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	<title>Comments for Science &amp; Consciousness Review</title>
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	<link>http://sciconrev.org</link>
	<description>News from the Scientific Study of Consciousness</description>
	<pubDate>Fri, 12 Mar 2010 14:03:40 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>Comment on Everyday Practice of Science: Where Intuition and Passion Meet Objectivity and Logic by rrrn</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2009/05/everyday-practice-of-science-where-intuition-and-passion-meet-objectivity-and-logic/comment-page-1/#comment-284517</link>
		<dc:creator>rrrn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 08:14:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sciconrev.org/?p=1336#comment-284517</guid>
		<description>More and more research shows that everyone is a genius. What are the consequences for academia?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>More and more research shows that everyone is a genius. What are the consequences for academia?</p>
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		<title>Comment on Alice by Everyday Practice of Science: Where Intuition and Passion Meet Objectivity and Logic &#124; Science &#38; Consciousness Review</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/alice/comment-page-1/#comment-284464</link>
		<dc:creator>Everyday Practice of Science: Where Intuition and Passion Meet Objectivity and Logic &#124; Science &#38; Consciousness Review</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2009 04:18:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.sci-con.org/alice/#comment-284464</guid>
		<description>[...] Reviewed by Alice Kim [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Reviewed by Alice Kim [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on Alice by Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood &#124; Science &#38; Consciousness Review</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/alice/comment-page-1/#comment-284285</link>
		<dc:creator>Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood &#124; Science &#38; Consciousness Review</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 Jan 2009 08:25:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.sci-con.org/alice/#comment-284285</guid>
		<description>[...] Summary by Alice Kim [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Summary by Alice Kim [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on Which brain regions enable us to remember our past and anticipate our future? by Future event forecasts &#171; morbius glass</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2007/01/which-brain-regions-enable-us-to-remember-our-past-and-anticipate-our-future/comment-page-1/#comment-284284</link>
		<dc:creator>Future event forecasts &#171; morbius glass</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2008 02:35:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.sci-con.org/2007/01/which-brain-regions-enable-us-to-remember-our-past-and-anticipate-our-future/#comment-284284</guid>
		<description>[...] More information here [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] More information here [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on How good are you at Self-Control? by Alain Morin</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2008/11/how-good-are-you-at-self-control/comment-page-1/#comment-284171</link>
		<dc:creator>Alain Morin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Dec 2008 06:04:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sciconrev.org/?p=1079#comment-284171</guid>
		<description>In response to the comment made above:
(1) It is indeed good to remind us that working memory is made up of both a verbal component (inner speech) and a visuo-spatial component (imagery). In my SCR Feature I deliberately simplified the picture and exclusively focused on the potential link between  the verbal component of working memory and self-regulation. It thus remains possible that imagery too plays an active role in self-regulation/control.  Note here (a) that my argument  has never been that «self-control equates to greater capacity for self-talk», but rather that «inner speech promotes self-control», and (b) to my knowledge, research showing a link between visuo-spatial skills and self-regulation is non-existent.

(2) Cognitive therapy (e.g., Beck’s work, as well as Meichembaum’s, Ellis’, etc.) does not suggest that self-talk per se is detrimental to self-control. Instead, it shows that some individuals misuse inner speech by either overusing it or by distorting it (by engaging in negative thought patterns), which leads to poor self-regulation indeed. These individuals are «self-ruminators» as opposed to «self-reflectors» -- see Trapnell and Campbell (1999). Healthy use of inner speech translates into highly effective self-regulation.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In response to the comment made above:<br />
(1) It is indeed good to remind us that working memory is made up of both a verbal component (inner speech) and a visuo-spatial component (imagery). In my SCR Feature I deliberately simplified the picture and exclusively focused on the potential link between  the verbal component of working memory and self-regulation. It thus remains possible that imagery too plays an active role in self-regulation/control.  Note here (a) that my argument  has never been that «self-control equates to greater capacity for self-talk», but rather that «inner speech promotes self-control», and (b) to my knowledge, research showing a link between visuo-spatial skills and self-regulation is non-existent.</p>
<p>(2) Cognitive therapy (e.g., Beck’s work, as well as Meichembaum’s, Ellis’, etc.) does not suggest that self-talk per se is detrimental to self-control. Instead, it shows that some individuals misuse inner speech by either overusing it or by distorting it (by engaging in negative thought patterns), which leads to poor self-regulation indeed. These individuals are «self-ruminators» as opposed to «self-reflectors» &#8212; see Trapnell and Campbell (1999). Healthy use of inner speech translates into highly effective self-regulation.</p>
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		<title>Comment on The Decider by whit</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2008/11/the-decider/comment-page-1/#comment-284149</link>
		<dc:creator>whit</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 06 Dec 2008 18:47:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sciconrev.org/?p=1157#comment-284149</guid>
		<description>&lt;blockquote&gt;... except that the brain itself is a machine, a network of cells that computes its choices....&lt;/blockquote&gt;If you start by asserting that this metaphor is simply the fact of the matter, your subsequent argument rests on quicksand. If you are right about the centrality of "the complex circulation of molecular information," you should address why virtually none of our actual computing machines work by circulating "molecular information."

If men were solely driven by their pleasures and pains, women would have centuries ago taken total control of men's minds. Really addressing the question of free will doesn't consist in showing the neural correlates of the "pleasure principle," but rather in showing how conscious human beings are so often (even if not all or most of the time) capable of transcending it.

Answering &lt;i&gt;that&lt;/i&gt; question would produce a plausible model of free will. Denying the question of transcendence - claiming that all behavior is merely the end result of calculation against projected sum results of an equation of pleasure and pain - misses the question of free will entirely.

It's also simply incoherent. It assumes that all pleasures can be neatly mapped onto an intensity scale. Yet any aesthete knows that subtle pleasures can be preferable to strong pleasures, and that the flavors and complexities of pleasures can hardly be reduced to a scale at all - or even multiple scales. To the extent different pleasures - say of fine food or fine scenery - can be scaled, it's not to the same scales across pleasure kinds either. Nor are pains differentiated simply in linear intensity.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>&#8230; except that the brain itself is a machine, a network of cells that computes its choices&#8230;.</p></blockquote>
<p>If you start by asserting that this metaphor is simply the fact of the matter, your subsequent argument rests on quicksand. If you are right about the centrality of &#8220;the complex circulation of molecular information,&#8221; you should address why virtually none of our actual computing machines work by circulating &#8220;molecular information.&#8221;</p>
<p>If men were solely driven by their pleasures and pains, women would have centuries ago taken total control of men&#8217;s minds. Really addressing the question of free will doesn&#8217;t consist in showing the neural correlates of the &#8220;pleasure principle,&#8221; but rather in showing how conscious human beings are so often (even if not all or most of the time) capable of transcending it.</p>
<p>Answering <i>that</i> question would produce a plausible model of free will. Denying the question of transcendence - claiming that all behavior is merely the end result of calculation against projected sum results of an equation of pleasure and pain - misses the question of free will entirely.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s also simply incoherent. It assumes that all pleasures can be neatly mapped onto an intensity scale. Yet any aesthete knows that subtle pleasures can be preferable to strong pleasures, and that the flavors and complexities of pleasures can hardly be reduced to a scale at all - or even multiple scales. To the extent different pleasures - say of fine food or fine scenery - can be scaled, it&#8217;s not to the same scales across pleasure kinds either. Nor are pains differentiated simply in linear intensity.</p>
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		<title>Comment on How good are you at Self-Control? by whit</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2008/11/how-good-are-you-at-self-control/comment-page-1/#comment-284148</link>
		<dc:creator>whit</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 06 Dec 2008 17:43:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sciconrev.org/?p=1079#comment-284148</guid>
		<description>How do you factor in the research showing that visuo-spatial working memory and verbal working memory are separable capacities (see Robert Logie's work)? So for instance, if your WMC test is "keeping several words in mind while doing math problems," have you determined whether the subject's strategy with math is primarily verbal or visuo-spatial? If the WMC capacity test is effectively finding greater visuo-spatial working memory, rather than verbal, then it might be that self-control more correlates with a capacity for "vision" of goals than "self-talk" of goals. Until you disambiguate this, the argument that self-control equates to greater capacity for self-talk isn't strong. 

You also should contend with Aaron Beck's findings suggesting that self-talk, lodged presumably in working memory, often leads to a neurotic lack of self-control, which can be improved precisely by training subjects to gain psychological distance from the self-talk - what his well-proven "cognitive therapy" consists in.

In folk psychology, of course, inner speech just is self-control, and there's a homunculus over there producing it, or is it that we're supposed to be the homunculus? All the standard arguments against a homunculus need to be disarmed, perhaps by better separating your claim from the folk psychological picture.

Also, even if better self-control capacity correlates with better verbal (as compared to visuo-spatial) working memory capacity, you need to show that it isn't the other way around: that better self-control capacity produces better working memory capacity. Keeping something within working memory is itself arguably an instance of self-control.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>How do you factor in the research showing that visuo-spatial working memory and verbal working memory are separable capacities (see Robert Logie&#8217;s work)? So for instance, if your WMC test is &#8220;keeping several words in mind while doing math problems,&#8221; have you determined whether the subject&#8217;s strategy with math is primarily verbal or visuo-spatial? If the WMC capacity test is effectively finding greater visuo-spatial working memory, rather than verbal, then it might be that self-control more correlates with a capacity for &#8220;vision&#8221; of goals than &#8220;self-talk&#8221; of goals. Until you disambiguate this, the argument that self-control equates to greater capacity for self-talk isn&#8217;t strong. </p>
<p>You also should contend with Aaron Beck&#8217;s findings suggesting that self-talk, lodged presumably in working memory, often leads to a neurotic lack of self-control, which can be improved precisely by training subjects to gain psychological distance from the self-talk - what his well-proven &#8220;cognitive therapy&#8221; consists in.</p>
<p>In folk psychology, of course, inner speech just is self-control, and there&#8217;s a homunculus over there producing it, or is it that we&#8217;re supposed to be the homunculus? All the standard arguments against a homunculus need to be disarmed, perhaps by better separating your claim from the folk psychological picture.</p>
<p>Also, even if better self-control capacity correlates with better verbal (as compared to visuo-spatial) working memory capacity, you need to show that it isn&#8217;t the other way around: that better self-control capacity produces better working memory capacity. Keeping something within working memory is itself arguably an instance of self-control.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Information Integration Theory of Consciousness by Oliver</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2005/12/information-integration-theory-of-consciousness/comment-page-1/#comment-283593</link>
		<dc:creator>Oliver</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 12 Mar 2008 08:07:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sci-con.org/index.php/2005/12/information-integration-theory-of-consciousness/#comment-283593</guid>
		<description>It makes no sense to me to propose fugue as evidence contrary to the phi hypothesis. Far from hypothesizing that a person's phi must be always high, Tononi suggests that it diminishes as one falls asleep--and he published a beautiful experiment in Science in 2005 that lends support to exactly that. There are people who function with one hemisphere, suggesting they are consciousness with half the phi of others. And how about the brains of two year-olds. I don't see what any of this has to do with Tononi's hypothesis.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It makes no sense to me to propose fugue as evidence contrary to the phi hypothesis. Far from hypothesizing that a person&#8217;s phi must be always high, Tononi suggests that it diminishes as one falls asleep&#8211;and he published a beautiful experiment in Science in 2005 that lends support to exactly that. There are people who function with one hemisphere, suggesting they are consciousness with half the phi of others. And how about the brains of two year-olds. I don&#8217;t see what any of this has to do with Tononi&#8217;s hypothesis.</p>
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		<title>Comment on From Monkey Brain to Human Brain: A Fyssen Foundation Symposium by Anibal</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2008/02/from-monkey-brain-to-human-brain-a-fyssen-foundation-symposium/comment-page-1/#comment-283153</link>
		<dc:creator>Anibal</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Feb 2008 11:47:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sci-con.org/2008/02/from-monkey-brain-to-human-brain-a-fyssen-foundation-symposium/#comment-283153</guid>
		<description>I read this book as soon as it was published because i was looking for the published work of one of the most accomplished authors in what is known as social cogntive neuroscience, his name is David I. Perrett.
The book represents an updated mixture of distinct  levels of comaprison between human and monkey brains ranging from anatomical studies, dietary influences on brain evolution in both species, homeobox genes, mirror neurons, arithmetic or number sense faculty, tool manipulation... and other share characteristics.
A good inversion!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I read this book as soon as it was published because i was looking for the published work of one of the most accomplished authors in what is known as social cogntive neuroscience, his name is David I. Perrett.<br />
The book represents an updated mixture of distinct  levels of comaprison between human and monkey brains ranging from anatomical studies, dietary influences on brain evolution in both species, homeobox genes, mirror neurons, arithmetic or number sense faculty, tool manipulation&#8230; and other share characteristics.<br />
A good inversion!</p>
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		<title>Comment on God on the brain by Spinoza</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2008/01/god-on-the-brain/comment-page-1/#comment-283029</link>
		<dc:creator>Spinoza</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 02 Feb 2008 02:34:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sci-con.org/2008/01/god-on-the-brain/#comment-283029</guid>
		<description>Not exactly new data as the link between the physical brain, especally via temporal lobe disturbances or the loci of the temporo-parietal junction has been know for years.  The evidence is far more persuasive that so-called mystical or "profound" religious/spiritual experience is derived from physical, causal phenomena... and the notion of god is clearly constructed from the bottom up... versus the bizarro hypothesis that humans are somehow "hardwired" by an unknown supernatural creator entity.

The latter hypothesis beyond lame since if such an entity existed, which is totally devoid of proof, the "neurotheological" circuit would be 1. present in all and 2. lead to perfect communion with this occult, ephemeral being.

Whether it's the "god gene" or Persinger's "god machine"... or OOB's... or religious hallucinations induced by drugs or schizophrenia... it is crystal clear to me that man has created god out of ignorance of the natural world, fear of death... and the wish to be demigods and live forever.

The fact that the belief in a god that has left not a trace in the physical world is a fixed delusion speaks volumes of a clear link between mental illness and the attendant hallucinations which often take on religious themes.  I had a friend once who literally went crazy on drugs... a brilliant,jewish muscian during the late 60's.  He was later arrested and in court defended himself in the person of jesus christ. Clearly, our culture determines the dialog and narrative these "visions and voices" will take.

Cheers to all who seek.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Not exactly new data as the link between the physical brain, especally via temporal lobe disturbances or the loci of the temporo-parietal junction has been know for years.  The evidence is far more persuasive that so-called mystical or &#8220;profound&#8221; religious/spiritual experience is derived from physical, causal phenomena&#8230; and the notion of god is clearly constructed from the bottom up&#8230; versus the bizarro hypothesis that humans are somehow &#8220;hardwired&#8221; by an unknown supernatural creator entity.</p>
<p>The latter hypothesis beyond lame since if such an entity existed, which is totally devoid of proof, the &#8220;neurotheological&#8221; circuit would be 1. present in all and 2. lead to perfect communion with this occult, ephemeral being.</p>
<p>Whether it&#8217;s the &#8220;god gene&#8221; or Persinger&#8217;s &#8220;god machine&#8221;&#8230; or OOB&#8217;s&#8230; or religious hallucinations induced by drugs or schizophrenia&#8230; it is crystal clear to me that man has created god out of ignorance of the natural world, fear of death&#8230; and the wish to be demigods and live forever.</p>
<p>The fact that the belief in a god that has left not a trace in the physical world is a fixed delusion speaks volumes of a clear link between mental illness and the attendant hallucinations which often take on religious themes.  I had a friend once who literally went crazy on drugs&#8230; a brilliant,jewish muscian during the late 60&#8217;s.  He was later arrested and in court defended himself in the person of jesus christ. Clearly, our culture determines the dialog and narrative these &#8220;visions and voices&#8221; will take.</p>
<p>Cheers to all who seek.</p>
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		<title>Comment on God on the brain by Anibal</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2008/01/god-on-the-brain/comment-page-1/#comment-283016</link>
		<dc:creator>Anibal</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Feb 2008 10:47:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sci-con.org/2008/01/god-on-the-brain/#comment-283016</guid>
		<description>There seems to be two camps interesecting throught out the many areas and subareas inquiring about the religious experience and pehnomena. 
The first one advocating that religious phenomena could be a universal trait, tries to find a correlation in our nature, particularly in our brains, about how the trascendental mind evolve. 
Dean Hamer investigations pointing to a gene (VMAT2) encoding for a neurochemical that builds our  preponsity to believe in God it is an example.
On the ohter hand, are those who in the style of the evolutionary psychology argues that the religious phenomena and its underlying cognitive scaffolding, it is a result of the interplay of selected cognitive faculties ending in an unexpected by-product not orginally selected for anything.
My question is, independently of what explanatation you favors, why we belive in God? what is the advantage?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There seems to be two camps interesecting throught out the many areas and subareas inquiring about the religious experience and pehnomena.<br />
The first one advocating that religious phenomena could be a universal trait, tries to find a correlation in our nature, particularly in our brains, about how the trascendental mind evolve.<br />
Dean Hamer investigations pointing to a gene (VMAT2) encoding for a neurochemical that builds our  preponsity to believe in God it is an example.<br />
On the ohter hand, are those who in the style of the evolutionary psychology argues that the religious phenomena and its underlying cognitive scaffolding, it is a result of the interplay of selected cognitive faculties ending in an unexpected by-product not orginally selected for anything.<br />
My question is, independently of what explanatation you favors, why we belive in God? what is the advantage?</p>
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		<title>Comment on The Science of Consciousness: Where It is and Where It Should Be by Spinoza</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2007/03/the-science-of-consciousness-where-it-is-and-where/comment-page-1/#comment-282648</link>
		<dc:creator>Spinoza</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 05 Jan 2008 00:14:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sci-con.org/2007/03/the-science-of-consciousness-where-it-is-and-where/#comment-282648</guid>
		<description>Nice synopsis and commentary... and as a physician with an interest in the neurosciences, I would argue that anyone challenging Sir Francis Crick's "astonishing hypothesis" that the mind consists of anything beyond our intricately evolved neural network (aka physical brain) is engaging in magical thinking at the very least.

I would add that along with researching dream-states during sleep... progressive levels of anesthesia and brain/mind altering drugs are fertile ground which have been sadly abandoned until only recently.

Regarding one commenter pontificating that QM has slayed any notion of a deterministic universe... and without a shread of evidence asserts free-will (FW) exists... I think absurd.  Like evolution, the great weight of evidence has demonstrated the utter lack of FW, whether from mountains of reasearch in neurobiology or interrelated genetics.  The alleged randomness of QM does not equate in any sense with some notion of FW.  Quite the contrary, it would be a strong argument against it.  Someone as eminent as Gerard t'Hooft has authored a paper on the "determinism underlying QM" as I recall!
I challenge anyone who desires to escape the determined Natural world (but certainly NOT the simplistically "mechanistic") to explain the nature of this "free-willing agent" which somehow, by some means, supervenes on our physical brains.  When did this supernatural agency appear in the context of human evolution, apart from the evolution of our physical brains?  When during our embryological development does FW appear?  Does FW operate at the synaptic, neuronal level... or is it some kind of ethereal super-identity, which comes from who-knows-where... for who-knows-why?

Cheers.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nice synopsis and commentary&#8230; and as a physician with an interest in the neurosciences, I would argue that anyone challenging Sir Francis Crick&#8217;s &#8220;astonishing hypothesis&#8221; that the mind consists of anything beyond our intricately evolved neural network (aka physical brain) is engaging in magical thinking at the very least.</p>
<p>I would add that along with researching dream-states during sleep&#8230; progressive levels of anesthesia and brain/mind altering drugs are fertile ground which have been sadly abandoned until only recently.</p>
<p>Regarding one commenter pontificating that QM has slayed any notion of a deterministic universe&#8230; and without a shread of evidence asserts free-will (FW) exists&#8230; I think absurd.  Like evolution, the great weight of evidence has demonstrated the utter lack of FW, whether from mountains of reasearch in neurobiology or interrelated genetics.  The alleged randomness of QM does not equate in any sense with some notion of FW.  Quite the contrary, it would be a strong argument against it.  Someone as eminent as Gerard t&#8217;Hooft has authored a paper on the &#8220;determinism underlying QM&#8221; as I recall!<br />
I challenge anyone who desires to escape the determined Natural world (but certainly NOT the simplistically &#8220;mechanistic&#8221;) to explain the nature of this &#8220;free-willing agent&#8221; which somehow, by some means, supervenes on our physical brains.  When did this supernatural agency appear in the context of human evolution, apart from the evolution of our physical brains?  When during our embryological development does FW appear?  Does FW operate at the synaptic, neuronal level&#8230; or is it some kind of ethereal super-identity, which comes from who-knows-where&#8230; for who-knows-why?</p>
<p>Cheers.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Researchers can read thoughts to decipher what a person is actually seeing by trehub</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2007/12/researchers-can-read-thoughts-to-decipher-what-a-person-is-actually-seeing/comment-page-1/#comment-281518</link>
		<dc:creator>trehub</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Dec 2007 17:05:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sci-con.org/2007/12/researchers-can-read-thoughts-to-decipher-what-a-person-is-actually-seeing/#comment-281518</guid>
		<description>This naturally raises the question: What kind of brain mechanism can give us an abstract neuronal signal that reliably identifies a person despite changes in pose, and also respond selectively to the name of the person? For the structural and dynamic details of a candidate brain mechanism that can do the job, see Trehub, A (1991) *The Cognitive Brain* (TCB), Ch. 3  Learning, Imagery, Tokens, and Types: The Synaptic Matrix. For a computer simulation test of the performance of the cognitive brain model, see TCB, Ch. 12  Self-Directed Learning in a Complex Environment. For a another account of the learning and recognition of faces by the proposed model, see Trehub, A. (1997) Sparse coding of faces in a neuronal model: interpreting cell population response in object recognition. In J. W. Donahoe &amp; V. P. Dorsal (Eds), *Neural Network Models of Cognition: Biobehavioral Foundations*. Elsevier Science.

Arnold Trehub</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This naturally raises the question: What kind of brain mechanism can give us an abstract neuronal signal that reliably identifies a person despite changes in pose, and also respond selectively to the name of the person? For the structural and dynamic details of a candidate brain mechanism that can do the job, see Trehub, A (1991) *The Cognitive Brain* (TCB), Ch. 3  Learning, Imagery, Tokens, and Types: The Synaptic Matrix. For a computer simulation test of the performance of the cognitive brain model, see TCB, Ch. 12  Self-Directed Learning in a Complex Environment. For a another account of the learning and recognition of faces by the proposed model, see Trehub, A. (1997) Sparse coding of faces in a neuronal model: interpreting cell population response in object recognition. In J. W. Donahoe &amp; V. P. Dorsal (Eds), *Neural Network Models of Cognition: Biobehavioral Foundations*. Elsevier Science.</p>
<p>Arnold Trehub</p>
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		<title>Comment on Baby study suggests beauty is not in the eye of the beholder by jfisher5</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2005/09/baby-study-suggests-beauty-is-not-in-the-eye-of-the-beholder/comment-page-1/#comment-281480</link>
		<dc:creator>jfisher5</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 12 Dec 2007 21:38:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sci-con.org/index.php/2005/09/baby-study-suggests-beauty-is-not-in-the-eye-of-the-beholder/#comment-281480</guid>
		<description>Does anyone know if the babies used were all male, all female or a mix of both?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Does anyone know if the babies used were all male, all female or a mix of both?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on A review of Henry Stapp&#8217;s Mindful Universe: Quantum Mechanics and the Participating Observer by doug seyfried</title>
		<link>http://sciconrev.org/2007/06/a-review-of-henry-stapps-mindful-universe-quantum-mechanics-and-the-participating-observer/comment-page-1/#comment-281381</link>
		<dc:creator>doug seyfried</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Dec 2007 20:10:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://sci-con.org/2007/06/a-review-of-henry-stapps-mindful-universe-quantum-mechanics-and-the-participating-observer/#comment-281381</guid>
		<description>I really enjoyed this book.  The points are made clearly and fit with my knowledge of neuroscience as well as my everyday experience.
In many ways this is the best physics book I've read (and I've read too many).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I really enjoyed this book.  The points are made clearly and fit with my knowledge of neuroscience as well as my everyday experience.<br />
In many ways this is the best physics book I&#8217;ve read (and I&#8217;ve read too many).</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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