-225
Louis A. Schmidt

23. Exploring emotion-regulation and autonomic physiology in metastatic breast cancer patients: Repression, suppression, and restraint of hostility
Pages 226-237
Janine Giese-Davis, Ansgar Conrad, Bita Nouriani and David Spiegel

24. Modeling the hierarchical structure of attachment representations: A test of domain differentiation
Pages 238-249
Chris G. Sibley and Nickola C. Overall

25. Measuring stress reaction style: A construct validity investigation
Pages 250-262
Nigel Guenole, Sasha Chernyshenko, Stephen Stark, Keith McGregor and Siva Ganesh

26. Detecting ‘faking bad’ on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales
Pages 263-272
Julian Boon, Lynsey Gozna and Stephen Hall

27. Conceptual and methodological errors that invalidate Luciano et al’s claim to have tested Robinson’s theory of personality and intelligence
Pages 273-277
David L. Robinson

28. Hormones and borderline personality features
Pages 278-287
Milagros Evardone, Gerianne M. Alexander and Leslie C. Morey

29. Associations among polychronicity, goal orientation, and error orientation
Pages 288-298
Kraig L. Schell and Jeffrey M. Conte

30. Eysenck meets Martindale: The relationship between extraversion and originality from the neuroscientific perspective
Pages 299-310
Andreas Fink and Aljoscha C. Neubauer

31. Underestimating the effects of faking on the validity of self-report personality scales
Pages 311-321
Ronald R. Holden

32. The Mate Retention Inventory-Short Form (MRI-SF)
Pages 322-334
David M. Buss, Todd K. Shackelford and William F. McKibbin

To determine election outcomes, study says snap judgments are sufficient

thomasr — Wed, 24 Oct 2007 10:54:47 +0000

A split-second glance at two candidates’ faces is often enough to determine which one will win an election, according to a Princeton University study.

Princeton psychologist Alexander Todorov has demonstrated that quick facial judgments can accurately predict real-world election returns. Todorov has taken some of his previous research that showed that people unconsciously judge the competence of an unfamiliar face within a tenth of a second, and he has moved it to the political arena. His lab tests show that a rapid appraisal of the relative competence of two candidates’ faces was sufficient to predict the winner in about 70 percent of the races for U.S. senator and state governor in the 2006 elections.

“We never told our test subjects they were looking at candidates for
political office — we only asked them to make a gut reaction response
as to which unfamiliar face appeared more competent,” said Todorov, an
assistant professor of psychology and public affairs. “The findings
suggest that fast, unreflective judgments based on a candidate’s face
can affect voting decisions.”

Todorov and Charles Ballew, an undergraduate psychology major who
graduated from Princeton in 2006, conducted three experiments in which
several dozen participants had to make snap judgments about faces.
Participants were shown a series of photos, each containing a pair of
faces, and asked to choose, based purely on gut feeling, which face they
felt displayed more competence. The differences among the experiments
largely concerned the amounts of time an observer was allowed to view
the faces – as brief as a tenth of a second or longer — and to pass
judgment afterward.

What was unknown to the participants in the third experiment was that
the image pairs were actually the photographs of the two frontrunner
candidates for a major election being held somewhere in the United
States during the time of the experiment in late 2006. The races were
either for state governor or for a seat in the U.S. Senate. In cases
where an observer recognized either of the two faces, the researchers
removed the selection from the data.

Two weeks later elections were held, and the researchers compared the
competency judgments with the election results. They found that the
judgments predicted the winners in 72.4 percent of the senatorial races
and 68.6 percent of the gubernatorial races.

“This means that with a quick look at two photos, you have a great
chance of predicting who will win,” Todorov said. “Voters are not that
rational, after all. So maybe we have to consider that when we elect our
politicians.”

Todorov’s paper on the findings, written with Ballew, appears in the
Oct. 22 issue of the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences. The paper has inspired researchers elsewhere to re-examine
their assumptions about visual images and their effect on
decision-making among the public.

“Political scientists have spent 50 years documenting only modest
effects of the media on voting behavior, but Todorov’s research suggests
we may have been looking in the wrong place,” said Chappell Lawson, an
associate professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. “Most of these previous studies have relied on
transcripts or printed records of what the media say, with much less
attention to visual images.”

Lawson, who called Todorov’s work “pioneering,” added that some of his
own work corroborates the new findings, indicating that competence
appears to be a universal quality, recognizable across cultures. His
research shows that American observers could predict the outcome of
elections in Mexico based on the same gut reactions.

“Both of these papers speak to the seminal quality of appearance in
candidate success,” Lawson said. “Our findings surprised us, because
Mexican politicians often emphasize very different aspects of their
appearance, such as facial hair, which American political figures avoid.
But Americans could still pick out the Mexican winners. Our data show
effects at least as strong as those Todorov found.”

Political scientists, Todorov said, are likely to be most interested in
his findings, primarily because they will want to identify which voters
are most strongly influenced.

“It’s still unclear how these effects operate in the real world,” he
said. “Not every voter is going to be affected. Obviously, some people
vote according to their values, but many others are uninformed about
candidates’ policy decisions. So we need to do the hard work to find
out.”

Source: Princeton University http://www.physorg.com/news112376210.html

The Feeling of Familiarity of Music and Odors: The Same Neural Signature?

thomasr — Mon, 22 Oct 2007 10:45:27 +0000

The feeling of familiarity can be triggered by stimuli from all sensory modalities, suggesting a multimodal nature of its neural bases.

In the present experiment, we investigated this hypothesis by studying the neural bases of familiarity processing of odors and music. In particular, we focused on familiarity referring to the participants’ life experience. Items were classified as familiar or unfamiliar based on participants’ individual responses, and activation patterns evoked by familiar items were compared with those evoked by unfamiliar items. For the feeling of familiarity, a bimodal activation pattern was observed in the left hemisphere, specifically the superior and inferior frontal gyri, the precuneus, the angular gyrus, the parahippocampal gyrus, and the hippocampus.

Together with previously reported data on verbal items, visual items, and auditory items other than music, this outcome suggests a multimodal neural system of the feeling of familiarity. The feeling of unfamiliarity was related to a smaller bimodal activation pattern mainly located in the right insula and likely related to the detection of novelty.

Plailly et al. in Cerebral Cortex

Empathy for Pain and Touch in the Human Somatosensory Cortex

thomasr — Mon, 22 Oct 2007 10:41:48 +0000

Although feeling pain and touch has long been considered inherently private, recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies hint at the social implications of this experience. Here we used somatosensory-evoked potentials (SEPs) to investigate whether mere observation of painful and tactile stimuli delivered to a model would modulate neural activity in the somatic system of an onlooker.

Viewing video clips showing pain and tactile stimuli delivered to others, respectively, increased and decreased the amplitude of the P45 SEP component that reflects the activity of the primary somatosensory cortex (S1). These modulations correlated with the intensity but not with the unpleasantness of the pain and touch ascribed to the model or the aversion induced in the onlooker by the video clips. Thus, modulation of S1 activity contingent upon observation of others’ pain and touch may reflect the mapping of sensory qualities of observed painful and tactile stimuli.

Results indicate that the S1 is not only involved in the actual perception of pain and touch but also plays an important role in extracting somatic features from social interactions.

Bufalari et al. in Cerebral Cortex

Emotion and Consciousness

alice — Sun, 21 Oct 2007 06:33:31 +0000

Edited by Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal, Piotr Winkielman

Presenting state-of-the-art work on the conscious and unconscious processes involved in emotion, this integrative volume brings together leading psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers. Carefully organized, tightly edited chapters address such compelling questions as how bodily responses contribute to conscious experience, whether “unconscious emotion” exists, how affect is transmitted from one person to another, and how emotional responses are produced in the brain. Bringing a new level of coherence to lines of inquiry that often remain disparate, the book identifies key, cross-cutting ideas and themes and sets forth a cogent agenda for future research.

2007, 420 p., Hardcover and paperback

ISBN-13: 978-1-59385-458-4
ISBN-10: 1-59385-458-7

Reviews Table of Contents

Dream content: Individual and generic aspects

thomasr — Thu, 18 Oct 2007 21:51:42 +0000

Dream reports were collected from normal subjects in an effort to determine the degree to which dream reports can be used to identify individual dreamers. Judges were asked to group the reports by their authors. The judges scored the reports correctly at chance levels. This finding indicated that dreams may be at least as much like each other as they are the signature of individual dreamers. Our results suggest that dream reports cannot be used to identify the individuals who produced them when identifiers like names and gender of friends and family members are removed from the dream report. In addition to using dreams to learn about an individual, we must look at dreams as telling us about important common or generic aspects of human consciousness.next term

Allan Hobson and David Kahn in press article in Consciousness & Cognition

How Schizophrenia Develops: Major Clues Discovered

thomasr — Thu, 18 Oct 2007 21:39:26 +0000

Schizophrenia may occur, in part, because of a problem in an intermittent on/off switch for a gene involved in making a key chemical messenger in the brain, scientists have found in a study of human brain tissue. The researchers found that the gene is turned on at increasingly high rates during normal development of the prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain involved in higher functions like thinking and decision-making — but that this normal increase may not occur in people with schizophrenia.

The gene, GAD1, makes an enzyme essential for production of the chemical messenger, called GABA. The more the gene is turned on, the more GABA synthesis can occur, under normal circumstances. GABA helps regulate the flow of electrical traffic that enables brain cells to communicate with each other. It is among the major neurotransmitters in the brain.

Abnormalities in brain development and in GABA synthesis are known to play a role in schizophrenia, but the underlying molecular mechanisms are unknown. In this study, scientists discovered that defects in specific epigenetic actions — biochemical reactions that regulate gene activity, such as turning genes on and off so that they can make substances like the GAD1 enzyme — are involved.

Results of the research were published in the Journal of Neuroscience, by Schahram Akbarian, MD, PhD, Hsien-Sung Huang, PhD student, and colleagues at the University of Massachusetts Medical School and Baylor College of Medicine.

“This discovery opens a new area for exploration of schizophrenia,” said NIMH Director Thomas R. Insel, MD. “Studies have yielded very strong evidence that schizophrenia involves a decrease in the enzymes, like GAD1, that help make the neurotransmitter GABA. Now we’re starting to identify the mechanisms involved, and our discoveries are pointing to potential new targets for medications.”

Another enzyme, Mll1, may play a role in the epigenetic actions. For genes to be turned on, temporary structural changes in certain proteins – histones – must take place to expose the genes’ blueprints in DNA. The researchers found evidence that, in schizophrenia, changes in Mll1 activity may interfere with this process in histones whose alterations enable the GAD1 blueprint to be exposed.

The researchers also showed, in mice, that antipsychotic medications like clozapine appear to correct this epigenetic flaw. This raises the possibility of developing new medications aimed at correcting defects in the mechanisms involved.

Finding more precise molecular targets for development of new schizophrenia medications is a key effort, because it can lead to more effective treatments with fewer side effects. Clozapine and other current antipsychotic medications are effective for many patients, but not all, and they can cause side effects severe enough that some people choose to stop treatment.

The researchers also found that people with three different variations of the GAD1 gene — variations previously associated with schizophrenia — also were more likely to have indicators of a malfunction in brain development. Among them were indicators of altered epigenetic actions related to GABA synthesis.

“We’ve known that schizophrenia is a developmental disease, and that something happens in the maturation of the prefrontal cortex during this vulnerable period of life. Now we’re beginning to find out what it is, and that sets the stage for better ways of preventing and treating it,” Akbarian said.

Reference: Huang H-S, Matevossian A, Whittle C, Kim SY, Schumacher A, Baker SP, Akbarian S. Prefrontal Dysfunction in Schizophrenia Involves Mixed Lineage Leukemia 1-Regulated Histone Methylation at GABAergic Gene Promoters. Journal of Neuroscience, October 17, 2007.

The study was funded by the National Institutes of Health’s National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) and National Institute of Child Health and Human Development.

Note: This story has been adapted from material provided by NIH/National Institute of Mental Health.

Feeling Sleepy Is All In Your Genes

thomasr — Thu, 18 Oct 2007 21:35:48 +0000

Genes responsible for our 24 hour body clock influence not only the timing of sleep, but also appear to be central to the actual restorative process of sleep, according to research published in BMC Neuroscience. The study identified changes in the brain that lead to the increased desire and need for sleep during time spent awake.

“We still do not know why we benefit from sleep, or why we feel tired when we are ‘lacking’ sleep, but it seems likely that sleep serves some basic biological function for the brain such as energy restoration for brain cells or memory consolidation.” Explains Dr Bruce O’Hara of the University of Kentucky, one of the neuroscientists who conducted the research. “We have found that clock gene expression in the brain is highly correlated to the build-up of sleep debt, while previous findings have linked these genes to energy metabolism. Together, this supports the idea that one function of sleep is related to energy metabolism.”

To explore the connection between the expression of clock genes and sleep, three inbred strains of mice with different genetic make-ups were utilized, and which had previously been shown to differ in their response to sleep deprivation by lead author, Dr. Paul Franken of Stanford University and Lausanne University. In this study, mice were first sleep deprived during the daytime period when mice normally sleep then allowed recovery sleep.

Changes in gene expression for three clock genes were examined throughout the brain during both phases. Clock gene expression generally increased the more the mice were kept awake and decreased when sleep was allowed, supporting that these genes play a role in the regulation of the need for sleep. Generally, the expression of the clock-genes Period-1 and Period-2, increased at a faster rate in mouse strains with the poorest quality of recovery sleep suggesting that the detailed dynamic changes in expression may underlie individual differences in sleep length and sleep quality. The changes in gene expression were also shown to occur in many different brain regions supporting the idea that sleep is a global brain function.

A handful of genes such as Period-1 and Period-2 have been shown previously to underlie our circadian rhythms (behavior and physiology that follow a 24 hour cycle). The major advantage of circadian rhythms is that they allow animals and plants to predict and prepare for periodic changes in the environment. The anticipatory increase in clock-gene expression may be, on a molecular level, an animal’s preparation for activity.

Variations in clock genes may underlie rhythmic traits influencing our preferred wake-up time, but the clock genes’ role in direct sleep regulation, as shown in this study, may also influence sleep duration and human performance with differing amounts of sleep. The research could also help shed light on the biology of mood disorders, such as Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) or bipolar disorder, that appear linked to both sleep and circadian rhythms.

Article: Paul Franken, Ryan Thomason, H. Craig Heller and Bruce F O’Hara, “A non-circadian role for clock-genes in sleep homeostasis: a strain comparison” BMC Neuroscience (in press)

Note: This story has been adapted from material provided by BioMed Central.

Prefrontal decision making

thomasr — Thu, 18 Oct 2007 08:09:03 +0000

The role of the prefrontal cortex in decision making is today placed on a solid scientific foundation. But for the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMF), it is still uncertain whether it plays a role in decision making under uncertainty or whether it is a “pure” decision structure per se. In a paper by Fellows and Farah, it is argued that “VMF plays a necessary role in certain as well as uncertain decision making in humans”

The Role of Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Decision Making: Judgment under Uncertainty or Judgment Per Se?

Lesley K. Fellows and Martha J. Farah

Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMF) is thought to be important in human decision making, but studies to date have focused on decision making under conditions of uncertainty, including risky or ambiguous decisions. Other lines of evidence suggest that this area of the brain represents quite basic information about the relative “economic” value of options, predicting a role for this region in value-based decision making even in the absence of uncertainty. We tested this prediction in human subjects with VMF damage. Preference judgment is a simple form of value-based decision making under certainty. We asked whether VMF damage in humans would lead to inconsistent preference judgments in a simple pairwise choice task. Twenty-one participants with focal damage to the frontal lobes were compared with 19 age- and education-matched control subjects. Subjects with VMF damage were significantly more inconsistent in their preferences than controls, whereas those with frontal damage that spared the VMF performed normally. These results argue that VMF plays a necessary role in certain as well as uncertain decision making in humans.

Cerebral Cortex

Dreaming: New issue

thomasr — Thu, 18 Oct 2007 07:43:38 +0000

A new issue of Dreaming is out, covering topics such as dreaming and physical health, insomnia and dream content, and personality types.

Volume 17, Issue 3

The relationships between dream content and physical health, mood, and self-construal.

King, David B.; DeCicco, Teresa L.

Dreaming and insomnia: Polysomnographic correlates of reported dream recall frequency.

Article abstract:	Hide abstract

Research is presented that examines the relationship among dream content, physical health, mood, and self-construal. Participants were 27 undergraduate students who completed the Medical Outcomes SF-36 Health Survey (SF-36), the Profile of Mood States Scale (POMS-SF), and the Self-Construal Scale (SCS). Each participant handed in four dream reports, which were analyzed according to the Hall and Van de Castle (1966) system of content analysis. Multiple significant correlations were observed between dream content and the SF-36, the POMS-SF, and the SCS. Most notable were the findings between physical health and dream content. Participants displaying poor physical health reported more bodily misfortunes, injuries and illnesses, medical themes, and body parts in their dreams. Findings support continuity between dreams and waking life physical and mental functioning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved)

Pagel, J. F.; Shocknesse, Shannon

Students’ views on the role of dreams in human life.

Article abstract:	Hide abstract

This study assesses which polysomnographic variables are associated with changes in reported dream recall frequency in patients meeting diagnostic criteria for primary insomnia. Data analyzed included sleep latency, total sleep time, sleep efficiency, time in REM, time in sleep stages (1&2 vs. 3&4), and periodic limb movement. For the grouping meeting ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for primary insomnia, a significant decrease in dream recall was found compared to the noninsomniac group. A decline in polysomnographic sleep quality was associated with a decline in reported dream or nightmare recall frequency. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved)

Szmigielska, Barbara; Holda, Malgorzata

Exploring dream work at end of life.

Article abstract:	Hide abstract

The present study was an attempt to investigate the subjectively perceived role of dreams. It examined the private concepts of dreams and dreaming, attitude toward dreams, and the influence of dreams on behavior, which can manifest in sharing dreams with other people, trying to interpret one’s own dreams, believing they have special meaning, or behaving according to the clues given by the dream. The sample consisted of 47 participants, students ages 19-20. A structured interview, individually administered, was used. The results indicate interesting relationships between analyzed variables and gender; they also show individual differences in both common notions about dreams and the way dreams can influence other kinds of behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved)

Goelitz, Ann

Dream emotions, waking emotions, personality characteristics and well-being–A positive psychology approach.

Article abstract:	Hide abstract

Dream work with the terminally ill is an effective intervention modality. Despite this, it remains an understudied phenomenon. This article will review the literature on the subject in an attempt to make recommendations regarding future research into this methodology. The author explores dream work with patients at end-of-life and contrasts it with dream work with trauma survivors. Complementary and alternative medicine interventions used to support the terminally ill are also surveyed. Hypnotic guided imagery at end of life in particular are examined and compared with dream work methodologies. Benefits from these therapies are outlined, as well as potential problems that practitioners may encounter with their utilization. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved)

Gilchrist, Sue; Davidson, John; Shakespeare-Finch, Jane

Letter: Behavioural improvements with thalamic stimulation after severe traumatic brain injury

Article abstract:	Hide abstract

The study aimed to discover whether personality characteristics and waking emotions relate to dreaming emotions. There were 123 participants, ranging in age from 17 to 82 years. It was hypothesized that participants with significant positive emotional trait and state ratings in waking life would experience more positive dreams. Data collection utilized diaries and questionnaires, including Hartmann’s Boundary Questionnaire, IPIP Emotional Stability Scale, Staats’ Hope Scale, Adult Dispositional Hope Scale, and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule to assess personality and attitudinal characteristics. Participants recorded and rated their waking and dream emotions over a 3-week period. Median correlations between corresponding waking and dream emotions were .58 for positive emotions and .47 for negative emotions. There were also low, but significant correlations between some personality characteristics and participants’ tendency to experience positive or negative emotions in dreams. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved)

Brain stem may be key to consciousness:

thomasr — Sat, 15 Sep 2007 19:47:49 +0000

From MindHacks
An article in this week’s Science News discusses whether the brain stem may play a more central role in consciousness than it’s usually given credit for.

It focuses on children with hydranencephaly, a where the cortex fails to develop in children and instead, the space is filled with cerebral spinal fluid.

Typically, affected children survive only a few months after birth, but those that do survive seem to remarkably more conscious than you would guess based on theories that suggest the cortex is where all the action happens to support consciousness.

Swedish neuroscientist Bjorn Merker wrote an article [pdf] in February’s Behavioural and Brain Sciences journal arguing that these cases suggest we need to rethink our ideas about how the brain supports conscious thought, and perhaps, even consciousness itself.

Merker argues that the brain stem supports an elementary form of conscious thought in kids with hydranencephaly. It also contains auditory structures capable of preserving hearing in someone without a cortex. In contrast, optic nerve damage in hydranencephaly frequently impairs vision, regardless of what the brain stem does.

Self-awareness and other “higher” forms of thought may require cortical contributions. But Merker posits that “primary consciousness,” which he regards as an ability to integrate sensations from the environment with one’s immediate goals and feelings in order to guide behavior, springs from the brain stem.

If he’s right, virtually all vertebrates—which share a similar brain stem design—belong to the “primary consciousness” club. Moreover, medical definitions of brain death as a lack of cortical activity would face a serious challenge. At the very least, physicians could no longer assume that individuals with hydranencephaly don’t need pain medication or anesthesia during invasive medical procedures.

Link to Science News article ‘Consciousness in the Raw’.
pdf of BBS article ‘Consciousness without a cerebral cortex’.

Gorillas heads race to extinction

thomasr — Wed, 12 Sep 2007 18:07:12 +0000

According to the Red List of Threatened Species for 2007, gorillas, orangutans, and corals are among the plants and animals which are sliding closer to extinction. You can read more about this at BBC.

The biology of sleep

thomasr — Wed, 12 Sep 2007 17:47:24 +0000

Medscape is running a special topic edition on the biology of sleep. The articles include papers on the management of insomnia; the relationship between passive sleeping and sleep disturbance during pregnancy; and the effects of hypothalamic stimulation on cluster headache and sleep.

Redefining the Management of Insomnia: Focus on the Biology of Sleep
David N. Neubauer, MD, explores the current and future management of insomnia with a focus on the biology of sleep.

Passive Smoking Increases Risk for Sleep Disturbance During Pregnancy
Results from 2 surveys showed that passive smoking is independently associated with increased sleep disturbance during pregnancy.

Hypothalamic Stimulation for Refractory Cluster Headache Improves Sleep
In patients with drug-resistant chronic cluster headache, deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the posterior hypothalamus effectively curtails nighttime attacks, which leads to better sleep, clinicians from Italy report in the July/August issue of the journal Headache.

Medscape.com Neurology and Neurosurgery section

Initiative: Decade of the Mind

thomasr — Mon, 10 Sep 2007 07:22:46 +0000

Dear all!

I would draw your attention to the letter ‘A Proposal for a Decade of the Mind Initiative‘ by JAMES S. ALBUS, GEORGE A. BEKEY, JOHN H. HOLLAND, NANCY G. KANWISHER, JEFFREY L. KRICHMAR, MORTIMER MISHKIN, DHARMENDRA S. MODHA, MARCUS E. RAICHLE, GORDON M. SHEPHERD, GIULIO TONONI just now published in SCIENCE VOL 317 7 SEPTEMBER 2007 page 1321.

The authors propose a Decade of the Mind initiative. According to them (they represent its steering committee) it would build on progress of the recent Decade of the Brain (1990-99) and should in short focus on four broad, but intertwined areas:

Healing and protecting the mind.
Understanding the mind.
Enriching the mind.
Modeling the mind.

I strongly agree with the view that ‘present time ripe for breakthroughs in the study of the mind’ and sure the Decade proposed is extremely opportune initiative which will also positively influence on mind research in many countries outside the USA. Even the fact of publishing the letter concerning
the idea of the Decade could help to mind research progress worldwide.

The ASSC as a whole, all its members and all who are interesting in mind/brain, psychology, cognition, computer etc sciences should without doubt intensively support the Decade of the Mind initiative.

Bravo!

Petro Gopych,
Kharkiv, Ukraine

(From the PSYCHE mailing list)

Science: special issue on social cognition

thomasr — Sun, 09 Sep 2007 13:39:44 +0000

Science is running a special edition on social cognition this week. It contains papers on the evolution of social cognition

Living in Societies – Caroline Ash, Gilbert Chin, Elizabeth Pennisi, and Andrew Sugden

All Together Now–Pull! – Greg Miller

Evolution in the Social Brain – R. I. M. Dunbar and Susanne Shultz

Social Components of Fitness in Primate Groups – Joan B. Silk

Forgetting the fear

thomasr — Sat, 08 Sep 2007 20:00:37 +0000

There are some memories one would rather forget. This is especially true for people who suffer from phobias or from post-traumatic stress disorder. Some memories can decrease and even disappear through a process called extinction, but the mechanisms that are involved are not known. Tsai and colleagues now show that a molecular pathway in the hippocampus that involves cyclin-dependent kinase 5 (Cdk5) regulates the extinction of contextual fear in mice.

When mice are exposed to an aversive stimulus in a neutral context, they develop fear for that context — this is called conditioned fear. In a subsequent ‘extinction procedure’ that consists of daily 3-minute long re-exposures to the context alone, the animals gradually become less afraid of the environment, as evidenced by reduced freezing.

Read full story here

Source:

Sananbenesi et al. Hippocampal cyclin-dependent kinase 5 regulates the loss of fearful associations. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 8, 651 (September 2007)

Abstract:

Treatment of emotional disorders involves the promotion of extinction processes, which are defined as the learned reduction of fear. The molecular mechanisms underlying extinction have only begun to be elucidated. By employing genetic and pharmacological approaches in mice, we show here that extinction requires downregulation of Rac-1 and cyclin-dependent kinase 5 (Cdk5), and upregulation of p21 activated kinase-1 (PAK-1) activity. This is physiologically achieved by a Rac-1–dependent relocation of the Cdk5 activator p35 from the membrane to the cytosol and dissociation of p35 from PAK-1. Moreover, our data suggest that Cdk5/p35 activity prevents extinction in part by inhibition of PAK-1 activity in a Rac-1–dependent manner. We propose that extinction of contextual fear is regulated by counteracting components of a molecular pathway involving Rac-1, Cdk5 and PAK-1. Our data suggest that this pathway could provide a suitable target for therapeutic treatment of emotional disorders.

New insights into OCD

thomasr — Thu, 06 Sep 2007 19:48:30 +0000

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a common debilitating psychiatric disorder, yet the cause of OCD is unknown and few effective treatments are available. A recent study of mutant mice reveals a novel mechanism leading to OCD-like behaviors in mice and suggests potential new therapeutic strategies.

By Dr. Jing Lu and Dr. Guoping Feng, in Scitizen.com

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is an anxiety disorder characterized by intrusive thoughts (obsessions) and repetitive behaviors (compulsions). OCD is one of the most common psychiatric disorders, affecting about 2 percent of the world population. Some of the most frequently occurring obsessive thoughts in OCD are of contamination, pathological doubt and a need for symmetry, while the most common compulsive behaviors include washing, checking and counting. Currently, the cause of OCD is unknown.

There are billions of neurons in the brain. They are connected in very specific ways and they constantly talk to each other. Defects in neuronal connections and communications have been widely implicated in neurological and neuropsychiatric disorders. We study how neurons in the brain make these specific connections and how they communicate with each other. In this study we focused on a gene called SAPAP3, which is critical for normal communication between neurons in the brain. The SAPAP3 gene is highly expressed in a brain region called the striatum, one of the brain’s information processing and decision-making centers that control movement and related behaviors. Previous studies in OCD patients suggested that defects in the striatum may be involved in OCD, but the nature of the defects were unclear.

When we mutated the SAPAP3 gene in mice using a genetic technology called gene knockout, we found that the mutant mice exhibited compulsive grooming behavior leading to hair loss and skin lesions in the facial and neck areas. Continuous videotaping observations confirmed that the lesions were caused by excessive self-grooming. These mice also showed increased anxiety—they tend to stay in corners and hesitate to enter “risky” environments, such as a brightly lit area. This is consistent with an OCD-like behavior, since anxiety is often associated with OCD in humans. When we treated these mice with Prozac, the first line of medicine for treating OCD, both the compulsive grooming and anxiety in these mice were relieved.

Nerve cells in the brain use several chemical messengers to communicate with each other. Previous studies of OCD have focused on one of the messengers called serotonin. However, SAPAP3 is required for neuronal communications that use another messenger called glutamate. Examination of the brain of SAPAP3 mutant mice indeed revealed defects in communications mediated by glutamate in the striatum. To prove that these defects play a causal role in the OCD-like behavior in mice, we reinserted SAPAP3 selectively into the striatum of the mutant mice. This is sufficient to largely prevent the development of compulsive grooming, anxiety and facial lesions. Thus, these studies revealed a brain region as well as a new player (glutamate-mediated communication) in OCD-like behavior. The ultimate goal is to translate this new discovery into a better understanding of the pathology and causes of OCD, and into new, improved therapeutic targets for drug development.

Reference:

Welch M., J., et al, Cortico-striatal synaptic defects and OCD-like behaviours in Sapap3-mutant mice, Nature 448, 894-900, 23 August 2007

Higher social skills are uniquely human

thomasr — Thu, 06 Sep 2007 19:44:16 +0000

A new study published today in Science reports that humans have distinctive social skills. Esther Herrmann, lead author of the study, answers Scitizen’s questions.

Apes bite and try to break a tube to retrieve the food inside while children follow the experimenter’s example to get inside the tube to retrieve the prize, showing that even before preschool, toddlers are more sophisticated in their social learning skills than their closest primate relatives, according to a report published in the 7 September issue of the journal Science.

This innate proficiency allows them to excel in both physical and social skills as they begin school and progress through life.

“We compared three species to determine which abilities and skills are distinctly human,” explained Esther Herrmann of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany and lead author of the research paper. Humans differ from their great ape relatives because human brains are about three times the size of the closest primate relatives and humans have language, symbolic math and scientific reasoning.

“Social cognition skills are critical for learning,” Herrmann said. The children were much better than the apes in understanding nonverbal communications, imitating another’s solution to a problem and understanding the intentions of others,” she said.

This is the first comprehensive test comparing social and physical skills of children, chimpanzees and orangutans, Herrmann explained, adding that the findings provide important insight into the evolution of human cognition.

The findings support the cultural intelligence hypothesis that suggests that humans have distinctive social cognitive skills to interact in cultural groups, Herrmann said. An alternate hypothesis suggests that humans differ from apes uniformly across physical and social cognitive tasks because they have more general intelligence.

About 230 subjects – chimps, orangutans and 2.5 year-old children – were compared using a battery of tests and found all to be about equal in the physical cognitive skills of space, quantities and causality. In the social skills of communication, social learning and theory-of-mind skills, the children were correct in about 74 percent of the trials, while the two ape species were correct only about 33 percent of the time.

Full story at EurekAlert

More at Max Planck Institute

Scitizen interview

Birth and sleep content

thomasr — Mon, 03 Sep 2007 07:33:59 +0000

The conception and birth of a child are emotional events that influence the dreams of most new mothers. In a surprisingly high number of cases, this influence reflects negative aspects of maternal responsibility, depicting the new infant in dreamed situations of danger and provoking anxiety in the mother that often spills over into wakefulness. Furthermore, these kinds of dreams are also accompanied by complex behaviors by new moms such as motor activity, speaking and expressing emotion, according to a study published in the September 1 issue of the journal SLEEP.

The study, authored by Tore Nielsen, PhD, of the Sleep Research Centre at the Hôpital du Sacré-Cœur de Montréal in Montréal, Québec, Canada, focused on 273 women, who were divided into three groups: postpartum, pregnant, and null gravida. The subjects completed questionnaires about pregnancy and birth factors, personality and sleep, and participated in interviews concerning the prevalence of recent infant dreams and nightmares, associated behaviors, anxiety, depression and other psychopathologic factors.

The following summarizes the results:

The percentage of women in all groups who recalled dreams ranged from 88-91 percent.
Postpartum and pregnant women recalled infant dreams and nightmares with equal prevalence, but more postpartum women reported they contained anxiety (75 percent) and the infant in danger (73 percent) than did pregnant women (59 percent).
Motor activity was present in twice as many postpartum (57 percent) as pregnant (24 percent) or null gravida (25 percent) women.
Expressing emotion was more prevalent among null gravida (56 percent) than postpartum women (27 percent), but was not different from pregnant women (37 percent).
Speaking was equally prevalent among the three groups (12-19 percent).
Behaviors were associated with nightmares, dream anxiety and, among postpartum women, post-awakening anxiety (41 percent), confusion (51 percent), and a need to check on the infant (60 percent).

“The research has uncovered a new dream phenomenon that affects a surprisingly large number of new mothers (and some fathers) and that therefore broadens our understanding of REM sleep parasomnias in the healthy population,” said Dr. Nielsen. “Hallucinatory baby-in-bed nightmares and other vivid dreams of the baby in peril appear to arise normally in response to the acute maternal responsibilities and sleep fragmentation that are endured by new mothers. The unique experiences constitute a window through which cognitive and emotional processes underlying the earliest steps of mother-infant attachment may be observed.”

A woman’s body goes through drastic changes during and after pregnancy. These changes can be physical, hormonal and emotional. All of these changes can affect a woman’s sleep.

Most pregnant women experience daytime fatigue even though they may get more sleep. This is because the quality of their sleep tends to be worse. Physical discomfort and awakenings are common. The third trimester tends to be the time when it is hardest to sleep well.

Studies show that snoring often increases during pregnancy. Obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) also may develop as the pregnancy progresses. Warning signs for OSA may become more evident. These include gasping, choking sounds and pauses in breathing. OSA is more likely to develop if a woman had a high body mass index prior to the pregnancy.

Two other sleep disorders that are more common during pregnancy are restless legs syndrome (RLS) and sleep related leg cramps. RLS affects nearly 25 percent of pregnant women. RLS may be related to low iron. Therefore, women who must take iron supplements during pregnancy may have a lower risk of RLS. Leg cramps occur in about 40 percent of pregnant women. They tend to go away after delivery.

Experts recommend that pregnant and postpartum women, as well as other adults, get seven-to-eight hours of sleep each night for good health and optimum performance.

Those who suspect that they might be suffering from a sleep disorder are encouraged to discuss their problem with their primary care physician or a sleep specialist.

(From EurekAlert)

###

SLEEP is the official journal of the Associated Professional Sleep Societies, LLC, a joint venture of the American Academy of Sleep Medicine (AASM) and the Sleep Research Society.

SleepEducation.com, a Web site maintained by the AASM, provides information about various sleep disorders, the forms of treatment available, recent news on the topic of sleep, sleep studies that have been conducted and a listing of sleep facilities.

For a copy of this article, entitled, “Dream-associated behaviors affecting pregnant and postpartum women”, or to arrange an interview with an AASM spokesperson regarding this study, please contact Jim Arcuri, public relations coordinator, at (708)492-0930, ext. 9317, or jarcuri@aasmnet.org.

Psychiatrists the least religious

thomasr — Mon, 03 Sep 2007 07:30:28 +0000

In a recent survey of American physicians (see also here) it was found that the least religious of all medical specialties is psychiatry. It was also found that religious physicians, especially Protestants, are less likely to refer patients to psychiatrists, and more likely to send them to members of the clergy or religious counselors. As co-author Farr Curlin claims:

“Something about psychiatry, perhaps its historical ties to psychoanalysis and the anti-religious views of the early analysts such as Sigmund Freud, seems to dissuade religious medical students from choosing to specialize in this field,”

SCR comment: Another possibility is that psychiatrist, contrary to other medical specialities, see the direct consequences of how both therapeutic (as well as recreational) drugs can alter the mind. It would be interesting to know whether the runner-up on the atheist scoreboard is the group of neurologists. This could suggest that these groups are more likely to view the mind as a product of the brain, and that other medical specialist groups may still operate (e.g. implicitly) with a view that allows a distinction between a physical body and a non-physical mind.

From EurekAlert:

Psychiatrists are the least religious of all physicians

And religious physicians appear to be less willing to refer patients to them

A nationwide survey of the religious beliefs and practices of American physicians has found that the least religious of all medical specialties is psychiatry. Among psychiatrists who have a religion, more than twice as many are Jewish and far fewer are Protestant or Catholic, the two most common religions among physicians overall.

The study, published in the September 2007 issue of Psychiatric Services, also found that religious physicians, especially Protestants, are less likely to refer patients to psychiatrists, and more likely to send them to members of the clergy or to a religious counselor.

“Something about psychiatry, perhaps its historical ties to psychoanalysis and the anti-religious views of the early analysts such as Sigmund Freud, seems to dissuade religious medical students from choosing to specialize in this field,” said study author Farr Curlin, MD, assistant professor of medicine at the University of Chicago. “It also seems to discourage religious physicians from referring their patients to psychiatrists.”

“Previous surveys have documented the unusual religious profile of psychiatry,” he said, “but this is the first study to suggest that that profile leads many physicians to look away from psychiatrists for help in responding to patients’ psychological and spiritual suffering.”

“Because psychiatrists take care of patients struggling with emotional, personal and relational problems,” Curlin said, “the gap between the religiousness of the average psychiatrist and her average patient may make it difficult for them to connect on a human level.”

In 2003, to learn about the contribution of religious factors on physicians’ clinical practices, Curlin and colleagues surveyed 1,820 practicing physicians from all specialties, including an augmented number of psychiatrists; 1,144 (63%) physicians responded, including 100 psychiatrists.

The survey contained questions about medical specialties, religion, and measures of what the researchers called intrinsic religiosity—the extent to which individuals embrace their religion as the “master motive that guides and gives meaning to their life.”

Although 61 percent of all American physicians were either Protestant (39%) or Catholic (22%), only 37 percent of psychiatrists were Protestant (27%) or Catholic (10%). Twenty-nine percent were Jewish, compared to 13 percent of all physicians. Seventeen percent of psychiatrists listed their religion as “none,” compared to only 10 percent of all doctors.

Curlin’s survey also included this brief vignette, designed to present “ambiguous symptoms of psychological distress” as way measure the willingness of physicians to refer patients to psychiatrists.

“A patient presents to you with continued deep grieving two months after the death of his wife. If you were to refer the patient, to which of the following would you prefer to refer first” (a psychiatrist or psychologist, a clergy member or religious counselor, a health care chaplain, or other).”

Overall, 56 percent of physicians indicated they would refer such a patient to a psychiatrist or psychologist, 25 percent to a clergy member or other religious counselor, 7 percent to a health care chaplain and 12 percent to someone else.

Although Protestant physicians were only half as likely to send the patient to a psychiatrist, Jewish physicians were more likely to do so. Least likely were highly religious Protestants who attended church at least twice a month and looked to God for guidance “a great deal or quite a lot.”

“Patients probably seek out, to some extent, physicians who share their views on life’s big questions,” Curlin said. That may be especially true in psychiatry, where communication is so essential. The mismatch in religious beliefs between psychiatrists and patients may make it difficult for patients suffering from emotional or personal problems to find physicians who share their fundamental belief systems.

###

The Greenwall Foundation and the Robert Wood Johnson Clinical Scholars Program funded this study. Additional authors include John Lantos, Marshall Chin, Ryan Lawrence and Shaun Odell of the University of Chicago, and Keith Meador and Harold Koenig of Duke University.

Final proof of role of neural coherence in consciousness?

thomasr — Fri, 31 Aug 2007 08:13:50 +0000

Melloni et al. have recently demonstrated, in the Journal of Neuroscience, that neural synchrony in the gamma range between distal rain regions is important for conscious perception. The authors say about their work that “the access to conscious perception is the early transient global increase of phase synchrony of oscillatory activity in the gamma frequency range”

Here we link to the article and some related works.

Synchronization of neural activity across cortical areas correlates with conscious perception.

Melloni et al. in J Neuroscience, J Neurosci. 2007 Mar 14;27(11):2858-65

Subliminal stimuli can be deeply processed and activate similar brain areas as consciously perceived stimuli. This raises the question which signatures of neural activity critically differentiate conscious from unconscious processing. Transient synchronization of neural activity has been proposed as a neural correlate of conscious perception. Here we test this proposal by comparing the electrophysiological responses related to the processing of visible and invisible words in a delayed matching to sample task. Both perceived and nonperceived words caused a similar increase of local (gamma) oscillations in the EEG, but only perceived words induced a transient long-distance synchronization of gamma oscillations across widely separated regions of the brain. After this transient period of temporal coordination, the electrographic signatures of conscious and unconscious processes continue to diverge. Only words reported as perceived induced (1) enhanced theta oscillations over frontal regions during the maintenance interval, (2) an increase of the P300 component of the event-related potential, and (3) an increase in power and phase synchrony of gamma oscillations before the anticipated presentation of the test word. We propose that the critical process mediating the access to conscious perception is the early transient global increase of phase synchrony of oscillatory activity in the gamma frequency range.

Journal of Neuroscience

Related work:

Early neural correlates of conscious somatosensory perception. [J Neurosci. 2005]
Time course of conscious and unconscious semantic brain activation. [Neuroreport. 2000]
Increased synchronization of neuromagnetic responses during conscious perception. [J Neurosci. 1999]
Perception’s shadow: long-distance synchronization of human brain activity. [Nature. 1999]
“Gamma synchrony” in first-episode schizophrenia: a disorder of temporal connectivity?

Nature Network group on consciousness

thomasr — Fri, 31 Aug 2007 07:55:27 +0000

Alfredo Pereira has initiated a Nature Network group on consciousness, termed Brain Physiology, Cognition and Consciousness. From the description of the group, we can read that:

This group is aimed at discussing recent findings about brain physiology and possible implications for the explanation of cognitive and conscious processing.

Our main topics include: Molecular Mechanisms: systems of transmitters, modulators, membrane receptors, and their participation in cognitive functions; Intracellular Signal-Transduction Pathways involved in cognitive functions; Brain Processes Supporting Memory, Attention and Executive Functions; Techniques for Measurement of Brain Activity and Imaging; Neuro-Astroglial Interactions; ERP, Oscillatory Synchrony and Other Correlates of Consciousness; Neurological and Psychiatric Phenomena Impacting Consciousness: loss of consciousness in Epilepsia, alterations of consciousness in Schizophrenia and Depression

Go check it out and contribute here.

SciVee — YouTube for scientists

thomasr — Fri, 31 Aug 2007 07:17:09 +0000

A website being dubbed the YouTube for scientists has been launched, raising new hopes of bringing science closer to the people. SciVee allows scientists to upload published papers, as well as a podcast presenting the paper. As the site is relatively new, content is still fairly sparse. Those behind the initiative are however confident that it will contribute to the widespread dissemination and comprehension of science.

‘SciVee, created for scientists, by scientists, moves science beyond the printed word and lecture theatre, taking advantage of the Internet as a communication medium where scientists young and old have a place and avoice,’ explains the website.

The benefit for scientists is the opportunity to disseminate their research to a wider and potentially new audience. They are also able to
create a professional profile and join science groups. The larger scientific community is able to access new scientific information,
comment on what is published, and subscribe to relevant channels and groups.

Authors must have published their paper in an open access journal in order to upload it to SciVee.

This dynamic form of presentation could also encourage a lay audience to investigate science. The appeal of the website to a general audience does however depend on the quality of the content, and the presentation skills of the scientists submitting their work. Users are able to tag, rate and comment on videos.

The current offerings are all biology-focused, dealing with subjects from evolution to proteins. Most would be challenging for a
non-scientific audience, although Dr Eric Scheeff, presenting ‘Structural Evolution of the Protein Kinase-Like Superfamily’ does
introduce the Protein Kinase family with a slideshow before moving on to the more technical aspects of his paper.

The initiative has three high-profile backers: the Public Library of Science (PLoS); the US’ National Science Foundation (NSF) and the San Diego Supercomputer Center (SDSC).

Nature Neuroscience special issue

thomasr — Fri, 31 Aug 2007 06:41:39 +0000

Nature Neuroscience is running a on emotions and disorders of emotion.

It includes papers on brain derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) and its role in depression and anxiety, the social learning of fear, and how the circuitry of mood and anxiety disorders can be altered.

Get introduced to consciousness science now!

thomasr — Thu, 30 Aug 2007 06:15:42 +0000

It is now time for the annual and popular on-line introductory course to consciousness science. Professors Baars and McGovern will lead you through the basic steps in this field, highlight important topics and findings, and invite you to in-depth discussions. Click on the banner to go to the webcourse website.

Cognition & Emotion — new issue

thomasr — Wed, 29 Aug 2007 13:19:26 +0000

A new issue of Cognition & Emotion is out, including articles on affective processing, affection as a form of cognition, and the interdependence of emotion and cognition.

Cognition & Emotion, Volume 21 Issue 6 2007

How distinctive is affective processing? On the implications of using cognitive paradigms to study affect and emotion
Authors: Andreas B. Eder; Bernhard Hommel; Jan De Houwer

Differentiation in cognitive and emotional meanings: An evolutionary analysis
Authors: Philip J. Barnard; David J. Duke; Richard W. Byrne; Iain Davidson

Affect is a form of cognition: A neurobiological analysis
Authors: Seth Duncan; Lisa Feldman Barrett

On the interdependence of cognition and emotion
Authors: Justin Storbeck; Gerald L. Clore

Can cognitive methods be used to study the unique aspect of emotion: An appraisal theorist’s answer
Author: Agnes Moors

Affect and action: Towards an event-coding account
Authors: Tristan Lavender; Bernhard Hommel

Common valence coding in action and evaluation: Affective blindness towards response-compatible stimuli
Authors: Andreas B. Eder; Karl Christoph Klauer

Mere exposure in reverse: Mood and motion modulate memory bias
Authors: Mark Rotteveel; R. Hans Phaf

Affective distinctiveness: Illusory or real?
Authors: John T. Cacioppo; Gary G. Berntson

Cognition & Emotion

New books on consciousness

thomasr — Tue, 28 Aug 2007 13:53:44 +0000

It’s been a while since we announced new books, but here we present some of the most recent titles that should grab your attention.

The experimental phenomena of consciousness – a brief dictionary

Talis Bachmann, Bruno Breitmeyer, and Haluk Ogmen

Although it was treated respectfully by early researchers such as Wilhelm Wundt, William James, and Edward Titchener, the concept of consciousness virtually disappeared from academic psychology until the 1980s, when it made a triumphant return to the behavioural sciences and reappeared as a legitimate subject of empirical study. There is, however, no succinct handbook or dictionary covering the most important experimental phenomena and research paradigms that have become the psychophysical basis for the modern empirical study of consciousness. This volume provides the first systematic listing and description of the typical experimental phenomena and effects where consciousness appears as a variable of interest. The authors describe the names and labels of these phenomena, the principal authors behind the respective research, the basic experimental designs needed to produce research, and provide a list of useful references that will help readers to expand and deepen their own knowledge of the consciousness.

Oxford University Press

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Cognition, Brain and Consciousness — textbook

Bernard B. Baars & Nicole Gage

A textbook for psychology, neuroscience, pre-medical students, and everybody interested in the neuroscience of cognition. A wave of new research is transforming our understanding of the human mind and brain. Many educational fields now require a basic understanding of the new topic of cognitive neuroscience. However, available textbooks are written more for biology audiences than for psychology and related majors. This text aims to bridge that gap. A background in biology of neuroscience is not required. The thematic approach builds on widely understood concepts in psychology, such as working memory, selective attention, and social cognition. Edited by two leading experts in the field, the book guides the reader along a clear path to understand the latest findings. A support website at http://textbooks.elsevier.com provides all figures in electronic format with export to Powerpoint, as well as supplementary material including movies and support material for teachers and students. (note: support website will be available after June 10, 2007) FEATURES * Written specifically for psychology, pre-medical, education and neuroscience undergraduate and graduate students * The thematic approach builds on on accepted concepts, not presuming a background in neuroscience or biology * Ancillary material includes a companion website and Learning Guide for students * Includes two Appendices on brain imaging and neural networks written by Thomas Ramsoy and Igor Aleksander * Introduces the brain in a step-by-step, readable style, with gradually increasing sophistication * Richly illustrated in full color with clear and detailed drawings that build the brain from top to bottome, simplifying the layout of the brain for students * Pedagogy includes exercises and study questions at the end of each chapter, including drawing exercises

Elsevier

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Consciousness, Function and Representation

Ned Block

This volume of Ned Block’s writings collects his papers on consciousness, functionalism, and representationism. A number of these papers treat the significance of the multiple realizability of mental states for the mind-body problem–a theme that has concerned Block since the 1960s. One paper on this topic considers the upshot for the mind-body problem of the possibility of a robot that is functionally like us but physically different–as is Commander Data of Star Trek‘s second generation. The papers on consciousness treat such conceptual issues as phenomenal versus access consciousness, Dennett’s theory of consciousness, and the function of consciousness, as well as such empirical matters as “How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness,” and (in an expanded version of a paper originally in Trends in Cognitive Sciences) an argument that there are distinct neural correlates for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Turning to the mind-body problem, Block defends physicalism against Max Black’s argument concerning phenomenal modes of presentation. The papers on representationism consider “mental paint” as well as the “Inverted Earth” thought experiment–a world in which colors are reversed but there is a compensating reversal in the words that are used to describe them.Consciousness, Function, and Representation, bringing together papers that have appeared primarily in journals and conference proceedings, can be regarded as Block’s most complete statement of his positions on consciousness.

MIT Press

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Hypnosis and conscious states

Graham Jamieson

The book introduces and describes many of the recent new tools that have become available to researchers in this field. Academics, researchers, and clinicians wanting to develop their knowledge of the latest findings, theories and methods in the scientific study of hypnosis and related states of consciousness will find this an up to date guide to this rapidly advancing field.

Oxford University Press

Anhedonia — great intro and review at Medscape.com

thomasr — Sun, 26 Aug 2007 19:29:00 +0000

Medscape.com has a very nice article on anhedonia, which is described as “an inability to experience pleasure from normally pleasurable life events such as eating, exercise, and social or sexual interaction”. Here, we bring an excerpt from the article.

All currently marketed antidepressants are thought to work via monoaminergic mechanisms. The two most prevalent mechanisms are the blockade of serotonin, noradrenaline and/or dopamine reuptake (e.g. SSRIs, SNRIs, NDRIs) or the inhibition of monoamine break-down in the synaptic cleft via MAO inhibition. This led to the formulation of the monoamine hypothesis of depression, which suggests that depression arises from a deficiency in monoamine neurotransmission in brain areas critical to the regulation of mood and other key symptoms of the disorder. This theory continues to prevail, even in the absence of clear evidence of monoamine deficits in the brain of depressed humans or animals exhibiting depression-like behavior (Stahl SM. Essential Psychopharmacology. 2nd ed.), and has led to validation of current animal models of depression primarily on the basis of monaminergic mechanisms. Consequently, it is questionable whether these models would be useful in identifying effective antidepressant drugs that work via other mechanisms. It is interesting to note that the current lack of non-monoaminergic antidepressants cannot be attributed to lack of effort directed at their discovery and development, and major efforts to test other mechanisms (e.g. substance P antagonists, CRF antagonists, gonadal steroids) have yet to provide clear proof of efficacy in humans, and other potentially therapeutic mechanisms may remain untapped due to limitations of our current screening methods.

Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness

thomasr — Sun, 26 Aug 2007 13:32:43 +0000

Humans normally experience the conscious self as localized within their bodily borders. This spatial unity may break down in certain neurological conditions such as out-of-body experiences, leading to a striking disturbance of bodily self-consciousness.

On the basis of these clinical data, we designed an experiment that uses conflicting visual-somatosensory input in virtual reality to disrupt the spatial unity between the self and the body. We found that during multisensory conflict, participants felt as if a virtual body seen in front of them was their own body and mislocalized themselves toward the virtual body, to a position outside their bodily borders.

Our results indicate that spatial unity and bodily self-consciousness can be studied experimentally and are based on multisensory and cognitive processing of bodily information.

Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness

Lenggenhager et al. in Science

When the Need to Belong Goes Wrong

thomasr — Sun, 26 Aug 2007 13:26:22 +0000

When the Need to Belong Goes Wrong: The Expression of Social Anhedonia and Social Anxiety in Daily Life

People possess an innate need to belong that drives social interactions. Aberrations in the need to belong, such as social anhedonia and social anxiety, provide a point of entry for examining this need. The current study used experience-sampling methodology to explore deviations in the need to belong in the daily lives of 245 undergraduates. Eight times daily for a week, personal digital assistants signaled subjects to complete questionnaires regarding affect, thoughts, and behaviors.

As predicted, higher levels of social anhedonia were associated with increased time alone, greater preference for solitude, and lower positive affect. Higher social anxiety, in contrast, was associated with higher negative affect and was not associated with increased time alone. Furthermore, greater social anxiety was associated with greater self-consciousness and preference to be alone while interacting with unfamiliar people.

Thus, deviations in the need to belong affect social functioning differently depending on whether this need is absent or thwarted.

Psychologial Science

Chimps hold out

thomasr — Sun, 26 Aug 2007 13:20:13 +0000

Researchers have found that chimps know how to distract themselves with play in order to ward off temptation.

Most children practice this mental trick: When asked to wait patiently for a promised treat–say, an hour of television–they occupy themselves with a toy or a book. Researchers have now shown that chimpanzees engage in similar self-distraction, a finding that further blurs the cognitive and behavioral boundary between humans and other primates. The discovery comes from a study conducted at Georgia State University in Atlanta. Psychologists Theodore Evans and Michael Beran put each of four chimps in front of a container connected to a candy dispenser. The chimps could reach over and pick up the container to eat the accumulated candies at any time, but doing so stopped the dispenser from delivering any more. That allowed the chimps to delay the reward as long as they wanted–so that they could get more of it.
In another experiment, the chimps were presented with the same scenario but also given some toys. Just like fidgety children, the chimps were able to hold out longer in this situation by distracting themselves with toys, the team reports online today in Biology Letters. To test whether playing with the toys was indeed a distraction technique, the researchers set up yet another condition in which the chimps could see the candy container filling up but couldn’t reach it. Most of the chimps spent significantly more time playing with the toys when they could
access the container than when they could not, indicating that their play was a deliberate strategy to control the impulse to eat the candies.

Frans de Waal, a primatologist at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, says the study fills yet another “mental gap” between humans and other species, adding to a list of impressive cognitive feats by animals such as the use of tools and planning for the future (ScienceNOW, 18 May 2006). “In humans, we’d certainly classify this as a form of self-awareness in relation to temptation: the knowledge that you’ll fall for it unless you distract yourself,” he says. The authors say the study also suggests a more sophisticated self-awareness in animals than previously believed. “It makes us think about just how much of their own psychology chimps and other animals are aware of,” says Evans. “Are the chimps aware that they are being tempted by the accumulating candies in the same way that some of us realize that items strategically positioned at the checkout counter tempt us to buy unnecessary goods?”

By Yudhijit Bhattacharjee

* The Language Research Center at Georgia State University, with more on ape behavior

Source: Science

Toddlers are capable of introspection

thomasr — Wed, 15 Aug 2007 11:57:55 +0000

Preschoolers are more introspective than we give them credit for, according to new research by Simona Ghetti, assistant professor of psychology at UC Davis.

Ghetti and her co-investigator, Kristen Lyons, a graduate student in psychology at UC Davis, will present their findings Friday morning, Aug. 17, at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association in San Francisco.

Scientists have demonstrated that dolphins, monkeys and even rats can engage in some form of “metacognition,” or an awareness of their own thought processes. But developmental psychologists have assumed that human children do not develop this capability before about age 5.

Lyons and Ghetti have toppled that assumption by teaching 3- and 4-year-olds to communicate their awareness of their thought processes using pictures rather than words.

“We’ve shown that even very young children can think about their thinking,” Ghetti said. “The reason we haven’t appreciated it before now is that the studies that have been used to test for it have been too verbally demanding.”

The UC Davis researchers devised a novel method to investigate metacognition in early childhood. They taught their preschool subjects to point to a photo of a confident-looking face when they felt confident they had the right answer to a question, and to a photo of a doubtful-looking child when they were not confident they had the right answer.

The tests showed that young children are aware of their uncertainty in the moment. Even 3-year-olds pointed to the confident face when they correctly identified, for example, a drawing of a monkey that had some features removed to make it harder to recognize. They pointed to the doubtful face if they could not come up with a correct answer.

“Even 3-year-olds are more confident when they’re right than when they’re wrong,” Ghetti said.

How children develop the ability to experience, recognize and understand their thoughts and emotions is a topic of increasing scientific interest, since self-awareness is a prerequisite for the development of a wide range of important human traits, from a conscience to healthy relationships.

Source: UC Davis

The benefits of deep-brain stimulation for a minimally conscious patient

alice — Tue, 07 Aug 2007 02:18:53 +0000

The benefits of deep-brain stimulation for a minimally conscious patient have recently been reported in the journal Nature (click here for the article), as presented in a previous SCR post by Thomas Ramsoy. Here is another article on this same minimally conscious patient, whose identity remains undisclosed, written by Tom Valeo (image from the article).

Click here to watch a video on Sarah Scantlin, a patient who was stuck in a minimally conscious state for 20 years.

Language and self-awareness

alice — Thu, 02 Aug 2007 14:24:18 +0000

A new study presents additional evidence for inner speech involvement in self-reflective activity.

In my 2003 SCR paper “Inner speech and conscious experience” I put forward the notion that we most often need to talk to ourselves in order to understand who we are. That is, inner speech is frequently required to access self-information and to gradually build a self-concept. To illustrate, let’s imagine that you want to reflect on an abdominal pain you are currently experiencing. It is very likely that you will engage in an internal monologue, thinking “Why is it that my belly hurts? I feel cramps… Ha! I get it-I skipped breakfast…” You could go on and also notice: “I’ve been missing breakfast often lately… I tend to sleep in, I don’t eat breakfast, and by noon I’m starving… And I don’t go to the gym as often as I should… This is bad-I’m getting lazy…” Here the adjective “lazy” constitutes the conclusion that you have drawn from your inner monologue; it may then become a more or less permanent part of your self-concept. So inner speech, and thus language, would play an important role in self-referential activities. Said differently: inner speech would represent an important cognitive process underlying self-awareness. Note that this view does not implicate that there is no self-awareness without language. We can be aware of a pain without having to talk to ourselves about it. However, I argue that the sensation will be fully brought to consciousness only if we verbally label it.

This is an intuitively appealing hypothesis that is largely accepted in the literature. But do we have empirical evidence to substantiate it? Not much. We know that frequency of self-focus and use of inner speech are correlated. We also know that disruption of inner speech following brain injury impedes self-awareness. But clearly, more work is needed.

Image 1-a fMRI scanning machine

Brain-imaging studies (see Image 1) indicate that the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG-Broca’s area in the left hemisphere) sustains inner speech use (see Image 2). This brain structure lights up when people are asked to talk to themselves in silence. On that basis I reasoned that brain-imaging studies of self-awareness could be reviewed to determine the extent to which LIFG activation is reported. I hypothesized that if such an activation was indeed frequently observed, I could infer that inner speech was most probably used by participants while working on self-relevant tasks. In a typical experiment, participants are invited to focus on some aspect of their inner experience while brain activity is being recorded.

Image 2-the LIFG

Myself and Jay Michaud, a student a Mount Royal College in Calgary, reviewed 59 studies measuring brain activity during processing of self-information in seven different self-domains. These were: (1) agency (knowing that you are the cause of your own actions), (2) self-face recognition (identifying a face seen on a screen as being yours), (3) emotions (assessing how you currently feel), (4) personality traits (determining if a trait adjective describes you), (5) autobiographical memory (remembering a personal past episode), (6) preference judgments (indicating which of two drinks you prefer), and the resting state (staying still and doing nothing). [You might think that our brain is inactive when we "do nothing", but it's actually quite active: in that state we think about our goals, emotions, needs, behavior, physiological sensations, etc. Thus the resting state represents an highly introspective condition.]

Our results have just been published in Brain Research Bulletin. 55.9% of all studies reported LIFG (and presumably inner speech) activity during self-awareness tasks in the seven self-dimensions described above. You might think: Well, that’s not that much, it means that 44.1% of the studies did not find LIFG activity. True. But as I stated before, self-awareness may be possible without language. After all, our ability to self-reflect constitutes a complex multidimensional phenomenon not only dependent upon cognitive factors (e.g., inner speech), but also neurological, social, and ecological aspects (see my 2004 paper for details). I propose that an activation of the LIFG in almost 60% of the studies reviewed is nonetheless substantial.

our data suggest a selective involvement of inner speech in self-referential processing.More importantly, our data suggest a selective involvement of inner speech in self-referential processing. This makes sense. It is unlikely that all self-awareness tasks require inner speech use. Take self-recognition as a point in case. It is doubtful that you will need to verbalize your name to yourself in order to recognize your face on a screen. Why? Because in essence, self-recognition represents a perceptual task, where the information to be assessed (your face) is visual and concrete. For that type of self-awareness, words are not needed for the information to be captured. But more conceptual self-dimensions, like emotions and personality traits, do entail that you talk to yourself about them, because the information is much more abstract in nature. So if you were asked to determine if you are punctual, you would most probably say to yourself “Well, I’m always on time for my appointments, so yes”, or “Well, I’m always late for my appointments, so no”. The same principle applies to other conceptual self-domains-e.g., preference judgments and autobiographical memory.

Figure 1 presents the percentage of studies in which LIFG activity for each self-domain was observed. It is obvious that access to more conceptual self-information is linked to increased LIFG activation. 68.1% of all studies employing conceptual self-tasks (i.e., REST, evaluating one’s personality traits, emotions and judgments, and accessing one’s autobiographical memory) reported LIFG activity, whereas only 20% of studies using perceptual self-tasks (i.e., sense of agency and face self-recognition) identified such activation. This difference was statistically significant. Again, what this suggests is that perceptual self-aspects (e.g., your face) can be brought to conscious awareness without words, whereas conceptual self-dimensions (e.g., your current emotional state) most probably necessitate verbalization.

Figure 1-Percentage of studies in which LIFG activity was observed as a function of self-domains

So far, most self-awareness studies have been trying to identify specific brain areas activated during processing of self-information. The medial prefrontal cortex seems to play an important role in that respect (see Image 3). But by looking at peripheral structures that are additionally recruited during self-awareness tasks, we can infer what particular thought processes are engaged as well. In our work we focused on the LIFG and found that it is often-but not always-activated during self-reflection.

Image 3-the medial prefrontal cortex (in red)

Author Information

Alain Morin, Behavioral Sciences, Mount Royal College,
4825 Mount Royal Gate SW, Calgary (AB), Canada T3E 6K6
Email: amorin@mtroyal.ca
Webpage: http://www2.mtroyal.ab.ca/~amorin/

References

Morin, A. & Michaud, J. (2007). Self-awareness and the left inferior frontal gyrus: Inner speech use during self-related processing. In press, Brain Research Bulletin.
Morin, A. (2004). A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 130(3), 197-222.
Morin, A. (2003). Inner speech and conscious experience. Science & Consciousness Review, April, No. 4.

Ventromedial moral

thomasr — Thu, 02 Aug 2007 08:39:52 +0000

Does the ventromedial prefrontal cortex play a role in personal moral judgment? Medscape.com has a nice report on 7 patients with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex that find that “the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is necessary to oppose personal moral violations, possibly by mediating anticipatory, self-focused, emotional reactions that may exert strong influence on moral choice and behavior.”

Selective Deficit in Personal Moral Judgment Following Damage to Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex

Abstract

Recent fMRI evidence has detected increased medial prefrontal activation during contemplation of personal moral dilemmas compared to impersonal ones, which suggests that this cortical region plays a role in personal moral judgment. However, functional imaging results cannot definitively establish that a brain area is necessary for a particular cognitive process. This requires evidence from lesion techniques, such as studies of human patients with focal brain damage. Here, we tested 7 patients with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and 12 healthy individuals in personal moral dilemmas, impersonal moral dilemmas and non-moral dilemmas. Compared to normal controls, patients were more willing to judge personal moral violations as acceptable behaviors in personal moral dilemmas, and they did so more quickly. In contrast, their performance in impersonal and non-moral dilemmas was comparable to that of controls. These results indicate that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is necessary to oppose personal moral violations, possibly by mediating anticipatory, self-focused, emotional reactions that may exert strong influence on moral choice and behavior.

Trating panic disorders — an update

thomasr — Thu, 02 Aug 2007 08:34:47 +0000

Psychotherapy and benzodiazepines have been reported as effective panic disorder treatments individually with different benefits and disadvantages. Does combining the therapies offer extra advantages? Medscap.com brings a report.

Combination of Psychotherapy and Benzodiazepines versus Either Therapy Alone for Panic Disorder: A Systematic Review

Abstract

Background: The efficacy of combined psychotherapy and benzodiazepine treatment for panic disorder is still unclear despite its widespread use. The present systematic review aims to examine its efficacy compared with either monotherapy alone.
Methods: All randomised trials comparing combined psychotherapy and benzodiazepine for panic disorder with either therapy alone were identified by comprehensive electronic search on the Cochrane Registers, by checking references of relevant studies and of other reviews, and by contacting experts in the field. Two reviewers independently checked eligibility of trials, assessed quality of trials and extracted data from eligible trials using a standardized data extraction form. Our primary outcome was “response” defined by global judgement. Authors of the original trials were contacted for further unpublished data. Meta-analyses were undertaken synthesizing data from all relevant trials.
Results: Only two studies, which compared the combination with behaviour (exposure) therapy, met our eligibility criteria. Both studies had a 16-week intervention. Unpublished data were retrieved for one study. The relative risk for response for the combination was 1.25 (95%CI: 0.78 to 2.03) during acute phase treatment, 0.78 (0.45 to 1.35) at the end of treatment, and 0.62 (0.36 to 1.07) at 6-12 months follow-up. Some secondary outcomes hinted at superiority of the combination during acute phase treatment.
One study was identified comparing the combination to benzodiazepine. The relative risk for response was 1.57 (0.83 to 2.98), 3.39 (1.03 to 11.21, statistically significant) and 2.31 (0.79 to 6.74) respectively. The superiority of the combination was observed on secondary outcomes at all the time points. No sub-group analyses were conducted due to the limited number of included trials.
Conclusion: Unlike some narrative reviews in the literature, our systematic search established the paucity of high quality evidence for or against the combined psychotherapy plus benzodiazepine therapy for panic disorder. Based on limited available published and unpublished data, however, the combined therapy is probably to be recommended over benzodiazepine alone for panic disorder with agoraphobia. The combination might be superior to behaviour therapy alone during the acute phase, but afterwards this trend may be reversed. We know little from these trials about their adverse effects.

Neurology: An awakening

thomasr — Thu, 02 Aug 2007 08:30:23 +0000

Neuroscientists and engineers are developing ways to help patients overcome paralysis and stroke. But what about mental function itself? Can medical intervention restore consciousness?

Nature runs a story on thalamic stimulation after severe stroke. Could this method be applied to help patients in coma or vegetative state regain their mental life?

Brain activity revived – Nature Editorial

At present there is no reliable way of enhancing recovery from extended loss of consciousness in patients with traumatic brain injury. But recent evidence suggesting that a level of cerebral activity is preserved in some minimally conscious patients has raised interest in the topic. In a single subject study, Schiff et al. show that bilateral deep brain stimulation in the thalamus in a minimally conscious state following brain injury can increase behavioural responsiveness and function. The observations, made six years after the injury, challenge current thinking on the management of patients with severe brain injury.

News: Implant boosts activity in injured brain – Deep-brain stimulation offers hope for minimally conscious patients.
Neurology: An awakening – Neuroscientists and engineers are developing ways to help patients overcome paralysis and stroke. But what about mental function itself? Can medical intervention restore consciousness?

Psychological Science, new issue

thomasr — Thu, 02 Aug 2007 08:03:12 +0000

A new issue of Psychological Science is now out, including papers on autistic intelligence, testosterone and conscious detection, self-reference in episodic memory, and the relationship between planning and perception.

Psychological Science

Volume 18, Issue 8, August 2007

RESEARCH REPORTS

The Level and Nature of Autistic Intelligence
Michelle Dawson, Isabelle Soulières, Morton Ann Gernsbacher, and Laurent Mottron
pages 657–662

Testosterone Reduces Conscious Detection of Signals Serving Social Correction: Implications for Antisocial Behavior
Jack van Honk and Dennis J.L.G. Schutter
pages 663–667

How Is the Boss’s Mood Today? I Want a Raise
Eduardo B. Andrade and Teck-Hua Ho
pages 668–671

Self-Reference During Explicit Memory Retrieval: An Event-Related Potential Analysis
Elena Magno and Kevin Allan
pages 672–677

Biased Forecasting of Postdecisional Affect
Nick Sevdalis and Nigel Harvey
pages 678–681

The Generation Effect in Monkeys
Nate Kornell and Herbert S. Terrace
pages 682–685

SHORT REPORTS

How Can Dual-Task Working Memory Retention Limits Be Investigated?
Nelson Cowan and Candice C. Morey
pages 686–688

Moral Hypocrisy: Social Groups and the Flexibility of Virtue
Piercarlo Valdesolo and David DeSteno
pages 689–690

RESEARCH ARTICLES

Interpersonal Disgust, Ideological Orientations, and Dehumanization as Predictors of Intergroup Attitudes
Gordon Hodson and Kimberly Costello
pages 691–698

Anxiety Moderates the Interplay Between Cognitive and Affective Processing
Jeremy D. Dvorak-Bertsch, John J. Curtin, Tal J. Rubinstein, and Joseph P. Newman
pages 699–705

The Cross-Category Effect: Mere Social Categorization Is Sufficient to Elicit an Own-Group Bias in Face Recognition
Michael J. Bernstein, Steven G. Young, and Kurt Hugenberg
pages 706–712

Planning to Reach for an Object Changes How the Reacher Perceives It
Peter M. Vishton, Nicolette J. Stephens, Lauren A. Nelson, Sarah E. Morra, Kaitlin L. Brunick, and Jennifer A. Stevens
pages 713–719

Who Benefits From Memory Training?
David Bissig and Cindy Lustig
pages 720–726

Silence Is Not Golden: A Case for Socially Shared Retrieval-Induced Forgetting
Alexandru Cuc, Jonathan Koppel, and William Hirst
pages 727–733

Thinking of Things Unseen: Infants’ Use of Language to Update Mental Representations
Patricia A. Ganea, Kristin Shutts, Elizabeth S. Spelke, and Judy S. DeLoache
pages 734–739

Ratio Abstraction by 6-Month-Old Infants
Koleen McCrink and Karen Wynn
pages 740–745

Recognizing Intentions in Infant-Directed Speech: Evidence for Universals
Gregory A. Bryant and H. Clark Barrett
pages 746–751

Online papers on consciousness

alice — Fri, 20 Jul 2007 02:57:37 +0000

Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes

alice — Mon, 16 Jul 2007 02:09:43 +0000

Abstract of Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes, in TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences.

The close relationship between attention and consciousness has led many scholars to conflate these processes. This article summarizes psychophysical evidence, arguing that top-down attention and consciousness are distinct phenomena that need not occur together and that can be manipulated using distinct paradigms. Subjects can become conscious of an isolated object or the gist of a scene despite the near absence of top-down attention; conversely, subjects can attend to perceptually invisible objects. Furthermore, top-down attention and consciousness can have opposing effects. Such dissociations are easier to understand when the different functions of these two processes are considered. Untangling their tight relationship is necessary for the scientific elucidation of consciousness and its material substrate.

For full access to this paper, click here.

New issue: Dreaming

thomasr — Thu, 05 Jul 2007 07:57:38 +0000

A new issue of Dreaming is out, including articles on emotion, culture, and the self. Here we bring the abstracts
Volume 17, Issue 2

Bicultural dreaming as an intersubjective communicative process.

Tedlock, Barbara

Research in the human sciences has undergone a radical shift in perspective from considering the world as a collection of objects (objectivity) or subjects (subjectivity) to understanding the world as a set of dialogical processes and psychodynamic relationships (intersubjectivity). Likewise, the ethnography of dreaming has changed from a simple gathering, arrangement, interpretation, and statistical comparison of dreams into an intersubjective dialogical communicative and interpretive process. Today, a number of fieldworkers collecting information on dreaming share their own dreams, associations, and interpretations with their subjects, and because of these sociolinguistic practices, they are becoming bicultural. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved)

Emotions before, during, and after dreaming sleep.

Yu, Calvin Kai-Ching

The aim of this study was to provide a preliminary overview of the emotions before, during, and after dreaming sleep in Chinese people. One hundred Chinese participants were included in the study. Cheerful emotions, including interest, exhilaration, and enjoyment, were pervasive in the collected dreams, although anxiety was also a common type of emotion. Positive correlations were found between the intensities of dream, presleep, and postsleep emotions. Significant reductions in intensity were noted in the analyses of emotions preceding dreaming sleep versus emotions following dreaming sleep. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved)

Gravity content in dreams.

Maggiolini, Alfio; Persico, Anna; Crippa, Franca

Flying and falling dreams are often listed among the most common of dreams. Aside from the pure form, in which the dreamer actually falls or flies, it is frequent to find situations in which the dreamer deals with actions or objects implying gravity functions, that is, climbing, floating through air or water, and going up or down on a ladder or in an elevator. By means of the analysis of 685 dreams of male and female subjects, aged between 10 and 32, we registered various gravity contents (falling, flying, water, climbing, descending, staircase, and elevator) and their interrelations. Results show the presence of these elements in 38.1% of the sampled dreams. The authors focused on the link between gravity contents and other typical elements appearing in the same dream (attack, loss, sexual relationships, the body, performance/exams, and nursing). Results tend to confirm a link between gravity content and sexuality. The results of our research are essentially consistent with the findings of an analysis in DreamBank (http://www.dreambank.net/) of the frequency of words related to gravity in a dreams sample (N=14,193). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved)

Dreams of female university students: Content analysis and the relationship to discovery via the Ullman method.

DeCicco, Teresa L.

This study extended the research on the dreams of students by examining the actual content of female students’ dreams and to what extent the content related to discovery via the Ullman method. Further analyses were conducted to examine what content categories significantly predicted discovery. Participants were 56 female undergraduate students who provided a dream and participated in the Ullman method of group interpretation. Dream content was analyzed via the Hall and Van de Castle method of content analysis. Many significant correlations were observed among dream content categories, discovery categories, and dream content and discovery categories together. Findings were representative of the sample being examined and provided evidence of the continuity hypothesis. Results both support and extend previous research on the dreams of students. Furthermore, specific categories of dream content were found to significantly predict discovery categories. Limitations and future directions are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved)

Representation of the self in REM and NREM dreams.

McNamara, Patrick; McLaren, Deirdre; Durso, Kate

The authors hypothesized that representations of the Self (or the dreamer) in dreams would change systematically, from a prereflective form of Self to more complex forms, as a function of both age and sleep state (REM vs. non-REM). These hypotheses were partially confirmed. While the authors found that all the self-concept-related dream content indexes derived from the Hall/Van de Castle dream content scoring system did not differ significantly between the dreams of children and adults, adult Selves were more likely to engage in “successful” social interactions. The Self never acted as aggressor in NREM dream states and was almost always the befriender in friendly interactions in NREM dreams. Conversely, the REM-related dream Self preferred aggressive encounters. Our results suggests that while prereflective forms of Self are the norm in children’s dreams, two highly complex forms of Self emerge in REM and NREM dreams. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved)

thomasr — Thu, 28 Jun 2007 06:52:19 +0000

On April 2nd Wiley-Blackwell celebrated the premiere issue of Mind, Brain, and Education with a reception at the Harvard Faculty Club in Cambridge, Massachusetts.During the celebration Kurt Fischer (Harvard University), Howard Gardner (Harvard University), Maryanne Wolf (Tufts University), and Stanislas Dehaene (Collège de France) discussed their recent findings regarding how brain science informs educational practice.

Now, Wiley-Blackwell offer podcasts of all talks from this site.

Download or play the podcasts

Kurt Fischer, Harvard University:
Mind, Brain, and Education: Analyzing Human Learning and Development
Mp3 file (6.5MB, 9 minutes 20 seconds).

Howard Gardner, Harvard University:
Is There Such a Thing as Brainless Education?
Mp3 file (4.9MB, 6 minutes 58seconds).

Maryanne Wolf, Tufts University:
Dyslexia Intervention: Reading and the Brain
Mp3 file (7.8MB, 11 minutes 6 seconds).

Stanislas Dehaene, Collège de France:
Traveling Along the Number Line: Mathematics and the Brain
Mp3 file (5.4MB, 7 minutes, 44 seconds).

Two of the speakers above have also contributed to the first issue of Mind, Brain, and Education. You can access these articles for free online:

Why Mind, Brain, and Education? Why Now?
Kurt W. Fischer, David B. Daniel, Mary Helen Immordino-Yang, Elsbeth Stern, Antonio Battro, and Hideaki Koizumi (Editors)

A Few Steps Toward a Science of Mental Life
Stanislas Dehaene

A review of Henry Stapp’s Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer

alice — Mon, 25 Jun 2007 02:57:38 +0000

A review of Henry P. Stapp’s Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer

English, 198 pages
Springer; 1 edition (Jul 1 2007)
ISBN-10: 3540724133
ISBN-13: 978-3540724131

Henry Stapp is well known for his complex theoretical discourses on the nature of the mind and brain. A distinguished quantum physicist at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Stapp has been exploring these topics for over 50 years. The Mindful Universe represents the latest effort in his ongoing crusade to convince the cognitive and neurosciences that the transition away from classical physics and towards quantum theory is long overdue. Stapp’s core argument is that cognitive and brain scientists are stuck in a paradigm of classical physics which is outdated and inaccurate. The text is carefully crafted to make his point from several complimentary directions, as well as to briefly refute other contemporary theorists who advocate alternative positions. While Stapp considers this a book for the lay reader, it is definitely not mass market material. There are far fewer equations than in many of his other writings, but any serious reader will find a basic understanding of contemporary consciousness and quantum theory helpful before picking up this text. The book opens with chapters presenting the core tenets from the Copenhagen and von Neumann interpretations of quantum theory, often in the words of their founders along with commentary from Stapp. His wider view of quantum theory is summed up well by the following passage:

The original form of quantum theory is subjective, in the sense that it is forthrightly about relationships among conscious human experiences, and it expressly recommends to scientists that they resist the temptation to try to understand the reality responsible for the correlations between our experiences that the theory correctly describes. (p. 11)

In these opening chapters he diligently works to establish the case that most of these powerful thinkers strongly believed in a causal gap within quantum theory that makes it an open system into which free choice can enter. Citing the fact that “purposeful action by a human agent has two aspects” (p. 23) he draws heavily on theories involving “…the interplay between the psychologically and physically described components of mind-brain dynamics, as it is understood within the orthodox (von Neumann-Heisenberg) quantum framework” (p. 15). Intentional actions are central to this overall view. Stapp draws on and extends von Neumann’s process 1 and 2 theories in this area, adding a process 0 (formerly referred to as process 4) to represent the process which determines the free choice on the part of the experimenter, noting:

It is the absence from orthodox quantum theory of any description on the workings of process zero that constitutes the causal gap in contemporary orthodox physical theory. It is this ‘latitude’ offered by the quantum formalism, in connection with the “freedom of experimentation” (Bohr 1958, p. 73), that blocks the causal closure of the physical. (p.24)

Stapp also adds a process 3 to represent the process that selects the probing action. Taken together, processes 0-4 represent the major components of how Stapp views the practical, empirical ontology of quantum theory.

Having clearly annunciated his views on quantum mechanics, Stapp sets out to transform the brain from a classical to a quantum system. He chooses to attack this in a short surgical way by striking at the lowest level of physiological brain function. Drawing on a brief background discussion of cloudlike forms, harmonic oscillation, and the double-slit experiment to introduce the necessity of the brain’s nerve terminals and calcium ion channels being quantum in nature, Stapp goes on to argue that because these foundational components are best understood in quantum terms the brain itself must be treated as a quantum system. Stapp next draws on many of the same points used in discussing the brain’s ion channels to make his case from another angle. He introduces his action template theory involving microscopic brain states capable of producing particular actions if held for a sufficient length of time. He links such actions to von Neumann’s process 1, but in doing so notes the potential problem this idea introduces:

…the only dynamical freedom offered by the quantum formalism in this situation is the freedom to perform at a selected time some process 1 action. Whether or not the ‘Yes’ component is actualized is determined by ‘nature’ on the basis of a statistical law. So the effectiveness of the ‘free choice’ of this process 1 in achieving the desired end would generally be quite limited. The net effect of this ‘free choice’ would tend to be nullified by the randomness in nature’s choice between ‘Yes’ and its negation ‘No’. (p. 35)

His own theory addresses this problem by drawing on the quantum Zeno effect. One feature of the dynamical rules of quantum theory allows for a stabilization of sorts regarding actions if a string of process 1 events can occur in rapid succession. Essentially if the initial process 1 request is selected by the outcome of the quantum event this action can be held in place by a rapid number of additional similar requests. Stapp believes that this rapid series of additional requests requires mental effort. Here he reaches back to find a kindred spirit in William James’ concepts of volitional effort and attention.

Continuing his quest for empirical verification of the quantum nature of the brain, Stapp draws on the work of UCSD psychologist Harold Pashler (1998) to support his contention of a quantum brain within contemporary psychology. At issue is why empirical studies of sensorimotor tasks performed contiguously in time disclose what appears to be a central processing bottleneck within the brain. Stapp comments that,

This kind of bottleneck is what the quantum-physics-based theory predicts: the bottleneck is precisely the single linear sequence of process 1 actions that enters so importantly into the quantum theoretic description of the mind-matter connection. (p.43)

Moving on, Stapp reviews recent developments in neuropsychology that support his view. For example, he notes that empirical evidence seems to suggest that conscious effort is correlated with brain activity. According to quantum mechanics, the microscopic uncertainties must rationally be expected to produce, via the Schrodinger equation (of brain plus environment), macroscopic variations that, to match observation, need to be cut back by quantum reductions. This means process 1 interventions. This leads, consistently and reasonably, to the entry of mental causation as described above, where the subject’s conscious effort is actually causing what his conscious understanding believes, on the basis of life-long experience, that effort to be causing. (p.48)

Stapp next takes a dismissive view of Penrose’s quantum coherence theory, observing that few quantum physicists consider the quantum coherence required by the Penrose-Hameroff theory to be possible in the warm liquid environment of the brain. He also notes his disagreement with Penrose’s idea of quantum gravity and the putative non-algorithmic nature of thought. Consistent with his long held Jamesian view of cognition, Stapp argues in Chapter 9 for the quantum brain as a “collection of classically conceived alternative possible states of the brain” (p. 50) all existing as parallel parts of “a potentiality for future additions to a stream of consciousness” (p. 52). Of all Stapp’s ideas, this has perhaps the widest coinage, representing the fruit of his technical reflections in a form that can be readily understood by all scholars of the mind.

The final chapters of the book examine a variety of alternative views on consciousness and the brain in relationship to quantum mechanics. We will not go into details here, but for the interested reader these include the many worlds theory, Bohm’s theories, and a discussion of Whiteheadian philosophy in regards to quantum theory. The reader will also find a reprint of Stapp’s 2006 interview by Harold Atmanspacher followed by the extensive and in depth commentary that followed it on JCS-online. He concludes with thoughts on how his theories and observations relate to human values, and rounds out the text with seven appendices that alternate between providing useful overviews for those readers with less background in QM and substantial additional detail on several of his key points for others with more expert knowledge. Overall, this book is a rigorous and demanding reflection drawn from a lifetime of thought by one of the leading theoretical physicists of our day. It is recommended for graduate libraries and for readers who are prepared to undertake its rigors.

References

Pashler, H. (1998). The Psychology of Attention. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Stapp, H. P., & Atmanspacher, H. (2006). Clarifications & Specifications. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(9), 67-85. Copyright © J. Martin & A. Combs
Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer. By Henry P. Stapp. Springer; July 2007, 210 pages.

Reviewer Information

Allan Combs; California Institute of Integral Studies

Jeffery Martin; California Institute of Integral Studies; Center for the Study of Intent
E-mail
Homepage

Phenomenology & the Cognitive Sciences

thomasr — Tue, 19 Jun 2007 06:53:03 +0000

A new issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is out with headlines such as

See the full TOC here.

Validating neural correlates of familiarity

thomasr — Mon, 18 Jun 2007 07:07:39 +0000

Familiarity is a pervasive memory phenomenon that occurs in its most basic form when someone recognizes a repeated stimulus without recollecting other aspects of the requisite prior learning episode. Theoretical controversy currently abounds with respect to both the cognitive and neural characteristics of familiarity. Here, we show that the extant data, particularly brain-potential data, are insufficient for validating putative neural correlates of familiarity, and we outline strategies for making progress on this problem. Conceptual priming is an implicit-memory phenomenon that often occurs together with familiarity; experiments that conflate the two phenomena can be misleading. Avoiding this conflation is required to understand familiarity and to determine the extent to which the neurocognitive processes that support priming also drive familiarity.

Hubmed

Paller KA, Voss JL, Boehm SG
Trends Cogn Sci. 2007 Jun ; 11(6): 243-50

The human mirror system: A motor resonance theory of mind-reading

thomasr — Mon, 18 Jun 2007 07:01:44 +0000

Electrophysiological data confirm the existence of neurons that respond to both motor and sensory events in the macaque brain. These mirror neurons respond to execution and observation of goal-orientated actions. It has been suggested that they comprise a neural basis for encoding an internal representation of action. In this paper the evidence for a parallel system in humans is reviewed and the implications for human theory of mind processing are discussed. Different components of theory of mind are discussed; the evidence for mirror activity within subtypes is addressed. While there is substantial evidence for a human mirror system, there are weaknesses in the attempts to localize such a system in the brain. Preliminary evidence indicates that mirror neurons may be involved in theory of mind; however, these data by their very nature are reliant on the presence, and precise characterization, of the human mirror system.

Hubmed

Agnew ZK, Bhakoo KK, Puri BK
Brain Res Rev. 2007 Jun ; 54(2): 286-293

48th Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society

alice — Sat, 16 Jun 2007 16:11:06 +0000

The Psychonomic Society promotes the communication of scientific research in psychology and allied sciences. The 48th Annual Meeting of the Society will be held at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Long Beach, California from November 15 – 18, 2007.

Click here to pre-register. For more information, please check the conference website.

25 hottest articles per journal

thomasr — Fri, 15 Jun 2007 07:35:25 +0000

ScienceDirect is running a neat service. They provide regular updates on what articles are being most read (i.e., downloaded) from each journal. In this way, you can always have the finger on the pulse of your peers — and competitors — on what’s hot in your research field.

Here we provide the top 25 articles from a few selected journals.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes • Article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 16-22
Koch, C.; Tsuchiya, N.
Self-projection and the brain • Article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 2, 1 February 2007, Pages 49-57
Buckner, R.L.; Carroll, D.C.
Optimal decision-making theories: linking neurobiology with behaviour • Review article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 3, 1 March 2007, Pages 118-125
Bogacz, R.
A model of hippocampal neurogenesis in memory and mood disorders • Article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 2, 1 February 2007, Pages 70-76
Becker, S.; Wojtowicz, J.M.
Space and the parietal cortex • Review article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 30-36
Husain, M.; Nachev, P.
The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory? • Review article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 4, Issue 11, 1 November 2000, Pages 417-423
Baddeley, A.
The self and social cognition: the role of cortical midline structures and mirror neurons • Article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 4, 1 April 2007, Pages 153-157
Uddin, L.Q.; Iacoboni, M.; Lange, C.; Keenan, J.P.
Cognitive science and the law • Review article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 3, 1 March 2007, Pages 111-117
Busey, T.A.; Loftus, G.R.
Emotion and consciousness • Article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 4, 1 April 2007, Pages 158-167
Tsuchiya, N.; Adolphs, R.
Associative memory and the medial temporal lobes • Review article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 3, 1 March 2007, Pages 126-135
Mayes, A.; Montaldi, D.; Migo, E.
Exploring the neural basis of cognition: multi-modal links between human fMRI and macaque neurophysiology • Review article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 2, 1 February 2007, Pages 84-92
Nakahara, K.; Adachi, Y.; Osada, T.; Miyashita, Y.
Can generic expertise explain special processing for faces? • Article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 8-15
McKone, E.; Kanwisher, N.; Duchaine, B.C.
Questioning the social intelligence hypothesis • Article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 2, 1 February 2007, Pages 65-69
Holekamp, K.E.
Frames and brains: elicitation and control of response tendencies • Short survey
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 2, 1 February 2007, Pages 45-46
Kahneman, D.; Frederick, S.
Contrasting roles for cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex in decisions and social behaviour • Review article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 4, 1 April 2007, Pages 168-176
Rushworth, M.F.S.; Behrens, T.E.J.; Rudebeck, P.H.; Walton, M.E.
Universal dimensions of social cognition: warmth and competence • Review article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 2, 1 February 2007, Pages 77-83
Fiske, S.T.; Cuddy, A.J.C.; Glick, P.
The empathic brain: how, when and why? • Article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 10, Issue 10, 1 October 2006, Pages 435-441
de Vignemont, F.; Singer, T.
The extreme male brain theory of autism • Review article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 6, Issue 6, 1 June 2002, Pages 248-254
Baron-Cohen, S.
Attitudes and evaluations: a social cognitive neuroscience perspective • Article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 3, 1 March 2007, Pages 97-104
Cunningham, W.A.; Zelazo, P.D.
Object recognition and segmentation by a fragment-based hierarchy • Article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 2, 1 February 2007, Pages 58-64
Ullman, S.
Do people use language production to make predictions during comprehension? • Article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 3, 1 March 2007, Pages 105-110
Pickering, M.J.; Garrod, S.
Processes of change in brain and cognitive development • Review article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 9, Issue 3, 1 March 2005, Pages 152-158
Johnson, M.H.; Munakata, Y.
Adding up the effects of cultural experience on the brain • Short survey
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 1-4
Cantlon, J.F.; Brannon, E.M.
A unifying view of the basis of social cognition • Article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 8, Issue 9, 1 September 2004, Pages 396-403
Gallese, V.; Keysers, C.; Rizzolatti, G.
Perception and misperception of bias in human judgment • Review article
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 37-43
Pronin, E.

Neuropsychologia

Distributed and interactive brain mechanisms during emotion face perception: Evidence from functional neuroimaging • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 174-194
Vuilleumier, P.; Pourtois, G.
Neural mechanisms of imitation and’mirror neuron’functioning in autistic spectrum disorder • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 44, Issue 4, 1 January 2006, Pages 610-621
Williams, J.H.G.; Waiter, G.D.; Gilchrist, A.; Perrett, D.I.; Murray, A.D.; Whiten, A.
Imitation and action understanding in autistic spectrum disorders: How valid is the hypothesis of a deficit in the mirror neuron system? • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 8, 1 January 2007, Pages 1859-1868
Hamilton, A.F.d.C.; Brindley, R.M.; Frith, U.
Remembering the past and imagining the future: Common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and elaboration • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 7, 1 January 2007, Pages 1363-1377
Addis, D.R.; Wong, A.T.; Schacter, D.L.
Differential activation of the amygdala and the’social brain’during fearful face-processing in Asperger Syndrome • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 2-14
Ashwin, C.; Baron-Cohen, S.; Wheelwright, S.; O\’Riordan, M.; Bullmore, E.T.
Impaired sadness recognition is linked to social interaction deficit in autism • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 7, 1 January 2007, Pages 1501-1510
Boraston, Z.; Blakemore, S.J.; Chilvers, R.; Skuse, D.
Bilingualism as a protection against the onset of symptoms of dementia • Short communication
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 2, 1 January 2007, Pages 459-464
Bialystok, E.; Craik, F.I.M.; Freedman, M.
Neural systems for recognition of familiar faces • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 32-41
Gobbini, M.I.; Haxby, J.V.
Are you always on my mind? A review of how face perception and attention interact • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 75-92
Palermo, R.; Rhodes, G.
Children’s and adults’neural bases of verbal and nonverbal’theory of mind’ • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 7, 1 January 2007, Pages 1522-1532
Kobayashi, C.; Glover, G.H.; Temple, E.
Amygdala damage impairs emotion recognition from music • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 2, 1 January 2007, Pages 236-244
Gosselin, N.; Peretz, I.; Johnsen, E.; Adolphs, R.
Event-related brain potential correlates of emotional face processing • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 15-31
Eimer, M.; Holmes, A.
Brain systems for assessing facial attractiveness • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 195-206
Winston, J.S.; O\’Doherty, J.; Kilner, J.M.; Perrett, D.I.; Dolan, R.J.
Sex differences in line bisection as a function of hand • Short communication
Neuropsychologia, Volume 40, Issue 3, 1 January 2002, Pages 235 – 240
Hausmann, M.; Ergun, G.; Yazgan, Y.; Gunturkun, O.
The cerebellum and emotional experience • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 6, 1 January 2007, Pages 1331-1341
Turner, B.M.; Paradiso, S.; Marvel, C.L.; Pierson, R.; Boles Ponto, L.L.; Hichwa, R.D.; Robinson, R.G.
Neural substrates of choice selection in adults and adolescents: Development of the ventrolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 6, 1 January 2007, Pages 1270-1279
Eshel, N.; Nelson, E.E.; Blair, R.J.; Pine, D.S.; Ernst, M.
Development of cognitive control and executive functions from 4 to 13 years: Evidence from manipulations of memory, inhibition, and task switching • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 44, Issue 11, 1 January 2006, Pages 2037-2078
Davidson, M.C.; Amso, D.; Anderson, L.C.; Diamond, A.
Rehabilitation of executive dysfunction following brain injury:”Content-free”cueing improves everyday prospective memory performance • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 6, 1 January 2007, Pages 1318-1330
Fish, J.; Evans, J.J.; Nimmo, M.; Martin, E.; Kersel, D.; Bateman, A.; Wilson, B.A.; Manly, T.
Mobile phones are good for you, p<0.36! Observations on Keetley, Wood, Spong and Stough (2006) • Short communication
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 7, 1 January 2007, Pages 1580-1581
Lewis, M.B.
Recovery from aphasia as a function of language therapy in an early bilingual patient demonstrated by fMRI • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 6, 1 January 2007, Pages 1247-1256
Meinzer, M.; Obleser, J.; Flaisch, T.; Eulitz, C.; Rockstroh, B.
Recall and recognition memory in amnesia: Patients with hippocampal, medial temporal, temporal lobe or frontal pathology • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 6, 1 January 2007, Pages 1232-1246
Kopelman, M.D.; Bright, P.; Buckman, J.; Fradera, A.; Yoshimasu, H.; Jacobson, C.; Colchester, A.C.F.
Inefficient response inhibition in individuals with mild cognitive impairment • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 7, 1 January 2007, Pages 1408-1419
Wylie, S.A.; Ridderinkhof, K.R.; Eckerle, M.K.; Manning, C.A.
Analysis of face gaze in autism using”Bubbles” • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 144-151
Spezio, M.L.; Adolphs, R.; Hurley, R.S.E.; Piven, J.
Do deep dyslexia, dysphasia and dysgraphia share a common phonological impairment? • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 45, Issue 7, 1 January 2007, Pages 1553-1570
Jefferies, E.; Sage, K.; Ralph, M.A.L.
Neural correlates of imagined and synaesthetic colours • Article
Neuropsychologia, Volume 44, Issue 14, 1 January 2006, Pages 2918-2925
Rich, A.N.; Williams, M.A.; Puce, A.; Syngeniotis, A.; Howard, M.A.; McGlone, F.; Mattingley, J.B.

NeuroImage

Modulation of emotion by cognition and cognition by emotion • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 35, Issue 1, 1 March 2007, Pages 430-440
Blair, K.S.; Smith, B.W.; Mitchell, D.G.V.; Morton, J.; Vythilingam, M.; Pessoa, L.; Fridberg, D.; Zametkin, A.; Nelson, E.E.; Drevets, W.C.; Pine, D.S.; Martin, A.; Blair, R.J.R.
Neuronal correlates of theory of mind and empathy: A functional magnetic resonance imaging study in a nonverbal task • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 29, Issue 1, 1 January 2006, Pages 90-98
Vollm, B.A.; Taylor, A.N.W.; Richardson, P.; Corcoran, R.; Stirling, J.; McKie, S.; Deakin, J.F.W.; Elliott, R.
A method for using blocked and event-related fMRI data to study”resting state”functional connectivity • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 35, Issue 1, 1 March 2007, Pages 396-405
Fair, D.A.; Schlaggar, B.L.; Cohen, A.L.; Miezin, F.M.; Dosenbach, N.U.F.; Wenger, K.K.; Fox, M.D.; Snyder, A.Z.; Raichle, M.E.; Petersen, S.E.
The neural correlates of maternal and romantic love • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 21, Issue 3, 1 March 2004, Pages 1155-1166
Bartels, A.; Zeki, S.
Empathy for positive and negative emotions in the gustatory cortex • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 1744-1753
Jabbi, M.; Swart, M.; Keysers, C.
A simultaneous EEG-fMRI study of painful electric stimulation • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 1428-1437
Christmann, C.; Koeppe, C.; Braus, D.F.; Ruf, M.; Flor, H.
The impact of processing load on emotion • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 3, 1 February 2007, Pages 1299-1309
Mitchell, D.G.V.; Nakic, M.; Fridberg, D.; Kamel, N.; Pine, D.S.; Blair, R.J.R.
Analysis of neurotransmitter receptor distribution patterns in the cerebral cortex • Short communication
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 1317-1330
Eickhoff, S.B.; Schleicher, A.; Scheperjans, F.; Palomero-Gallagher, N.; Zilles, K.
Neural correlates of error awareness • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 1774-1781
Klein, T.A.; Endrass, T.; Kathmann, N.; Neumann, J.; von Cramon, D.Y.; Ullsperger, M.
Brain dopamine transporter levels in treatment and drug naive adults with ADHD • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 3, 1 February 2007, Pages 1182-1190
Volkow, N.D.; Wang, G.J.; Newcorn, J.; Fowler, J.S.; Telang, F.; Solanto, M.V.; Logan, J.; Wong, C.; Ma, Y.; Swanson, J.M.; Schulz, K.; Pradhan, K.
In vivo calcium imaging from genetically specified target cells in mouse cerebellum • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 3, 1 February 2007, Pages 859-869
Diez-Garcia, J.; Akemann, W.; Knopfel, T.
Sequence of information processing for emotions based on the anatomic dialogue between prefrontal cortex and amygdala • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 3, 1 February 2007, Pages 905-923
Ghashghaei, H.T.; Hilgetag, C.C.; Barbas, H.
Functional connectivity in fMRI: A modeling approach for estimation and for relating to local circuits • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 3, 1 February 2007, Pages 1093-1107
Winder, R.; Cortes, C.R.; Reggia, J.A.; Tagamets, M.A.
Analysis of a large fMRI cohort: Statistical and methodological issues for group analyses • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 35, Issue 1, 1 March 2007, Pages 105-120
Thirion, B.; Pinel, P.; Meriaux, S.; Roche, A.; Dehaene, S.; Poline, J.B.
Human brain activity associated with audiovisual perception and attention • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 1683-1691
Degerman, A.; Rinne, T.; Pekkola, J.; Autti, T.; Jaaskelainen, I.P.; Sams, M.; Alho, K.
The NIH MRI study of normal brain development (Objective-2): Newborns, infants, toddlers, and preschoolers • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 35, Issue 1, 1 March 2007, Pages 308-325
Brain Development Cooperative Group; Almli, C.R.; Rivkin, M.J.; McKinstry, R.C.
Diffusion tensor imaging-based tissue segmentation: Validation and application to the developing child and adolescent brain • Short communication
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 1497-1505
Hasan, K.M.; Halphen, C.; Sankar, A.; Eluvathingal, T.J.; Kramer, L.; Stuebing, K.K.; Ewing-Cobbs, L.; Fletcher, J.M.
Understanding the functional neuroanatomy of acquired prosopagnosia • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 35, Issue 2, 1 April 2007, Pages 836-852
Sorger, B.; Goebel, R.; Schiltz, C.; Rossion, B.
Asymmetries of cortical shape: Effects of handedness, sex and schizophrenia • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 3, 1 February 2007, Pages 939-948
Narr, K.L.; Bilder, R.M.; Luders, E.; Thompson, P.M.; Woods, R.P.; Robinson, D.; Szeszko, P.R.; Dimtcheva, T.; Gurbani, M.; Toga, A.W.
Enhanced detection of artifacts in EEG data using higher-order statistics and independent component analysis • Short communication
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 1443-1449
Delorme, A.; Sejnowski, T.; Makeig, S.
In vivo mapping of functional connectivity in neurotransmitter systems using pharmacological MRI • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 1627-1636
Schwarz, A.J.; Gozzi, A.; Reese, T.; Bifone, A.
Internet-enabled high-resolution brain mapping and virtual microscopy • Short communication
NeuroImage, Volume 35, Issue 1, 1 March 2007, Pages 9-15
Mikula, S.; Trotts, I.; Stone, J.M.; Jones, E.G.
Dynamic causal modelling • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 19, Issue 4, 1 August 2003, Pages 1273-1302
Friston, K.J.; Harrison, L.; Penny, W.
Diffusion tensor imaging of the corpus callosum in Autism • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 61-73
Alexander, A.L.; Lee, J.E.; Lazar, M.; Boudos, R.; DuBray, M.B.; Oakes, T.R.; Miller, J.N.; Lu, J.; Jeong, E.K.; McMahon, W.M.; Bigler, E.D.; Lainhart, J.E.
Temporal classification of multichannel near-infrared spectroscopy signals of motor imagery for developing a brain-computer interface • Article
NeuroImage, Volume 34, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 1416-1427
Sitaram, R.; Zhang, H.; Guan,

Vision Research

Vividness of mental imagery: Individual variability can be measured objectively • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 474-478
Cui, X.; Jeter, C.B.; Yang, D.; Montague, P.R.; Eagleman, D.M.
Perceptual learning without signal • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 3, 1 February 2007, Pages 349-356
Dupuis-Roy, N.; Gosselin, F.
Suppression of mouse rhodopsin expression in vivo by AAV mediated siRNA delivery • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 9, 1 April 2007, Pages 1202-1208
Gorbatyuk, M.; Justilien, V.; Liu, J.; Hauswirth, W.W.; Lewin, A.S.
The duration of the attentional blink in natural scenes depends on stimulus category • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 5, 1 March 2007, Pages 597-607
Einhauser, W.; Koch, C.; Makeig, S.
Microglial changes occur without neural cell death in diabetic retinopathy • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 5, 1 March 2007, Pages 612-623
Gaucher, D.; Chiappore, J.A.; Paques, M.; Simonutti, M.; Boitard, C.; Sahel, J.A.; Massin, P.; Picaud, S.
Shift in spatial scale in identifying crowded letters • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 437-451
Chung, S.T.L.; Tjan, B.S.
Retinal degeneration mutants in the mouse • Article
Vision Research, Volume 42, Issue 4, 1 February 2002, Pages 517-525
Chang, B.; Hawes, N.L.; Hurd, R.E.; Davisson, M.T.; Nusinowitz, S.; Heckenlively, J.R.
Attention makes moving objects be perceived to move faster • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 2, 1 January 2007, Pages 166-178
Turatto, M.; Vescovi, M.; Valsecchi, M.
Two mouse retinal degenerations caused by missense mutations in the @b-subunit of rod cGMP phosphodiesterase gene • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 5, 1 March 2007, Pages 624-633
Chang, B.; Hawes, N.L.; Pardue, M.T.; German, A.M.; Hurd, R.E.; Davisson, M.T.; Nusinowitz, S.; Rengarajan, K.; Boyd, A.P.; Sidney, S.S.; Phillips, M.J.; Stewart, R.E.; Chaudhury, R.; Nickerson, J.M.;
The effects of aging on motion detection and direction identification • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 6, 1 March 2007, Pages 799-809
Bennett, P.J.; Sekuler, R.; Sekuler, A.B.
A role for rhodopsin in a signal transduction cascade that regulates membrane trafficking and photoreceptor polarity • Article
Vision Research, Volume 46, Issue 27, 1 December 2006, Pages 4427-4433
Deretic, D.
Is visual attention required for robust picture memory? • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 7, 1 March 2007, Pages 955-964
Wolfe, J.M.; Horowitz, T.S.; Michod, K.O.
Second-order motion without awareness: Passive adaptation to second-order motion produces a motion aftereffect • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 569-579
Whitney, D.; Bressler, D.W.
Dynamical evolution of motion perception • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 7, 1 March 2007, Pages 937-945
Kanai, R.; Sheth, B.R.; Shimojo, S.
Temporal frequency and contrast tagging bias the type of competition in interocular switch rivalry • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 4, 1 February 2007, Pages 532-543
Silver, M.A.; Logothetis, N.K.
Feature detection and letter identification • Article
Vision Research, Volume 46, Issue 28, 1 December 2006, Pages 4646-4674
Pelli, D.G.; Burns, C.W.; Farell, B.; Moore-Page, D.C.
Acuity, crowding, reading and fixation stability • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 126-135
Falkenberg, H.K.; Rubin, G.S.; Bex, P.J.
A neural model of 3D shape-from-texture: Multiple-scale filtering, boundary grouping, and surface filling-in • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 5, 1 March 2007, Pages 634-672
Grossberg, S.; Kuhlmann, L.; Mingolla, E.
Two mechanisms underlying the effect of angle of motion direction change on colour-motion asynchrony • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 5, 1 March 2007, Pages 687-705
Amano, K.; Johnston, A.; Nishida, S.
Isolating the impact of visual perception on dyslexics’reading ability • Article
Vision Research, Volume 46, Issue 20, 1 October 2006, Pages 3514-3525
Shovman, M.M.; Ahissar, M.
Motion-onset VEPs: Characteristics, methods, and diagnostic use • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 2, 1 January 2007, Pages 189-202
Kuba, M.; Kubova, Z.; Kremlacek, J.; Langrova, J.
Stereo channels with different temporal frequency tunings • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 3, 1 February 2007, Pages 289-297
Lee, S.; Shioiri, S.; Yaguchi, H.
Real-world visual search is dominated by top-down guidance • Article
Vision Research, Volume 46, Issue 24, 1 November 2006, Pages 4118-4133
Chen, X.; Zelinsky, G.J.
Spatial grouping in human vision: Temporal structure trumps temporal synchrony • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 2, 1 January 2007, Pages 219-230
Guttman, S.E.; Gilroy, L.A.; Blake, R.
Visible light affects mitochondrial function and induces neuronal death in retinal cell cultures • Article
Vision Research, Volume 47, Issue 9, 1 April 2007, Pages 1191-1201
Lascaratos, G.; Ji, D.; Wood, J.P.M.; Osborne, N.N.

Brain and Cognition

Action monitoring and perfectionism in anorexia nervosa • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 63, Issue 1, 1 February 2007, Pages 42-50
Pieters, G.L.M.; de Bruijn, E.R.A.; Maas, Y.; Hulstijn, W.; Vandereycken, W.; Peuskens, J.; Sabbe, B.G.
Executive function deficits in autism spectrum disorders and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder: Examining profiles across domains and ages • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 61, Issue 1, 1 June 2006, Pages 25-39
Happe, F.; Booth, R.; Charlton, R.; Hughes, C.
Tuning the engine of cognition: A focus on NMDA/D1 receptor interactions in prefrontal cortex • Review article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 63, Issue 2, 1 March 2007, Pages 94-122
Castner, S.A.; Williams, G.V.
On feeling in control: A biological theory for individual differences in control perception • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 62, Issue 2, 1 November 2006, Pages 143-176
Declerck, C.H.; Boone, C.; De Brabander, B.
Remembering 1500 pictures: The right hemisphere remembers better than the left • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 63, Issue 2, 1 March 2007, Pages 136-144
Laeng, B.; Overvoll, M.; Ole Steinsvik, O.
Hemispheric differences in the time-course of semantic priming processes: Evidence from event-related potentials (ERPs) • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 63, Issue 2, 1 March 2007, Pages 123-135
Bouaffre, S.; Faita-Ainseba, F.
The functions of the orbitofrontal cortex • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 55, Issue 1, 1 June 2004, Pages 11-29
Rolls, E.T.
The role of emotion in decision-making: Evidence from neurological patients with orbitofrontal damage • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 55, Issue 1, 1 June 2004, Pages 30-40
Bechara, A.
Disorders in planning and strategy application in frontal lobe lesion patients • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 63, Issue 3, 1 April 2007, Pages 240-246
Gouveia, P.A.R.; Brucki, S.M.D.; Malheiros, S.M.F.; Bueno, O.F.A.
Physiological and cognitive effects of expressive dissonance • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 63, Issue 1, 1 February 2007, Pages 70-78
Robinson, J.L.; Demaree, H.A.
Sex differences in brain activity related to general and emotional intelligence • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 59, Issue 3, 1 December 2005, Pages 277-286
Jausovec, N.; Jausovec, K.
An ERP study on self-relevant object recognition • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 63, Issue 2, 1 March 2007, Pages 182-189
Miyakoshi, M.; Nomura, M.; Ohira, H.
Are there pre-existing neural, cognitive, or motoric markers for musical ability? • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 59, Issue 2, 1 November 2005, Pages 124-134
Norton, A.; Winner, E.; Cronin, K.; Overy, K.; Lee, D.J.; Schlaug, G.
Individual differences in risk perception versus risk taking: Handedness and interhemispheric interaction • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 63, Issue 1, 1 February 2007, Pages 51-58
Christman, S.D.; Jasper, J.D.; Sontam, V.; Cooil, B.
What aspects of face processing are impaired in developmental prosopagnosia? • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 61, Issue 2, 1 July 2006, Pages 139-158
Le Grand, R.; Cooper, P.A.; Mondloch, C.J.; Lewis, T.L.; Sagiv, N.; de Gelder, B.; Maurer, D.
fMRI of parents of children with Asperger Syndrome: A pilot study • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 61, Issue 1, 1 June 2006, Pages 122-130
Baron-Cohen, S.; Ring, H.; Chitnis, X.; Wheelwright, S.; Gregory, L.; Williams, S.; Brammer, M.; Bullmore, E.
Pleasures of the brain • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 52, Issue 1, 1 June 2003, Pages 106-128
Berridge, K.C.
Sex differences in spatial ability: A lateralization of function approach • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 56, Issue 3, 1 December 2004, Pages 332-343
Rilea, S.L.; Roskos-Ewoldsen, B.; Boles, D.
Neurocognitive mechanisms of cognitive control: The role of prefrontal cortex in action selection, response inhibition, performance monitoring, and reward-based learning • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 56, Issue 2, 1 November 2004, Pages 129-140
Ridderinkhof, K.R.; van den Wildenberg, W.P.M.; Segalowitz, S.J.; Carter, C.S.
Study design in fMRI: Basic principles • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 60, Issue 3, 1 April 2006, Pages 220-232
Amaro, E.; Barker, G.J.
The neural regions sustaining episodic encoding and recognition of objects • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 63, Issue 2, 1 March 2007, Pages 159-166
Hofer, A.; Siedentopf, C.M.; Ischebeck, A.; Rettenbacher, M.A.; Widschwendter, C.G.; Verius, M.; Golaszewski, S.M.; Koppelstaetter, F.; Felber, S.; Wolfgang Fleischhacker, W.
Neural substrates for episodic encoding and recognition of unfamiliar faces • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 63, Issue 2, 1 March 2007, Pages 174-181
Hofer, A.; Siedentopf, C.M.; Ischebeck, A.; Rettenbacher, M.A.; Verius, M.; Golaszewski, S.M.; Felber, S.; Fleischhacker, W.W.
Appearance of symmetry, beauty, and health in human faces • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 57, Issue 3, 1 April 2005, Pages 261-263
Zaidel, D.W.; Aarde, S.M.; Baig, K.
High functioning children with autism spectrum disorder: A novel test of multitasking • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 61, Issue 1, 1 June 2006, Pages 14-24
Mackinlay, R.; Charman, T.; Karmiloff-Smith, A.
Caffeine, fatigue, and cognition • Article
Brain and Cognition, Volume 53, Issue 1, 1 October 2003, Pages 82-94
Lorist, M.M.; Tops, M.

Learning to pay attention

thomasr — Fri, 15 Jun 2007 07:20:03 +0000

By Rachel Jones

Our sensory system is constantly bombarded with inputs, but owing to the brain’s finite processing power, we are forced to pay attention to only a tiny proportion of these inputs at any given time. In a new study, Richard Davidson and colleagues report [in PLoS Biology] that intensive training in meditation can alter the way in which the brain allocates attentional resources to important stimuli, allowing people to improve their performance on a demanding visual task.

In the “attentional blink” task, volunteers were asked to identify two “target” stimuli—for example, two particular numbers—in a stream of rapidly presented “non-target” stimuli—for example, letters—which are irrelevant to the task. When the first target number appears on the screen, it captures the attention of the subject, and this can prevent the person from spotting the second target if it appears within around half a second of the first (the attentional blink). It is as if the brain is so busy processing the first target that it can’t also process the second, and therefore the second target goes unnoticed. However, the attentional blink does not represent a structural processing bottleneck. Most subjects are able to spot the second target on at least a small proportion of trials. Since this task gauges the ability of subjects to allocate cognitive resources efficiently when multiple stimuli compete for attention, it is perfectly suited for investigations of the effects of mental training on attention.

Read full story at PLoS Biology

Neural Mechanisms of Visual Attention: How Top-Down Feedback Highlights Relevant Locations

thomasr — Fri, 15 Jun 2007 06:56:59 +0000

Attention helps us process potentially important objects by selectively increasing the activity of sensory neurons that represent the relevant locations and features of our environment. This selection process requires top-down feedback about what is important in our environment. We investigated how parietal cortical output influences neural activity in early sensory areas. Neural recordings were made simultaneously from the posterior parietal cortex and an earlier area in the visual pathway, the medial temporal area, of macaques performing a visual matching task. When the monkey selectively attended to a location, the timing of activities in the two regions became synchronized, with the parietal cortex leading the medial temporal area. Parietal neurons may thus selectively increase activity in earlier sensory areas to enable focused spatial attention.

Science

TSC 2007 — registration

thomasr — Wed, 13 Jun 2007 13:02:55 +0000

The “Toward a Science of Consciousness 2007″ international conference will be arranged in Budapest, Hungary, July 23-26, 2007.

Plenary talks by: Walter Freeman, Stuart Hameroff, Ivan Havel, Ilona Kovács, David Papineau, Karl Pribram, Petra Stoerig.

Workshops and concurrent sessions: Philosophy, Language and Consciousness, Machine Consciousness I-II, First Person Methods, Phenomenological Concepts, Neuroscience I-III, Psychophysiology, Concept of Consciousness I-II, Cognitive Science and Psychology I-III, Qualia, Ontology of Consciousness, Altered States of Consciousness, Materialism and Dualism, Physical and Biological Sciences, Ethic and Free Will.

For detailed program and registration, see: http://www.tsc2007.org/

!!! Early registration ends on June 15 !!!

The Experimental Phenomena of Consciousness: A Brief Dictionary

alice — Wed, 13 Jun 2007 03:44:54 +0000

Authored by Talis Bachmann, Bruno Breitmeyer, Haluk Ogmen

Experimental Phenomena of Consciousness is the definitive collection of consciousness phenomena in which awareness emerges as an experimental variable. With its comprehensive yet succinct entries, arranged alphabetically, this dictionary will be a valuable reference tool for libraries and researchers at all levels in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy, who are investigating consciousness, cognition, perception, and attention. It will also be an important addition to the reading lists of courses on consciousness and cognition. Most entries include illustrations and a list of references where a more thorough treatment of the topic can be found. The text is supported by a web page that provides dynamic illustrations and other supplemental material. As the first reference book on the topic, Experimental Phenomena of Consciousness will be a valuable tool for undergraduates, graduate students, professional researchers, and anyone who has an interest in the subject of consciousness.

2007, 160 p., Hardcover and paperback

ISBN-10: 0195316908
ISBN-13: 978-0195316902

Reviews

About the Authors

Talis Bachmann studied psychology at the University of Tartu, Estonia. He has Ph.D.-level degrees in psychology and in psychophysiology. He is a full-time professor at the University of Tartu and is internationally known for his research in perception, attention, and consciousness. Bachmann is also the author or editor of three internationally distributed titles and 10 Estonian-language books, the two-time recipient of the Estonian national prize for scientific studies, and the former Rector of the Tallinn University in Estonia.

Bruno Breitmeyer is Professor of Psychology at the University of Houston. He studied mathematics at the University of Illinois and received his Ph.D. in psychology from Stanford University in 1972. Best known for his work on visual masking, he currently uses visual masking as a means of exploring the types and levels of both nonconscious and conscious visual processing.

Haluk Ogmen obtained his Ph.D. in electrical engineering from Universite Laval, Quebec, Canada. He is currently professor and chair of the Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering and director of the Center for Neuro-Engineering and Cognitive Science at the University of Houston. His research combines experimental and theoretical approaches for the study of visual perception and cognitive dynamics.

Visual hallucinations in brain recovery

thomasr — Tue, 12 Jun 2007 13:02:38 +0000

As if it was not bad enough to suffer from a brain injury following such as stroke, many sufferers of injury to visual areas also report experiences of hallucinations.

Interestingly, these reports should not necessarily be understood as the result of neuropathology or as unimportant symptoms, but rather as the result of functional reorganization – aka plasticity – of the neural underpinnings of visual perception.

Visual hallucinations during spontaneous and training-induced visual field recovery

D.A. Poggel et al.

Neuropsychologia
Volume 45, Issue 11, 2007, Pages 2598-2607

Visual hallucinations after post-geniculate visual system lesions were shown to be associated with spontaneous recovery of visual functions. We investigated the occurrence of hallucinations during spontaneous recovery and additionally tested whether hallucinations were re-instated in a phase of vision restoration therapy (VRT). Nineteen patients with post-geniculate lesions and homonymous visual loss participated in a prospective study, and 121 patients with various lesions were included in a retrospective study using a questionnaire including verbal descriptions as well as drawings of hallucinations experienced by the patients. In both samples, visual-field size was determined before and after 6 months of VRT. Many patients in both groups experienced post-lesion hallucinations (mostly colors, objects, motion) which subsided after spontaneous recovery of visual functions (increase of visual field size, recovery of more complex visual function) was ended. Hallucinations re-emerged during training. However, the majority of patients reported simple, unformed visual hallucinations (uncolored phosphenes, spots, flashes), especially when visual field recovery was most intense. Hallucinations were mainly found in patients with large shifts of the visual field border. They occurred in blind areas, particularly in areas of residual vision where recovery was predominantly observed. Hallucinations may reflect functional recovery in partially lesioned brain areas. While the colored/formed hallucinations during spontaneous recovery may represent non-specific activation of higher visual areas, the simple, unformed training-related hallucinations may indicate recovery in the primary visual cortex during treatment. Hallucinations should not generally be discarded as pathological or unimportant symptoms, but they may be functional indicators of visual system plasticity.

Latest articles on executive functions and will

thomasr — Tue, 12 Jun 2007 11:09:39 +0000

The scientific study of choice, aka decision making, willed action or executive functions, has provided plenty of new articles just during the past few weeks. Here we provide some of them.

Brain, emotion and decision making: the paradigmatic example of regret

Giorgio Coricelli, Raymond J. Dolan, and Angela Sirigu

Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Volume 11, Issue 6, June 2007, Pages 258-265

Human decisions cannot be explained solely by rational imperatives but are strongly influenced by emotion. Theoretical and behavioral studies provide a sound empirical basis to the impact of the emotion of regret in guiding choice behavior. Recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging data have stressed the fundamental role of the orbitofrontal cortex in mediating the experience of regret. Functional magnetic resonance imaging data indicate that reactivation of activity within the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala occurring during the phase of choice, when the brain is anticipating possible future consequences of decisions, characterizes the anticipation of regret. In turn, these patterns reflect learning based on cumulative emotional experience. Moreover, affective consequences can induce specific mechanisms of cognitive control of the choice processes, involving reinforcement or avoidance of the experienced behavior.

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An information theoretical approach to prefrontal executive function

Etienne Koechlin and Christopher Summerfield

Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Volume 11, Issue 6, June 2007, Pages 229-235

The prefrontal cortex subserves executive control – that is, the ability to select actions or thoughts in relation to internal goals. Here, we propose a theory that draws upon concepts from information theory to describe the architecture of executive control in the lateral prefrontal cortex. Supported by evidence from brain imaging in human subjects, the model proposes that action selection is guided by hierarchically ordered control signals, processed in a network of brain regions organized along the anterior–posterior axis of the lateral prefrontal cortex. The theory clarifies how executive control can operate as a unitary function, despite the requirement that information be integrated across multiple distinct, functionally specialized prefrontal regions.

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Where There Is a Way, Is There a Will? The Effect of Future Choices on Self-Control

Uzma Khan and Ravi Dhar

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Volume 136, Issue 2, May 2007, Pages 277-288

Choices often involve self-control conflicts such that options that are immediately appealing are less desirable in the long run. In the current research, the authors examine how viewing such a choice as one of a series of similar future choices rather than as an isolated decision decreases the preference for items requiring self-control. The authors show that (a) in a choice between a vice and a virtue, the share choosing vice increases when the decision is presented as one of a series of similar future choices versus when the same choice is viewed in isolation, and (b) the overall share choosing a vice increases when decisions are seen in connection with similar future choices. The findings contrast with the general wisdom that broader choice frames lead to the exercise of greater self-control. The authors propose that the context of similar future choices allows people to optimistically believe that they will choose a virtue in the future choice and hence provides them with a guilt-reducing justification to not exercise self-control in the present.

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Metacognition of Agency

Janet Metcalfe and Matthew Jason Greene

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Volume 136, Issue 2, May 2007, Pages 184-199

The feeling that we are agents, intentionally making things happen by our own actions, is foundational to our understanding of ourselves as humans. People’s metacognitions of agency were investigated in 4 experiments. Participants played a game in which they tried to touch downward scrolling Xs and avoid touching Os. Variables that affected accuracy included speed of the scroll, density of the targets, and feedback. Of central interest were variables directed not only at accuracy but also at people’s control: the turbulence of the cursor and how close the cursor had to come to the target for a hit (i.e., “magic”). After each trial, people made judgments of agency or judgments of performance. People were selectively sensitive to the variables to which they should be responsive in agency monitoring—whether the cursor moved in close synchrony to their movements and whether targets disappeared by magic. People knew, separably from their objective or judged performance, when they were in control and when they were not. These results indicate that people can sensitively monitor their own agency.

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The missing link between action and cognition

Deborah J. Serrien, Richard B. Ivry and Stephan P. Swinnen

Progress in Neurobiology
Volume 82, Issue 2, June 2007, Pages 95-107

The study of the neural correlates of motor behaviour at the systems level has received increasing consideration in recent years. One emerging observation from this research is that neural regions typically associated with cognitive operations may also be recruited during the performance of motor tasks. This apparent convergence between action and cognition – domains that have most often been studied in isolation – becomes especially apparent when examining new complex motor skills such as those involving sequencing or coordination, and when taking into account external (environment-related) factors such as feedback availability and internal (performer-related) factors such as pathology. Neurally, overlap between action and cognition is prominent in frontal lobe areas linked to response selection and monitoring. Complex motor tasks are particularly suited to reveal the crucial link between action and cognition and the generic brain areas at the interface between these domains.

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Human Medial Frontal Cortex Mediates Unconscious Inhibition of Voluntary Action

Petroc Sumner et al.

Neuron
Volume 54, Issue 5, 7 June 2007, Pages 697-711

Within the medial frontal cortex, the supplementary eye field (SEF), supplementary motor area (SMA), and pre-SMA have been implicated in the control of voluntary action, especially during motor sequences or tasks involving rapid choices between competing response plans. However, the precise roles of these areas remain controversial. Here, we study two extremely rare patients with microlesions of the SEF and SMA to demonstrate that these areas are critically involved in unconscious and involuntary motor control. We employed masked-prime stimuli that evoked automatic inhibition in healthy people and control patients with lateral premotor or pre-SMA damage. In contrast, our SEF/SMA patients showed a complete reversal of the normal inhibitory effect—ocular or manual—corresponding to the functional subregion lesioned. These findings imply that the SEF and SMA mediate automatic effector-specific suppression of motor plans. This automatic mechanism may contribute to the participation of these areas in the voluntary control of action.

http://assc2007.neuralcorrelate.com/

CSBBCS 17th Annual Meeting

alice — Tue, 05 Jun 2007 22:26:38 +0000

The Canadian Society for Brain, Behaviour and Cognitive Science (CSBBCS) is a non-profit organization whose primary function is to advance Canadian research in experimental psychology and behavioral neuroscience. The 17th annual meeting for the CSBBCS will be held at the University of Victoria, British Columbia from June 15-17, 2007. Online registration is available until June 15, 2007.

For more information, please check out the conference website.

Early Neural Correlates of Conscious Somatosensory Perception

alice — Tue, 05 Jun 2007 03:11:17 +0000

Abstract of Early Neural Correlates of Conscious Somatosensory Perception, in the Journal of Neuroscience.

The cortical processing of consciously perceived and unperceived somatosensory stimuli is thought to be identical during the first 100 –120 ms after stimulus onset. Thereafter, the electrophysiological correlates of conscious perception have been shown to be reflected in the N1 component of the evoked response as well as in later (_200 ms) nonstimulus-locked _-band (28 –50 Hz) oscillatory activity. To evaluate more specifically the time course and correlation of neuronal oscillations with conscious perception, we recorded neuromagnetic responses to threshold-intensity somatosensory stimuli. We show here that cortical broadband activities phase locked to the subsequently perceived stimuli in somatosensory, frontal, and parietal regions as early as 30 –70 ms from stimulus onset, whereas the phase locking to the unperceived stimuli was weak and primarily restricted to somatosensory regions. Such stimulus locking also preceded the perceived stimuli, indicating that the phase of ongoing cortical activities biases subsequent perception. Furthermore, the data show that the stimulus locking was present in the _- (4–8 Hz), _- (8 –14 Hz), _- (14 –28 Hz), and _- (28–40 Hz) frequency bands, of which the widespread _-band component was dominant for the consciously perceived stimuli but virtually unobservable for the unperceived stimuli. Our results show that the neural correlates of conscious perception are already found during the earliest stages of cortical processing from 30 to 150 ms after stimulus onset and suggest that _-frequency-band oscillations have a role in the neural mechanisms of sensory awareness.

The 13th Annual Meeting of the Organization for Human Brain Mapping

alice — Sun, 03 Jun 2007 02:07:14 +0000

The 13th annual meeting for the Organization of Human Brain Mapping will be held in Chicago, Illinois at the Sheraton Chicago Hotel & Towers from June 10-14.

The purpose of the Organization is to advance the understanding of the anatomical and functional organization of the human brain and to bring together scientists of various backgrounds who are engaged in investigations relevant to human brain organization.

For more information, please visit the conference website.

2007 Annual Meeting for the Society for Philosophy and Psychology

alice — Sat, 02 Jun 2007 17:17:47 +0000

The 2007 annual meeting for the Society for Philosophy and Psychology will take place from June 14-17. It will be held on the Keele campus of York University in Toronto, Canada.

The stated purpose of the SPP is to promote interaction between philosophers, psychologists and other cognitive scientists on issues of common concern.

For more information please visit the conference website.

Narrative selves

thomasr — Thu, 24 May 2007 20:41:58 +0000

From MindHacks — Philosophy Now has an article on how the self might be based on our ability to create narratives. The article looks at how the self has been related to our ability to make narratives out of the disconnected events in our lives, and particularly focuses on the theories of philosophers Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur.

From the article:

Don Quixote and The Narrative Self

Stefán Snaevarr asks, are our identities created by narratives?

Once upon a time a philosopher wrote an article called ‘Don Quixote and The Narrative Self’. He commenced by saying: In this essay, I will discuss the question of whether our selves are constituted by narratives, ie stories. Are we like Don Quixote, whose self was created by his reading of medieval romances: are we Homo quixotienses, the narrative self? Or are we rather like the protagonist of Sartre’s novel Nausea, Antonin Roquentin, whose life did not form any narrative unity? Are we in other words rather Homo roquentinenses?

The idea that our life is a story is by no means new. Thus the great bard Shakespeare said that life “…is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” (Macbeth) However, it took philosophers some time to discover the philosophical import of this view of life. It was actually a German chap called William Schapp who first gave this age-old idea a philosophical twist. He maintained that we live our lives in a host of stories, which have connection with the stories of other people in various ways; so actually, our selves are nothing but cross-sections of stories. Our identities are created by a vast web of stories, as is our relationship with reality. We understand and identify things by placing them in the stories we tell about them: just like selves, things do not really exist outside of stories. We are caught in this narrative web because we cannot exist outside of it. There is a world-wide web of stories: the world is that web.

(…) Full story at Philosophy Now

Does the brain show a lie?

thomasr — Thu, 24 May 2007 20:30:57 +0000

Amanda lies flat on her back, clad in a steel blue hospital gown and an air of anticipation, as she is rolled headfirst into a beeping, 10-ton functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) unit. Once inside, the 20-something blonde uses a handheld device to respond to questions about the playing cards appearing on the screen at the foot of the machine. With each click of the button, she is either lying or telling the truth about whether a card presented to her matches the one in her pocket, and the white-coated technician who watches her brain image morph into patterns on his computer screen seems to know the difference.

It’s unlikely anyone would shell out $10,000 to exonerate herself in a dispute over gin rummy. But Amanda, the model in a demo video for Tarzana, Calif.-based No Lie MRI, is helping to make a point: lie-detection is going high-tech. No Lie MRI claims it can identify lies with 90% accuracy. The service is meant for “anybody who wants to demonstrate that they are telling truth to others,” says founder and CEO Joel Huizenga. “Everyone should be allowed to use whatever method they can to defend themselves.

Watching the Brain Lie

Can fMRI replace the polygraph?
By Ishani Ganguli

No Lie MRI isn’t the only company hawking fMRI scans as lie detection tests. A competitor, Cephos, based in Pepperell, Mass., makes similar claims though the company has yet to unveil its test. And some government and law enforcement officials are bullish on the technology, as suggested by the federal research dollars being poured into the field.

But at a symposium hosted by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences this past February, several neuroscientists and legal experts said they’re not quite ready to save a place for fMRI lie detection in the courtroom or elsewhere. “No published studies come even close to demonstrating the kind of lie detection that would be useful in a real world situation,” says Nancy Kanwisher, a professor of cognitive neuroscience at MIT, who spoke at the symposium. “Scientists are endlessly clever, so I’m not saying that it can’t be done. But I can’t see how.”

Humans aren’t particularly good at knowing when they’re being deceived. In studies, subjects can only correctly identify 47% of lies on average, according to a review by Bella DePaulo at the University of California, Santa Barbara. So those who detect lies for a living have turned to science. The polygraph test – used in the United States since the 1920′s to root out liars by measuring physiological responses to stress – has largely been discredited as a scientific tool (see “A History in Deception”). Researchers are now honing in on the brain itself, turning to imaging techniques including fMRI, which measures blood oxygen concentrations across the brain every few seconds, in an attempt to map neural activity in real-time.

There are many types of lies-omissions, white lies, exaggerations, denials-that likely involve differing neural processes that scientists are just beginning to parse (see “Anatomy of Lying”). But in comparing fMRI images in such studies, it’s clear that the brain generally works harder at lying than telling the truth. As Marcus Raichle, professor at the Washington University in St. Louis School of Medicine, puts it, “You slow down, that’s not what you’re used to doing. In your brain, a whole new set of areas come online as you try to abort this learned response [to tell the truth] and institute something new and novel.”

Steve Kosslyn, a psychologist at Harvard University, is studying how fMRI results differ for spontaneous versus rehearsed lies-for which the work of concocting the new story has already been done. Nearby, John Gabrieli’s group at the Harvard-MIT Division of Health Sciences and Technology hopes to find a characteristic brain response associated with preparing to lie or tell the truth. Since September 11, 2001, grants from US agencies including the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security have burst open the field (Gabrieli is partially funded by the Central Intelligence Agency), and pushed many of its practitioners to seek practical applications.

Daniel Langleben at the University of Pennsylvania, who has spent nearly a decade studying deception, has recently been trying to apply fMRI to lie detection on the premise that a scanner can detect the suppression of truth, or “guilty knowledge.” No Lie MRI’s technology is based on the results of this research, partially funded by the Department of Defense (DoD). In one study, published in NeuroImage in 2002, Langleben gave each of his 18 subjects a playing card (a five of clubs) and a $20 bill before entering the fMRI machine. They looked at a string of cards on a screen and manually responded yes or no when asked about the identity of that card-their guilty knowledge-among a series of questions. They could keep the cash if they successfully fooled the tester. Using this approach, Langleben and colleagues have found increased activity associated with lying in cortical regions associated with conflict and suppression of a truthful response. They report they can distinguish lies from truths with up to 88% accuracy.

In 2005, the researchers who are now behind Cephos, and are also partially funded by the DoD, published results of another experimental approach in Biological Psychiatry. Mark George, director of the Brain Stimulation Laboratory at the Medical University of South Carolina, and Andy Kozel, a professor of psychiatry at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, had subjects steal either a ring or a watch from a room, then deny it when they were asked a series of questions. They imaged the brains of 30 subjects while asking questions about the mock crime to establish a model for brain differences associated with lying, then applied this model to predict when another 31 subjects were lying or telling the truth. The researchers found greater activation in the anterior cingulate-thought to monitor intention-and the right middle and orbital frontal lobes, thought to carry out the lie. They say they could predict accurately for 90% of the subjects in the latter group.

But MIT’s Kanwisher says she is skeptical about such research. For one thing, group averages of brain patterns-which are required to make sense of the patterns in the first place-are difficult to interpret (and fraught with noise) on the level of individual prediction. And in the real world, lying is verbal and carried out in defiance of instruction, and the stakes are incomparably higher. Rather than missing out on a $20 study reward, being caught in a lie could mean life in prison. Lying under these circumstances comes with an emotional component that is poorly elicited by a playing card, she argues.

“Applied fMRI studies of the kinds done so far have similar limitations to those of typical laboratory polygraph research,” according to a 2003 National Academy of Sciences report. “Real deception in real life circumstances is almost impossible to explore experimentally. You can’t randomly assign people to go do crimes. I do think that’s an inherent limit,” says Gabrieli, a professor of cognitive neuroscience. Others worry about the level of nuance that fMRI-posed questions can accommodate.

The limitations in the research haven’t stopped people from trying to take its applications to market. No Lie MRI’s Huizenga was selling fMRI scans as screens for heart disease at his last company, Ischem, when he read about Langleben’s work in 2001. He says he thought, “I can automate what you’re doing, [I] can make it into a product.” So he acquired the technology from the University of Pennsylvania.

Though the company’s product is still based on comparing brain scans to those in Langleben’s preliminary studies, No Lie MRI had its first commercial customer in December 2006: Harvey Nathan, who has been trying to get compensation from his insurance company after his Charleston, South Carolina delicatessen burned down in 2003. He had been cleared of arson charges in a criminal case, but wanted to use No Lie MRI to convince his insurance company he hadn’t started the blaze, for a per-session fee of $1,500 (clients get a hefty discount from the $10,000 going rate for agreeing to be televised). Nathan came out squeaky clean in the test, though his insurance company has yet to pay up, Huizenga reports.

Huizenga won’t say how many people have since tried the technology, but he’s clear on the philosophy behind it: “We’re testing individuals that want to be tested in areas [in which] they want to be tested. If they want to be tested on the topic of taking money from the cash register, we won’t test them on: are you having sex with your assistant? We deliver results to them personally. They get to use the results in the manner that they wish,” he says.

Huizenga eagerly points to the high prediction rate in Langleben’s study as a huge step up from the rate associated with the “nearest competing product”-the polygraph. He counts on snagging a worldwide patent for the service, administered at “Veracenters,” and if the company’s website is any indication, he will continue to market it for such uses as “risk reduction in dating.”

Cephos CEO Steve Laken got into the business of lie detection when he met Kozel, then at the Medical University of South Carolina, at a 2003 conference on human brain mapping in New York. Laken wanted to bring his findings to bear in post 9/11 counterterrorism efforts. Since its 2004 incorporation, Cephos has had weekly calls from individuals eager to use the technology, according to Laken, and government agencies have expressed interest as well. But he expects it will be a while until he is ready to put people through the fMRI machine-he’s hoping to increase what he claims is a 90% accuracy rate to 95%.

Laken says they are making strides toward this goal. In addressing concerns that the studies are poor approximations of reality, they are raising the perceived stakes in deception and imposing realistic time delays. In one, college students executed “a pretty elaborate mock crime” that involved stabbing a dummy and they were tested days or weeks afterwards, George explains. You can’t really have people go out and break the law. [Institutional Review Boards] won’t allow you to do that,” George chuckles. “[Still,] they thought they were involved in something a little bit illegal. We had people’s hands shaking.”

One of fMRI-based lie detection’s hurdles, oddly enough, is bettering the oft-questioned polygraph. Though “polygraphy isn’t much of a gold standard,” it still needs to be directly compared to these new methods before they can be widely adopted, Gabrieli says. Laken and Huizenga tout fMRI as the anti-polygraph, but the new technology may not be as different that people would like to think. fMRI “involves many of the same presumptions and interpretative leaps and gamesmanship,” argues Ken Alder, a historian at Northwestern University and author of The Lie Detectors: The History of an American Obsession. Research on fMRI lie detection has progressed much more openly than that on polygraphs, but Alder is concerned that fMRI may turn out to similarly operate as a placebo if used at this stage, catering to what Morse calls the “lure of mechanism” in courts and otherwise.

Still, Laken sees the machine as a clear alternative to the polygraph. Unlike the older technology, he says, on-site fMRI test administrators can send out brain scans for independent analysis. Questions are presented on a screen, eliminating the human element, and the entire process is completed in under an hour.

Elizabeth Phelps, a professor of psychology at New York University, raises concerns about potential test-beating strategies such as thinking about unrelated topics or doing mental arithmetic, though Laken denies being fooled by these in preliminary studies. But in reality, a nonconsensual testtaker need only move his or her head slightly to render the results useless.

And there are other challenges. For one, individuals with psychopathologies or drug use (overrepresented in the criminal defendant population) may have very different brain responses to lying, says Phelps. They might lack the sense of conflict or guilt used to detect lying in other individuals. Laken concedes that they’ve tested the machine on a rather limited population-18-50 year-olds with no history of drug use, psychiatric disease, or serious traumatic brain injuries. But he says he is content for his clientele to be restricted to “relatively normal people” like Martha Stewart and Lewis “Scooter” Libby – neither of whom has actually used the technology.

There’s another drawback: If a person actually believes an untruth, it’s not clear if a machine could ever identify it as such. Researchers including Phelps are still debating whether the brain can distinguish true from false memory in the first place. “In law, we’re concerned with acting human beings [who] can intentionally falsify or unintentionally falsify,” says Stephen Morse, professor of law and psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania. “To the extent that we’re trying to get at the truth, we need a valid measure to understand [the difference].”

Jed Rakoff, US District Judge for the Southern District of New York, says he doubts that fMRI tests will meet the courtroom standards for scientific evidence (reliability and acceptance within the scientific community) anytime in the near future, or that the limited information they provide will have much impact on the stand. In court, most lies are omissions or exaggerations of the truth – among the trickiest to recreate in a laboratory. In his experience, and given the polygraph’s history, he says he would argue that the potential for harm outweighs the foreseeable benefits.

On the other hand, Judy Illes, who is the director of neuroethics at the Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics, expects to see the technique enter courtrooms in the not-too-distant future. “I believe that technology like fMRI will certainly reach the point where its reliability and accuracy is sufficient to be an indicator of whether someone is lying or being forthright (i.e, the answer to the “if” question),” writes Illes in an e-mail. “A significant challenge for the legal system, however, is that this kind of technology will unlikely be able to ‘get inside someone’s head’ enough that it can reveal answers to the ‘what’ question, i.e., what is someone lying about, what is motivating them to lie, and does content and motivation interact with the concept of moral culpability or guilt.”

As for Huizenga and Laken, they are both optimistic that the fMRI test will eventually be legally viable, but in the meantime, they would be content to sell their services for out-of-court settlements. According to Rakoff, the best way to get at the truth in the courtroom is still “plain old cross-examination.” And in the national security sphere, there’s “much more to detecting spies than the perfect gadget,” Raichle agrees. “There’s some plain old-fashioned footwork that needs to be done.”

Source: The Scientist

Visual hallucinations? Draw it!

thomasr — Thu, 24 May 2007 19:31:49 +0000

Visual (and other non-visual) hallucinations sometimes occur during epileptic seizures. A relatively straightforward but little used method to describe these experiences is to ask the sufferer to draw the hallucinations — even as they occur.

According to G.D. Schott, in an article in the latest issue of Brain, such descriptions not only not only serve as tools to understand the sufferer and symptoms; they can also be used for differential diagnosis.

Exploring the visual hallucinations of migraine aura: the tacit contribution of illustration

G. D. Schott

The visual aura of migraine is a subjective phenomenon, and what the migraineur experiences is necessarily inaccessible to others. Fortunately, however, the sufferer can occasionally reveal what is being seen by means of graphic representation, enabling an otherwise closed ‘window’ to be opened on the transiently dysfunctioning brain. This article explores the unique contribution that illustration has made to understanding mechanisms subserving the visual aura. The most revealing illustrations are those made by the very few scientists who have recorded and analysed the scotomas, and in particular the expanding fortification spectra, experienced during their migraine attacks. It is solely through illustrations such as these that the uniform nature of many of these hallucinations has been demonstrated. As a result, it follows that there is likely to be a similarly uniform repertoire of processes that generate the hallucinations in the occipital cortex. The precise form of the zigzags that comprise the fortification spectrum, their shimmering appearance, and in particular the speed of the peripheral spread, all of which are entirely dependent on graphic display for their elucidation, enable conclusions to be reached about a number of the underlying pathophysiological mechanisms, including the involvement of spreading cortical depression, that likely occur. Illustration has been pivotal too in revealing uncommon and sometimes curious, if not bizarre, visual hallucinations, the forms of which suggest that extrastriate and temporal lobe involvement contributes to migraine aura in some instances. Illustration can also be valuable in differential diagnosis, depicting other forms of visual hallucination which result from a variety of non-migrainous causes. Illustration, particularly when made during the attack, provides an unusual, little used but powerful tool which uniquely allows the sufferer’s subjective visual experiences to inform objective analysis. In turn, this analysis leads to insights into some of the cerebral disturbances which subserve migraine aura.

Brain

The unconscious motivator

thomasr — Tue, 22 May 2007 12:46:50 +0000

A study (PDF) recently reported in Science shows how unconsciously processed information about monetary rewards influences behaviour.

Furthermore, the researchers identify a basal forebrain region that specifically underpin this effect, thus operating as a functional node that drives reward-related behaviour without the need for conscious processing.

How the brain translates money into force: a neuroimaging study of subliminal motivation.

Pessiglione M, Schmidt L, Draganski B, Kalisch R, Lau H, Dolan RJ, Frith CD
Science. 2007 May 11; 316(5826): 904-6

Unconscious motivation in humans is often inferred but rarely demonstrated empirically. We imaged motivational processes, implemented in a paradigm that varied the amount and reportability of monetary rewards for which subjects exerted physical effort. We show that, even when subjects cannot report how much money is at stake, they nevertheless deploy more force for higher amounts. Such a motivational effect is underpinned by engagement of a specific basal forebrain region. Our findings thus reveal this region as a key node in brain circuitry that enables expected rewards to energize behavior, without the need for the subjects;awareness.

Minds, brains and programs — Searle BBS draft

thomasr — Tue, 22 May 2007 12:28:25 +0000

An unedited penultimate draft of a BBS target article by John Searle is now available. It has been accepted for publication (Copyright 1980: Cambridge University Press U.K./U.S. — publication date provisional) and is currently being circulated for Open Peer Commentary. This preprint is for inspection only, to help prospective commentators decide whether or not they wish to prepare a formal commentary. Please do not prepare a commentary unless you have received the hard copy, invitation, instructions and deadline information.

For information on becoming a commentator on this or other BBS target articles, write to: bbs@soton.ac.uk

MINDS, BRAINS, AND PROGRAMS

John R. Searle
Department of Philosophy
University of California
Berkeley, California. 94720
searle@cogsci.berkeley.edu

Abstract
This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4.

“Could a machine think?” On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.

Keywords
artificial intelligence, brain, intentionality, mind

The units of thought

thomasr — Tue, 22 May 2007 07:53:17 +0000

What is the nature of thought? And what is the resting state? Moshe Bar and colleagues argues in a new paper (PDF) in the journal Hippocampus that besides the long-held idea that associative processing provides the vehicle of thought, that “one primary outcome of associative processing is the generation of predictions, which approximate the immediately relevant future and thus facilitate perception, action, and the progression of thought”.

From the article:

Associations are proposed to provide the units of thought,b ut they should not be perceived as the actual content of thought; they merely provide the vehicle for linking related representations. In fact, our proposal is that the primary role of associations and associative activation is to generate predictions, which guide our actions, expectations, plans, and thoughts. To elaborate on this it will be useful to consider our broader theoretical framework: We propose that rather than passively ‘‘waiting’’ to be activated by sensations, the human brain is constantly busy generating predictions that approximate the immediate, directly relevant, future. Building on previous work, this proposal posits that rudimentary information is ﬁrst extracted rapidly from a perceptual input, and then used to derive analogies linking the input with the most similar representations in memory. The linked stored representations in turn selectively activate the associations that are relevant in the speciﬁc context, which provides focused, testable predictions. These predictions facilitate perception and cognition by presensitizing representations all the way downstream to primary cortices. For example, we see a fork, the image of which will

The units of thought.

Bar M, Aminoff E, Mason M, Fenske M
Hippocampus. 2007; 17(6): 420-8

That associative processing provides the vehicle of thought is a long-standing idea. We describe here observations from cognitive neuroimaging that elucidate the neural processing that mediates this element. This account further allows a more specific ascription of a cognitive function to the brain’s “default” activity in mindwandering. We extend this account to argue that one primary outcome of associative processing is the generation of predictions, which approximate the immediately relevant future and thus facilitate perception, action, and the progression of thought.

HubMed

Resting states in unconscious monkeys

thomasr — Tue, 22 May 2007 07:33:43 +0000

Nature has an interesting report from Marc Raichle‘s laboratory that studies the resting states in monkeys. This study not only demonstrates that resting states occur in non-human primates, but that it is possible to find such activity during unconscious states.

The authors found three separate networks showing organized patterns of activity in anaesthetized monkeys. These systems also display spontaneous BOLD signal fluctuations in awake humans. First, they investigated the oculomotor system and found spatially and temporally robust activity in discreet areas of this system. Second, the authors found similar spontaneous BOLD signal fluctuations in regions of the somatomotor system, which is involved in movement and touch. A third network of spontaneous activity was found in the visual system.

The findings raise the question of whether similar findings can be made in unconscious humans. If this is the case, the activity clearly does not reflect conscious thought, and it may signal a more basic aspect of functional organization of the brain that may be conserved throughout animal evolution.

Intrinsic functional architecture in the anaesthetized monkey brain.

Vincent JL, Patel GH, Fox MD, Snyder AZ, Baker JT, Van Essen DC, Zempel JM, Snyder LH, Corbetta M, Raichle ME
Nature. 2007 May 3; 447(7140): 83-6

The traditional approach to studying brain function is to measure physiological responses to controlled sensory, motor and cognitive paradigms. However, most of the brain’s energy consumption is devoted to ongoing metabolic activity not clearly associated with any particular stimulus or behaviour. Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies in humans aimed at understanding this ongoing activity have shown that spontaneous fluctuations of the blood-oxygen-level-dependent signal occur continuously in the resting state. In humans, these fluctuations are temporally coherent within widely distributed cortical systems that recapitulate the functional architecture of responses evoked by experimentally administered tasks. Here, we show that the same phenomenon is present in anaesthetized monkeys even at anaesthetic levels known to induce profound loss of consciousness. We specifically demonstrate coherent spontaneous fluctuations within three well known systems (oculomotor, somatomotor and visual) and the ‘default’ system, a set of brain regions thought by some to support uniquely human capabilities. Our results indicate that coherent system fluctuations probably reflect an evolutionarily conserved aspect of brain functional organization that transcends levels of consciousness.

Smarter, sentient whales

thomasr — Mon, 21 May 2007 08:13:47 +0000

Recent studies have shown that the brains of sperm whales is second in size only to human (relative to body size). It is about 60% larger in absolute mass than that of an elephant. How this brain evolution has occurred is the topic of a most interesting article in PLoS Biology, authored by Lori Marino et al. In this article the authors also forcefully argue that the increased brain size is paralleled by a comparable increase in cognitive complexity. As the authors write:

We believe that the time is ripe to present an integrated view of cetacean brains, behavior, and evolution based on the wealth of accumulated and recent data on these topics. Our conclusions support the more generally accepted view that the large brain of cetaceans evolved to support complex cognitive abilities.

Who’s superstitious?

thomasr — Mon, 21 May 2007 07:28:13 +0000

What makes some people supersticious, or believe in the paranormal? In the latest issue of the Journal of Research in Personality, researchers Marjaana Lindeman and Kia Aarnio from Helsinki, Finland, first set out by conceptually distinguishing between the concepts of superstition, magical beliefs and paranormal beliefs. All concepts are commonly identified as “a confusion of core knowledge about physical, psychological, and biological phenomena”. Then, by applying a self-report questionnaire, they show that superstitious individuals accepted more violations of core ontological distinctions, and that “ontological confusions discriminated believers from skeptics better than intuitive thinking, analytical thinking, or emotional instability”. The report is available as a preprint here (PDF).

Abstract:

Superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs: An integrative model

Lack of conceptual clarity has hampered theory formation and research on superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs. This study offers a conceptual framework where these concepts are differentiated from other unfounded beliefs and defined identically as a confusion of core knowledge about physical, psychological, and biological phenomena. When testing this definition with questionnaire items (N = 239), the results showed that superstitious individuals accepted more violations of core ontological distinctions than skeptics did and that ontological confusions discriminated believers from skeptics better than intuitive thinking, analytical thinking, or emotional instability. The findings justify the present conceptualization of superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs, and offer new theoretical propositions for the familiar everyday beliefs that are yet scientifically so poorly understood.

Harmless Hallucinations in the Elderly

alice — Mon, 14 May 2007 01:07:02 +0000

It can be very upsetting, but it may have a fairly mild medical origin: It is called Charles Bonnet Syndrome, and it was first reported 250 years ago, in 1760, by the Swiss philosopher Charles Bonnet (Plummer et al, 2007).When damage occurs to visual nerves in elderly people, they may “see” all sorts of things. For example, a 73-year-old woman saw “inch-long black ants scurrying along the kitchen floor, walls and windows. In desperation, she began spraying insecticide throughout the house… ” Later, when she was brought to the Emergency Room, “floating seahorses and featherless chickens joined the colonies of ants… A Roman chariot, the rider dressed in gold, flashed across the curtain several times. On the ward, tropical vines would grow from the foot of her bed. A man stood with thick brown tree trunks for legs and green tree branches for arms. Nurses’ heads would shrink and then expand before melting into the floor. Brightly coloured fairies carrying wands invited her for walks around the hospital grounds.”A second patient was a 90 year old man, who “woke to find a bright pink handkerchief on the floor of his bedroom. Every time he tried to pick the cloth up it seemed to move out of reach. He followed it from room to room but was distracted by the appearance of rows of bearded human faces with bulging eyes jutting out from the lounge-room wall. Through the window he saw a large brown Ayrshire cow in the front yard and, beyond it, he made out a red sports car racing up the street towards his house. He opened the front door only to be greeted by a trio of policemen dressed like American highway patrol officers toting large guns. Fearing at this point that he was losing his faculties he summoned his wife and an ambulance was called. In the Emergency Department of the local hospital he saw a draught horse pulling a cart loaded with wooden logs.”

CBS is a limited problem, and patients who have it are not going mad, nor are they suffering from dementia.Scary stuff, but no, it isn’t a psychotic episode. It’s not even a difficult-to-manage disease. Charles Bonnet Syndrome (CBS) may be a fairly common side effect of macular degeneration, the age-related degradation of the retinal cells at the back of the eye. Patients with this condition lose their visual acuity in the damaged area, as if the normal “blind spot” (which all of us have in each eye) expands to cover the central area of vision. We can’t see the blind spot under normal circumstances – it is “filled in” with adjacent colors and textures – and CBS patients may fill in their growing “blind spot” (called a scotoma) with visual hallucinations of the most terrifying kind. Fortunately, there are now new treatments for age-related macular degeneration (AMD), if it can be caught early enough before the retinal cells die. Even without curing the underlying AMD, the distressing symptoms of Charles Bonnet Syndrome (CBS) may go away by themselves.

What do you do if an elderly relative develops these distressing visual imaginings? It is important to understand that CBS is not a mental condition. There isn’t anything wrong with the patients’ understanding of reality, and in the case of the 90-year-old man cited above, “He was soon convinced that the visions were imagined and his anxiety was replaced by a sense of amusement.” Five years later the visual hallucinations were gone. That makes CBS very different from mental disorders — people with those disorders don’t learn to laugh at their experiences. CBS victims know they are hallucinating.

So the first rule is the oldest treatment of all: reassurance. CBS is a limited problem, and patients who have it are not going mad, nor are they suffering from dementia. Rather, their visual hallucinations are similar to the visual images we tend to experience during dreams and drowsy “twilight states.”

That is in fact one of the significant features of CBS. It tends to occur during drowsy states. Plummer and colleagues suggest a specific mechanism in the outer visual system. The most plausible hypothesis, they argue, is that neurons in the visual pathway going from the retina to cortex become hyper-excitable, due to the loss of light receptors. This phenomenon has been observed directly in the brain. It is as if the pattern-recognition regions of the cortex are trying desperately to figure out what light patterns are coming into the eye, and are trying out quick, conscious hypotheses to explain the noisy input. The end result is a kind of projection of cortical guesses on the ambiguous stream of incoming stimulation.

Shakespeare had this figured out, in his own way, when Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, tried to make a fool of the old courtier Polonius:

“Ham. Do you see that cloud that’s almost in shape like a camel?

Pol. By the mass, and it’s like a camel, indeed.

Ham. Methinks it is like a weasel.

Pol. It is back’d like a weasel.

Ham. Or like a whale?

Pol. Very like a whale.”

Obviously Polonius was just following Hamlet’s suggestions. This is often called “top down processing.” CBS victim are living in a kind of visual cloud, and their brains can’t quite decide if their eyes are looking at a whale, a camel or a weasel.

Author Information

Bernard Baars is a Senior Fellow in Theoretical Neurobiology at the Neurosciences Institute in San Diego. He is widely known for his Global Workspace Theory and remains at the heart of the study of consciousness. He is also the founder of Science and Consciousness Review.

References

Plummer, C., Kleinitz, A., Vroomen, P. & Watts, R. (2007) Of Roman chariots and goats in overcoats: The syndrome of Charles Bonnet, Journal of Clinical Neuroscience (in press).

ASSC 2007

virgil — Mon, 30 Apr 2007 22:21:31 +0000

The 11th annual meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness will take place between June 22nd and June 25th, 2007, at the Imperial Palace Hotel, Las Vegas.

ASSC11 will promote interdisciplinary dialogue in the scientific study of consciousness. ASSC members as well as non-members are encouraged to submit contributions that address current empirical and theoretical issues in the study of consciousness, from the perspectives of neuroscience, philosophy, psychology, computer science, and cognitive ethology. ASSC11 will provide an excellent opportunity for the presentation of new empirical findings or novel theoretical perspectives in an atmosphere that will promote discussion and debate.

Multiple priming routes

thomasr — Sat, 28 Apr 2007 18:25:48 +0000

Is it possible to have more than one priming effect at a time? According to a German research team, it is possible to have at least two simultaneous priming effects.

Unconscious priming according to multiple S-R rules.

Kiesel A, Kunde W, Hoffmann J
Cognition. 2006 Jun 28;

The present study investigated if unconscious primes can be processed according to different stimulus-response (S-R) rules simultaneously. Participants performed two different S-R rules, such as judging a digit as smaller or larger than five and judging a letter as vowel or consonant. These S-R rules were administered in random order and announced by a previously presented cue. Each target stimulus was preceded by subliminal primes which afforded a different or an identical response according to either the currently irrelevant or currently relevant S-R rule. In three experiments, we consistently found priming effects according to currently irrelevant S-R rules, even when primes for the relevant and irrelevant S-R rules were presented simultaneously. Thus, unconscious stimuli have the power to activate responses according to currently required and currently not required S-R rules concurrently. The results are in line with response activation accounts of subliminal priming and suggest that at least two routes may gain access on response processes simultaneously.

HubMed

Sleep Protects Declarative Memories From Interference

thomasr — Sat, 28 Apr 2007 16:15:11 +0000

Declarative memories — memories for facts and events in time — become more resistant to interference during sleep, according to a study that will presented at the 59th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Neurology (AAN) in Boston, Massachusetts.

“We know that sleep helps boost memory for procedural tasks, such as learning a new piano sequence. But we’re not sure, even though it’s been debated for over a hundred years, whether sleep impacts declarative memory,” said lead author Jeffrey Ellenbogen, MD, a clinical fellow in medicine at Harvard Medical School, in Boston.

To test whether sleep strengthens declarative memory in the face of interference, a research team led by Dr. Ellenbogen conducted a study whereby 48 people between the ages of 18 and 30 were divided evenly into 4 groups: a wake group without interference, a wake group with interference, a sleep group without interference, and a sleep group with interference.

All groups were taught the same 20 pairs of words in the initial training session. The wake groups were taught the word pairings at 9 AM and then tested on them at 9 PM, after 12 hours of being awake. The sleep groups were taught the word pairs at 9 PM and tested on them at 9 AM, after a night of sleep.

Just before testing, the interference groups were given a second list of word pairs to remember. The first word in each pair was the same on both lists, but the second word was different, testing the brain’s ability to handle interference. The interference groups were then tested on both lists.

The investigators found that subjects in the sleep groups had superior recall, relative to those in the wake groups. The difference between the sleep and wake groups was greatest when the subjects were tested after interference (76% vs 32% of words recalled correctly in the sleep group vs the wake group; P < .0001).

“These results mean that sleep does in fact lead to a benefit for declarative memory consolidation,” Dr. Ellenbogen told Medscape. “We were surprised by the magnitude of the effect,” he said. “The benefit of sleep [for memory consolidation] was even larger than we were anticipating.”

The authors think the results may help in understanding the neurobiology of memory consolidation and could have important applications for patients with dementia and sleep disorders.

“The real strength of the research by Ellenbogen’s team is in the way they measured memory,” said Matthew Walker, PhD, director of the sleep and neuroimaging lab, department of psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, who was not involved in the study.

“What Ellenbogen and colleagues have done very cleverly was not simply just train subjects on a list of words and then test them after wake or after sleep,” Dr. Walker told Medscape. “They trained subjects on a list of words, and then just before they tested them after wake or sleep, they quickly had them learn a new set of words. And what they found is that when you do that across sleep, sleep provides a remarkable benefit in the face of interference for those old memories.”

This is a novel finding, according to Dr. Walker, because it reveals something new about what sleep does to memory. “It also tells us that the biggest effect of sleep can be seen only when you test whether or not that memory holds up against interference from additional new learning.”

American Academy of Neurology 59th Annual Meeting: Abstract S39.003. April 28 – May 5, 2007.

From Medscape.com

What is the FACT?

alice — Mon, 23 Apr 2007 06:28:08 +0000

The FACT refers to ‘The First Axiom of Consciousness and Thought’ – ‘If a thing is not alive, it cannot be conscious, nor can it think’, a lucid thought if ever one was expressed. Dr. Endel Tulving wrote about the FACT in one of his earlier, tellingly animated tales that is now available online (posted with his permission). His message is piercing and his writing style is refreshingly entertaining. It is a great read that I recommend to anyone interested in the scientific study of consciousness. Tulving E. (1997). FACT: The first axiom of consciousness and thought. In R. Solso (Ed.), Mind and Brain Sciences in the Twenty-First Century.

What is happening in the brain when our minds wander?

alice — Mon, 23 Apr 2007 05:34:26 +0000

It seems like science still has a ways to go before this question can be answered, but scientists have already started the investigation. In a recent study, Mason and colleagues used fMRI and thought sampling to study which areas of the brain show increased activations in one kind of situation where our minds are likely to wander: when we perform tasks that become banal with continual practice. They compared brain activity that was associated with performing blocks of well-practiced tasks with that of non-practiced, but otherwise identical, tasks and observed greater activation for the practiced tasks in following brain areas: bilateral medial prefrontal cortex (BAs 6, 8, 9, and 10); bilateral superior frontal gyri (BAs 8 and 9); anterior cingulate (BA10); bilateral aspects of the posterior cingulate (BAs 29 and 30); precuneus (BAs 7 and 31); left angular gyrus (BA 39); bilateral aspects of the insula (BA 13); left superior temporal (BA 22), the right superior temporal (BA 41) and the left middle temporal gyri (BA 19). They also found a significant positive relation between changes in brain activity in many of the aforementioned regions for blocks in which subjects performed practiced, relative to non-practiced, tasks and the subjects’ frequency of mind-wandering, which was assessed using the daydream frequency scale of the Imaginal Processes Inventory. Following-up with this intriguing study, it would be interesting to examine the brain activity that arises during specific instances, as opposed to blocks, when participants report mind-wandering.

Wandering minds: the default network and stimulus-independent thought.

Mason MF, Norton MI, Van Horn JD, Wegner DM, Grafton ST, Macrae CN

Despite evidence pointing to a ubiquitous tendency of human minds to wander, little is known about the neural operations that support this core component of human cognition. Using both thought sampling and brain imaging, the current investigation demonstrated that mind-wandering is associated with activity in a default network of cortical regions that are active when the brain is “at rest.” In addition, individuals’ reports of the tendency of their minds to wander were correlated with activity in this network.

Science abstract

Consciousness in the Single Neuron

alice — Tue, 17 Apr 2007 15:45:12 +0000

Are the contents of conscious perception tied to individual brain cells? Can we use single neurons to determine someone’s subjective experience? A recent studies published in PNAS suggests otherwise: there are no specialized neurons that carry information about what enters awareness and what not. If one holds the picture of a butterfly in front of one eye and the image of an apple before the other, the brain gets into a deep dilemma. It must integrate the contradictory pictures to a meaningful whole. This situation inevitably leads to a fascinating phenomenon called “binocular rivalry“. During rivalry, perception alternates between the picture shown to one eye and that shown to the other one. In other words, the butterfly will be seen during some moments and the apple during others. It is as if the brain is unable to decide which eye to trust, and therefore constantly wavers back and forth between them.

stimulus-dependent activity patterns that are decisive for what reaches conscious awareness and what does notThere are neurons in the visual cortex, which become strongly active for certain pictures (such as that of a butterfly), but not for others. If one measures the activity of such a cell by means of tiny electrodes, it is often possible to determine which stimulus gets perceived at any moment during binocular rivalry. Interestingly, however, some cells do not seem to be affected by the spontaneous perceptual changes during binocular rivalry. Instead, they truthfully indicate that the stimulus that activates them is constantly present, regardless whether it is perceived or not. This observation raises the question of whether there are individual brain cells that differ in their characteristics from other cells so that their activity stands in direct connection with what we consciously perceive. To answer this question, scientists at the Max Planck Institute at Tuebingen, Germany repeated the experiment using another trick. After all, while one sees a certain image with one eye, one can replace the image in the other eye, without affecting awareness. The question was, would this manipulation nonetheless affect neuronal activity? To the surprise of the researchers, any exchange of the pictures had large effects on the activity of the recorded neurons. In fact, many cells lost their special characteristic and showed no more activity fluctuations during perceptual alternations. Other cells, however, which had been unaffected by perception before, began to indicate the perceptual alternation of the stimuli.

Whether an individual brain cell participates in conscious experiencing or not therefore seems to be flexibly determined. Based on these results, it is conceivable that it is not only fixed interconnections between neurons, but also stimulus-dependent activity patterns that are decisive for what reaches conscious awareness and what does not.

Author Information

Alex Maier was a graduate student at the Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics in Tübingen, Germany. He is now a researcher within the Unit on Cognitive Neurophysiology and Imaging at the National Institute of Mental Health in Bethesda, MD.

References

Alexander Maier, Nikos K. Logothetis, and David A. Leopold Context-dependent perceptual modulation of single neurons in primate visual cortex, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

ABSTRACT Some neurons in the visual cortex alter their spiking rate according to the perceptual interpretation of an observed stimulus, rather than its physical structure alone. Experiments in monkeys have suggested that, although the proportion of neurons showing this effect differs greatly between cortical areas, this proportion remains similar across different stimuli. These findings have raised the intriguing question of whether the same neurons always participate in the disambiguation of sensory patterns and whether such neurons might represent a special class of cortical cells that relay perceptual signals to higher cortical areas. Here we explore this question by measuring activity in the middle temporal cortex of monkeys and asking to what degree the percept-related responses of individual neurons depend upon the specific sensory input. In contrast to our expectations, we found that even small differences in the stimuli led to significant changes in the signaling of the perceptual state by single neurons. We conclude that nearly all feature-responsive neurons in this area, rather than a select subset, can contribute to the resolution of sensory conflict, and that the role of individual cells in signaling the perceptual outcome is tightly linked to the fine details of the stimuli involved.

Film – Victim of the Brain

virgil — Fri, 06 Apr 2007 15:15:43 +0000

Victim of the Brain is a 1988 docudrama by Dutch director Piet Hoenderdos about “the ideas of Douglas Hofstadter”. It features interviews with Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett. It has never been online before, but is now available on Google Video.

Can blindsight lead to superior sight?

thomasr — Fri, 06 Apr 2007 10:04:08 +0000

In a most interesting paper by Ceri Trevethan, Arash Sahraie and Larry Weiskrantz, it is suggested that blindsight patients are actually superior on certain visual stimulus detection tasks. In this paper, published in Cognition, the authors also provide experimental evidence that this is indeed the case.

The study highlights the neural dynamics that take place in the case of brain damage. While the areas that are damaged have been responsible for a given task (i.e. vision) it is likely that such injury leads to unmasking of previously suppressed functions in adjacent or other connected areas. As such, brain damage might indeed not only lead to reduced functions, but unmasking — and enhancement — of other functions. As in this study,

Can blindsight be superior to ‘sighted-sight’?

Ceri T. Trevethan, a, Arash Sahraie, a and Larry Weiskrantz, a

a: Vision Research Laboratories, School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, AB24 2UB Scotland, UK

Received 11 January 2006; revised 20 April 2006; accepted 21 April 2006. Available online 9 June 2006.

Abstract

DB, the first blindsight case to be tested extensively (Weiskrantz, 1986) has demonstrated the ability to detect and discriminate a range of visual stimuli presented within his perimetrically blind visual field defect. In a temporal two alternative forced choice (2AFC) detection experiment we have investigated the limits of DB’s detection ability within his field defect. Blind field performance was compared to his sighted field performance and to an age-matched control group (n = 6). DB reliably detected the presence of a small (2°), low contrast (7%), 4.6 c/° Gabor patch with the same space-averaged luminance as the background presented within his blind field but performed at chance levels at the same eccentricity (11.3°) within his sighted field. Investigation of detection as a function of stimulus contrast revealed DB’s ability to detect the presence of an 8% contrast stimulus within his blind field, compared to 12% in his sighted field. No significant difference in detection performance between DB’s sighted field and the performance of six age-matched control participants suggests poor sighted field performance does not account for the results. Monocular testing also rules out differences between the eyes as an explanation, suggesting that DB demonstrates superior detection for certain stimuli within his visual field defect compared to normal vision.

An artificial sixth sense

virgil — Thu, 05 Apr 2007 18:16:58 +0000

Wired has a story about new sensory prosthetics giving people a sense of magnetic north, “tactile vision”, etc. Subjects report that they even dream in their new senses.

Here is a piece from the article:

Direction isn’t something humans can detect innately. Some birds can, of course, and for them it’s no less important than taste or smell are for us. In fact, lots of animals have cool, “extra” senses. Sunfish see polarized light. Loggerhead turtles feel Earth’s magnetic field. Bonnethead sharks detect subtle changes (less than a nanovolt) in small electrical fields. And other critters have heightened versions of familiar senses — bats hear frequencies outside our auditory range, and some insects see ultraviolet light.

We humans get just the five. But why? Can our senses be modified? Expanded? Given the right prosthetics, could we feel electromagnetic fields or hear ultrasound? The answers to these questions, according to researchers at a handful of labs around the world, appear to be yes.

Ned Block paper, BBS call for commentators

thomasr — Wed, 04 Apr 2007 18:38:00 +0000

Ned Block is known for his suggestions that there are two aspects of consciousness and their neural underpinnings that need to be disentangled. In BBS, there is now an unedited and uncorrected final draft of a manuscript that, while being accepted for publication, it needs commentators, as is standard procedure in BBS. The paper is called “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience“.

If you are interested in commenting on this interesting paper, go to the BBS commentator page for this manuscript. Mind, do not start to write the comment before receiving a formal invitation.

Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience

Abstract

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority, and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is ‘Yes’, then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is ‘Yes’? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! The paper argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. The paper argues that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things equal) by the explanations it allows.

Full manuscript (PDF)

BBS comment page

Startle reflex following subliminal images of fear and sex

thomasr — Wed, 04 Apr 2007 18:21:13 +0000

What happens if you are presented with subliminal stimuli that are normally associated with fear or sexual arousal? In a study published in Biological Psychiatry two Spanish researchers now document that both negative positive biologically relevant stimuli can be nonconsciously processed. Furthermore, it is thought that this mechanism is mediated by amygdala activation and that such stimuli can affect behavioral responding.

Fearful and Sexual Pictures Not Consciously Seen Modulate the Startle Reflex in Human Beings

Elisabeth Ruiz-Padial and Jaime Vila

Background

Animal and human studies consistently have demonstrated that the startle reflex elicited by intense auditory stimulation is enhanced by the previous presentation of fear-evoking stimuli. There is also growing and varied evidence of the nonconscious processing of fear stimuli in human beings eliciting brain and autonomic fear responses.

Methods

We report two studies using the startle probe paradigm and the backward-masking procedure to examine the modulation of the eye-blink component of the startle reflex by consciously and nonconsciously presented emotional pictures.

Results

Conscious and nonconscious presentation of fearful pictures amplified the magnitude of the startle reflex in both studies. The opposite tendency was observed for conscious and nonconscious presentation of sexually attractive pictures in the second study.

Conclusions

These findings support the notion that negative (and possibly positive) biologically relevant stimuli can be nonconsciously processed, presumably via amygdala activation, and can affect behavioral responding.

ScienceDirect abstract

Event perceptions

thomasr — Wed, 04 Apr 2007 18:11:46 +0000

So how do we really experience the world around us, and events as they occur? As discrete units of experiences or as one flow of experience. In a recent paper in Psychologial Bulletin authors Jeffrey Sacks and colleagues suggest that we perceive and conceive of activity in terms of discrete events, and that the perception of boundaries between events arises from ongoing perceptual processing. The elaboration of this view and accompanying consequences are laid out in this paper. Here we link to the abstract as well as the manuscript.

Event Perception: A Mind–Brain Perspective

Jeffrey M. Zacks, Nicole K. Speer, Khena M. Swallow, Todd S. Braver, and Jeremy R. Reynolds

People perceive and conceive of activity in terms of discrete events. Here the authors propose a theory according to which the perception of boundaries between events arises from ongoing perceptual processing and regulates attention and memory. Perceptual systems continuously make predictions about what will happen next. When transient errors in predictions arise, an event boundary is perceived. According to the theory, the perception of events depends on both sensory cues and knowledge structures that represent previously learned information about event parts and inferences about actors’ goals and plans. Neurological and neurophysiological data suggest that representations of events may be implemented by structures in the lateral prefrontal cortex and that perceptual prediction error is calculated and evaluated by a processing pathway, including the anterior cingulate cortex and subcortical neuromodulatory systems.

ScienceDirect abstract

Full manuscript (PDF)

Jeff Sacks homepage

Dynamic Cognition Lab

Emotion

thomasr — Tue, 03 Apr 2007 21:21:28 +0000

A new issue of Emotion is out, containing articles on topics including:

emotion inference
emotional competence in childhood
chimp facial expressions

Emotion

Volume 7, Issue 1, Pages 1-225 (February 2007)

1. The Process of Emotion Inference
Matthias Siemer and Rainer Reisenzein

2. Getting From Situations to Emotions: Appraisal and Other Routes
Brian Parkinson

3. Emotions and Appraisals: Can You Have One Without the Other?
Matthias Siemer and Rainer Reisenzein

4. Emotion Regulation and Culture: Are the Social Consequences of Emotion Suppression Culture-Specific?
Emily A. Butler, Tiane L. Lee and James J. Gross

5. Inhibition of Return to Social Signals of Fear
Raliza S. Stoyanova, Jay Pratt and Adam K. Anderson

6. Evidence for Universality in Phenomenological Emotion Response System Coherence
David Matsumoto, John B. Nezlek and Birgit Koopmann

7. Task Feedback Effects on Conflict Monitoring and Executive Control: Relationship to Subclinical Measures of Depression
Avram J. Holmes and Diego A. Pizzagalli

8. Kindergarten Children’s Emotion Competence as a Predictor of Their Academic Competence in First Grade
Christopher J. Trentacosta and Carroll E. Izard

9. The Role of Attention and Relatedness in Emotionally Enhanced Memory
Deborah Talmi, Ulrich Schimmack, Theone Paterson and Morris Moscovitch

10. Intoxication Level and Emotional Response
Keith F. Donohue, John J. Curtin, Christopher J. Patrick and Alan R. Lang

11. Are Facial Expressions of Emotion Produced by Categorical Affect Programs or Dynamically Driven by Appraisal?
Klaus R. Scherer and Heiner Ellgring

12. Toward a Dialect Theory: Cultural Differences in the Expression and Recognition of Posed Facial Expressions
Hillary Anger Elfenbein, Martin Beaupré, Manon Lévesque and Ursula Hess

13. Distinguishing Between Automaticity and Attention in the Processing of Emotionally Significant Stimuli
Hadas Okon-Singer, Joseph Tzelgov and Avishai Henik

14. Multimodal Expression of Emotion: Affect Programs or Componential Appraisal Patterns?
Klaus R. Scherer and Heiner Ellgring

15. Classifying Chimpanzee Facial Expressions Using Muscle Action
Lisa A. Parr, Bridget M. Waller, Sarah J. Vick and Kim A. Bard

16. Common and Distinct Patterns of Affective Response in Dimensions of Anxiety and Depression
Christine L. Larson, Jack B. Nitschke and Richard J. Davidson

17. When Danger Lurks in the Background: Attentional Capture by Animal Fear-Relevant Distractors Is Specific and Selectively Enhanced by Animal Fear
Ottmar V. Lipp and Allison M. Waters

18. Does Processing of Emotional Stimuli Predict Symptomatic Improvement and Diagnostic Recovery From Major Depression?
Sheri L. Johnson, Jutta Joormann and Ian H. Gotlib

19. The Timing of Appraisals
Nathalie Lanctôt and Ursula Hess

20. Sun and Water: On a Modulus-Based Measurement of Happiness
Christopher K. Hsee and Judy Ningyu Tang

21. Anger and Time Perception in Children
Sandrine Gil, Paula M. Niedenthal and Sylvie Droit-Volet

What is the relation between emotion and consciousness?

alice — Mon, 02 Apr 2007 06:29:51 +0000

What is the relation between emotion and consciousness? In their recent paper in TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, Tsuchiya and Adolphs review recent studies that address this question.

Focusing on domains where emotion and consciousness overlap and interact, Tsuchiya and Adolphs suggest that each (emotion and consciousness) is necessary for aspects of the other. They follow the common view that emotion and consciousness result from neuronal activity in the brain and they argue that both emotion and consciousness depend on neural representations of one’s own body. Moreover, Tsuchiya and Adolphs argue that these representations arise from structures in the brainstem and medial telencephalon that receive interoceptive information. The authors believe that future work requires not only more data but also further theoretical development of the relevant concepts that are currently under investigation.

Emotion and consciousness
Naotsugu Tsuchiya and Ralph Adolphs

Consciousness and emotion feature prominently in our personal lives, yet remain enigmatic. Recent advances prompt further distinctions that should provide more experimental traction: we argue that emotion consists of an emotion state (functional aspects, including emotional response) as well as feelings (the conscious experience of the emotion), and that consciousness consists of level (e.g. coma, vegetative state and wakefulness) and content (what it is we are conscious of). Not only is consciousness important to aspects of emotion but structures that are important for emotion, such as brainstem nuclei and midline cortices, overlap with structures that regulate the level of consciousness. The intersection of consciousness and emotion is ripe for experimental investigation, and we outline possible examples for future studies.

Studying the wandering mind

thomasr — Sun, 25 Mar 2007 07:26:27 +0000

Do your thoughts stray from your work or studies? Do you catch yourself making to-do lists when your attention should be elsewhere? Welcome to the club.

College students reported mind-wandering almost one-third of the time in their daily lives, according to a new study led by faculty and graduate students at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro. The study will be published in the July issue of Psychological Science.

The study followed 124 undergraduates, who carried personal digital assistants for a week. The PDAs signaled the students eight times a day between noon and midnight to report whether their thoughts were wandering away from what they were doing and to answer multiple-choice questions about their current activity, surroundings and state of mind.

On average, the students reported mind-wandering in about 30 percent of their responses. But individual results varied widely: One student reported no mind wandering, while another reported it in more than 90 percent of responses.

Despite being so common, mind-wandering remains little studied and poorly understood, said Dr. Michael Kane, an associate professor of psychology at UNCG, who led the study. “If you want to understand people’s mental lives, this is a phenomenon we ought to be thinking about,” he told the Associated Press.

Why does attention wander? And why are some better able to control it than others? The answers to these questions could be used to improve reading comprehension and change the way teachers present their lessons. This information could help prevent accidents and treat those with attention-deficit disorders, Kane said.

The study produced other interesting findings. The students were first given a working memory capacity (WMC) test, a kind of intelligence test that asks subjects to remember short lists while they are simultaneously engaged in another mental task.

Overall, WMC did not predict mind wandering. But during activities requiring concentration and mental effort, higher WMC subjects maintained focus better than lower WMC subjects.

The team of study authors includes faculty members Dr. Paul Silvia and Dr. Thomas Kwapil, and doctoral students Leslie Brown and Jennifer McVay, all in the UNCG Department of Psychology. Dr. Inez Myin-Germeys of the University of Maastricht also is an investigator.

Source: Association for Psychological Science

Why We Give In To Temptation

thomasr — Sun, 25 Mar 2007 00:18:19 +0000

We’ve all had our moments of weakness when trying to control ourselves; eating that donut on your diet, losing your temper with your kids, becoming upset when you’re doing your best not to. It isn’t like we plan on these lapses in judgment. It’s more like they just sort of happen.

There is scientific evidence that explains this phenomenon of everyday life. Self regulation, our strength to inhibit impulses, make decisions, persist at difficult tasks, and control emotions can be spent just like a muscle that has been lifting heavy weights. When we spend our strength on one task (trying to control your emotion around a petulant boss), there is less to spend on others (avoiding the Ben & Jerry’s when we get home).

The funny thing about being vulnerable to saying, eating, or doing the wrong thing is that humans are typically unaware that they are in a moment of weakness, unlike the strain and fatigue we feel in our muscles after a workout. Fortunately, new research conducted by University of Kentucky psychologists Suzanne Segerstrom and Lise Solberg Nes suggest that there may be a biological indicator to tell us when we are working hard at resisting temptation and consequently when we are vulnerable to doing things contrary to our intentions.

A measure of cardiac regulation called “heart rate variability” (HRV) appears to be linked to self regulation.

The researchers conducted a two-part study in order to test their hypothesis. In the first, participants were instructed to fast for three hours in order to take part in what they believed was a “physiology of food preference” experiment. Participants’ HRV was monitored while they were presented with a tray of cookies, candy and….carrots. Temptation, in this case, was indicated by giving into the tastier but decidedly less healthy snack of cookies and candy.

HRV as it turns out was considerably higher when people were working to resist temptation (eating carrots rather than cookies and chocolate) than when they were not, suggesting that HRV was mirroring the self regulation taking place.

In part two of the experiment, after resisting or giving into temptation, the authors had the participants attempt to complete difficult anagrams, some of which were impossible to solve. The authors measured how long participants persevered at the anagrams and as predicted, those who had exerted high self regulation by resisting sweets were more likely to give up earlier on the task.

Moreover, the people who had higher levels of HRV by nature, regardless of giving into temptation, were likely to endure longer at the anagram task.

HRV was not singled out as an indicator on a lark. Segerstrom and Solberg Nes noted that the brain structures involved in self regulation overlap considerably with the structures that control HRV which suggested that HRV would accurately reflect self regulation.

So, will we be wearing a cardiac monitor in the near future to gauge whether we are vulnerable in our self regulating abilities? It’s doubtful, say the authors. However, when considering special populations with more serious consequences of self regulatory failure (say, alcoholics) HRV feedback could be helpful to determine when those critical relapses in regulation will happen.

Reference: Psychological Science “Heart Rate Variability Reflects Self-Regulatory Strength, Effort, and Fatigue.”

Source: Association for Psychological Science

Beliefs about the rigidity of personality

thomasr — Sat, 24 Mar 2007 23:57:44 +0000

How do people reason about personality, and how people change or stay the same over time? In a study by Nick Haslam and colleagues lay theories of personality over time was explored. Among other things the researchers found that beliefs about normative personality change generally corresponded to research evidence on adult trajectories of the Big Five factors; and that recalled and anticipated personal change tended to be more positive than these norms

One potential shortcoming of the study is that it used only undergraduates. It would be interesting to see how the perception of personality continuity would also change according to ageing (as well as across different educational groups).

Beliefs about personality change and continuity
Nick Haslam, Brock Bastian, Christopher Fox and Jennifer Whelan

Lay conceptions of personality change and continuity were examined in a sample of 112 undergraduates. Participants rated their personal change over 5 years (past or future), the change they perceived to be normative over 10-year age spans between 15 and 65, their beliefs about whether personality is fixed or malleable (“lay theories”) and their beliefs about the causes of personality change and continuity. Beliefs about normative personality change generally corresponded to research evidence on adult trajectories of the Big Five factors, with some age bias, whereas recalled and anticipated personal change tended to be more positive than these norms. Participants tended to endorse environmental causes more for personality change than for continuity. Lay theories were not consistently associated with these causal beliefs, or with beliefs about personal and normative change.